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Abstract 
The central objective of this research is to assess the contribution of Islamic 
banking to the development of the Sudanese economy. Having operated for nearly 
a decade and a half, Islamic banks in the Sudan, as in other countries, are under 
scrutiny for their role in financing development. 
Critics as well as proponents of Islamic banks are questioning the role of Islamic 
banks in extending credits to real productive sectors. Criticisms were made that 
Islamic banks have been concentrating on short-term (and trade) finance and have 
done little to promote long-term (and equity) finance. 
The research findings show that the contribution of Isl&mic banks to develop- 
ment financing is insignificant. There are different factors affecting this role, such 
as the character and strength of demand for financing productive projects, the at- 
titude of the Islämic banks managements, government policies, and the structural 
rigidities characterising the Sudanese economy. 
As for the first factor, the research findings show that for investors of Islamic 
banks, the following elements affect their decision to demand credit: repayment 
period, grace period, profit margins and the type of guarantee. Islamic banks 
specify these elements as conditions for obtaining credit. The fieldwork findings 
reveal that the repayment and grace periods are too short and that profit margins 
are high, which discouraged customers from applying for credit. Thus demand was 
affected, especially demand for medium-and-long-term investments. 
On the other hand, borrowers themselves refrained from applying for credit for 
productive investments and tended instead to go for trade finance. There are two 
reasons for customers' preference for trade finance rather than productive loans: 
customers are not prepared to take risk and they lack adequate capital. Therefore 
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the attitude of customers in this regard is characterised by the low demand for 
medium-and-long-term investments and the high demand for short-term or trade 
finance. 
The attitude of Islamic banks' managers is not conductive to medium-and- 
long-term investments. The concentration on borrowers in urban areas; the great 
emphasis on collateral without differentiating between the nature of the proposed 
projects; the shifting of resources from rural to urban areas, all these and other 
factors influence Islamic banks managers to sponsor productive investments. 
So far as the" effect of public policies on the role of banks in economic devel- 
opment is concerned, policies have negatively affected this role. The government 
policies have been consistently protectionist, and therefore bankers in particular, 
and industrial entrepreneurs in general, have adopted conservative behaviour. 
Of course, it is not only the attitude of authorities which has affected the con- 
tribution of all banks to the financing of productive projects; structural problems 
of the Sudanese economy have also hampered the role of banks in this regard. For 
managers of Islamic banks, uncertainties surrounding productive investments are 
high, especially given the nature of the Sudanese economy. 
The role of Islamic banks has also been assessed in terms of their contribution 
to the monetisation of the economy. In this regard, their role is found to be 
encouraging. 
Islamic banks were able to attract new clients and to convince others who 
had already banking relations with conventional banks to deal with them. The 
logical step for Islamic banks to maintain their fairly good share in the deposit 
market is to build on their relationship with customers. This should be done by 
satisfying customers' needs and requirements. These motives were listed as: reli- 
giously permissible (interest-free) transactions, competitive (high) rates of return 
on investment deposits, the great access to banking credit facilities, competitive 
services and a wide spread of services. 
However, the research findings show that the religious element is ranked first 
in importance for customers. The competitive service and wide spread of services 
ranks after the religious element. Thus customers deal with Islamic banks basically 
iv 
for these three reasons. One finding which is unfavourable for Islamic banks is that 
customers were not attracted by high returns or by greater access to credit facilities. 
Financial facilities provided by the commercial banks, and the pattern of al- 
locating these facilities provide evidence that smaller firms in the Sudan are at a 
disadvantage in terms of type, volume and conditions of financing. Thus, com- 
mercial banks contributed partly to the smaller business finance gap in the Sudan. 
Banks have been highly security-conscious and profit-oriented. 
Financing practices of even the development financial institutions violated the 
main objective of setting up these development bodies as they have been, as well, 
both security-conscious and profit-oriented. 
Regarding the financial institutions policies, there is a small business `policy 
gap'. In addition to this, there is found to be lack of information and advice about 
the financial facilities available in the banking system. 
The Faisal Islamic Bank initiated financial assistance to small firms. This 
experience is fruitful, but it needs a thorough-going evalution. Such an evaluation 
was one aim of the study, so that banking credit could be directed more effectively 
to the small crafts sector in order to enhance economic growth. 
Crafts firms face a finance gap, and information and advice gaps. Of particular 
importance is the finance gap. The crafts branch of Faisal Islämic Bank (Sudan) 
has helped in bridging part of this gap, but still the crafts sector is under-financed. 
The cause for this has been tackled with regard to the conditions stipulated for 
credit extension by the branch. An empirical investigation proves that with the 
exception of `grace period condition', other stipulations are flexible and have not 
influenced craftsmen in deciding to increase credit. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Islamic Banks: A Brief History 
Islamic banks (IBs) differ from other banks operating in Muslim countries by 
virture of their rejection of the conventional banking practices of charging interest 
on loans and paying interest on deposits. The levy of any fixed charge on the use 
of money is viewed as riba, or usury. Like other financial intermediaries, however, 
IBs make profits by putting the savings of investors at the services of borrowers. 
Instead of charging fixed rates to borrowers, they share in the profits - and losses' 
- of the borrowers' business transactions, and divide their share of the profit with 
investors who have deposited funds in the bank. Rates of return, calculated ex post 
facto, are variable, depending on a whole complex of business transactions rather 
than on a predetermined fixed rate that would be tantamount to interest. 
The 19th and the 20th centuries witnessed the triumph of the West over the 
Muslim world. The radical changes which were accompanied by a decline in the 
power of the social order of Islam to control Muslim life. A new set of secular 
norms and Western-inspired cultural, political and socio-economic development 
programmes were imposed as an alternative to the common set-up and heritage 
rooted in the consciousness of Muslim societies throughout their history. 
However, since the main focus of this study is the contribution of Islamic 
banking to economic development, only the economic and financial aspects are 
relevant in this regard. In both the pre- and post- colonial periods, the idea which 
spread among rulers and elites of Muslim societies was that the strategy of socio- 
economic development should be adopted within a seculr framework. In particular, 
the capitalist (and socialist) economic approach should be followed. 
In this concern, by far the most significant event has been the introduction of 
the interest-based banking system- i. e. riba-based banking- into Muslim societies. 
1A system called the profit-and-loss sharing system (PLS). 
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Riba-based banking is a product of Western socio-economic and religious develop- 
ment, with its roots in medieval commercial practices. It was in fact part of the 
naturalistic (secular) protest against the medieval church which had hitherto stood 
firm against the practice of usury. 
The rise of riba-based banks in the Muslim world gave rise to controversy over 
the legitimacy and permissibility of interest as well as other transactions performed 
by these banks. The controversy absorbed the attention of Muslim scholars and 
stood as a critical test for the Muslim masses to prove their loyalty to their religion 
(Mallat, C., 1988). More decisive and important was the response of the Muslim 
jurists. Despite all the efforts to find an excuse for justifying the use of interest, it 
was denounced by the majority of Muslim scholars as riba to be prohibited in all 
forms as well as under all circumstances. 
However, for more than half a century the debate of Muslim jurists concen- 
trated only on the prohibition of riba and the permissibility of profit via trade, 
which is allowed according to the Qurä `n and the Sunna. There was no practical 
alternative to the interest-based banks. 
The first attempt to establish an interest-based bank in the Muslim world came 
in Pakistan in the late 1950s, (Wilson, R. J. A., 1985). 'A braver and more im- 
portant move in this direction was the constructive experiment of the Myt Ghamr 
rural saving banks which started in Egypt in 1963. These and other early at- 
tempts notwithstanding, the development of the modern Islamic banking move- 
ment started as recently as 1975 (see Chapter IV). Within a decade, the Islamic 
banking movement had achieved an impressive growth. From a single Islamic bank 
in 1975, the number of banks and financial institutions operating on an interest- 
free basis is currently not less than fifty. In addition to the Sudan, where 6 out of 
24 operating banks are Islamic, two Muslim countries - Iran and Pakistan - have 
already made their financial systems interest-free. 
Arguably, the most salient feature of the development of Islamic banking is its 
inception and operation in some non-Muslim countries such as England, Swizer- 
land and the Bahamas. Not less impressive is the initiative taken by a number 
of interest-based banks in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries to open sub- 
branches and divisions for `interest-free dealings'. 
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The relationship between IBs and the financial and monetary authorities in 
the countries in which they work is still unclear. Despite the restrictions imposed 
on this kind of banking activity, the IBs progressed steadily in their early years. 
In fact their rapid growth has been not only in terms of number, but also in terms 
of the size of their assets. 
To conclude, it can be said that interest-free banks are now a reality and not 
just a theoretical response to the issue of interest. The existence of IBs is evidence 
of the fact that `financial interest-free' dealings could come about in practice. More- 
over, the phenomenon of interest-free banks has enriched the economic literature, 
for there have been many works written on the issue of Islamic financial theory. 
As they become a reality, IBs face important issues concerning their develop- 
ment. These unsolved issues might detract from the urgent need of these banks 
to formulate a comprehensive strategy. The need for a strategy is highlighted by 
the fact that IBs are not simply financing institutions as other banks are; they are 
banks with a mission. As Howaidi put it 
`Islämic banks are missionary in the sense that they should perform the task of Isl. m as 
they depend on a religion with its own moral rules and rightness' (Howaidi, F., 1988). 
The need for a strategy could be justified as follows: 
(i) IBs do not seek to satisfy the banking needs of their customers within 
the framework of the official monetary policies as traditional banks do. Rather 
they aim at restructuring the banking needs of their customers, re-stating the 
deposit-bank-borrower relationships, and reshaping monetary policies and institu- 
tions. These changes cannot be achieved instantly and the process may take a 
considerably long period of time. Thus there is a need for a strategy which can 
govern and guide the course of change, preparing IBs for a new phase of expansion 
and consolidation, (Awad, M. H., 1988). 
(ii) The IBs movement has been recognised by the banking community, govern- 
ments, international financial institutions and academic circles, inside and outside 
the Muslim world. 
The tenets of Islamic finance from which Islamic banking is derived have been 
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recognised by international financiers, particularly after the recent development in 
the debt crisis. Moreover, the poor stock market performance since October 1987 
has demonstrated to the shareholders and dealers that even this form of investment 
can be adversely affected by high interest rates, which can disprupt the entire 
financial system. Even the usurers have come to realise that, with inflation rates 
exceeding the interest rates they charge, they have become the victims of interest 
charging while their debtors are the gainers; had they followed Islamic methods 
of finance, which are subtly inflation-indexed, they would have been markedly 
better off. Similarly, Muslim investors in the world capital market have suffered 
from both inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, two hazards against which the 
Islamic system of finance would have insured them. 
All these developments bring to the Islamic banking movement a substantial 
number of opportunities within the Muslim world and beyond, and call for co- 
ordinated and sustained efforts on behalf of all its constituent banks. 
1.2 Motives of the study 
After almost a decade and a half, IBs are at a turning point. When first 
launched in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, IBs made large initial profits, although 
their performance deteriorated in the mid-1980s. Some writers have attributed 
this to the economic recession in the Gulf which reduced imports into the region 
(Moore, C., 1990). Because IBs are more dependent for revenues on short-term 
trade financing than are most commercial banks, they suffered more from the 
recession. 
However, this point raises the question of the contribution of IBs to the de- 
velopment of real productive sectors rather than trade sectors. In other words, it 
raises the questions about the distribution of IBs' funding activities between the 
medium-and-long-term investments and short-term investments, i. e. trade finance. 
The question of the IBs' contribution to assist developing the economies in 
which they work is also examined, given the recommendations of the General 
Conferences of IBs. At the first conference of IBs held in Turkey in 1986 the main 
recommendations of the conference included: 
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(1) Comprehensive development encompassing all of the Muslim world and 
transforming both its economy and society along Islamic lines; 
(2) Creation of a modern and efficient banking system based on Islamic prin- 
ciples of finance, together with the flexible adoption of international banking in- 
novations that comply with these principles; 
These and other goals are to be achieved by: 
- Formulation of plans and phased programmes; 
- Formulation by IBs of affiliated development companies to furnish medium- 
and-long-term finance to investors; 
- Transformation of the International Association of Islämic Banks (IAIB) into 
a central planning organ for all IBs, and vesting it with certain executive powers 
for implementing approved plans; 
- Creation of supportive services and facilities including a joint trust, a sec- 
ondary market for securities, a re-insurance organ and training centres; 
- Establishment of a feasibility study and project promotion unit for the prepa- 
ration and propagation of investment projects of particular importance. 
The second conference of IBs was held in Sudan in 1988. It confirms again the 
fact that: 
(1) lBs should participate actively in achieving balanced economic and social 
development, concentrating on providing the basic needs of the societies, and giving 
special attention to the backward areas of the countries in which they work and 
to less developed sectors of the economies of these countries; 
(2) Spreading and developing savings and investment knowledge among the 
general public in order to mobilise as much finance as possible and re-invest these 
mobilised savings to help in the development of a proper economic base; 
(3) Concentrating on medium-and-long-term allocation of resources in different 
economic activities; 
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(4) IBs should seek to improve their performance in order to provide compet- 
itive services and allocate the available resources optimally; 
(5) Encouraging the financing of small craft firms, farmers and co-operatives. 
Accordingly, the main focus of this study will be the role of the Sudanese IBs 
in development financing. In particular, there shall be a concentration on the 
contribution of the IBs to economic development at the following levels: 
Firstly, at the level of savings mobilisation, it will cover the spread of Islamic 
banking services, especially in rural areas, the structure of their deposits, and the 
nature of the liability side. In other words, their role in the process of monetising 
the Sudanese economy will be appraised. 
Secondly, at the level of financing productive sectors, and in this regard it will 
show the size of finance directed by IBs to sectors such as agriculture, industry 
and other real sectors. 
Thirdly, as part of the contribution to development financing, the volume of 
Islamic credit deployed in the small crafts sector will be investigated, especially 
the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) (FIBS), the leading bank in the Sudan which has 
initiated the financing of this vital sector. 
Therefore, an empirical study based on the experience of Islamic banking in 
the Sudan will be carried out as an essential part of this work. The experience of 
IBs in the Sudan is chosen for the following reasons: 
" The Sudan has more IBs than any other Islamic country. As mentioned above, 
out of 24 operating banks in the Sudan, 6 are Islamic. Moreover, in terms of 
the banking clienteles or market share, the Sudanese IBs have nearly 20% of 
banking deposits, and 60% of the paid-up capital of the Sudanese commercial 
banks. 
" Among all Arab and Muslim countries, the Sudan has greater potential for 
growth in productive sectors, especially agriculture, industry and agro-industries. 
This potential has not yet been utilised, partly because of the lack of capital. 
Like other financial institutions, IBs are expected to contribute to the provision 
of development financing. 
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" Islamic banking is well established in Sudan, with FIBS, which was the first 
Islamic bank to be established in the Sudan (in 1978), among the top 100 Arab 
banks alongside with the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt and the Kuwaiti Finance 
House (Moore, C. H., 1990). 
" The Sudanese economy is closely linked to international financial institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank. Since 1978 the economy has been run 
according to the policies prescribed by the IMF and the performance of the 
economy was totally different before and after the implementation of these 
policies (see Chapter V). In general, the IMF policies are basically dependent 
on credit control, and it will be interesting to see whether this affects the role 
of IBs in the Sudan in the provision of medium-and-long-term financing. 
" As seen before, the first and the second conferences of IBs recommended that 
the financing of small craft firms be encouraged. FIBS, the first and leading 
Islamic bank in Sudan, has initiated the provision of loans to small craftsmen 
in the Sudan. Thus the financial assistance of small crafts units as experienced 
by FIBS needs close investigation in order to determine the contribution of the 
Sudanese IBs to development financing. 
" Records of commercial banks in the Sudan reveal that they limit their fund- 
raising and lending activities to urban areas, extending only limited bank- 
ing services to rural areas (see Chapter VI). Thus, the legitimate question is 
whether the Sudanese IBs have repeated the same thing, or whether they have 
expanded their services to the desperately needy rural areas. In other words, 
what is their contribution to the monetisation of a backward economy such as 
that of the , 
Sudan, where the traditional sector is still dominant? 
" Do IBs in the Sudan depend on the religious motive of clients to deal with them 
or are they competitive enough to attract and satisfy customers' interest and 
so maintain their market share? 
" IBs started in the Sudan in 1978 with special laws; the first Islamic bank, FIBS, 
was granted certain exemptions and concessions. However, in 1984 there was a 
big change in government policy towards IBs, and since then it might be said 
that there has been some sort of biased public policy towards these banks. Has 
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this change in public policy affected the performance of IBs, and in particular 
their contribution to development financing? 
" Despite government encouragement, since 1984, IBs in the Sudan have con- 
tinuously come under severe attack from both officials and the public at large, 
which accuse them of concentrating on short-term (trade) rather than medium- 
and-long-term (equity) finance. 
" The performance of the Sudanese IBs is of special concern to the author, who 
was formerly an official with the Tadamon Islamic Bank (Sudan). He worked 
there in different divisions of the investment department for two and a half 
years. He is now an official at the researches and statistics centre of FIBS. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
In the light of the above explanation, the following hypotheses can be put 
forward: 
" The contribution of the Sudanese lBs to development financing is still insignif- 
icant. 
" Their contribution is largely affected by the public authorities' attitude towards 
these banks and by the attitude of IBs' managers themselves. 
" Though better than other commercial banks, the Sudanese IBs still concentrate 
on an urban clientele. Rural areas, where the informal money market with 
its characteristic feature of extravagantly high interest rate is dominant, are 
deprived of banking services. 
" Despite the fact that they are just as competitive as other commercial banks, 
IBs in the Sudan still depend on the religious motives of their clients; in the 
long-run this might endanger their market share and therefore their existence. 
1.4 Objectives 
This study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
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" To examine the general framework of Islamic economics, the opinion on the is- 
sue of the interest rate both in theological and philosophical schools of thoughts, 
and to discuss interest and profit in economic theory. 
" To give a brief historical background on the growth of Islamic banking, to ex- 
plain the methods of finance they use, and to explore unsolved issues concerning 
and affecting the process of development of these banks. 
" To examine the wider environment within which IBs work, i. e. the Sudanese 
economy, and the narrower and more important environment, i. e. the finan- 
cial and monetary structure of the Sudanese economy, and its impact on the 
performance of IBs in the Sudan. 
e To assess the overall contribution of IBs to development financing and the 
monetisation of the economy. The prime concern of this assessment will be 
to reveal whether or not the insignificant contribution of IBs to development 
financing can be attributed to: (a) the attitude of the public authorities; (b) 
the attitude of IBs managers; (c) the attitude of customers; or (d) the nature 
of Islamic methods of finance. 
" One of the most important objectives of this study is to assess the experience 
of the leading Islamic bank in the Sudan, FIBS, in financing the small craft 
firms. This is an important issue not only in the Sudan, but also in developed 
countries such as Great Britain and the United States. The concern here is 
primarily to see whether there is a finance gap facing smaller craftsmen in 
the Sudan, and to ascertain the role of FIBS in bridging this gap and other 
`information and advice' gaps. 
" To reach a comprehensive conclusion and propose recommendations based on 
the findings of the research. 
1.5 Methodology and Procedures 
The methodology adopted for this study has two main aspects: 
" The theoretical aspect, which involves two major steps: 
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(i) The collection of material on economics in general, and Islämic economics 
and Islämic banking in particular, from various sources inside the Sudan and else- 
where. 
(ii) Use of the available material to analyse the theoretical aspect of the working 
mechanism of Islamic banking. 
" The empirical aspect, which involves the following: 
(i) Examination of the characteristic features of the Sudanese economy in gen- 
eral and the financial and banking sector in particular. This will be done by refer- 
ring to the secondary data on the subject, e. g. works of references, dissertations, 
official reports and other publications. 
(ii) Analysis of the funding and lending activities of IBs in the Sudan. This is 
actually in two different, but complementary, parts. The first is an assessment of 
the performance of IBs in general; the second is an assessment of the experience of 
FIBS in funding small crafts firms. For this purpose, the following procedure will 
be adopted: 
(a) The secondary data will be analysed through a study of the annual reports 
and publications and private reports of IBs. 
(b) The primary data' will be analysed as follows: 
(i) A questionnaire will be conducted with depositors who keep different ac- 
counts with IBs. 
(ii) A questionnaire will be conducted with investors, those who take loans 
from IBs. 
(iii) Managers of the Sudanese IBs will be interviewed. 
(iv) Some officials from the Central Bank of Sudan, the Ministry of Finance 
(Sudan) and those in the Ministry of Industry (Sudan) will also be interviewed. 
2 The author collected data from the Sudan during the fieldwork tour over the period January-April 
1989 (see Chapters VII and VIII). Another set of data was collected on craftsmen funded by FIBS 
(see Chapters X and XI). 
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(c) The experience of FIBS in financing smaller craft businesses will be assessed 
by: 
(i) First, analysing the secondary data on the small-scale industries (SSIs) in 
the Sudan, the finance gap facing these firms, and the role of financial institutions 
to bridge that gap. An assessment of small crafts by FIBS invloves an exploration of 
the literature on small-scale business financing, and the application of the notions 
of the small firms' `finance gap' and `information and advice gaps' to the Sudan. 
This also entails an overview of the setting-up of SSIs in the Sudan in general (see 
Chapter X). 
(ii) Analysing the secondary data provided from FIBS' reports and the reports 
and files of the crafts branch. ' 
(iii) Analysing the primary data on the smaller craftsmen and their experience 
with FIBS (see Chapter XI). 
1.6 Scope and limitation 
The scope and content of this study should be seen in the light of the following: 
The author has tried to depend mainly on the primary data collected through 
the fieldwork by distributing questionnaire forms to depositors who keep accounts 
with IBs, investors who borrow money from IBs, craftsmen who deal with the 
crafts branch of FIBs, and managers of IBs. However, due to time constraints and 
prohibitive costs, it was not possible to reach customers outside urban areas in the 
Sudan. 
The secondary data depended on the annual reports of IBs, the Bank of Sudan, 
the Ministry of Finance (Sudan) and the Ministry of Industry (Sudan), and other 
economic institutions (in the public and private sectors). However, data from these 
sources are in many aspects inconsistent and incomplete. Accordingly, the research 
may suffer from these limitations, although the data from secondary sources have 
been treated with caution in the light of their inconsistency and inadequacy. 
3 The specialised branch set-up by FIBS as a separate branch to supervise and fund smaller crafts 
units. 
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1.7 Format of the Study 
This research is divided into twelve chapters. The first chapter is an intro- 
duction to the study. It provides a background to the problem and explains the 
purpose and methodology of the study. The second chapter is a broad introduction 
to Islamic economics and the notion of riba from the theological and philosophical 
point of view. In particular, it compares the phenomenon of Hba in both Christian- 
ity and Islam. Chapter III discusses the notions of interest and profit in economic 
theory. The old and modern forms of profit-sharing system, as an alternative 
to the interest rate institution, are also identified in this chapter. Adressing the 
Islamic solution to the problem of riba, the theoretical and practical development 
of banking is examined in Chapter IV. 
The practical part of this work begins with Chapter V, which reviews the struc- 
ture and development performance of the Sudanese economy. The financial and 
banking aspects of the economy and their development 
are discussed in Chapter 
VI. 
The remaining part of the thesis is the central part of the study, in which the 
author has attempted a comprehensive appraisal of Islamic banking in the Sudan. 
Chapter VII discusses the problems and prospective development of the Sudanese 
IBs. It gauges the role of IBs in the monetisation of the Sudanese economy and 
discusses some of the problems of these banks. An evaluation of the performance 
and contribution of IBs to development financing in the Sudan is carried out in 
Chapter VIII. These two chapters constitute the first part of the fieldwork on the 
overall contribution of IBs to economic development in the Sudan. 
Chapter IX tackles the workings of FIBS while Chapter X covers the theoretical 
aspects of small firms financing and applies the notion of a small business finance 
gap, and other gaps, to SSIs in the Sudan. Chapter XI is an assessment of the 
financial assistance given by FIBS to crafts firms in the urban area of Greater 
Khartoum. This chapter is intended to complete the theme about the role of 
IBs in development financing in the Sudan. It also represents the second part 
of the fieldwork. The final chapter of the thesis includes the conclusion and the 
recommendations of the study. The thesis ends with the relevant appendices and 
the bibliography. 
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Chapter II 
Islamic Financial Theory And Usury 
2.1 The Economic System of Isläm 
The Islamic system is dedicated to social and economic justice and the equi- 
table distribution of income, as well as to individual freedom within the context 
of social welfare. The Islamic economic system is different from the capitalist and 
socialist systems in that it is spiritually-oriented; it recognizes material well-being 
based on spiritual values. 
This chapter describes the characteristic features of the Islamic economic sys- 
tem with regard to its encouragement of economic enterprise, its recognition of 
private ownership and freedom of enterprise, and the levying of Zakät and other 
distributive measures as a tool of disbursing wealth to different groups of the so- 
ciety and as a source of finance. It also describes usury according to the religious 
and philosophical viewpoints. 
2.1.1 Desirability of Economic Enterprise 
Man's natural desire for economic well-being is duly recognized by Islam. Islam 
gives man certain rights and adumbrates a social order which ensures collective 
well-being and the elimination of poverty. A distinguishing feature of the Islamic 
economic system is that 
`it removes the edge from economic competition and puts human relations on'a co-operative 
basis', (Siddiqi, M. N., 1970, p. 115). 
Islam highlights the desirable features of economic enterprise. It gives the 
individual rights of property and freedom of enterprise. It enjoins the fulfilment 
of contracts and emphasizes justice as a basis of economic relations; it also fixes 
certain responsibilities on the state relating to social security and economic devel- 
opment. 
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At the same time, Islam condemns the undesirable features of economic activity 
and puts certain restrains on the right of property and freedom of enterprise. 
It seeks to maintain a balance between individual liberty and social interest by 
laying down certain guiding principles of social policy. According to Islam, all the 
resources of nature are accessible for use by all so that men might lead a good life. 
The Qur'an says: 
`It is we who have placed you with authority on earth, and provided you therein with means 
for the fulfilment of your life', (Suret A'raf or the Heights, verse 10). 
That is, all the material things which are crucial for comfortable life, as well 
as those powers, faculties and opportunities which are instrumental in elevating 
human existence to a higher level. 
Islam sees wealth as a blessing from the God and considers it a means for 
living, 
`Your property which God has made a means of support for you', (Suret An Nisd' or the 
Women, verse 5). However, owners of property are not free to do any thing they 
wish with what they own; their rights are limitted by what is useful and good for 
society. This principle of Islam is reiterated in by the Sunna4 for the prophet is 
recorded to have said that 
`Wealth is a good help in a righteous living'. 
The Islamic approach to economic enterprise can be understood in the light 
of the fact that enterprises providing the necessities for life are socially obligatory 
in the sense that some people must engage in them; if not, society as a whole 
would suffer. Thus the Islamic system set great store by economic enterprise for 
the proper ends. As Baqir al- Sadr says 
`The extraction of every particle of usefulness from the entire universe is an ideological 
objective of the Islämic society', (Baqer al Sadr, Mohammed, 1968, p. 573). 
This is, in this sense, a religious obligation of man on earth, by both ethical 
teaching and legislation. Modern Islamic works on economics provide a relatively 
extensive survey of the texts from the two main sources of Islamic jurisprudence, 
4 Sunna is the second main source of IslAmic jurisprudence. 
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the Qur'an and the Sunna. These texts clarify the Islamic view of the importance 
of production and the prohibition of abstention from economic activity, even if this 
be for the sake of extra worship. The legislative means taken by Islam to promote 
productivity and discourage non-utilization of resources are many. They include: 
the right of the government to take land away from the private owner if he fails to 
cultivate it; the strict prohibition of all non-productive activities such as gambling; 
the imposition of a 2.5% annual tax on money and other mobile assets in order 
to discourage hoarding; restrictions placed on speculation and the prohibition of 
mere speculative transactions in both the finance and commodity markets. 
Modern Islamic literature on economics emphasizes the fact that economic 
activity is necessary for the improvement of not only man's material condition 
but also his moral outlook. Therefore Islam bans any kind of economic activity 
which deprives man of his moral values; it also prohibits all the types of industrial 
activity and relations which degrade man or make him party to vices for the sake 
of economic gain, (K., Monzer, 1978). 
2.1.2 Private ownership & freedom of enterprise 
Man is given the right of property and economic enterprise is encouraged for 
fulfilling proper ends. The free mutual consent of buyer and the sellers is, according 
to all schools of Muslim jurisprudence, a necessary condition for any business 
transaction. The only system that would conform to this spirit of freedom in the 
Islamic way of life is one where the conduct of the greater part of production 
and distribution of goods and services is left to individuals or freely constituted 
groups. Freedom of enterprise and the institution of private property are therefore 
recognised and accepted by Islam. 
The Qur'an, Sunna and the fikh5 literature all discuss in significant detail the 
norms related to the acquisition and disposal of private and business property and 
the purchase and sale of merchandise. The institutions of gakät and inheritance 
are also considered. These would not have been examined in such detail had the 
institution of private ownership of most productive resources not been recognized 
by Islam. 
Fikh is the opinions of Muslim jurists which they derive from Qur'an, Sinna and other sources 
of Islämic jurisprudence. 
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Any system incorporating freedom of enterprise needs motives. For this reason 
Islam recognizes profit motives, essential for the successful operation of the system. 
But since it is possible for profit to become an end rather than a means, thus leading 
to many bad social and economic repercussions, Islam places certain regulatory and 
moral restraints on the profit motive to ensure that it fosters individual self-interest 
within a social context and does not violate the Islamic goals of social and economic 
justice and equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
The concept of profit maximization is modified in the Islamic approach because 
it does not stand as it does in the capitalist mode in relation to the time-horizon 
and the connotation of success. To simplify an understanding of the goals of the 
firm, in the Islamic economy, profit maximization can be used as a fair criterion 
if it is seen as being constrained not only by cost but also by a minimum level of 
what is conceived as `good', guaranteed both by ethical values and legislation. As 
Abbas puts it, 
`Islamic economic philosophy lays special emphasis on securing a `fair' factor compensation. 
The Islamic concept of fairness combines both its material and its spiritual notions, unlike the 
non-Islamic concepts which usually relate fairness to individualistic norms and preferences with 
no reference whatsoever to non-individualistic or religious factors', (Abbas, A. B. M., 1987, 
pp. 187-188). Within this context, the process of maximizing profit should not 
violate the `rules of the game' of the Islämic economy. 
Islam's acceptance of freedom of enterprise, private property and individual 
initiative does not mean that the Islamic system is similar to capitalism. There 
are several important differences: 
Firstly, in the Islämic system, even though property is allowed to be privately 
owned, it is considered a trust from God. In other words, private ownership is 
related intimately to the principle that man is the trustee of God. 
Secondly, because man is a vicegerent of God and the wealth he owns is a 
trust from him, he is therefore bound by the moral precepts of Islam, particularly 
the criterion of halal and haräm, (i. e. the permitted and the forbidden), social 
and economic justice, equitable distribution of income, and the fostering of the 
common good, (Chapra, M. 'Umar, 1979). 
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Thirdly, the degree of interference of law, whenever this is deemed necessary, 
is indisputably greater in the Islamic economy. In the Islamic economic sphere, 
there exists a hisba agency or market controlling system, in which the market 
controller (muhtasib) is responsible for supervising prices. Accordingly, whenever 
there is an unnecessary price rise declared by firms and traders, the muhtasib uses 
his authority to prevent it. The crucial point is to preserve freedom in the market 
while at the same time eliminating monopolistic practices. The Islamic market 
economy relies upon the market mechanism to a very great extent. Although the 
seller should not be forced to give up profit, by the same reasoning he should not 
be allowed to hurt others. A seller is required to conduct injury-free economic 
activities so that his economic conduct can be considered Islamically permissible, 
i. e. gharar-free 6 
The involvement of government in the market is not occasional or temporary. 
The Islamic economic system views government as co-existing with other economic 
units in the market on a permanent and stable basis. Since, however, Islamic 
economics does not believe in the `invisible hands' of the market, the government 
has to take the role of planning and organizing. 
Fourthly, although the Islamic economy is a free one, its freedom is expressed 
more in co-operation than in competition. Indeed, co-operation is a general theme 
of the social organization of Islam which marries individuals' objectives with the 
social requirements. Islamic teaching in general, and the verses of the Qur'an 
in particular, emphasize repeatedly the significance of co-operation and collective 
work. 
Fifthly, and finally, the Islamic system is not morally neutral with regard to 
resource allocation. Resources must be allocated according to the priorities and 
needs of the society, and income gaps between calsses should be narrowed to attain 
a desirable allocation of limited resources. 
s Gharar is lexically defined as the missepcification and the misrepresentation of the contract. 
Gharar contract is defined as the one wherein the duties and/or the obligations of one (or more) 
of the parties involved are uncertain while others' duties and obligations are relatively immuned 
from such uncertainty and the parties involved in the contract should be mutually agreed provided 
that the parties have equal power when the contract is determined. 
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To conclude, although the market system is recognized by Islam, because of 
the freedom it offers to individuals, it is not sacrosanct, it is the goals of Muslim 
society which are more important. The market system is only one of the means of 
attaining these goals, and as such must be modified as necessary. 
In Islam, property rights are not only qualified and limited, but are also tied 
to certain obligations towards others. An individual is obliged to share the respon- 
sibility of the poor. Islam regards wealth as a source of subsistence for all people 
irrespective of its distribution and formal ownership. Hence the Islamic economic 
system includes the payment of Zakät, which is one of the highest religious duties 
of Muslims. 
2.1.3 Islamic Taxation Through Zakät 
Zakät is a tax of 2.5% on net wealth and 5% on agricultural products in the 
case of artificial irrigation and 10% in the case of natural irrigation, (Volker, N., 
undated paper on the Islamic View). It covers almost every kind of wealth: cash 
and bullion, stocks and inventories, agricultural produce, cattle, mineral wealth .... 
etc. Once fixed, exception limits and rates of Zakät apply for ever. 
As a permanent provision in Islamic law, this redistributive measure is ne- 
cessitated by the unequal distribution of abilities which in turn causes unequal 
opportunities. This measure is supplemented by the Islamic law of inheritance, 
which limits the right of ownership in time by the life of the owner'. Thus, the 
inheritance law of the Qur'an gives details concerning the distribution of the estate 
because a human-being is only a vicegerent on earth and has no absolute rights. 
Zakät is not a charity. It is the right of the have-nots to a proportion of the 
wealth of the haves. The Quor'an asserts 
`And in whose wealth there is a right acknowledged for the beggar and the destitute', (Suret 
Ma'äriq or the Ways of Ascent, verses 24-5). 
It is entirely different from taxes levied to meet the cost of government. Zakdt 
is a measure designed to transfer part of the wealth of the rich to the poor so that 
the latter are guaranteed an acceptable standard of living. Jurists almost agree 
7 After death, an owner of wealth does not have any right to it. 
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unanimously that the duty of the whole Muslim society in general and of its rich 
in particular, is to take care of the needs of the poors. If the well-to-do fail to 
fulfil this responsibility, the state can and should compel them to assume their 
responsibility. 
In general, Islam holds that an individual should be guaranteed the minimum 
standard of living determined by the degree of development and other attendant 
factors. The distribution measures specified by Islam are likely to reduce concen- 
tration of wealth and sharp inequalities in three ways: 
Firstly, through the Islämic law of inheritance, which distributes the property 
among a number of heirs, 
Secondly, through the principle of Zakdt, which takes from the rich and gives 
the poor. 
Thirdly, through the provision of surplus consumables. 
The government's guarantee of a minimum standard of living stems from its 
role as an agent of the public; it is authorized to collect enough funds through 
Zakät and other sources to finance this guaranteed level. However, what has been 
stated above is an ideal picture of the role of Zakät as a source of finance and as 
a redistributive instrument. Practically this may not be the case; the achievement 
of this depends on whether or not Zakät principles are applied effectively. Certain 
difficulties prevent the effective use of Zakät as a source of finance and as a built-in- 
stabilizing tool. Among these are assessment and utilization problems. A process of 
classification is needed to determine which types of property are subject to Zakät 
payment so that the financial authorities can estimate revenue in quantitative 
terms. It is equally important, however, to determine whether the Zakät funds 
may be paid only to those listed conclusively in the Qur'an, or whether they may 
bypass those recipients eligible and be used to finance the supply of public goods, 
which would then reach those groups of eligible recipients indirectly. ' 
s For detailed discussion of the economic implications of Zakät, see Shumo, E. Ahmed (1990), The 
Theory Of Zakat And Its Applications In The Sudan, Ph. D. Thesis, Department of 
Economics, University of Durham. 
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The distributive issue is a general theme of Islamic economics. Most impor- 
tant is the question of usury, or interest rates. In fact, although Islamic economics 
embraces many different aspects, the theory of interest is central to this particular 
type of economic thought. In order to provide strong evidence for the strict prohi- 
bition of interest rate by the jurisprudents and theologians, the following sections 
include a compartive study of the viewpoints of both the classical philosophy and 
orthodox Christianity on the issue of usury. Both condemned the practice of usury. 
A discussion of these viewponits precedes a preview of the position of the Islamic 
Shari'a on the issue. 
2.2 Usury from the Philosophical & Christian Viewpoint 
In the Christian religion, usury was originally prohibited. Religious authorities 
continued to defend the prohibition untill the sixteenth century when ideas on the 
illegality of usury differed and the growth of business forced religious scholars to 
change their view-point. The religious opinion on usury is explored here in order 
to highlight the gradual relaxation of the ban on usury, and how the issue was 
eventually resolved. The concept of usury in classical philosophy is examined, since 
the classical viewpoint had some influence on the medieval Christian opinions on 
the issue. It is important to consider first how lending and borrowing were carried 
out in the middle ages up to the sixteenth century, at which time a significant 
change in the process of lending came out. 
2.2.1 The practice of usury 
That lending and borrowing exists on a large scale in Europe in the Middle 
Ages can be seen from the whole mass of secular and Christian church legislation on 
the subject of usury. By the thirteenth century certain main types of transaction 
were treated as the common norm. At that time, the authors of practical hand- 
books for administrators pointed out various ways of disguising usurious contracts 
such as time bargains, fictitious partnerships, excessive security and the exaction 
of interest in kind or in personal labour; all these forms were practiced latter in 
the sixteenth century, (Wilson, T., 1925, ). 
The present institution of the interest rate was developed in the sixteenth 
century, a time when the role of the financier was expanding and the importance 
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of commercial capital was on the increase. This increased importance was an 
inevitable result of the transfer of the control of industry from the individual 
producer to the commercial capitalist, which was the most salient result of the 
industrial revolution of the sixteenth century. 
The effect of this movement was to render more acute the problem of main- 
taining the independence of the craftsman against the financier. The financial 
independence of the craftsman thus became normal and permanent. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, agriculture, industry and foreign trade 
were largely dependent on credit. In addition, the vast majority of lenders were in 
rural areas and were called usurers. 
Not only in the sixteenth century, but also much earlier, goldsmiths frequently 
appeared in the money lending transactions. They would provide money against 
deposit of values, and lend money to finance merchants or needy people. 
In England, there were two other groups of tradesmen in the sixteenth century 
who could be regarded as financiers: 
The first group was composed of the various textile traders. Accustomed to 
trading on borrowed money, the capitalists of the wool trade were prominent in 
the world of finance and a leading role was ascribed to them in the development 
of the money market in London. 
The second was that of the scriveners, who had originally been expert notaries. 
The scriveners were interested in the legal and financial business carried out by 
the brokers. The constant mortgaging of land, and the growing dependence of 
both land owners and traders on credit transactions involved a great increase in 
the work of the scriveners. This made the scrivener indispensable and put into his 
hands considerable sums of money. Towards the end of the century, the scrivener 
became a specialist in certain branches of finance. He became an adviser who was 
consulted as to the financial standing of the parties to a bargain. From being an 
adviser he became a financial middleman. The scrivener was not only concerned 
with broking; his intimate knowledge of business conditions and his practice in 
gauging the standing of money lenders and their clients made it inevitable that, 
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in addition to arranging loans, the scrivener should himself take to lending money, 
(Wilson, T., 1925). 
It is evident, therefore, that lending was not the domain of goldsmiths only, and 
that there was a mass of financial business which for centuries had been carried on 
by money-lenders of the other kinds. The importance of goldsmiths in the evolution 
of banking in England, especially after the Restoration, is not in question; the point 
is that their role in this evolution was shared by different sources of finance. 
However, in England the significant factor in the sixteenth century was not 
the advance in banking technique, but the discovery by considerable sections of 
the rich classes that money-lending was as profitable as agriculture, industry and 
commerce. Usury offered excessive gain and freedom from all kinds of common 
charge with ease, security and command over those in debt. 
This was, in short, the situation of lending and borrowing, in Europe in gen- 
eral and in England in particular, during the Middle Ages and in the sixteenth 
century. Usurious dealings were practised extensively although social reformers 
and moralists militated against it and tried to enable the borrowers to maintain 
their independence by borrowing on easy terms. The issue of usury was a contro- 
versial one and was discussed continuously, especially after the Reformation and 
the development of business affairs. 
2.2.2 Usury in the philosophical thought 
In classical times, outright opposition to usury came from the philosophers 
and moralists. The Roman philosophers were unanimous in their opposition on 
moral grounds. However, two classical philosophers had a significant influence on 
the issue of usury: Aristotle, a Greek, and Seneca, a Roman. 
Seneca considered usury to be morally wrong because it involved paying for 
time. 
Aristotle distinguished between wealth of two kinds: natural wealth, to him an 
organic concept - which is the result of human effort combined with raw materials; 
and unnatural finance, brought about by the introduction of the currency system 
to effect exchange. Finance was seen by Aristotle as an evil art, the most evil form 
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of which was usury. This was because coin, an inorganic object, whose only proper 
function was that of a medium of exchange, cannot breed coin and was therefore 
barren. Thus, according to Aristotle, usury is the result of the unnatural use of 
money and is contrary to natural law. The basis of Aristotle's position is that 
money is sterile and cannot bear, and indeed ought not to bear, interest (Taylor, 
T. W. & Evans, J. W., 1987). Aristotle also dealt with the concept of economic 
duress and the concept of just equivalence. 
The opinions of these two philosophers had a considerable impact on medieval 
thought, which was an intellectual reconciliation of philosophy (mainly Greek) 
with the Christian faith. Seneca's opinion became a vital element in the analysis 
of prohibition, but the impact of Aristotle's ideas was much greater. It was on 
these foundations that the medieval ban of usury depended. 
2.2.3 The Christian opinion: the gradual recognition of usury 
In most parts of Europe, the great expansion of the sphere of credit operations 
which took place in the sixteenth century created a controversy. At the start of the 
century, to live by usury was seen as immoral or illegal; at the end of the century, 
money lending was on its way to enjoying the legal security of a recognized and 
reputable profession. This change was part of a larger revolution which led to 
naturalistic thinking in the place of theology. 
The sixteenth century inherited two main legacies from the Middle Ages (AD 
1100-1500). The first was the belief that the world of economic conduct did not 
form its own laws but was amenable, like other fields, to moral criteria, the ultimate 
sanction of which was the authority of the Christian church. The second legacy 
was the body of legal principles with regard to money lending and credit, the most 
elaborate expression of which was the canon law. The canon law, in the form that 
reached the sixteenth century, banned payment of the interest rate merely for the 
use of money, although it sanctioned transactions that were not seen as conflicting 
directly with the principle of banning. 
The view in the Middle Age was that investment in rent charges had always 
been regarded as unobjectionable, since the payment received by the capitalist 
came from the bounty of nature and was not wrung from the necessities of man. 
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The commercial partnership, cornrnenda, in which a sleeping partner invested cap- 
ital with a merchant to `gain and to lose', was seen as legitimate, since if he shared 
the profit of the enterprise he also shared the risk. Annuities were not banned for 
the same reason, i. e. that gain is not certain but contingent. 
The medieval writers maintained that it is reasonable that the borrower who 
fails to pay his creditor at the appointed date should submit to a penalty and that 
the creditor who loses an opportunity of gain by lending out his money should 
receive compensation. They showed little objection to the offer of interest as a 
voluntary gift - although they regarded it as a dangerous exception, (Wilson, T. 
1925). 
That which remained unlawful until the end of Middle Ages was any pay- 
ment for a loan where there is no risk, no loss, no inconvenience and no loss of 
opportunity. In term of economic theory, what was banned is 
`net or economic interest', all the other elements of gross interest are `permissible in the 
appropriate circumstances', (Taylor, T. W. & Evans, J. W., 1987, p. 19). In other 
words, what was prohibited was what the Mediavel writers called the `the sale 
of time itself', i. e., interest as a fixed payment stipulated in advance for a loan of 
money or wares without risk to the lender. This is, however, a proper interpretation 
of usury, i. e. when gain is sought from the use of a thing not in itself productive 
(such as a machine) without labour, expense or risk on the part of the lender. 
To the medieval writers, the essence of usury was that it was certain, and 
that whether the borrower gained or lost, the usurer would take his money. These 
writers, although sanctioning profits provided that they were reasonable, continued 
to denounce as immoral the whole range of transactions that ran at variance with 
the doctrine that an equitable bargain was one from which both parties derived 
equal advantage. To state it in Islamic terms, they denounced the gharar bargain. 
(see the preceding section). 
The important point here is that religious opinion after the Reformation in the 
sixteenth century continued to hold that buying and selling, lending and borrowing 
are to be regulated by a moral law of which the church is the guardian. That is to 
say, religious opinion continued to condemn usury as contrary to the law of God. 
But Post-Reformation religious opinion tried to accommodate a classification of 
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the types of transactions to which the term usury might be held to apply and 
therefore its denunciation of usury was less rigorous. 
Religious opinion after the Reformation maintained that the insistence on the 
application of moral criteria to matters of business had always been compatible 
with considerable differences of opinion as to what precisely those criteria were. 
Sixteenth century writers were of the opinion that the medieval condemnation of 
usury had been neither unanimous nor undiscriminating. Moreover, they argued 
that the canon law had gone a long way towards sanctioning transactions involving 
what was, in effect, payment for the use of capital. 
Following this line of arguement, the Post-Reformation religious opinion began 
to recognize certain usurious transactions. However, with the expansion of new 
types of capitalist enterprise and the drawing apart of different churches after 
the Reformation, religious opinion began to argue that although almost every 
one agreed that usury was prohibited, the question was whether usury was to be 
defined so as to include all interests, or whether, in certain circumstances, moderate 
interest was to be allowed. 
The stricter school defended on the letter of Scripture and the law of the church, 
regarding usury as differing not merely in degree, but in kind, from payments 
which, like profits and rent, were morally unobjectionable provided they were not 
excessive in amount. Usury was to be interpreted as equivalent to whatever is 
taken for a loan above the principal. 
Liberal opinion, concerned to marry Christian teaching to contemporary eco- 
nomic practices, admitted that although the exaction of interest might be rep- 
rehensible, it's legitimacy depended on the circumstances of the parties involved 
and the purposes of the loan. Thus usury, instead of meaning the payment of any 
interest whatever, would mean the payment of interest which, in the circumstances 
of the case, was exortionate. 
From the middle of the century conservative influence was undermined not only 
by attacks from the world of business, but also by differences among the religious 
authorities themselves. Their response to the whole issue was confused. 
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Aristotle's thesis which holds that `money does not breed money' was chal- 
lenged: since in practice, land and capital are interchangeable investments, why 
permit one but condemn the other? In this view, all exortion is to be avoided, 
but lending at interest, provided that the rate is reasonable and that loans are 
made freely to the poor, was not regarded as more exorbitant than any other of 
the economic transactions without which human affairs could not be carried out. 
Once stated, this became the position of most powerful religious movement. 
The consequence of this was an economic system arranging for gratis or conces- 
sionary loans for the poor, while the commercial world was left free to engage in 
whatever transactions it saw suitable. The whole body of opposition to usury was 
weakened. Luther, while not rejecting prohibition outrightly, accepted interest as 
a concession to human weakness. The growing capitalists were provided with the 
moral justification required to recognize their economic practices. 
After the middle of the sixteenth century, the whole body of legal doctrine 
which had hitherto condemned the capitalists was reversed. In one country after 
another, the rapidly growing financial interests revolted against the system which 
penalized the most profitable payments of their capital. 
The laws against usury were criticized not in detail but in principle. The 
religious revolution of the sixteenth century brought the canon law under review. 
The Aristotle basis of the whole concept was challenged. Writings of the Post- 
Reformation thinkers had the effect of removing anti-usury laws from the statute- 
books of Western European countries by the 1860s. 
The question was no longer whether interest was right or wrong, but whether 
the rate of interest legally sanctioned was reasonable or excessive. Hence the inter- 
est rate as such was no longer considered sinful; indeed, it was deemed necessary 
for the success of trade. 
However, the absence of the anti-usury laws raised the questions of economic 
duress and injustice once more, and by the end of the nineteenth century new 
anti-usury laws were reintroduced. 
One important point is that although usury had been recognized in one way or 
another, what was never accepted was the argument that interest was justifiable 
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because lending bridged the time gap. The theological argument was that time is 
common to all, and thus one should not charge for the passage of time. 
To that end, one notices that usury was originally prohibited in classical 
philosophies and the Pre-Reformation theologian thought. With the increasing 
domination of commercial capital and the expansion of credit transactions and 
business life, payment of interest was recognized gradually, and in the latter stage 
of industrial development was regarded as necessary. 
In fact, the prohibition of usury was not peculiar to the secular or Christian 
writings in the Medieval ages. Usury was condemned by Jews in the old Testament. 
The Greek and Roman laws, while not prohibiting usury altogether, regulated it. 
More crucial is the ban imposed on usury by the Islamic Shari'a. This is important 
both for the sake of comparison and for the purpose of this study, which aims at 
pinpointing an appropriate alternative for the contemporary interest rate-based 
financial system. The Shari'a opinion on the subject of usury is explained below. 
2.3 Usury in the Islämic Shari'a 
Linguistically, ribä means increase. The word is derived from the Arabic word 
rabcz, i. e. to grow or increase. Rabä means increase. That is it means literally to 
grow or inflate or increase or excess. At the root of it is the increase of usury of 
money where it has increased. The word is applied in the sense of an additional 
increase in an object over and above its original size or amount (Wilson, R. J. A. 
1985, p. 24). As a technical term, it means usury and interest, and in general any 
unjustifiable increase of capital for which no compensation is given. 
In the Pre-Islamic era, ribä signified the increase of money in consideration 
for an extension of the term of maturity of a loan. The Pre-Islamic Arabs used 
to pay the money on loans and received a certain sum leaving the principal sum 
untouched. When the maturity date expired, they would claim the principal sum 
from the debtor; if it was not possible for the debtor to repay, they would increase 
the principal sum and extend the term. Thus there were transactions with a fixed 
time limit and payment of interest, as well as speculations of all kinds that formed 
an essential element in the trading system of the pre-Islamic era. A debtor who 
could not repay the capital (money or goods) with the accumulated interest at the 
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time it fell due was given an extension of time during which to pay, but at the 
same time the sum due was doubled. This is referred to clearly in the Qur'an. 
2.3.1 Qur`anic injunctions concerning riba 
In the Holy Qur'an, the first verse which deals with ribä9 is in Suret Ar Rum: 
`That which ye lay out for increase through the property of (other) people, will have no 
increase with God: But that which ye lay out for charity, seeking the countenance (face) of God 
will increase: It is these who will get a recompense multiplied', (Suret Ar Runi (Romans), 
verse 39. ) 
According to the Qur'anic exegetes, this verse was revealed in Mecca before 
the emigration (Hijra) to Madina, i. e. before the prohibition of ribä for which the 
verse paved the way. 
The second verse which mentions ribä 
`For the inquity of the Jews we made unlawful for them certain (food) goods and wholesome 
things which had been lawful for them; in that they hindered many from God's way. That they 
took usury, though they were forbidden, and that they devoured Men's substance wrongfully; we 
have prepared for those among them who reject faith agrievous punishment', (Suret An Nisi, `, 
(Women) verses 160-161. ) 
An express prohibition follows in Sura III which mentions ribä and bans it for 
the first time, 
`Oh ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubled and multiplied; But fear God; that ye may 
(really) prosper', (Suret Al Imran (family of Al Imrn), verse 139. ) 
This is the first verse to impose a ban on usury. In interpreting this verse, 
the exegetes agreed that the expression multiples does not restrict the ban but 
expresses usury which people were accustomed to practice, assuming that this 
matter of multiples of multiples is no more than a description of a state of 
affairs and not a condition relevant to the imposition (Qutob, S., 1971). 
The prohibition was intensified in Sura II. The verses in question, the last to 
be revealed concerning the prohibition of ribä are as follows: 
a Ribä is taken throughout this study as synonymous with interest or usury. 
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`Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the Evil (satan) One by 
his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they said: trade is like usury; But God hath 
permitted trade, and forbidden usury. Those who after receiving direction from their Lord, 
desist, shall be pardoned for the past, their case is for God (to judge); but those who repeat (the 
offence) are companions of the fire: they will abide therein (for ever). God will deprive usury 
of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity: for the loveth not creatures ungrateful 
and wicked. Those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness and establish regular prayers and 
regular charity, will have their rewards with their Lord: On them shall be no fear, nor shall they 
grieve. Ye who believe! Fear God and give up what remains of your demand for usury, if you 
are indeed believers. If ye do it not, take notice of war, from God and his Apostle: but 
if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital sum; deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with 
unjustly', (Suret al Baqara, or the Cow, verses 277-279). 
In these verses ribä is condemned and prohibited in the strongest possible 
terms while legitimate trade or industry increases the prosperity and stability of 
individuals and nations, dependence on usury would merely encourage unproduc- 
tive activities. The Qur'an also speaks (in verse 280 of the same Suret) about 
further concessions on behalf of debtors. Creditors are asked to: (a) give up even 
for claims arising out of the past on account of usury, (b) to give time for pay- 
ment of capital if a debtor is in financial difficulties or, (c), to write off the debt 
altogether as an act of charity. 
Thus the verses mentioning ribä show that all unlawful grasping of wealth 
at the expense of others is condemned, and many different practices10 either by 
individuals or nations are covered by this ban. The principle is that any profit 
that a human-being seeks should be through his own exertions and not through 
the exploitation of others. The Qur'an regards ribä as a practice of unbelievers, it 
demands, as a test of belief, that it should be abandoned. 
Dealing with usury as mentioned in the Qur'an applies to debts and is not 
related to sales. Usury in sales is not subject to the stipulations of the Qur'anic 
verses. However, although usury is a general term, it is intended to give a specific 
10 Some scholars define ribä as any increase sought through illegal means, such as usury, bribery, 
profiteering, fraudulent trading etc. See Yousif, A. A., THE Holy Quor'an: Text, Trans- 
lation and Commentary, second ed., 1984, p. 1062. 
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meaning, which is not restricted to a certain form of usury of the Pre-Islamic era, 
which involves doubling and multiplicity of debt. 
2.3.2 The Prophet's sayings on ribä 
The Prophet's authenticated sayings (hadiths) that deal with the subject are 
numerous, so it will be sufficient to mention only some of them. The usury consid- 
ered by the Qur'an is called `debt usury' (or nasi`a, nazira and dain) whereas the 
Sunna explains `sale usury'. In practice, the Sunna discusses both types of usury 
- debt and sales - but its role in regard to the first kind is one of enforcement of 
the God's commandment and assertion of what is banned. What was generally 
understood in the earliest period from the ribä forbidden in the Qur'an seems only 
to have been interest on loans; any thing that goes beyond this is to be regarded 
as a later development. 
The first time the prophet dealt with debt usury was when one tribe (the 
Thaqeef) claimed repayment of its debt from another tribe (the Bani Muqeera), 
a debt which remained from the Pre-Islamic usury. The Prophet told th Thaqeef 
that the Qur'an had ordered the abandonment of the remnants of Pre-Islamic 
usury. The second time the Prophet dealt with the subject was when he spoke in 
his last sermon (on the occasion of the farewell pilgrimage), 
`Every usury is disparaged, and the first usury I disparage is our's- Abbas Bin Abd Al 
Muttalib's usury- that is the prophet's relatives' usury. It is all disparaged', (As Shcüs, A. A., 
1987). Thus the Sunna ascertained the prohibition of debt usury as that against 
which the Qur'an gave judgement. 
As mentioned above, the Sunna confirms the prohibition of debt usury and 
prescribes and bans sales usury. The view on sales usury is laid down in a group 
of traditions. There is a considerable number of hadiths, but the most famous and 
accepted one is that: 
`Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt 
for salt, the like for the like, hand to hand (yadanbi - yad, i. e. immediate sale), (But) if the 
kinds differ, then sell as you may like if from hand to hand'11 
11 Related by Ahmed, Bukhari, Muslim and others (these are Muslim jurists. ) 
30 
Another hadith is one narrated by Abu Sa'id from the Prophet who said: 
`Do not sell gold for gold unless an equivalent for an equivalent, do not prefer one and not 
the other (i. e., no discrimination between equivalents), do not sell what is available now for what 
is not available at the place of sale' 
The fukahä"2 (Muslim jurists) interpreted these sayings as positing two types 
of sales usury: 
(i) Increase Usury (ribä al- fadl) 
This occurs when (a) there is a sale where items of the same kind are exchanged; 
(b) where both items are of the kind capable of ribä (mäl ribawi); and (c) where 
there is an increase in either item over the other even if they differ in quality. 
Therefore, when items of the same type are exchanged in sale, if either of them 
carries an increase over the other, the increase is ribä, provided both kinds are 
property items subject to usury (mäl ribawi) 
(ii) Delayed Payment Usury (riba an Nas? 'a) 
This form of sales usury occurs if, (a) there is a sale; (b) if both items are 
properties subject to usury (mäl ribawi); and (c) if one of the items is received at 
the time and place of the sale and not the other item. 
Therefore, delayed payment usury occurs when an item, available at the place 
of sale, is sold for an item which is not available at the place of sale, even if the two 
items are exchanged for equal quantity in order to avoid increase usury. Equality 
in exchange of both items is not a condition here, owing to their dissimilarity. 
However, an overview of the jurists' view-points on the matter will certainly 
reveal that there are divergences in interpretation of the Qur'anic verses and the 
Prophet's hadiths concerning ribä. The important point is, firstly that these con- 
siderable differences are a normal phenomenon in Islamic jurisprudence and are 
differences on details, not the fundamentals of juriprudence; and secondly, and 
much more importantly, in spite of these differences, the opinion of the majority 
12 fukahä` (singular is fakih), 'ülamd' (singular is. 'aiim) are Arabic-derived terms used inter- 
changeably for Muslim jurists or scholars. 
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of Muslim jurists is by no means likely to justify debt usury or sales usury. The 
`fukahä' are unanimous in their condemnation of ribä and are backed by both the 
Qur'an and the Sunna, the main sources of the Islämic Shari`a. Strong support 
for the complete agreement on the ban on usury is, practically and unequivocally, 
provided by what has been stated by the second conference of Islämic Researches 
Academy in 1965. In that conference the 'ülamä` issued a fatwa (legal ruling) that 
interest on all kinds of loans is prohibited absolutely, without any differentiation 
between consumption or productive loans, (see above). 
2.4 The Medieval Christian & Islamic Opinions 
2.4.1 Summary 
What can be deduced from the Pre-Reformation Christian and Islamic posi- 
tions on usury is that both prohibit usury outright; all that is clearly permissible 
is a return from a partnership, Commenda, provided the partner making the in- 
vetment genuinly shares the risk. That is, both call for a share of risk between the 
lender and the borrower, and no single party is allowed to aquire extra advantages 
at the expense of the other partner. Both reject time as a justification for the 
payment of interest and say that when gain is sought from an activity which is 
not in itself productive without labour, expense or risk on the part of lender, it is 
illegitimate and reprehensible. According to both, the essence of usury is that it is 
certain and whether the borrower gains or loses, the lender always takes his pound 
of flesh. They call therefore for an equitable bargain from which both parties might 
derive equal advantage according to the amount of risk they run. 
However, in spite of the fact that the positions of the two religions are almost 
identical, there is a slight difference regarding the matter of usury. 
Classical Christian thought maintains that the borrower who fails to pay his 
creditor at the appointed date should submit to a penalty, and that the creditor 
who loses an opportunity of gain by standing out of his money should receive 
compensation. The Islamic opinion is that the borrower is not liable for punishment 
if he fails to pay up on the maturity date. Islam suggests that the lender postpones 
the date of payment without taking interest from the borrower or, preferably, cancel 
the whole amount of debt as gratis. In fact Islam is very emphatic on this point, 
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to the extent that the Qur'an mentions this call for cancellation of the debt if the 
debtor is in financial difficulties immediately after the verses that prohibits ribiT 
`If the debtor is in a difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to repay. But if ye remit 
it, by way of charity, that is best for you if ye only know', (Suret Al-Baqara, verse 280). 
Another slight difference is that medieval Christianity allows the offer of inter- 
est as a voluntary gift, even though it was regarded by religious men as a dangerous 
exception. Islam does not allow even the voluntary interest rate as a gift to the 
lender. 
However, Post-Reformation Christian thought is very different from the Islamic 
thought, as this has removed itself from its own origin - hence the gap between 
contemporary Western thought and the Islamic stance (Taylor, T. W., & Evans, J. 
W., 1987). The difference has originated from the side of the former, which tried 
to accommodate classifications into types of transactions in which the word usury 
might be held to apply, and to find way of recognising moderate interest by saying 
that not all interest is to be generally condemned. 
This does not mean that the modern Western economic system does not call 
for ethics and morals in the course of economic transactions. It is by all means an 
ethical system; but with the passage of time ethics have become implicit rather 
than explicit, as they were in the medieval economic system. 
This built-in ethical characteristic, which has unfortunately become only im- 
plicit, is obvious in the recent developments that call for an ethical character to the 
economic system. Moreover, there is a growing criticism that contemporary eco- 
nomics is becoming less able to offer satisfactory remedies to problems such as the 
international debt crisis. In 1987 one of the Vatican Commissions advised Third 
World debtors that they are not always morally obliged to repay their creditors 
and that debt defaults can be justified (Taylor, T. W. & Evans, J. W., 1987). 
In fact, these calls for the re-orientation of contemporary economics to take 
into account the ethical considerations and to share the risk with the borrower are 
in complete harmony with the arguments and fundamentals of Islamic economics 
which is known as the profit-and-loss sharing system. 
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The discussion on usury has thus far centered on a comparison between the 
stance of Christianity and the Isamic opinion. There is, however, much literature 
on the issue in economic theory. The next chapter discusses the issue of interest rate 
and profit in economics, examining specifically the development of the interest and 
profit theories and their similarities and differences with the Islamic view-point. 
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Chapter III 
Interest Rate And Profit In Economic Theory 
3.1 Interest Rate Theories 
Interest in its primary meaning is the payment for the use of money. The word 
came into use in the late Middle Ages, replacing the term usury. Interest in the 
modern sense was in the Middle Ages only merely an important type of usury; 
since then the term usury has become specialised to mean interest at exorbitant or 
illegal rates. In tribal and economically underdeveloped societies there is a strong 
sentiment against lending money at interest, which is usually prohibited as between 
members of the social groups, (Knight, Frank H., 1934). In Greece and Rome, the 
opposition to money lending was grounded in the idea of social respectability. 
However, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, in the Middle Ages the pro- 
hibition was premised on religious and ethical principles. The doctrine basis of 
the opposition to interest was found in the concept of objective value, for it was 
argued that no value could attach to the use of consumptible good separate from 
the good itself, and money was regarded as consumptible. Another argument was 
directed against the payment for time, over which no one could claim owership. 
But as trade and industry developed and a general loan market came into being, 
lending ceased to be treated as different from other market transactions. During 
the sixteenth century there developed a movement to abolish the prohibition, so 
that the first legal action was in England; the prohibition of usury was replaced 
by a legal maximum. 
In the two following centuries, the justice of charging interest was still a con- 
trovesial subject in the theological and political writings, but no attempt was made 
to discuss interest as an economic problem. The attack ran in the old moral and 
religious terms, and the defense was based on the fact that the use of money is 
a source of gain and is of value to both the debtor and the creditor and hence 
should be treated by law like other articles of commerce. Latter, the demand for 
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regulation was based on merchantilist grounds so that English writers, for instance, 
argued that low interest was necessary to help English business to compete with 
foreigners in the export trade, (Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1934, p. 132). 
3.1.1 The Classical School 
However, the next stage in the historical development of interest theory com- 
prising the work of the classical school of economists which extends for more than 
a century after the publication of Adam Smith's work `Wealth of Nation' in 1776. 
Writers of this school were regarded as contributing little towards the formula- 
tion of an integrated distribution theory in which interest rate falls. This criticism 
is sound because: first, classical writers regarded the problem of distribution not 
as one of pricing services furnished to production, but as one of dividing the total 
income of society into the shares of the three economic classes which they recog- 
nised. The landlord's share, rent, was explained as a `surplus' on the ground that 
it did not enter into the price of the final product stated in terms of pain cost; 
second, wages were explained by the simple observation that the labour must live; 
third, the share of the capitalist, which was called profit, was regarded as a residue 
after the other shares were paid. J. S. Mill, for instance, thought that profit arises 
because labour produces more than is required to sustain the labourer; fourth, the 
classical school never faced the problem of the nature of capital as a quantity, their 
general conception of capital was that like products generally, it is produced by 
labour and hence is legally the embodiment either of a certain quantity of labour or 
of the subsistence goods on which the labourers live while performing that labour; 
they, therefore, 
`could not have said any thing very illuminating about the rate of interest', (Knight, Frank 
H., 1934, p. 132). 
In fact though the classicals show shallow argument regarding interest, they 
showed profound insight in many partial analyses. For instance N. W. Senior, 
following up hints in Ricardo, developed good ideas in connection with capital 
and its return. In his effort to support the pain cost theory of price, he argued 
that the essence of capital as an element in cost is the pain of abstinence. But 
although Senior repeatedly explained the productivity of capital, he stated clearly 
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that abstinence has nothing to do with the reurn after capital has changed hands 
through gifts or inheritance. 
Economists of the classical school achieved progress also in analysing the var- 
ious elements of the gross return and Adam Smith himself made it clear that in 
typical cases part of the return must be treated as essentially a wage and another 
part as compensation for risk, true interest being different from both. On the other 
hand, J. S. Mill further differentiated between payment for risk as an insurance 
premium against a recognised hazard, and payment for mere accidental deviations 
from a normal return because of miscalculation on unforeseen changes. However, 
these beginnings developed into the tendency to treat profit not as the gross in- 
come including interest, which was the usage of the classical writers, but as the 
final residual income of the entrepreneur after a deduction of both interest and 
wages of management. 
3.1.2 Exploitation Theories and interest 
The socialistic schools were considered developed in part as a result of the con- 
fusion in the classical reasoning between the causality problem of the market value 
of services of various kinds and the ethical question of remuneration for sacrifice. 
These schools treated all property income as exploitation of labour. The different 
socialist writers, Gadwin, Thompson, Louis Blane, Robertus and Karl Marx, all 
held the view that slavery feudalism were merely replaced by the economic power 
of property ownership based on economic freedom. They considered labour as the 
producer of all wealth, the belief that was already held by the classical school. 
Exploitation theories attacked the classical schools on ethical ground regarding 
abstinence as a satisfaction for interest. The former held the view that most of the 
abstaining seems to be done by persons who have first consumed all they can or 
at least more than they need. Knight criticised the exploitation theories on this 
point by saying that the ethical challenge by these theories goes without saying 
that in competitive society every income is based on economic power, and whether 
or how far property income is defensible on grounds of abstract right or of social 
expediency is the question to be answered by the ethical or political philosopher 
rather than by the economist. Knight thought that interest is merely a form of 
payment for the use of real wealth transferred from one person to another, he 
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regarded its merits or demerits as those of private property and of social order 
based on ownership. He further criticised the exploitation theories saying that it is 
questionable whether a clear-cut distinction can be drawn between property and 
labour income, and he agreed with the classical view stated by Smith and Senior 
that a large part of the earning power of individuals paid for as labour is really 
the fruit of an investment not diferent in principle from any other, (Knight, Frank 
H., 1934). 
3.1.3 Time Preference Theory and interest 
Interest has been justified according to this theory via the existence of posi- 
tive time preference that emerged from the difference between present and future 
valuations. Present goods worth more than future goods of the same kind and 
number. Böhm Bawerk attributed this to three reasons. First, individuals are less 
capable of forecasting the future. Second, the different circumstance of want and 
provision in the present and the future. Third, present goods possess an economic 
superiority over future goods because they make it possible for more goods to exist 
in the future. In other words, present goods worth more than future goods because 
capital is productive, (Böhm Bawerk, 1891). However, according to Böhm Bawerk, 
the first two reasons alone explain the existence of a positive interest. 
Fisher as well argued that people prefer earlier income enjoyments to deffered 
ones basically because future income is uncertain. This uncertainty of future in- 
come affects the psychological time preference of the income earners, encourage 
them to prefer present consumption, (Fisher, Irving, 1965). 
Thus, for the time preference theory interest rate is paid to encourage sav- 
ing. It is a reward for individuals' patience to choose future rather than present 
consumption. 
3.1.4 The Productivity Theory and interest 
The English economist Jevons had given a mathematical version of a type 
of productivity theory and discussed the relative valuation of present and future 
goods. But this work received limited recognition until similar views were presented 
in a more popular form by the Austrian school whose thinkers were Weiser and 
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Böhm Bawerk. However, Böhm Bawerk's work is connected with the interest 
theory and on which discussion was concentrated in the period preceding the World 
War. 
Although, however, Böhm Bawerk's view rests on the preference for the present 
as against future goods, it is in reality a productivity theory because he put the 
possibility of the productive investment as is the most important reason for such a 
preference. Jevons, Böhm Bawerk and the writers who have followed their line of 
approach interprete capital as meaning essentially the substitution of more indirect 
or roundabout for more direct methods in production, as an increase in the time 
length of the production process with a resulting increase in efficiency of the use 
of primary factors. 
According to this theory, there is a productive good on which a value is set. 
This value is of course the value of the stream of income which it is expected to 
yield in the future in comparison with similar units of services or satisfaction at 
the moment. This future income is discounted by the prevailing interest rate. So 
the interest rate is the discount rate. But this discount rate is possible only under 
perfect competition and in actual markets economic adjustments work imperfectly. 
If so, then the yield of productive good can not be predicted exactly at the time 
when productive commitments are made, and therefore productive property from 
the start may yield more or less than the interest on its cost, (Metzler, 1950). 
However, the longer the production period the more uncertain becomes the 
relation between return and cost. Thus, it is unacceptable to determine in ad- 
vance an interest rate for either savers or borrowers as long as unforeseen changes 
occur and the owner of productive wealth affected by these changes will receive 
a speculative profit or suffer a speculative loss. It is on this ground of uncertain 
result of productive commitments that the Islamic financial theory rejects interest 
rate to be given in advance. 
3.1.5 The General (eclectic) Theory of interest 
This can be called the combined theory of interest. It unifies the time pref- 
erence and productivity theories in a supply-demand analytical framework. Here, 
interest can be paid because capital is productive and must be paid because people 
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suffer a disutility in saving. An individual saver will give up present consumption 
only if he is compensated by a constant stream of future income approximately 
equals to the rate of the time preference. Likewise, a borrower expects a stream 
of net return and will not continue borrowing unless the marginal productivity 
of capital - the rate that equalizes the present value of the expected net returns 
with the cost of investment - is greater than or at least equal to the rate of inter- 
est demanded by the lender. Hence, the equilibrium rate of interest equates the 
marginal time preference with the marginal productivity of capital. 
Generally, eclectic theory considers the problem of interest in terms of supply 
and demand. The supply of the commodity, i. e. the use of capital comes from 
savings while the demand for it comes from the investors. The supply and demand 
reveal respectively time preference and productivity. According to this theory 
interest is a price. The interest rate is simply determined by the willingness or the 
reluctance of persons to save and the expected productivity of capital that could 
be secured by this saving. 
However, this theory could be criticised on the ground that it is only through 
the expectation of returns that this theory might justify interest. The overall rate 
of interest reflects the average of the individual investors' expected `average' rate 
of return. But the overall expected rate of interest is not necessarily equal to the 
overall actual rate of interest or the investors' `average' rate of return, (Abbas, A. 
B. M., 1987). 
3.1.6 The Dynamic Theory 
The dynamic theory was initiated by Schumpeter whose theoretical construc- 
tion regards interest as belonging essentially to dynamic economy. For Schumpeter, 
interest is the payment for the use of money purchasing power that enables en- 
trepreneurs to acquire capital goods which are capable of generating profit, and, 
hence, interest is a derivative of profit. 
In competitive equilibrium, profit is likely to be zero and may arise only due 
to monopolistic practices. So the question arises, how can interest be a derivative 
of profit though the latter might disappear in equilibrium situations. Schumpeter 
answered this question by the concept of innovation. Continuous innovation causes 
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continuous disequilibrium and continuous demand for capital and hence gives rise 
to profit. Interest is, therefore, a phenomenon of economic dynamics. 
The dynamic theory could be criticised on the ground that it regards interest 
as a reward for money, i. e. reward for the purchasing power of money. But if 
interest is a derivative of profit and if profit is uncertain how could interest be 
fixed in advance although its source (profit) is uncertain? 
3.1.7 Keynes' (Liquidity Preference) Theory 
In the Keynesian theory, holding cash or interest-bearing assets - i. e. sav- 
ings, depends on income via the marginal propensity to consume. If saving and 
investment are equal, then it is income and not interest that ensures this equal- 
ity, (Keynes, J. M., 1937A). Thus in his view-point Keynes regarded interest as a 
consequence of saving and not its cause. 
However, the Keynes's propensity to consume is regarded as another expression 
of the psychological time preference, (Hazlitt, 1959). Moreover, lie did allow for 
trading off between holding money for transaction and precautionary motives on 
one hand, and the return for holding earning assets on the other hand. In other 
words, interest can affect the form of saving and, if this is so, interest might affect 
the supply of money. 
The `liquidity preference' is the core of Keynes' monetary theory of interest. 
He regarded interest as the premium obtainable on current cash over deffered cash, 
(Keynes, J. M., 1937B). He regarded holding of cash as a claim over the productive 
goods. Thus, according to this theory, interest is a price that should be paid to 
get use of this claim on the productive asset. 
In short, in Keynes' theory, interest is a monetary phenomenon; it emerges 
from the efficiency of holding money and is therefore determined by the supply 
and demand for money. The change in the rate of interest depends on the respon- 
siveness of the money supply to the changes in the demand for money. 
However, this theory can be criticised as it presupposes an existence of interest 
whose level is to be determined by monetary factors. But the claim that monetary 
factors only do affect the interest is insufficient to drop the effect of real factors, 
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(Hazlitt, 1959). Moreover, even if this theory is accepted as an explanation of 
interest, it cannot be generalized because if interest is the price for parting with 
liquidity, a barter economy should accordingly be interest-free, (Abbas, A. B. M., 
1987). 
3.1.8 The Natural and the Market Rate of Interest Theory 
This is a theory distinguishing between the natural and the market rate of 
interest, as determined respectively by the real and monetary factors. Wicksell 
argued that the natural rate of interest is that rate which equates savings and 
investment and the market rate a deviation from the natural rate, (Wicksell, K., 
1936). The monetary authorities can affect the market rate of interest by affecting 
the supply of money; thus the market rate could be kept well below the natural 
rate of interest. 
According to this theory, if the market rate is above the natural rate, borrowing 
will be discouraged, the volume of money and credit will be contracted and hence 
there will be a fall in prices, activities and employment. Conversely, if the market 
rate is below the natural rate of interest, borrowing will be stimulated, and money 
and credit will be expanded. 
It is noticed that this theory just confined itself to the role of the real and 
monetary factors in affecting the magnitude of both the market and the real rate 
of interest. Still there is no answer to the question why interest, whether natureal 
or market rate, is fixed in advance?. 
3.1.9 The Loanable Funds Theory 
This theory combines the real factors of interest determination emphasized by 
the neo-classical theory with the monetary factors mentioned by the Keynesian 
theory. The theory is generally based on the proposition that the greater the 
reward (interest) the greater the volume of purchasing power offered to be used 
as capital, and the lower the reward the greater the volume of purchasing power 
demanded by businessmen. In equilibrium, the rate of interest equates the ex ante 
demand for loanable funds, (Cochran, 1983). But the theory still says nothing 
about why should the loanable funds be priced in advance? 
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3.1.10 Conclusion 
What could be deducted from an exposition of all these theories of interest 
is that they discuss the problem from different angles, having considered different 
factors that might affect interest rate. However, all the theories are concerned with 
the expected rate of interest only. The question of real rate of interest remains 
untouched. In other words, if both the borrower and the lender of capital, any 
form of capital, are to get `fair' gain from any joint work, negotiation on a pre- 
determined interest rate would be unfair for either of the two parties. If the 
borrower is successful and gets high returns, the lender would be deprived of being 
paid less than what he would have to get on a non-pre-determined rate. If, on 
the other hand, the borrower incurs losses, he still has to pay the fixed rate to his 
creditor. Thus, both parties should share the `actual' return of their work not the 
`expected' return, the one, i. e. the expected return, which all theories of return try 
to justify. The economic activity based on actual returns, that is on profit-and-loss, 
is the one advocated by the Islamic financial theory. 
3.2 Theories of Profit 
Modern theories of profit based their views on the subject following the classical 
economists who were concerned with the problem as one of dividing social income 
among the socio-economic classes, landlords, labourers and businessmen calling 
the share of businessmen as profit. 
3.2.1 The Classical Theory 
The classical economists envisaged the process of division in two stages: they 
divided, first, total income between rent and gross income of the capitalist; then 
they divided the latter between the capitalist and the labouring class. They re- 
garded wage as being determined independently, and the remaining part of gross 
income is a residium for capitalist. However, the classicals' division was criticised 
as it failed to implement the process of distribution through any discussion of the 
actual workings of competitive principles of price fixing. 
The classical economists from Adam Smith onward differentiated between in- 
terest and profit, but this differentiation was not so clear because at that time 
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capital was almost employed by its owner. Firms which borrow at interest in mod- 
ern times were few or not yet developed. They, however, recognised three elements 
in the income of the capitalist entrepreneurs, first, a payment for the base use of 
capital, second, payment representing payment for entrepreneur's activities as a 
manager and, third, payment to compensate the entrepreneurs for risk. 
Profit as a unique form of income not reducible to remuneration for either 
capital or labour was a view developed by German writers. Thünen defined profit 
as the residue after deduction of all three payments, interest, insurance for risk 
and wages of management. Von Mangoldt H. made an elaborate analysis of profit, 
recognising payments for wage and for risk as actual profit, but defining profit as 
a surplus above all costs. 
3.2.2 Exploitation Theory 
However, the classical writers included different elements in the concept of 
profit, and their distinction between land and capital was loose. The socialists, 
Marx and others, as developing the classical economics, dropped this distinction. 
They, therefore, merged land with capital and regarded profit as including all 
non-labour income. Their view of profit is one of labour exploitation. 
However, in replying to such type of the arguement, some writers like Knight 
(1934) thought that in the idealised society of equilibrium theory, there would be 
no occasion for assigning the distinctive name of profit to any type of return. He 
argued that in the perfectly competitive pricing systems, all services are assumed 
to be valued correctly and precisely, and under these conditions the entire produce 
in the form of income would be divided exactly among workers of various sorts 
and owners of property of various sorts. Thus there would be only two forms of 
income exist, wage, as a payment for personal services, and rent, as a payment for 
property services. Interest and rent are differentiated only by the form of equity 
which the recipients hold. 
In actual society economists commonly use the expression `pure profit' to refer 
to the income of the business after deduction of wages and rent or interest for all 
the human and property services employed in the enterprise. 
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However, attempts to present a theory of profit restricted in meaning have, 
in the end, taken two main directions: the first centers in the effort to identify a 
peculiar form of service of which profit is the remuneration, a service which can 
be rendered only by the owner of an enterprise and cannot be paid for in the form 
of a wage or a salary. Since the ordinary managerial activities are frequently hired 
on a salary basis, there left the service of `risk bearing' as a basis for such theory. 
The second direction revolves around the view which brought about recognition of 
the fact that the business manager not merely bears risk but estimates risks and 
selects those to be borne. Thus, the risk theory tends to revert to an examination of 
the functions of management and the nature of business ability, a problem which 
clearly ties up at the same time with the nature of the risks which can not be 
insured. The concept of profit as a remuneration for unique form of rare human 
qualities has been advanced by Maurice Dobb. 
3.2.3 Risk Theory 
The doctrine that profit is to be explained exclusively in terms of risk has been 
rigorously upheld by F. B. Hawley who finds in risk-taking the essential function 
of the entrepreneur and therefore the basis of his peculiar income, (Hawley, F. B., 
1907). 
This doctrine is, however, criticised on the point that it fell into the confusion 
in assuming that the crucial value of the risks taken is known to the entrepreneur. 
If a risk is known, it will not lead to any reward of special payment at all. 
In fact Hawley comes nearer to the crux of the matter in his insistence of the 
responsibility and risk of proprietorship as the essential attributes of entrepreneur- 
ship. The entrepreneur, he said, 
'is the owner of all real wealth, and ownership involves risk; the coordinator snakes decisions 
but it is the entrepreneur who accepts the consequence of decisions', (Hawley, F. B., 1907, 
p. 88). It remains that Hawley treats risk as a known quantity. This view is, 
however, identical to the Islamic view-point in one aspect that the capital owner 
should share risk consequences of the work with the capital user. Precisely it is 
similar to the m. udäraba mode of finance, (see the next chapter). 
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3.2.4 Dynamic Theory 
J. B. Clark developed the main alternative to risk theory, one which connects 
profits with economic change or economic dynamics, (Clark, J. B., 1900). Walras 
and Cassel also explained profit as resulting from friction in the working of the 
competitive system. Moreover, Schumpeter developed theories of profit as due to 
the dynamic character of society, (see the section above). 
3.2.5 The Risk and Dynamic (eclectic) Theory 
An important part in the theory of profit is the view combining the conceptions 
of risk, of economic change and of the role of business ability elaborated by F. H. 
Knight. 
First, the procedure of taking changes in conditions as the explanation and 
cause of profit is criticised in that it overlooks the fundamental question of the 
difference between a change that is foreseen a measurable time in advance and 
one that is unforeseen. If, however, all the dynamic changes are foreknown for 
a sufficient time before they take place, then the whole arguement based on the 
effect of change will stand invalid. Dynamic changes, as Knight put it, 
`give rise to a peculiar form of income only in so far as the changes and their consequences 
are unpredictable in character', (Knight, Frank H., 1970, p. 37). 
Second, Knight differentiated between risk, a `measurable uncertainty', and 
uncertaity, an `unneasurable risk'. The term uncertainty is restricted to cases of 
the non-quantitive type. For Knight it is true uncertainty, and not risk, which 
forms the basis of valid theory of profit and accounts for the divergence between 
actual and theoretical competition, (Knight, Frank H., 1970). 
Thus, for this theory of profit, unmeasurable risk is in fact associated chiefly 
with economic change. According to this theory, if the manager were completely 
and accurately informed on every matter connected with his decisions, he would 
never incur losses, and if all competitors were so informed he would have no op- 
portunity to make gains. In a world free from progressive change, no managerial 
decisions would be called for. Moreover, changes which could be predicted indefi- 
nitely in advance by every one affected would not give rise to managerial problems 
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or error or profit, (Knight, Frank H., 1934). 
In fact, this theory seems to say that profit is an uncertain outcome of eco- 
nomic activity in a continuously changing environment. Economic conditions are 
changeable and it is impossible to predict the future perfectly. Risk arises under 
these circumsatnces; risk itself is conceived as error in decisions. Profit is a reward 
to managerial talent working within uncertain envirnment. 
However, an upholder of this theory went further in his analysis and argued 
that both profit and loss arise in many cases from circumstances entirely apart from 
human foresight, and the question then is one of justice rather than of incentive. 
He was emphatic on 
`full weight to be given to the question of moral value of different motives, of the qualities of 
personalty and of human relationship which go with different types of economic systems, as well 
as to more strictly economic issues of efficiency or even justice', 
(Knight, Frank H., 1934, p. 
486). 
One would conclude that this view on profit is identical with the Islamic view- 
point of profit as being uncertain outcome. Thus, it is not justifiable to prede- 
termine interest to be given to the rentier and leaving the capital user facing all 
the uncertain future and the expected hazards in a continuously changing environ- 
ment. So, as Knight put it, profit and loss arise in many cases from circumstances 
entirely apart from human foresight, and it is not `fair' not to share the risk of the 
work. It is for this reason that the Islamic Shari 'a recommends the profit-and-loss 
sharing (PLS) system which is fair for both parties to the work. 
3.3 PLS Institutions 
3.3.1 PLS practices 
3.3.1.1 The Middle Ages 
The shari'a advocates the share in profit and in loss for any transaction to be 
undertaken by partners. That is, instead of working on the basis of ribä, or in 
terms of the current economic literature, on the basis of an ex ante interest rate, 
the Islamic shari'a calls for participation in the ex post or the actual result of the 
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work. Profit sharing arrangement is consistent with the Islamic rules of fairness 
as it is deduced from the Islamic ethical principles regarding ribä and Bai', it is 
gharar-free, i. e. free from interest. 
In fact, although profit sharing is advocated by the shari'a, both the Middle 
Ages and the modern history show some attempts of applying this form of gain 
distribution. The forms applied were quite similar to the Islamic modes of finance 
as will be shown below. 
Like the custom of creating rent charges so also the mediaeval practice and 
theory of partnership have been explained as primarily due to the effort to escape 
from the operation of the usury law. 
The oldest form of partnership in the Middle Ages was the commenda which 
was originally a partnership only for a particular enterprise, (Ashley, William, 
1936). As early as the latter part of the tenth century, commenda was the practice 
in the commercial cities of Italy for merchants who wished to engage in foreign 
trade, but who did not themselves care to accompany their goods across the sea, to 
entrust them to agents. The travelling associate known as tractator or a commen- 
datarius. This commendatarius might be rewarded with a fixed remuneration, he 
did not himself contribute to the capital invested in the enterprise. This form is, 
however, known as mudäraba in the Islamic financial theory which will be explained 
in the next chapter. 
However, a successful tractator would quickly be in a position to invest in trade 
himself, and there were examples of his contributing a portion of the capital. In 
such cases the division of earnings was determined by some rule as in the case of 
the simple commenda. An arrangement of this kind was more commonly known 
as Societas or collegantia. This form is, again, similar to the Islamic mode of 
mushdraka (partnership) with some difference that in the collegantia the division 
of earnings was lump sum, while in mushdraka earnings of the tractator is of two 
parts, one for management and the other for sharing in capital. 
Thus commenda is a form of partnership, it differed in important respects from 
a mere lending of money. The canonist doctrine had, of course, no objection to 
bring against the ordinary business partnership, where each partner shared in the 
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management; for here the gain might be regarded as the result of labour, on the 
part of each, together with capital. So long as the partner who contributed only 
capital shared in the risk, the canonist doctrine regarded him as having a moral 
right to share in the profit. The canonists regarded it that so long as the capital 
contributor retained his ownership in the money invested, the transaction seemed 
clearly distinct from mutuum or loan which was always defined as involving a 
transference of ownership, (Ashley, William, 1936). 
3.3.1.2 The Modern History 
Generally, the above is an example of Middle Ages' PLS practices which are 
recognised by Islamic scholars. In modern history, profit sharing was defined by 
the International Congress on profit sharing, held of Paris in 1889, as an agree- 
ment freely entered into, by which the employees receive a share, fixed in advance 
of profit, (Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1934, p. 487). The Congress inter- 
preted this to include both legally binding agreements and those in which there was 
no other than a moral obligation; emphasis was upon the necessity of determining 
in advance the method of sharing profits. This interpretation is consistent with 
the Islamic mushäraka in which there is no capital rentier on one side receiving an 
ex ante interest rate, and a capital user facing all the hazard of work. 
As mentiond above, there were profit sharing practices in the Middle Ages. 
The modern movement, however, started in France in the 1840's and was given a 
powerful impetus by the growth of reformism after the Revolution of 1848. Busi- 
nessmen were convinced that by giving the workers the opportunity to participate 
in profits, they would economise on materials and improve the quality of their work 
to such a degree that additional profits would result both for himself and for the 
employees. Profit sharing in England was early identified with the co-partnership 
movement, which implies ownership of stock by employees. The Christian social- 
ist movement, influenced by religious convictions, appeared responsible in some 
degree for this emphasis on profit sharing as a means to co-partnership. 
In general, in Europe, profit sharing was introduced to give incentives to work- 
ers, preventing strikes and increase output. The system was not found in Soviet 
Russia essentially because it seemed to be initiated by the capitalist businessmen. 
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While, however, in Europe profit sharing was in part an expression of the move- 
ment for social reform, in the United States it was inspired wholly by employers 
under pressures of labour unrest. 
Thus, modern econmic history advocated the merits of profit sharing as a 
form of sharing gains, it could encourage production and prevent discontent and 
strikes of workers. However, these forms of profit sharing were limited, had they 
been developed, they could have resulted in an equity-based economic system that 
could have prevailed all over the world. It is this equity-based system which is 
the one advocated, as mentioned repeatedly, by the Islamic financial theory and it 
can be in different modes of funding like mushäraka, mudäraba, musäka, istisnä' 
and other forms. These are the forms of finance which are examined in the next 
chapter. 
3.3.1.3 Modern financial institutions 
There are many reasons advanced in the literature for the possible instability 
of the traditional banking system. Proposals for reforms of this system along the 
lines of equity participation have been made at various times in the United States, 
especially during periods of banking crisis. 
An example of these proposals is the one made by Henry Simons who argued 
that traditional banks should be replaced by two separate financial institutions. 
First, there would be depositors' banks which maintain 100 per cent reserves so 
that they could not create or destroy effective money. A second type of institutuins 
would be in the form of an investment trust which would perform the lending 
functions of existing banks. Thus, Simons called for a sharp distinction between 
the payments and the portfolio functions of banks (Simons, Henry C., 1948). 
Fisher was also a supporter of a 100 per cent reserve requirement to stop 
banking failure, (Fisher, Irving, 1945). Some Muslim writers have also suggested a 
100 per cent reserve requirement for the same reason, (Al Jarhi, Mobid A., 1983). 
Friedman also agreed on the idea of a 100 per cent reserve requirements, (Friedman, 
Milton, 1970). 
Arguments for PLS system have also been made in the wake of the debt cri- 
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sis in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil during the 
1980's. There has been a revival of proposals for an equity-based system. Ameri- 
can economists raised the issue of the potential financial instability of a fractional 
reserve banking system, (Khan, Mohsin S., 1986). They argued that bank failures 
have more baneful implications because they affect the payment mechanism of the 
economy. They called, therefore, for protection of this payment mechanism and 
not necessarily the overall lending and borrowing operations of banks. 
Hence, all the proposals made for reform are similar to the Islamic banking 
system being implemented in several countries, at least on the deposit side. At 
the same time, however, it should be observed that the Islamic banking system 
goes beyond these proposals because it requires that loans and advances made by 
banks are also based on equity participation. 
Those who made suggestions for reform maintain that the basic flaw in the 
traditional system is that as a crisis developed and earnings fell, banks should seek 
to contract loans to increase reserves. Each bank would do so at the expense of 
other people. In the process some banks will become insolvent and be forced to 
close. They maintained also that banks tend to switch from techniques of asset 
management to those of liability management in the face of crisis. If banks raise 
interest rates to attract or retain deposits in problem situations, and if the total 
stock of deposits is fixed in the short-run, the process would clearly be unstable 
and would eventually lead to bankruptcy. 
The Islamic banking system may prove to be better suited to adjusting to 
shocks that result in banking crises and disruption of the payments mechanism of 
the country. In an equity-based system that excludes predetermined interest rates 
and does not guarantee the nominal value of deposits, shocks to asset position 
are immediately absorbed by changes in the values of shares (deposits) held by 
the public in the bank. Because of the PLS basis, the real values of assets and 
liabilities of IBs would be equal at all points in time. In the traditional banking 
system since the nominal value of deposits is fixed, shocks can cause a divergence 
between real assets and real liabilities and it is not clear how this disequilibrium 
would be corrected and how long the process would take. There is rigidity in the 
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traditional banking system which prevents instantaneous adjustments, and this 
rigidity can lead to possible instability. 
The principal difference between the Islamic and traditional banking system is 
not the prohibition of interest rate in the former. The difference stems from the 
fact that an Islamic system treats investment deposits as shares and accordingly 
does not guarantee their nominal value. In the traditional banking system such 
deposits are guaranteed. 
However, it must be admitted that a system based on PLS will be affected 
by swings in economic activity and the business cycle. But there are reasons to 
believe that it will perform better than an interest-based system. 
The interest-based system in fact intensifies the business recession. As soon 
as the banks find that business concerns are beginning to incur losses, they reduce 
assistance and call back their loans, as a result of which some firms have to close 
down. This increases unemployment resulting in further reduction in demand and 
the infection spreads. IBs, on the other hand, are prepared to share in losses which 
reduces the severity of business recession and enable the productive enterprises to 
tide over difficult periods without a shut down. 
There are changes in the real world; as soon as interest rates rise in one part 
of the world, capital starts moving to that part. And when the rate changes, 
massive movements of capital start from one country to another. Even in the 
same country, it moves between sectors erratically. Now, under the PLS system 
movements of capital will be guided by the expectations about profits. The point 
is that fluctuations in the rates of profits will be less than present fluctuations in 
the rate of interest. Therefore, the system from which interest is abolished and 
which is basically reorganised on profit-sharing basis will be more stable than the 
interest-based system. 
Another important point is that profit-sharing ensures a fair distribution of 
profits, especially when high profits are achieved, which will be distributed to a 
large number of shareholders. When a loss incurring entrepreneur pays back the 
full amount plus the interest, some payment in this case will be coming out of the 
entrepreneur's existing wealth being effected in favour of the rentiers or in favour 
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of people with money. Under a PLS system, rich people will get more money only 
if their wealth has helped the society to create additional wealth, (Siddiqi, M. N., 
1983). 
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Chapter IV 
The Islamic Banking Experience 
4.1 Introduction 
Muslim writers maintain that since Islam prohibits usury, it is essential that 
interest be avoided in any sound economic system. It is in the light of this per- 
spective that the decision to establish Islamic banks, (IBs) was taken. 
The Islamic revival has resulted in Muslim scholars giving consideration to 
ways and means of restructuring the financial system so that it might eschew in- 
terest rates. Theoretical models of interest-free banking developed by a number 
of writers since the early 1950's show that the function of financial intermedia- 
tion could be carried out on the basis of profit and loss sharing (PLS), which is 
permitted in Islam. Enough details were provided to show that the Islamic le- 
gal concepts of mudäraba and mushäraka could be translated into institutionalised 
banking practices to suit the realities of the modern day economies. In this chap- 
ter the application of Islamic principles and the practical experience of IBs are 
considered. An examination is made of how IBs have evolved to their present 
stage. Financial aspects of IBs, including the modes of operation of these institu- 
tions, are also discussed in this chapter, in addition to other issues influencing the 
development of these institutions. 
4.2 IBs: A Historical Perspective 
Interest-free banking was first introduced into Pakistan in the late 1950's, 
(Wilson, R. A. J., 1985). The institution was supported by deposits of a limited 
number of landowners and was not funded by the government. Poor landowners 
made use of these funds without being charged interest. The institution later 
closed down due to a shortage of funds and staff. 
Another early example of a bank established along the principle of PLS was 
the Myt Ghamr Saving Bank in Egypt in the early 1960's. 
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The founder13 noticed that private banks generally concentrated their activities 
on the upper and middle-income classes of traders. Small savers and investors, 
especially artisans and farmers in the rural areas, were generally neglected. 
The savings bank began work in 1963. It extended short-term credit on an 
interest-free basis and charged only administrative expenses. The bank had to 
observe the prohibition of riba. The main purpose of the bank was initially to 
supply its members, i. e. depositors, with the short-term credit needed to cope 
with seasonalities in their income. The bank's credit enabled borrowers to acquire 
command over real resources, since it linked savings and entrepreneurship. 
In response to the emerging demand, the bank's business was soon expanded. 
More fundamentally it changed the ethos of banking in the minds of the rural 
population. The bank continued working until 1967 when it was wound up. It ran 
out of funds because it did not share in the profits and it lacked staff. 
The experiment in interest-free banking was revived again in 1972 in a modified 
version. The Nasir Social Bank was established on a wider base and was funded 
by the Egyptian Government. The bank's activities extended to other banking 
services, in addition to raising deposits and providing interest-free loans. 
These were the first experiments in interest-free banking which facilitated the 
spread of IBs. Another factor which helped to further the development of IBs was 
the financial surpluses in the Muslim world, particularly after the 1973 oil price 
increases. 
In 1975 the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was established in Jeddah in 
order to provide development financing. People - especially in the Gulf states - 
wanted to make use of the post-1973 surpluses through the financial sector, which 
was dominated by interest-based banks. As a result, a number of Islamic insti- 
tutions were established, the first being the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975, mainly 
owned by private shareholders. In 1977 another Islamic financial institution was 
founded in Kuwait, the Kuwait Finance House. It was supported by the govern- 
ment and concentrated on large-scale project financing. This was followed in 1979 
by the Bahrain Islamic Bank. After that, two large Islamic financial institutions 
13 Dr. Ahmed El Naggar, was the chairman of the International Association of Islamic Banks, (IAIB). 
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were founded, the Dar al- Mal al- Islami and the Al Baraka group. There are now 
no less than fifty two IBs all over the world. 
The development of IBs was affected greatly by regulatory measures in the 
countries where they operate. IBs started in the 1970's in Muslim countries with 
conventional banking systems. In some countries, IBs were set up through the 
introduction of special laws exempting them from a number of existing banking 
rules. Other Islamic institutions were set up through the support of non-banking 
governmental entities. However, as a result of the increasing impact of IBs, central 
banks sought to regulate their activities; consequently, the central banks resorted 
to the legislative authorities in order to bring the IBs under control. 
The relationship between the IBs and the monetary authorities in different 
countries is still unstable. Unsolved issues remain which affect adversely the work 
of IBs both inside or outside Muslim countries. The implications of these issues 
are magnified when IBs seek to participate in international stock markets. These 
issues affect IBs especially when they act as investors in non-Muslim countries. 
The development of IBs was also affected by the press campaign, particularly after 
1982 when two leading Islamic financial institutions incurred losses. 
4.3 Methods of Islamic Financing 
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that the prohibition of ribä occupies 
a central position in Islamic Shari'a law. However, the prohibition of ribä has 
deeply affected every-day life, and the requirements of commerce have given rise 
to a number of methods of evasion, (called hiyal in Arabic language). Thus some 
Muslims, though they are pious, frequently take bank interest. This part of the 
thesis, shows how the PLS system, which is permitted by the Shari'a, could be 
applied by IBs in their bilateral relations with customers, i. e. as receivers of 
deposits or as investors of these funds. 
In dealing with the practical issues raised by an Islamic banking system, the 
concentration shall be here in this section on the methods of raising funds and the 
ways in which they are allocated by lBs given that a developed broad financial 
market operating in accordance with Islamic tenets has not yet been developed. 
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The implementation of the PLS system raises problems mainly with respect 
to various forms of IBs' lending operations. Banks and other financial institutions 
provide finance on the basis of participation in profits and losses using instruments 
and techniques such as mudäraba, leasing up, ijära, mark-ups in prices (muräbaha) 
and hire purchase. The principle of PLS is also applied to the liability side of 
financial intermediaries, since there are various kinds of account, including deposit 
accounts, investment accounts and saving accounts. 
When IBs work on the basis of interest-free tenets, there are three parties: 
(i) the actual user of the capital or entrepreneur; (ii) the bank, which serves as a 
partial user of the capital funds and as an intermediary link; and (iii) the supplier 
of savings or capital funds, i. e. the depositors. There is a triangular relationship 
between the actual entrepreneurs, the bank and the depositors. One link in the 
mudaraba partnership will be between depositors and the bank, the other between 
the bank and the ultimate users of the funds. What follows is an explanation of 
the two links of the mudäraba partnership. It is worth mentioning here that the 
status of the Islamic bank in relation to its clients is that of a partner, an investor 
or a trader, whereas the conventional bank's relationship with clients is that of a 
creditor or a debtor. 
Where normal banking practices do not contradict Islamic principles, IBs adopt 
the current banking tools and procedures. Where this is not the case, IBs have 
devised their own tools and procedures to accomplish their banking activities. 
There now follows an examination of the methods of savings mobilization used by 
IBs. 
4.3.1 Fund-raising activities 
IBs receive two types of deposits: (a) deposits not committed for investment, 
which take the form of current accounts or saving accounts; and (b) deposits 
committed for investment, which are called investment accounts. 
4.3.1.1 Current account deposits 
A current account is operated in the same way as it is managed in the con- 
ventional banking system. Current account deposits are owned by different sec- 
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tions with primarily the `transaction motive' of keeping the excess liquidity readily 
available so that the depositors can write cheques on these accounts, thus finding a 
convenient method of spending and making payments. However, since the motive 
of the depositors is not to earn any profit or income, the banks generally do not 
and need not pay any return on this category of deposits. Funds mobilized in 
current accounts can legally be used to meet short-term financial needs only, such 
as balancing the liquidity position; they cannot be used for long-term finance. 
4.3.1.2 Saving deposits 
Money is deposited in savings accounts primarily in order to earn income and 
secondarily to provide protection against unexpected future expenditures. That 
is, the primary motive is precautionary while the secondary one is an investment 
motive. Therefore a savings account has to fulfil the function of an investment as 
well as a current account. Although depositors allow the Islämic bank to use their 
money for long term purposes, the bank guarantees their value only and is not 
obliged to pay any returns. However, most of the IBs either pay cash reward from 
their profits at the end of the financial year, or give certain privileges to the holders 
of these accounts, e. g., by providing financial support for small projects, selling 
consumer durables or producers' goods by instalments, or distributing gifts. The 
rewards are discretionary and are paid only when the bank is earning substantial 
profits. Thus IBs savings accounts are not substantially different from current 
accounts except that in the case of savings account, a book showing the balance is 
kept by the depositor, while the current account holder can obtain information on 
his/ her balance only at the bank. Since cheques are drawn on current accounts, 
only the bank can maintain an up-to-date record. 
Some Islämic scholars believe that since funds deposited in saving accounts are 
invested on a PLS basis, they are viewed as part of the investment account; other- 
wise, as they argue, it is meaningless to reward deposits. This was specifically an 
opinion of Mohammed 'Uzair in the 1950's; today he holds the idea that banks can 
invest these funds and credit the income thus earned to the account of depositors 
on a pro rata basis, ('Uzair, M., 1980). 
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4.3.1.3 Investment Accounts 
Depositors with these accounts are concerned with earning profits rather than 
holding funds for precautionary or transaction purposes. The primary motive of 
the depositors is the `investment motive' or `finance motive'. In other words, to 
earn some income from idle funds during the period that they themselves do not 
utilize those funds in their normal business operations. The secondary motive 
may be `precautionary'. The funds raised in investment accounts are invested by 
banks on the basis of the PLS principle. IBs share the amount of profit from 
their investments with depositors. The basis of distribution is a bank's overall 
profit and loss position if deposits are unconditional and of a long-term nature, 
although some IBs such as the Kuwaiti Finance House offer unconditional deposits 
linked to a particular project. The Jordanian Islamic Bank, on the other hand, has 
introduced specified accounts so that profit and loss for deposits in these accounts 
are calculated only on the performance of the projects, (Financial Times, October 
4,1978, p. 33 & July 15,1981, p. 23). 
Funds deposited in investment accounts may, however, result in losses. Depos- 
itors are liable to suffer losses in the same proportion as they share profits. Savers 
have to forgo earnings on their savings, and might possibly lose part of their de- 
posited amounts. In this sense, depositors are like shareholders who lose some or 
all of their shares if the bank goes bankrupt. But the shareholders are members of 
the General Assembly and are vested with the power to criticize the management 
of the bank, a right which is not given to the depositors. Moreover, unlike shares, 
investment certificates are not tradeable and this may imply more risk to deposi- 
tors who cannot dispose of their certificates except through the bank. One more 
difference between depositors and shareholders is that dividends on shareholders' 
stock would be discretionary on the part of bank management, whereas depositors' 
investment always yield a constant proportion of profits. 
Investment accounts can be of two types: 
Accounts with authorization in which the account holder authorizes the bank 
to invest his money in any one of its projects, receiving profit at the end of a 
specified period. 
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Accounts without authorization in which the account holder may choose a par- 
ticular project in which to invest. He is also free to determine the period of deposit. 
Profits of the chosen project are distributed between the two parties according to 
an agreed percentage. If the investment account is opened for a fixed period, the 
customer is not allowed to withdraw before the end of the specified period. For 
instance, the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) and the Tadamon Islamic Bank (Sudan) 
both specify three months as a minimum period for an investment deposit to be 
entitled to a share in profits. It should be mentioned here that whereas savings 
accounts have attracted relatively few deposits, investment accounts have been 
able to attract subtantial investment deposits. 
However, problems are likely to arise with regard to information costs to those 
wishing to place funds in investment deposits, (Khan, M. and Mirakhor, A., 1985). 
In the absence of a single interest rate, there would be an increase in the information 
cost. Savers would have to collect information on different rates of return offered by 
different banks, i. e. to evaluate the relative performances of various banks. In the 
case of traditional banks, depositors would have information directly on time - and 
saving - deposits with a known interest rate. For lBs to reduce these information 
costs they need a secondary market in which to trade investment deposits. By 
pricing, this market would help investment depositors to gather information on 
the current and expected performance of banks. So long as the economies in which 
IBs work do not develop these markets, this will be one of the problems that IBs 
will continue to face. 
So far IBs have been seen as financial intermediaries in the mobilization of sav- 
ings from the public on the basis of mudäraba. These funds are advanced as capital 
to entrepreneurs on the same PLS system. Profits accruing to entrepreneurs on 
capital advanced are shared by the bank at a mutually agreed percentage. Making 
allowances for adminitrative costs, the net revenue on all these accounts consti- 
tutes the profits of business. This is distributed over the entire capital involved, 
i. e. public deposits held by IBs on the basis of mudäraba and the banks' share 
capital. 
If the net revenue of the bank is a negative quantity, the loss is distributed 
equally between share capital and PLS deposits; according to the nature of this 
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system, depositors are liable to bear losses should they materialize. 
4.3.2 Profit-earning activities 
In the traditional western system, financial institutions, companies and other 
economic units in the financial market raise funds mainly by issuing equity shares 
or bonds or by medium-term and long-term borrowing from banks at fixed interest 
rates. These methods of financing are, however, at variance with Islamic principles. 
A number of Islamic countries have taken steps to bring their financial systems 
into line with Islamic tenets: Iran and Pakistan are two examples. A number of 
laws have been passed in these countries to base financial transactions on the 
PLS principle. For instance, Pakistan introduced participation-term certificates to 
replace interest-bearing bonds. Banks and other financial institutions are asked to 
grant long-term loans on a PLS basis to provide long-term finance to industry and 
commerce. 
Since they cannot earn interest by lending money, IBs have to undertake in- 
vestment to earn profits. As mentioned above, a large number of depositors enter 
into individual mudäraba contracts with the banks, organized on the basis of share 
capital, and contracts stipulate the share of the profits. IBs assume the role of 
financier-entrepreneur in providing capital to the businessmen. The latter then 
share with the IBs the profits of their productive enterprise. 
4.3.2.1 Mushäraka (Partnership) 
The mushäraka contract is bilateral agreement between the financial institution 
and the user of funds; it is not documented in the form of a negotiable instrument 
and cannot be traded like other financial assets on the market, (Iqbal, Z. & Mi- 
rakhor, A., 1987). 
The Islamic bank and its clients agree to participate in a joint operation over 
an agreed period of time. Both parties contribute to the capital of the operation 
in varying degrees and agree to divide the net profit in proportions agreed upon 
in advance. Mushäraka is similar to the societas practised in the Middle Ages in 
Europe. 
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There is no set formula for profit sharing. In medium and long-term oper- 
ations, a self-liqudating form of participation can be agreed upon, whereby the 
ownership of the whole project may pass either to the customer or the bank. The 
bank may also participate permanently in any establishment, building factory, or 
agricultural project, untill the liquidation of the firm. The bank may also par- 
ticipate temporarily, promising to withdraw its share by selling to partners who 
pay the bank amounts as a lump-sum instantly or on instalments as per mutual 
agreement among them. 
As mentioned above, the profit-sharing arrangement is dependent on the ex- 
pected profit, which is adjusted according to the performance of the project. In 
return for his managerial responsibilties, the client receives an agreed proportion of 
the expected profit, and the remaining balance is divided between the two parties 
according to their degree of participation in the capital. 
In the Sudan, IBs give the clients about 35% of the total profits as a reward 
for their managerial responsibilties. Losses are shared between the two parties in 
proportion to their contribution to the employed capital. 
Mushäraka is also applied to activities other than those involving long-term 
capital; it is used to fund the working capital requirements of the trade and indus- 
trial sectors. 
4.3.2.2 Mudäraba (quiräd) 
This is a form of financing similar to the commenda, one of the oldest forms of 
partnership practised in the Middle Ages in Europe (see the preceding chapter). 
In this type of investment, the bank takes care of the financing while the 
customer contributes only his managerial effort or labour in return for an agreed 
proportion of the profits actually realized. This arrangement places human capital 
on par with financial capital. In both mudäraba and mushäraka, both sides stand 
to gain, depending on the actual performance of the operation. Under mudäraba 
arrangements, the partner offering his effort will lose his labour in case of financial 
loss incurred from normal business conditions; but he is responsible for the loss 
of capital should this be a result of negligence or a wilful act. The bank, as the 
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provider of capital, bears all the financial risks; this in itself justifies the bank's 
claim to its share of the profits. To safeguard against negligence or intentional acts 
by the client, the bank may require a guarantee. An essential difference between 
mudäraba and mushäraka is the number of parties involved in the transaction; in 
the latter there is more than a single contributor of funds. 
Legally, mudäraba denotes a business in which one person participates with 
his money and the other with his effort and skills. It can be of two kinds: multi- 
purpose mudäraba, with more than one specific objective; and specific-purpose 
mudäraba. Banks can either engage in direct lending, or can make loans indirectly 
through companies set up superficially to engage in mudäraba financing. Risk 
capital for the mudäraba company is provided by banks in the form of direct 
equity, or through loans with equity features (Khan, M. and Mirakhor, A., 1985). 
In Pakistan, Islamic financial institutions have developed a PLS instrument 
of finance, the participation-term certificate (PTC), which is designed to replace 
fixed interest-bearing bonds. The PTCs are transferrable corporate instruments 
based on the principle of PLS. They have a specified maturity period that may 
not exceed ten years, excluding the period of grace, and are secured by the legal 
mortgage on the fixed assets of the company. Proceeds of PTC are used exclusively 
for implementing the intended project. In order to control the use of funds, a 
trustee is appointed with wide-ranging auditing rights. The PTC holders share in 
the profits of the company on a basis determined by mutual agreement between 
them and the company management, (Gazette of Pakistan, January 1981). 
4.3.2.3 'Dade Finance 
(i) Muräbaha (Mark-up) 
Under the muräbaha arrangement, the bank arranges for the purchase of goods 
requested by the customer and sells them to him on the basis of cost plus the 
agreed profit margin. The customer guarantees the bank a delayed payment upon 
fulfilment of the actual purchase. In order to avoid interest (ribä) some banks 
will not demand any legal obligation on the partner to buy goods. Therefore 
the customer can stop buying goods from the bank, and the risk is still that 
of the bank. There is, however, the practice of financing a mark-up with the 
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obligation on the customer to buy the goods, which is followed by all IBs in the 
Sudan. Specifically, for the mark-up system to be consistent with Islamic law, the 
transaction must satisfy two conditions: Firstly, the bank, as financier, has to take 
physical possession of the goods being financed for the borrower. This ensures that 
the lender is exposed to some degree of risk. Secondly, the rate of mark-up should 
not be tied to the length of the period over which the financing is to be provided. 
A mark-up arrangement is used most commonly in foreign trade and short-term 
transactions for purchasing raw materials. 
(ii) Bai' Salam (Post-Delivery Sale) 
The bank buys certain goods on post-delivery and pays the cost instantly or 
sells certain goods on post-delivery and receives its cost immediately. Under this 
procedure, costs are fixed and paid in advance but the delivery of the sold item 
is postponed or delayed for a certain period. Similarly, the place of delivery, the 
costs and quantity of the sold goods should also be fixed and defined as they are 
conditions for such a sale. 
(iii) Hire-Purchase (Leasehold) 
This is another system that enables IBs and other financial institutions to 
provide medium and long-term finance. With leasehold, an Islamic bank acquires 
certain fixed assets such as machinery and leases them for a specified period to the 
customers for a hire fee. The main feature of this arrangement is that the lessor (the 
bank) retains the ownership of the asset, while the lessee (the entrepreneur) has 
the possession and use of it. The procedure may also be converted into a reduced 
renting procedure whereby the customer, by paying every year an instalment of the 
value of equipment/ physical capital, reduces the rent untill the whole equipment 
is owned by him and the rent is eliminated. 
One question raised by the hire-purchase system is this: how are the rentals to 
be tied to the profits and losses of the lessee so as to harmonize the leasing system 
with the partnership principle. Some writers suggest making lease or rental pay- 
ments a certain percentage of annual profits assigned to the assets leased; however, 
banks might face difficulties if the number of assets leased was high and the value 
of single items was low compared with the total amount of funds provided. One 
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suggested solution is, however, to relate rentals to the output of an asset, (Karsten, 
I., 1982). 
(iv) Mudäraba Certificates (Islämic Securities) 
These are financial instruments issued not for any specified project. A mudäraba 
(participation) company issues certificates which are receipts for the money re- 
ceived and a guarantee by the mudäraba company to reimburse the proceeds of the 
company, if any, to bearers of certificates at the date of maturity and according to 
the amount with which he participates. 
Mudäraba companies invest these funds in different businesses according to the 
Shari'a rulings. In the Sudan, the Islamic Investment Company (Sudan) issues 
the mudäraba certificates with a maturity of between three months and one year. 
It places these mobilized resources only in productive sectors - agricultural and 
industrial interests. 
(v) IBs also provide interest-free loans (quard hasan). These are granted on 
altruistic grounds to individuals and governments. The banks receive only the 
principals of loans given but the Islamic Development Bank applies also service 
charges. 
The above are the most important kinds of operation in the IBs. There are, 
however, other means of finance which can be developed as muzära'a and musäga 
(kinds of agricultural credits). According to the former, IBs can provide agricul- 
tural lands that they own, or which are otherwise in their possession, to farmers for 
cultivation for a specific period in return for a pre-determined share of the harvest. 
Banks may also provide seeds and fertilizers along with the land if they so choose. 
Under the musägä arrangement, banks may provide trees to farmers for a 
specific period of time and a pre-determined share of the harvest. 
These are, then, what one may call the `lending operations' of IBs. These op- 
erations are not problem-free. For instance, IBs have not yet developed feasibility 
study techniques to apply to the projects selected for financing. The forecasting 
of profits and losses needs to be closely scrutinized, since IBs receive no interest 
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on their provision of finance and share only in the expected profits. Therefore if 
the projection of profits is not accurate, IBs will definitely experience losses. 
Given the diverse methods of Islamic finance, IBs have to determine which 
of these methods are effective for resource allocation in the long-run and which 
are appropriate for short-term financing. This requirement is crucial in order that 
IBs can use their mobilized funds in a way that is compatible with the methods 
of finance. More precisely, IBs need to manage their portfolio efficiently so that 
they can contribute significantly to real production and development and realize 
adequate profit levels. 
IBs carry other income-generating operations which are in effect banking ser- 
vices, such as issuing letters of credit, letters of guarantee, discounting negotiable 
instruments. 
4.4 IBs: some problems 
4.4.1 Portfolio management 
The behaviour of economic agents in any country is determined partly by past 
experience and present constraints. In some countries participants in the financial 
system are generally subjected to different constraints, while in other countries 
they are subjected to only a few constraints on their behaviour. 
The Islamic banks are still growing in experience. Regarding constraints, IBs 
in different countries, particularly in those economies where the banking sector is 
not fully interest-free, do not freely choose arrangements which best suits their 
interests. As a result, their activities are not demand-oriented and do not re- 
act flexibly to structural shifts in the economic setting as well as to changes in 
preferences. 
Following the sediment theory14, IBs' management know that a certain portion 
of the short-term fund is normally not withdrawn at maturity; these funds could 
be used for medium or long-term financing, and as a consequence the average 
14 The sediment theory is based on the assumption that a certain core of funds always remains with 
banks over longer period of time. In constrast, is the golden rule of banking which implies that 
short-term deposits should be used to finance only short-term lending, and that long-term lending 
should be financed only by long-term deposits and other long-term sources of funds. 
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maturity on the asset side of balance sheet is longer than on the liabilities side. 
However, a precondition for this maturity transformation is that the bank be able 
to obtain liquidity from external sources in case of unexpected withdrawals. Some 
writers mentioned that without an interest-free money and capital market, IBs 
have no adequate instruments to meet this pre-condition for effective maturity 
transformation, (Nienhaus, Volker, 1986). 
To overcome these difficulties, some Islamic bankers such as Dr. Hassan Al 
Ani, from the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, have proposed a new type of 
financial certificate which is in accordance with the Islamic law. But these certifi- 
cates are legal according to the shari `a only when they represent the ownership of 
real assets. IBs can issue certificates upon income generating real objects and it 
is possible to calculate the present value of the expected future income. Siddiqi 
proposes that in the event of unusually large withdrawals, IBs can seek temporary 
financial accommodation from the central bank on a mudäraba basis, (Siddiqi, M. 
N., 1983). Moreover, IBs could seek assistance from other IBs to tide over the 
temporary liquidity shortage. 
It is true that term transformation involves the risk that the institution may not 
have sufficient reserves if short-term deposit account holders unexpectedly with- 
draw their funds. Similar problems of illiquidity can arise if loans are not repaid on 
time. But IBs can undertake a certain degree of term transformation without en- 
dangering their liquidity so long as deposits maintain a moderately steady growth. 
Moreover, IBs can arrange withdrawals, particularly from investment accounts. 
Thus there is always a core of deposits that remain with IBs and can be invested 
in a more suitable way. The degree of stability of these core deposits helps to 
determine what portion of resources available in the current period can be relied 
upon to remain available over future periods. 
IBs can enhance term transformation if there is an interest-free bank market or 
a secondary market for Islämic financial papers. Adequate financial mechanisms 
still have to be developed, without which financial intermediation, especially the 
risk and maturity transformation, is not performed properly. Where IBs can have 
access to short-term funds in domestic or international markets, this will relieve 
the pressure on their liquidity. 
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4.4.2 Conflict of interests 
It is often argued that conflicts of interest will occur frequently unless IBs 
embrace a wide range of banking services and consequently greater portfolio and 
service diversification. 
The evidence suggests that funds supplied to banks are determined mainly by 
the extent of bank's services and the volume of its investment activities. Funds 
are also affected by the expected return to depositors and shareholders and the 
level of risk involved. B. A. Bashir mentions that to ensure the future success of 
IBs, they must be well managed to fulfill the customer's objectives. These include: 
(a) an efficient banking service; (b) cheap and less risky loans on participation; 
(c) high return to customers on their investments; and (d) a low risk of zero 
returns, (Bashir, B. A., 1982). He adds that this would be simple if they were 
also the overall objectives of the bank. But if the achievement of high returns 
to equity shareholders of the bank is also an important objective then the task 
becomes more difficult. He attributes this difficulty to the contradiction between 
customers' objectives (those of particular depositors) and the maximisation of 
returns to equity holders. 
At the core of the problem is the choice between a strong liquidity position 
with, consequently, less profitable investment, and a less liquid position, but with 
profitable investment. The first alternative satisfies the depositors' need for a prof- 
itable and efficient banking service, whilist the second is preferred by shareholders 
since it guarantees high returns. 
In other words, a low profit-sharing ratio with a less profitable portfolio will 
increase banks' liquidity but will result in a low profit ratio and vice versa. But 
high profits to satisfy the return objectives can be achieved only with high risks, 
and in the case of IBs high risk would simply lead to the failure of the bank. 
This is because, as Bashir has said, depositors can draw their funds from the bank 
before losses are incurred. He concludes that there should be an optimal policy 
to reconcile the objectives of depositors and equity holders. But if shifts from the 
optimal policy are to occur, he suggests that they have to be in favour of more 
profitable banking services and short-term investments, and if necessary also a 
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higher profit-sharing ratio rather than through long-term investments and a low 
profit-sharing ratio to depositors, (Bashir, B. A., 1982). 
It is correct that IBs should adopt an optimal policy, but this should not favour 
depositors at the expense of equity holders for the following reasons: 
Firstly, depositors will not withdraw their money if they expect to lose, because 
investment accounts in IBs are conditional with respect to the minimum period 
and minimum amounts of deposits. Moreover, the system is dependent on the PLS 
basis. 
Secondly, some IBs such as the Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) and the Faisal 
Islamic Bank of Egypt are supported by a large number of shareholders from 
middle and lower-income groups. Therefore, by the same reasoning, they will be 
discouraged by low profit ratios if the banks concentrate on services only. 
Thirdly, one study has disclosed that regression results on the stability of de- 
mand, time and savings deposits for a selected number of developing countries 
suggest that a high percentage of nominally short-term funds such as demand de- 
posits can be relied on to remain available over more than one period. In a number 
of cases the core of demand deposits is larger than that of time and savings de- 
posits combined, (Khatkhate, Deena R. and Klause Walter, 1980). These results 
indicate clearly that an important percentage of financial resources which are usu- 
ally considered short-term can be used for longer-term lending wihout endangering 
the liquidity of an institution. But this conclusion is based on the stability of IBs' 
lending side; arrears in loans or defaults may cause problems in the banks' uses of 
resources. 
To conclude, an optimal policy is needed to serve the objectives of both de- 
positors and equity holders. For IBs working in developing countries, the need for 
such a policy is important because of (i) the greater preference of savers there for 
liquidity assets; and (ii) the importance of higher capital formation for growth. 
This optimal policy could be attained through a proper term transformation of 
financial resources, which in turn could be enhanced by devising flexible financial 
instruments. In Islamic economic thought there are different modes of financing 
characterised by a high degree of flexibilty and specifity, (Wilson, R. J. A., 1988). 
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4.4.3 The regulatory environment 
The relationship between IBs and the monetary authorities is a delicate one. 
For IBs in different countries an important institution is the central bank. The 
central bank exercises authority over IBs under laws and regulations engneered to 
control and supervise traditional banks whose goals and functions are less compre- 
hensive and different from IBs. IBs came into existence in an environment where 
the laws, institutions, training and attitudes are set to serve an economy based 
on the principles of interest. The operations of IBs are concluded under contracts 
which actually do not come fully under the jurisdiction of the existing civil laws. 
If there are disputes to be handled, civil courts are not sufficiently acquainted with 
the rationale at the heart of these contracts. 
Doubts have been expressed about the ability of IBs to conform to the cri- 
teria of banking authorities in the West. The banking laws of the West differ 
from country to country, but even in those with less restrictive laws such as West 
Germany, the authorities have not yet granted licence to any Islamic financial in- 
stitution, (Nienhaus, Volker, 1986). One of their arguments is that the protection 
of depositors, which has the highest priority for the German banking authorities, 
is insufficient in Islamic financial institutions. 
Regarding the protection of depositors, IBs are required to let the authorities 
know the difference between money paid into current accounts and money paid 
into investment accounts. IBs operate two broad types of deposits: (a) deposits 
which cover transaction balances. These have a 100 per cent reserve requirement 
and are completely safe, thus satisfying the needs of risk averters; (b) the PLS or 
equity account, in which depositors are treated exactly as if they were shareholders 
in the bank. There is no guaranteed rate of return or nominal value of the share. 
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England is very stringent in granting li- 
ciences for lBs to operate. Under the British law, the 1979 Banking Act lays down 
restrictive requirements for the management and owners of licenced deposit takers. 
In order to be established in England, IBs must also meet the requirements of the 
Department of Trade, the Customs and Excise authorities and the Inland Rev- 
enue. So apart from legal constraints there are economic measures which restrict 
operations of IBs in the non-Muslim world. 
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IBs operations in Muslim countries also face legal and economic restrictions. 
For instance in the Sudan IBs are not allowed to use their resources in certain 
areas of economic activity. Moreover, strict measures on foreign currency dealings 
are unfairly applied on IBs there. 
Finding acceptable investment outlets is a major challenge for Islamic financial 
institutions. The Islamic banking movement has given substantial funds to the 
international financial system but much more narrowly than it had hoped. IBs are 
constantly trying to find ways to diversify their activities without transgressing 
the shari'a. 
4.4.4 Inadequate staff 
IBs do not have a high degree of expertise in the evaluation of projects. This 
inability to evaluate the profitability of projects may tend to militate against prof- 
itable projects. 
IBs relied initially on staff who were trained in traditional commercial banks. 
They need to be given intensive courses in the workings of shari `a, basically ex- 
plaining the rules which govern economic activities in Islam. The personnel needed 
by IBs should not only be well qualified and competent, they should also be com- 
mitted to the cause of Islam. 
4.4.5 Planning 
The planning of future policies is a problem especially for financial institutions 
operating in developing economies. This is particularly serious when government 
policies cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. 
Succesful planning is dependent largely on information drawn from past expe- 
rience, matched with adequate knowledge. In view of their short history, IBs are 
at a disadvantage compared with traditional banks. The evaluation of the appro- 
priateness of any financial transaction rests generally on a thorough assessment 
of alternatives. Hence a considerable amount of information is necessary. In this 
regard IBs are expected to exchange information between themselves and to ex- 
pand the circle of co-operation with other non-Islamic financial institutions. The 
International Association of Islamic Banks can occupy a central position as the 
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conductor of this information so that the related cost-advantage of an individual 
institution in an Islamic banking system translates itself into the more efficient 
use of existing scarce resources for the benefit of the economies within which IBs 
operate. 
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Chapter V 
The Sudanese Economy: Structure And Development 
Performance 
5.1 General Features 
According to the United Nations' terminology, the Sudan is one of the least 
developed countries (LDCs). It is distinguished among LDCs with its vastness and 
low population density. The Sudan shares with LDCs most of their economic and 
related characteristics, these are: (i) the low per capita income, (ii) low growth 
rate, (iii) retarded economic development because of poor physical infrastructure, 
lack of trained man-power and a shortage of resources for investment, (iv) dual 
economic structure. 
A dual structure implies the existence of both traditional and modern sectors. 
A large part of the population is engaged in primary economic activities following 
a traditional pattern - depending on hand-operated irrigation methods or rainfall. 
The modern sector, on the other hand, adopts power-operated methods of irriga- 
tion and the use of mechanical implements, (Lees F. A., & Brooks H. C., 1977). 
In the Sudan, there is an enormous potential for development. The country 
is the largest territorially in Africa and Arab World, with 2.5 million square km 
including 12% agricultural and 30% forest. Out of the total area of approximately 
597 million feddansls, it is estimated that 85.5 million feddans are arable land. 
Of the total arable land, only 20% is under cultivation. The climate is diversified 
with water provided by the two (white and blue) Niles. All these conditions are 
favourable for an expansion of agricultural and other economic activities. 
Compared to its land resources Sudan is relatively sparsely populated. The 
population, currently being about 23 millions, is not evenly distriuted. Population 
is Feddan is approximately equivalent to 1.05 acre. 
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density is approximately 9 inhabitants per square k. m. With this thin and dis- 
persed population and the vastness of the country, transport and communications 
have been constituting a major problem in the development process. 
Another important feature is that, almost all non-traditional economic activi- 
ties are dominated by the public sector. The government owns and operates all the 
public utilities, railways, electricity ... etc. It monopolises internal and external 
trade in certain basic commodities including sugar, wheat, cotton and cement. It 
also occupies a central position in industry and services. 
The Sudanese economy is an underdeveloped one. Recalling that the manu- 
facturing subsector is supposed to be the most dynamic of all sectors in terms of 
affecting the growth process, its share in GDP is less than 10% (see Table 5.3). An- 
other evidence of underdevelopment is the disproportionate increase in the share 
of services sector -a supposedly unproductive sector. The Sudanese economy is 
classified as a non-industrialised one with a value added share of less than 20%. 
The underdeveloped structure of the economy could also be ascertained from 
the distribution of the labour force over the major sectors. According to infor- 
mation relating to 1980, the share of agriculture, industry and services sectors in 
the total labour force is reported as 78%, 10% and 12% respectively, (Ali, A. A. 
G., 1985). In the World Bank's Reports figures are slightly different. The share 
of industry was counted as 3.5% only. In 1973, agriculture absorbed 72.7% of 
the labour force, while industry absorbed 4.7%. These results, when compared 
with the figures in 1980, show that agricultural activity dominates in the main 
occupations. The work force engaged in manufacturing is very small. 
The economy is dependent on agriculture, and more specifically on cotton as its 
principal cash crop. As recently as 1979 cotton accounted for 65% of export revenue 
and in 1983 it accouted for 49%. This percentage declined in recent years, it was 
only 30.4% in 1987, (Economic Survey, 1987/88). The disadvantage of economic 
dependence on such exports have been critical because of the wide fluctuations 
of commodity prices on world markets and the inequality between price levels 
for commodity exports and those for energy imports or imports of manufactured 
goods. Yet, there is little progress made towards diversifying the economy. The 
textile industry, for example, like manufacturing in general, has been hampered 
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by lack of spare parts and shortages of power supplies, due in turn to the lack of 
foreign exchange. 
Since the mid-1970's, Sudan's own supply of skilled workers has been depleted 
severely due to the emigration to the oil-rich Gulf countries. The external debt has 
been soaring continuously. Civil war in the south has been hampering exploitation 
of oil and water resources. 
5.2 The Sudanese economy and Economic Planning 
Sudan has a history of interrupted development plans. A ten-year plan for the 
decade to 1969-1970 was announced in 1961. During the latter half of the 1960s 
performance deteriorated and by 1967 the plan had been effectively abandoned. 
The then new government, coming to power in May 1969, set a new plan to 
cover the five years - 1970/1975 and this aimed at total investment of LS. 370 
millions to increase GDP by 8.1% a year. By June 1974, it was decided to bring 
in a two-year interim programme on to the existing plan to extend it to 1977. The 
government did this because it felt that the oil wealth in Arab countries could be 
attracted. 
As a consequence, in the mid-1970s, the famous `breadbasket' plan was adopted. 
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) in Kuwait studied 
the feasibility of a 25-year agricultural investment programme in the Sudan. The 
objective was to meet a large proportion of Arab requirements of wheat, sugar, 
vegetable oil, feedstuffs and meat. 
The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) 
was set up to channel Arab money into Sudanese agricultural projects. Two de- 
velopment phases were set out, the first covering the ten years to 1985, and 100 
projects were devised to be funded by public and private sources. 60% of these 
projects were to be carried out during the course of Sudan's own six-year devel- 
opment plan for 1977-1983, launched in July 1977. However, AAAID suffered 
many problems among which was the increasing prices of sorghum especially in 
late years. By the time of its annual general meeting in 1985, AAAID's seven 
subsidiary companies had recorded losses estimated at some U. S. $ 80 millions. 
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Sudan's own plan for 1977-1983 was said to represent the first phase of an 18 
years programme for the period up to 1994-1995. It aimed at overall investment 
of LS. 2670 millions and an average annual GDP growth rate of 7.5%. Annual 
growth of 6.5% was the aim for agriculture, with industry projected to grow at 
9.5% a year. 
This plan too, was ill-fated. It had just begun before balance of payments 
problems caused by a 78% increase in the trade deficit between 1977 and 1978. 
This situation forced Sudan to turn to the IMF and it unwillingly initiated a series 
of three-year austerity or stabilisation programmes for the period 1978-1983 and 
up to 1984-1985. 
The three-year plans were intended to rehabilitate existing plant and agricul- 
tural schemes, consolidate and expand infrastructure, correct price distortions that 
had constrained cotton production, and partly by increasing cotton production to 
improve the balance of payments. The IMF sponsored a decision to encourage 
cotton production - at the expense of wheat output- to generate foreign exchange. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of incentives for cotton farmers coincided with 
very serious floods which destroyed farms and cotton plantations and washed away 
irrigation canals. Latter, just as cotton exports was to show signs of revival after 
the poor harvest of 1978, Sudan was hit once again by a second round of oil price 
rises in 1979/1980. The import bill more than doubled between 1980/1981 and 
1982/1983, taking the foreign trade deficit over LS. 1 billion. Oil imports were 
equal to more than half the total value of all exports. At the same time, high 
interest rates were compounding Sudan's debt problem. The external debt has 
more than trebled over the years 1981-1987 to reach a figure more than U. S. $ 10 
billions and has become the single most important issue facing the economy. 
Rescheduling was encouraged in the early 1980's by the prospect that oil discov- 
eries in the Southern Sudan would be exploited to replenish financial and economic 
positions of the economy. In fact, inefficiency in management, transport problems, 
political instability in the southern region of the country and drought, all these 
factors affected the economy performance adversely. The past regime was over- 
thrown in April 1985 and a transitional government came in power. It suspended 
the previous three-year plans and launched a one-year development budget for the 
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year 1985-1986. However, by February 1986, when Sudan had failed yet again to 
pay some long delayed arrears to the IMF, it was officially declared illegible for 
further IMF borrowing. The Sudan faced a reduced capital inflow from abroad. 
In April 1986, a new government has been elected. It was only recently that 
the IMF agreed with the government on a new economic programme. The IMF 
team negotiated a new rescheduling package. The proposed four-year recovery 
programme - called the economic salvation programm (ESP) - was discussed. 
The main subject was, however, the repayment of the estimated U. S. $ 375 millions 
of arrears to the IMF. One important issue was the unification of the exchange 
rate, but the IMF endorsed this medium term ESP when the Sudanese pound was 
devalued from U. S. $ 1= LS. 2.5 to U. S. $ 1= LS. 4.5, i. e. a devaluation of 80%. 
The ESP was intended to recover and rehabilitate the national economy to cover 
the period 1988-1991. Its principal objective is to provide the minimum necessities 
of life, restore environmental balance, develop natural resources and introduce 
administrative and institutional reforms, (E. I. U., COUNTRY REPORT, No. 1, 
1987). 
The new government (being in power since June 1989) plans to launch a new 
interim development programme, starting in January, 1991, and would continue 
for three years. Characteristics and details of the programme have not yet been 
disclosed. In general, it would appear that the development programme would 
be similar to the preceding programmes, especially the last four-year recovery 
programme. 
5.3 The Overall GDP Growth Performance 
5.3.1 GDP growth rates 
Statistical problems surrounding national income accounts are usual in the 
Sudan. Estimated figures are therefore not reliable. 
Generally, real economic growth has been erratic. The average annual growth 
rate of the GDP was 0.7% during the period 1960-1970 and increased to 6.3% 
during the period 1970-1982, -0.7% during 1980-1985 and -0.1% over 1980-87, 
(The World Bank, Development Reports). But the high average GDP growth 
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rates during the 1970's reflects to a large extent price increases rather than real 
growth rates as there is no official GDP deflator. 
In the course of the years 1978/79-1984/85, growth rates for the Sudanese 
economy had been unstable. In absolute (nominal) terms, the GDP shows an 
upward (but fluctuating) increase, (Table 5.1). In real terms GDP shows negative 
growth rates. 
Table 5.1: GDP* and GDP Growth Rates 
Years GDP 
(LS. million) 
Annual (absolute) 
increase (%) 
Deflated CPI' 
% 
GDP/CPI 
% 
Real growth 
rate (%) 
1970/7 761.1 - - - - 
1971/7 832.4 9.4 112.9 7.4 - 
1972/7 896.8 7.7 128 7.0 -5.4 
1973/7 1246.2 39.0 155 8.0 14.3 
1974/7 1510.8 21.2 191.8 7.9 -1.3 
1975/7 1848.0 22.3 213.1 8.7 10.1 
1976/7 2339.7 26.6 233.4 10.0 14.9 
1977/7 2882.7 23.2 276.9 10.4 4.0 
1978/7 3462.0 20.0 350.5 9.9 -4.8 
1979/8 4072.1 17.6 451.1 9.0 -9.1 
1980/81 4792.1 17.6 563.4 8.5 -5.6 
1981/8 6063.0 26.5 705.2 8.6 1.2 
1982/8 7521.0 24.0 909.2 8.3 -3.5 
1983/8 8996.0 19.6 1199.5 7.5 -9.6 
1984/8 10421.0 15.8 1683.4 6.2 -17.3 
* At constant market price, (1970 = 100) 
* Consumer price index (CPI). 
Source: Economic Surveys; Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues. 
However, with high levels being reached in 1974 and 1977, the GDP registered 
low growth rate in 1978, being 4%, then successive negative growth rates. That 
is, the positive trend of growth rates of the GDP was reversed in the late 1970's 
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and early 1980's. It fell to a negative rate of 5.6% over the period 1978-1985. This 
could be attributed partly to the substantial fall of agricultural production in the 
rainfed areas and cotton production in the irrigated area. Table 5.1 shows the 
GDP annual growth rates for the period 1970-1985. 
5.3.2 GNP per capita growth rates 
With respect to GNP per capita, Sudan is classified with the low-income coun- 
tries. Per capita income is low, being US$ 200 per head in 1978, US$ 370 in 1979, 
US$ 410 in 1980 and increased to US$ 440 in 1982; it was only US$ 330 in 1987. 
However, compared with other countries in the same group, Sudan's per capita 
income is relatively higher, (Table 5.2). 
On the other hand, the average annual growth rate of per capita income is 
lower than the average for the group of low-income countries as a whole. Average 
annual growth rates were negative since 1981 and onwards, (Table 5.2). The level 
of per capita income was affected negatively by the slow growth of the economy, 
the droughts and the inflow of refugees. 
5.3.3 Distribution of GDP 
As it has been mentioned above, the Sudanese economy is dependent on the 
agricultural sector which never constituted less than 25% of the GDP. On the 
other hand the contribution of industry was and is still very weak. At the same 
time there is a persistent unnecessary expansion of the unproductive sectors. The 
services sector never constituted less than 48% of the GDP over the period 1980- 
1987. An agricultural sector regularly accounted, on average, for 35.37% of the 
GDP, having declined from 57% soon after independence and 40% in 1974. 
A quick look at Table 5.3 will display this heavy dependence on agriculture. 
While for Sudan agriculture constituted 35% of the GDP over the period 1980-1985, 
for middle-income economies it constituted only 3% of GDP over the same period. 
In being heavily dependent on agriculture, Sudan is similar to other low-income 
economies, (Table 5.3). 
The contribution of industry remains insignificant. On the eve of independence 
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Table 5.2: GNP Per Capita 
years Low-income 
economies 
Middle-income 
economies 
Industrialised 
economies 
Sudan 
1978 200* 1250 8070 320 
1960-7 (1.6)* (3.7) (3.7) (0.1) 
1979 230 1420 9440 370 
1960-7 (1.6) (3.8) (4.0) (0.6) 
1980 260 1400 10320 410 
1960-8 (1.2) (3.8) (3.6) (-0.2) 
1981 270 1500 11120 380 
1960-81 (2.9) (3.7) (3.4) (-0.3) 
1982 280 1520 11070 440 
1960-8 (3.0) (3.6) (3.3) (-0.4) 
1983 260 1310 11060 400 
1965-8 (2.7) (3.4) (2.5) (1.3) 
1984 260 1250 11430 360 
1965-8 (2.8) (3.1) (2.4) (1.2) 
1985 270 1290 11810 300 
1965-8 (2.9) (3.0) (2.4) (.. ) 
1986 270 1270 12960 320 
1965-8 (3.1) (2.6) (2.3) (-0.2) 
1987 290 1810 14430 330 
1965-8 (3.1) (2.5) (2.3). (-0.5) 
* In US$; * Average annual growth (percent). 
Source: The World Bank, Development Reports, various issues. 
in 1956, industry's share of GDP was only 4.3% and that of manufacturing a mere 
7%. These shares did increase during the 1960's, with manufacturing and mining 
accounting for 9% of GDP by 1970, and remaining at the 6% level through the 
latter part of the 1970's, before increasing slightly to 8% in 1983, and 9% in 1985. 
As for the services sector, it expanded and constituted a larger share of the 
GDP. Nevertheless its share to GDP is less than that of many other low-income 
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countries, although it is higher than the weighted average for these countries, 
(Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Structure of Production (percent) 
Distribution of GDP 
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing* Services 
1978 43 (38)' 12 (24) 6 (13) 45 (38) 
1979 38 (34) 13 (36) 6 (13) 49 (30) 
1980 38 (36) 14 (35) 6 (15) 48 (29) 
1981 38 (37) 14 (32) 7 (14) 50 (31) 
1982 36 (37) 14 (32) 7 (14) 50 (31) 
1983 34 (37) 15 (34) 8 (14) 51 (29) 
1984 33 (36) 16 (35) .. 
(15) 51 (29) 
1985 26 (32) 18 (33) 9 (26) 57 (35) 
1986 35 (32) 15 (35) 7 (24) 50 (32) 
1987 37 (31) 15 (37) 8 (.. ) 48 (32) 
* As a subsector of the industrial sector; * Low-income economies. 
Source: The World Bank Development Reports, various issues. 
5.3.4 Consumer price inflation 
The Sudanese economy has been suffering from accelerating inflation rates, 
specially since the mid-1975. An average annual rate of inflation was only 3.7% 
during 1960-1970; it was 15.2% between 1970-1982, and then reached 31.7% over 
the period 1980-1985 and 32.6% over 1980-1986, (The World Bank, World Devel- 
opment Reports). 
IMF figures for annual consumer prices increases range between 25 and 31% 
for the period from 1979 to 1983. Today, unofficial estimates of inflation vary 
from 25% to 100% or more. The inflation has been fuelled by persistent deficit 
financing and by the chronic transport bottlenecks leading to a scant supply of 
necessary consumer goods. That is, it is mainly caused by structural rigidities. 
Devaluation of the Sudanese pound and the gradual removal of food subsidies in 
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accordance with the conditions attached to the IMF credits have also contributed 
to the inflationary pressures. 
In contrast to other low-income countries, Sudan is characterised by higher 
inflation rates, (Table 5.4). Throughout the period 1978-87, the average annual 
rate of inflation is higher than the weighted average for the group of low-income 
economies. As the figures on Table 5.1 tell, the deflated consumer price index 
increased from 100 in 1970 (1970 = 100) to 191.8 in 1974/75,451.1 in 1979/80, 
1683.4 in 1984/85. The index reached 2290.2 in 1986 and 2903 in 1987. 
Table 5.4: Inflation Growth Rates (percent) 
Years low-income 
economies 
Sudan 
1960-70 3.0 3.7 
1970-78 10.6 7.4 
1970-79 10.8 6.8 
1970-80 11.2 15.8 
1970-81 11.2 15.9 
1970-82 11.5 15.2 
1973-83 5.4 18 
1973-84 5.9 19.3 
1980-85 7.5 31.7 
1980-86 8.1 32.6 
1980-87 8.6 31.7 
Source: The World Bank Development Reports, various issues. 
Table 5.5 displays the cost of living indices in Khartoum. It is obvious, however, 
that these indices are high, especially for the low-income salaried groups. The 
Khartoum cost of living index rose from 100 in 1970 to 787.1 in 1982 for all income 
groups. It continued rising until it reached 2673 in 1986 for the low income groups, 
(Bank of Sudan, Annual Report, 1986) and 3226.3 in 1987 (Economic Survey, 
1987/88). However, no one can tell what exactly is the level of inflation in Sudan. 
Even the official circles and those who agr2 concerned are not certain about it. 
Table 5.5: Cost of Living Indices*: Great khartoum 
low salaries 
index (%) 
High salaries 
index (%) 
1981 643.5 604 
1982 808.2 765.2 
1983 1055.9 1007.6 
1984 1417.2 1317.3 
1985 2060.3 1938.7 
* (1970 = 100) 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, relevant years. 
5.4 Economic Structure 
5.4.1 Agriculture 
Theoretically Sudan has great agricultural potential. The agricultural sector 
occupies a dominant position. Agriculture still accounts for some 35% of the 
Sudan GDP and around 90% of its exports, while providing the livelihood for 
about 80% of the population. In short agriculture will remain the key sector of 
the Sudanese economy for the foreseeable future. This sector is composed of four 
distinct activities: 
(a) Modern irrigated farming, the majority of which is large scale schemes. 
With an area of four million feddans, these produce cotton, groundnuts, sorghum, 
wheat and sugar. The agricultural output of these schemes, however, largely de- 
termines an economic growth of the economy. 
(b) Mechanised rainfed crop production sector with an area of about five mil- 
lions, which produce sorghum and sesame. 
(c) Traditional rainfed farming with an area of about nine million feddans, 
producing millet, sorghum, sesame, groundnuts and gum arabic. 
(d) Animal husbandry or livestock subsector. 
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The first two subsectors together account for 65% of agricultural production. 
Because of the labour intensive methods of the traditional sector, however, it is 
equally important socially. Furthermore, while the irrigated modern agricultural 
sector might provide most of the country's foreign currency, it is the rainfed sector 
which provides the food requirements of the population at large. 
However, a few years ago, the Sudan experienced severe years of drought. 
Indeed the lack of rainfall in 1984 was unprecedented before and this affected crop 
production. Cotton production, the main cash crop, has been fluctuating and in 
many times low world prices left large quantities of the cotton stocks unsold. 
In general, crop production, especially cash crops, was not high enough since 
the 1970's. The 1970's witnessed a rapid rise in oil prices which accounted for a 
growing proportion of Sudan's imports bill. But although prices of major Sudanese 
export crops were rising, this favourable price trend was not utilised as the quantum 
index of exports was falling. However, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) is arguing that with the cost of inputs such as fuel and 
insecticides rising, cotton's net profitability has come under pressure. It believes 
that Sudan's export potential now lies in food production in the rainfed sector. 
This view appears to imply a reversal from the previous United States and IMF 
policy of recommending that cotton production should supplant food production, 
(EIU Country Report, 1986/1987). 
5.4.2 Industry 
In terms of industrial development the Sudan is classified as a non-industrialised 
economy as the value added share is less than 20%. The manufacturing sector as 
a subsector of industry is supposed to be the most dynamic of all sectors in terms 
of affecting the growth process. But the role of the Sudanese manufacturing sec- 
tor remains relatively small. For instance, manufacturing and mining contributed 
7.9% of GDP in 1982/83, and it employed only 3.5% of the total labour force inside 
the country, (The World Bank, 1985). 
Industry has been promoted either through processing agricultural products, 
or manufacturing import substitution goods. It started with the ginning of cot- 
ton early in this century. After independence, factories were concentrated in and 
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around Khartoum and the initiative was left to the private sector. 
The 1970's witnessed a growing industry, especially the textile industry, sup- 
ported by official as well as private foreign capital. The industrial sector is domi- 
nated by two activities which are typical of most of the LDCs' in their early stages 
of industrialisation; these are tobacco and food beverages industries and textiles, 
clothing and leather industries. Heavy industry is confined to two cement plants 
and petroleum processing in the single Port Sudan Refinery. 
There are, however, a number of reasons for the negligible contribution of 
manufacturing sector to the GDP. It faces severe shortages of trained man-power, 
raw materials and foreign exchange needed for importing essential intermediate 
inputs. Production costs increased due to a series of devaluations of the Sudanese 
pound, (Mohamed, S. H., 1985). These, coupled with infrastructural bottlenecks 
and unannounced interruption in electricity supply, have led to a drastic fall in ca- 
pacity utilisation .A study of capacity utilisation in 1977 has shown that 22 plants 
were operating below 65% of their capacity and 10 plants below 35% (Ministry of 
National Planning, 1977). 
Moreover, there are delays in the implementation of new industrial projects. 
Manufacturing industries in the Sudan could not as yet compete with imported 
products - especially since they have to obtain raw materials in the parallel market. 
The current emphasis is on rehabilitating existing manufacturing industries. 
With the help of regional and international organisations, the comprehensive re- 
habilitation programme aims at increasing capacity utilisation and improving the 
capital stock of the factories. 
5.4.3 Transport 
The Sudan has an extremely large land area as already mentioned. Transport 
is, therefore, vital for economic development. Distant consumption and produc- 
tion areas need an efficient network of transport and communications. Transport 
bottlenecks have been a serious impediment to economic growth. 
Railway transport has been dominant for many years, carrying about two 
thirds of long distance freight transport. The operational performance of railway 
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has been poor and railway traffic does not exhibit any regular trend of the traffic 
growth for several years. The declining trend is explained on the one hand by 
partial traffic diversion to road transport and on the other hand by the inability 
of the railway to handle the freight available sufficiently quickly. This, however, is 
a consequence of: (a) insufficient locomotives and rolling stock; (b) lack of spare 
parts and physical damage to the track caused by washouts and excessive heat. 
Moreover, the railway corporation faces many problems, that of transporting 
consumption goods at less than marginal cost prices, the empty trucks going to 
Port Sudan and the scarcity of liquidity to replace old machines. These factors, 
combined with administrative problems and frequent strikes, have caused delays, 
low operating speeds and locomotive breakdowns. 
In view of the poor performance of railway, road transport received an increas- 
ing attention in the 1970's. By 1977, the cumulative asphalted road length had 
risen to 1081 k. m. and to 2000 k. m. in 1985/86. As a consequence, the contri- 
bution of road transport to the GDP increased from 2.8% in 1974/75 to 8.1% in 
1982/83 and to 11% in 1985/86. 
5.4.4 Power 
Because of energy problems, electric power generation is an essential infras- 
tructure - especially from water sources. 70% of the total public power supply 
is provided by hydro-electricity up to 1983. This heavy reliance on hydro-electric 
power for the country's electricity supply causes considerable problems. Despite 
the steady growth in electric power generation, electric power supply is still uncer- 
tain and inadequate. The problem with electric power is that the Rosseris Dam 
grid provides about 83% of the total electric generating capacity. This grid is 
dependent on the seasonal flow of the Blue Nile. During rainy season it does not 
work and electricity is generated by the thermal power stations. The supply cannot 
meet the growing demand. 
Moreover, electricity consumption grew rapidly between 1970 and 1980. This is 
attributed to the excessive needs of irrigation schemes and the many manufacturing 
industries established in the 1970's. Also, there has been an increasing demand by 
domestic and commercial consumers in the urban areas. 
86 
5.5 Public & Private Sectors: A Contribution to Development 
The initiative for undertaking capital investment in the Sudan has been shared 
almost equally between the public and the private sectors. This applies to expe- 
rience recorded for the latter half of the 1960's, as well as in the Five year de- 
velopment plan for the period 1970-1975. This section discusses the contribution 
of both public and private sectors in the economy, with special emphasis on the 
latter. The periods covered are the 1960's and the 1970's till 1977, the year when 
the last development plan, the Six-year plan, was launched. After 1977 there were 
stabilisation programmes which started in 1978 and continued up to 1985. During 
the period 1985-1987 there were no economic development plans. In late 1987, a 
new four-year ESP has been launched. Throughout the entire period, all economic 
plans and programmes emphasised an importance of the private sector. This is vi- 
tal for the sake of this study which evaluates the role of Islamic credit in economic 
development, especially the role of IBs, as private sector banks. It is important 
because if the policy makers adopt a socialist approach in development planning, 
all private banks would have minor role to play. Now that from the development 
planning point-of-view all banks, including IBs, face no hinderance, as the gov- 
ernment recognises and emphasizes their role as a part of the private financial 
institutions to finance development. It is, however, relevant to give first a brief 
account of the trends of consumption, savings and investments in the economy. 
5.5.1 Propensity to consume, saving & capital formation 
The Sudan is characterised by dualism in most aspects of economic and social 
activity. This economic dualism has important implications for government poli- 
cies, the pattern of consumption expenditure and real investment opportunities. 
5.5.1.1 Consumption 
In the Sudan, as a LDC, the marginal propensity to consume, MPC, and 
the average propensity to consume, APC, are influenced by the relatively large 
traditional sector and demonstration effects. Therefore they tend to be high. 
Over the period 1955-1967, the share of consumer spending in disposable in- 
come remained within a range of 89.8 to 98.4%. The data for the entire period 
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reflect an average propensity to consume for the Sudanese economy of 93%. The 
MPC was 0.89, (Lees F. A. & Brooks H. C., 1977). The average annual growth 
rate of private consumption increased from 1.7% over the period 1965-1973 to 7.3% 
during the period 1973-1983. The average for all the low income economies was 
3.5% and 4.5% for the two periods respectively, (The World Bank, Development 
Report, 1985). As a percentage of GDP, the average for consumption for the period 
1970-1979 was 89.4%. Thus, it is generally noticed that the Sudanese economy is 
characterised by higher levels of MPC. This characteristic is also clear from the 
structure of consumption. 65% of total househols consumption is for food and 
clothing and footwear, (The World Bank Development Report, 1989). 
5.5.1.2 Savings & capital formation 
With regard to capital formation in the Sudan, the main economic problem 
has been and still its excessive dependence on the cultivation and export of a 
few agricultural products. Lack of adequate savings has prompted a recourse to 
external sources of investment funds. It further required government fiscal policy to 
be directed to financing a major share of the accumulation of capital. Throughout 
the periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1978, fixed capital formation has represented a 
modest 11.13% and 13.13% of GDP for the two periods respectively, (U. N., Year 
Book of National Accounts Statistics, 1984). Table 5.6 shows the formation of 
fixed capital up to 1978, as there are no data for recent years. 
Table 5.6: Total Gross Capital Formation 
Gross capital 
formation(LS. million) 
GDP 
(LS. million) 
As a percentage 
of GDP 
1970 89.6 761.1 11.8 
1974 265 1510.8 17.5 
1975 427.5 1848 23.1 
1976 399.6 2339.7 17.1 
1977 413.7 2882.7 14.4 
1978 431.5 3253.8 13.3 
Source: U. N., National Accounts Statistics, 1984. 
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Several reasons are accounted for the low ratio of capital formation. These 
include, (1) the low level of per capita income which reduces opportunities for 
savings, (2) the absence of a large competitive business enterprise sector to initiate 
highly profitable investments, (3) the scarcity of infrastructure and (4) limits on 
the ability of the economy to attract foreign sources of capital in large amounts. 
The last two factors are more effective especially since the beginning 1980 when the 
economic position deteriorated and the flow of capital from the Arab oil-producing 
countries was reduced sharply. 
5.5.2 Public & private sectors' role 
In order to trace the contribution of each sector, and in particular the private 
enterprise role, this is done by subdividing periods since 1956 - the year of political 
independence of Sudan. 
(I) The period 1956-1960 
In the Sudan, although the government financed a major share, the private 
sector played a vital role in economic development. This is noticed either through 
its contribution in total investment and financing, in providing labour opportuni- 
ties or in the value added. Over the period 1955/56-1960/61, fixed investments 
were distributed between the public and the private sector as 60.5% financed by 
the former and 39.5% by the latter. 
(II) The periods 1960-1970 & 1970-1975 
The Ten-year plan assigned 60% of total investment to the public sector and the 
remaining 40% to the private sector. Although there was no accurate information 
on the actual investments undertaken by each sector, the studies preceded the 
revised Five-year plan pointed out that, the public sector financed 52% and the 
private sector 48% of the actual investment during the period 1965-1970, (Ministry 
of National Planning, 1977). In particular, over the period 1968-1972, the private 
sector's contribution was major. It financed 58% of the total investment. 
Estimates of the Five-year plan allocated 55.8% of investment to the public 
sector and 44.2% to the private sector. All these figures indicate that the private 
sector is growing side by side with the public sector. However, had it been provided 
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with formidable climate for investment, the private sector could contribute more. 
It is in fact true that the private sector occupied a dominant position over years, 
but the major share of its investment went to housing, and, to a lesser extent, 
to transport. 51% of private investments in the Five-year plan was basically in 
housing. Even in the Ten-year Plan, it was not less than 30% of the total private 
investment. 
(III) The Six-year Plan 1977-1983 
The Six-year plan started in 1977 to cover the period 1977-1983, but only after 
two years the plan was discontinued and since 1978 the government has adopted 
stabilisation and reformation programmes. Even then, the salient feature of the 
plan was its explicit recognition of the decisive role of private sector and its ability 
to achieve a high level of investment. Investment estimates of the plan were LS. 
2670 millions, LS. 1570 millions would be from the public sector, and LS. 1100 
millions were assigned to be financed by the private sector. 
The plan was formulated with a view to greater contribution from private 
finance, both internal and external. A cornerstone of the plan was the incentives 
declared to increase private investment. It was stated that local financing would be 
solved by an extension of banking services so that commercial banks would extend 
credit facilities, and for external financing, planners determined the investment 
priorities which needed financing. 
In the Six-year Plan concentration on agriculture was big. As compared with 
the Five-year plan, the Six-year Plan allocated 26.4% of private investment into 
agriculture, while the former plan directed only 16% of private investment to agri- 
culture. Although the plan included ambitious development objectives it was dis- 
continued. Since 1978 the Sudanese economy geared to adopt the IMF policies. 
There have been three-year stabilisation programmes. With more submission 
to the IMF prescribed measures, the structure of investment changed with an 
attempt to increase private investment. A number of public enterprises were liq- 
uidated and reorganised to allow private shareholding. The government continued 
following the system of three-year programmes. These programmes were revised 
annually. Up to 1985, there were six `three-year' public investment programmes. 
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These programmes stated only investment for the public sector and the private in- 
vestment was not included explicitly. The economic performance deteriorated and 
implementation of the policy was hampered by scarcity of finance and drought. 
(IV) The Period 1985-1987 
When the transitional government came to power in 1985, it suspended the 
previous three-year programmes. Instead it launched its one-year development 
exxpenditure budget for 1985-1986. The present elected government embarked on 
a four-year ESP which started in late 1987. The government has initiated a new 
extended role for the private sector, (see Chapter VIII, section 8.5). 
5.6 The External Sector & Foreign Exchange Constraints 
The main features of the external financial performance of the Sudanese econ- 
omy are in the balance of payments' statements. The balance of payments exhib- 
ited a number of structural rigidities. Since the first half of the 1970's, there has 
been a persistent deficit in the current account; disbursements from external loans 
and other capital inflows have been insufficient to compensate for these deficits. 
There was a severe drain on the foreign exchange reserves of the country. 
As foreign reserves ran out and the internal gap widened, arrears in external 
payments were accumulated, and, consequently, reschedulings were undertaken in 
1980. this situation led to a severe lack of foreign exchange, causing widespread 
scarcities of spare parts and other vital imports needed such as capital and con- 
sumer goods. However, the main causes of this unfavourable balance of payments 
situation were: 
(i) weak export performance 
(ii) imports growth 
(iii) the external shocks 
(iv) a sharp increase in the external debt service burden and, 
(v) poor policies represented by persistent devaluation of the Sudanese pound. 
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These and other factors caused the external gap which impeded growth of the 
economy as a whole. However, this section discusses implications of the first four 
factors. The last factor's implications are elaborated in the next section which is 
on the the IMF conditionality applied on the Sudanese economy. 
5.6.1 Export performance 
The export performance in volume terms constituted the primary cause of the 
balance of payments' deteriorations. In the Sudan these deteriorations began since 
early 1970s. Poor performance of the export sector is reflected by its fluctuating 
and declining trend since 1974. Annual growth rates of exports began to fluctuate 
up and down up to 1978 when the annual growth rate was negative (-12%). 
In volume terms exports declined but increased in nominal terms both because 
of the devaluation of the Sudanese pound and increases in prices. This is why 
exports showed an increasing growth rate between 1978 and 1983. After 1983 
and up to the mid-1987, exports exhibited slow growth rates which were -1.4% 
and -0.7% in 1986 and 1987 respectively. These rates of growth which pertain to 
total exports proceeds hide the actual decline in the volume of the most important 
Sudanese exportable crop, cotton. 
Cotton exports ratio declined from 55.4% in 1973 to 35.5% in 1974. They then 
fluctuated and reached their lowest level in 1981, as cotton exports constituted 
only 19.2% of total exports. The sharp fall could be attributed mainly to : (a) 
the unfavourable weather conditions which affected both sowing and picking of 
the crop, (b) the various cotton diseases and (c) shortages of labour for picking. 
Cotton exports represented 44% and 30.4% of the total Sudanese exports in 1986 
and 1987 respectively, (Economic Survey, 1987/88). 
However, this poor performance of exports led to a deteriorated balance of 
payments. On average, the annual growth rate of exports was 10% and 18% 
for the two sub-periods 1973-1978 and 1979-1987. Over the same sub-periods, the 
average annual rate of growth of imports were 27% and 19% respectively. Therefore 
trade balance deteriorated over time. In 1983, the trade deficit became LS. 1318.9 
million and reached LS. 1569 million in 1986. 
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5.6.2 Imports growth 
A rapid growth rate of imports caused LDCs in general to be in a continuous 
balance of payments deficit. In the case of the Sudanese economy, imports' average 
growth rate was 27% over the period 1973-1978 and 19% since then up to the 
first half of 1987. This rapid growth rate resulted mainly from the increase in the 
qunatum and value of imports. The bulck of Sudan's imports is composed of foods, 
manufactured goods, transport and machinery equipment, in addition to petroleum 
products. The value of these items, which are necessary, represented about 80% 
of the Sudan total imports. Moreover, an increase in the value of imports was 
associated also with the adjustment in the exchange rate of the Sudanese pound 
frequently since 1978. 
With negative growth of exports and a rapidly growth rate of imports, the gov- 
ernment attempted to control the cumulatively worsening position of the balance 
of payments. It applied the IMF measures which aimed at raising domestic prices 
of the exportable products and giving incentives to producers to increase supply. 
They aimed also at restoring the profitability of government entities engaged in 
export activities. 
But numerous rigidities in the Sudanese economy, together with the highly 
inelastic nature of the supply of agricultural produce which dominates Sudan's 
exports, mitigated against an immediate or medium-term increase in exports. 
The measures applied were, as well, expected to reduce imports, but the de- 
mand for imports of consumer and producer goods is highly inelastic. Therefore 
the overall impact of the government efforts to reduce the balance of payments 
deficits was negative. Imports' prices increased, exports' prices increased but to 
a lesser extent. One study shows that after devaluation of the Sudanese pound 
in 1978, imports' prices grew by 27% while those of exports grew by 16% only, 
(Hussien, M. N., 1985). 
The worsening balance of payments created an external imbalance which has 
been impeding economic growth. The situation was getting more severe by an 
internal gap - the sharp difference between government expenditure and revenue. 
Both external and internal gaps reinforced the need for external and domestic 
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borrowing. As a result, deficit financing increased tremendously. For instance, 
changes in money supply increased from LS. 181.5 millions in 1979/80 to LS. 1447 
millions in 1984/85 and LS. 3624 million in 1987. The central government's net 
position with the banking system deteriorated by LS. 58.8 millions in 1979/1980 
and jumped to LS. 1899.7 millions in 1985/86. Government's indebtedness abroad 
is nearly U. S. $ 13 billions. The economy is facing a sharp rise in debt service costs. 
5.6.3 An external shocks & terms of trade 
The Sudan's balance of payments and trade balance were affected by the kinds 
of external shocks as well. These shocks were attributed to the cyclical movements 
in the world markets: 
(a) First, there was a four-fold increase in the price of oil in 1973/1974 and 
the successive increases afterward, especially in 1980. These increases had direct 
effects through a rising import bills and an indirect effects through inflationary 
pressures imported with manufactured goods. 
(b) Second, the slow-down in the industrial economies led to a reduction in 
the demand for all LDCs' exporting primary products. Therefore the economic 
growth and foreign exchange earnings of the Sudan were adversely affected by slack 
markets, because the economy depended heavily on production and exportation of 
primary products. 
(c) Third, the implementation of stabilisation policies by the industrialised 
economies caused a sharp rise in nominal and real interest rates in the world 
markets. Terms of borrowing became harder and debt service costs rose sharply. 
However, a rise in oil prices had compound effects in the Sudan as it increased 
costs of essential input materials such as fertilisers, pesticides and gazoline which 
are used in pump irrigation schemes. Cotton, the major export crop, is also import- 
intensive. It was estimated that 20% of gross earnings from cotton exports were 
used to meet the spraying costs for pest control, (Ministry of Finance, 1981). 
Therefore, external shocks caused a sharp rise in import prices, particularly 
the oil bill. These shocks resulted in a deterioration in the terms of trade which 
registered an annual rate of decline of 0.2% between 1975/76 and 1978/79 and a 
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further decline of 0.7% between 1981/82 and 1984/85. Table 5.7 shows growth in 
the terms of trade18 of the Sudanese economy. 
Table 5.7: Growth of Merchandise Trade & Terms of Trade 
Years Exports 
(LS. million) 
Imports 
(LS. million) 
Resource balance Terms of trade 
1977/78 691.1 1360.0 (663.9)* 92 (1970 = 100) 
1978/79 699.4 1321.3 (621.8) 78 (1975 = 100) 
1979/80 798.4 1563.5 (765.1) 86 (1975 = 100) 
1980/81 698.9 1850.4 (1151.5) 88 (1975 = 100) 
1981/82 704.2 2166.7 (1461.5) 87 (1980 = 100) 
1982/83 839 2042.5 (1203.5) 88 (1980 = 100) 
1983/84 732 1417 (685) 96 (1980 = 100) 
1984/85 374 771 (397) 87 (1980 = 100) 
1985/86 497 1138 (641) 70 (1980 = 100) 
1986/87 482 694 (212) 84 (1980 = 100) 
* Brackets indicate deficit. 
Source: The World Bank, Development Reports, various issues. 
What all these imply is that the external imbalance widened. Foreign reserves 
were depleted and the government resorted to borrow externally at the world 
market competitive prices. 
5.6.4 An external debt service burden 
An internal imbalance, together with sharp rises in import prices exacerbated 
the country's long standing balance of payment's difficulties. These factors led to 
a sharp rise in foreign liabilities and a precarious official reserve position. 
The government, in order to finance the deficit, has increased its external bor- 
rowing sharply and most of the large loans acquired have relatively short maturities 
16 The terms of trade, or the net barter of trade, measure the relative movement of export prices 
against that of import prices. Calculated as the ratio of a country's index of average export prices 
to its average import price index, this indicator shows changes over a base year in the level of 
export prices as a percentage of import prices. 
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and high interest rates. In addition, there has been a remarkable increase in the 
banking system's indebtedness which consisted mainly of short term credit. In 
consequence, the Sudan's total external debts have increased. 
With a sharp rise in their amounts, the cost of servicing debts rose to high 
levels. Sudan's debt servicing ratio rose from 15% in 1978 to 25% in 1980 and 40% 
in 1981 despite the rounds of rescheduling with the Paris Club between 1978 and 
1982, (IBRD Report, 1982). 
The Sudan's debt problem was, however, aggravated by an unfavourable debt 
structure. For instance of the U. S. $ 2.4 billions contracted debt before 1978,68% 
was on hard terms with an average rate of interest of 7.1% and an average maturity 
of 9.7 years (including the three year grace period), and with a grant element of only 
11%, (IBRD Report, 1978). Therefore the external sector performance had been 
hardly affected by an increase in the cost of servicing debts which are mounting 
over time. 
Due to the debt problem, successive governments, including the present one, 
were and still, trying to follow economic policies geared to repayment of debts and, 
more or less, designed by creditors. Table 5.8 shows the changes in external public 
debt and debt service ratio for the period 1977-1985. 
5.7 The Sudanese economy & The IMF 
As the impact of the IMF policies on the Sudanese economy has been consid- 
erable, it is worth examining the effect in detail, especially as other Third World 
debtors are in similar position. Sudan has become one of the most troubled debtors 
with high debt servicing ratios and severe balance of payments difficulties. This 
section discusses the various economic crises in the Sudan and the devaluation 
policy used to solve these crises. 
The devaluation policy is the IMF's proposal which is known as the "supply 
side framework for exchange rate determination", (Nashashibi, K., 1980). The 
approach of the IMF is to use the exchange rate not as an instrument for increasing 
the demand for a country's tradeable goods, but to increase the profitability of 
supply. This is to improve the competitiveness of each export by relating its 
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domestic costs to its international value added. The international value added is 
the difference between the value of output and the value of imported inputs used 
in production, both measured in domestic currency. 
Table 5.8: External Public Debt & Debt Service Ratios 
Years Debt size* 
($ million) 
Interest payments 
($ million) 
Debt service as a percentage of 
GNP Exports 
1978 2076 36 1.4 9.4 
1979 2114 86 4.5 33 
1980 3097 16 1.8 14.4 
1981 4807 31 1.0 5 
1982 5093 11 0.8 7.5 
1983 5726 37 1.2 11.2 
1984 5659 65 .. 13.6 
1985 5086 67 1.8 15.6 
1986 7057 32 0.8 7.7 
1987 7876 18 0.6 6.8 
* Excluding the use of IMF credits and short-term debts. 
Source: The World Bank, Development Reporte, various issues. 
Many economists view devaluation as advantageous, easier and quicker than 
demand management alone in solving balance of payments problems. The use of 
devaluation as a solution or means of solution should be preceded by a prior study 
and recognition to the import and export elasticities. 
Devaluation is regarded as successful and effective if imports of the country 
are mainly luxurious goods with a high price elasticity. The rising prices of im- 
ports are to be traced by lower quantity demanded without affecting the level of 
satisfaction of consumers significantly. Also exports are to be highly responsive 
to price changes. That is, the demand of external consumers to Sudanese exports 
should be price elastic, as devaluation makes exported products relatively cheap 
and then the demand for exportables would be expected to increase. If, however, 
these primary conditions and pre-requisites are satisfied, the devaluation would be 
regarded as the best quick tool to improve the balance of payments. 
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5.7.1 The IMF argument for devaluation 
The IMF argued that domestic and international economic developments, af- 
fecting budettary operations, credit expansion and cost price relationship, have 
resulted in structural disequilibria in the Sudanese economy, and imbalances in 
both the budget and balance of payments. Devaluation of the Sudanese pound is 
seen as a corrective action. 
The principal aim is to accelerate growth by efficient utilisation of the country's 
potential resources especially in agriculture and agro-industries. A mix of fiscal 
and monetary policies is used to raise the rate of savings to meet the increasing 
development and expenditures. Therefore the devaluation would accord the proper 
valuation to imported foodstuff, raw materials and capital goods. Hence, the 
basis for investment profitability and its sectoral distribution would be set. The 
devaluation will provide incentives to producers to increase productivity since the 
domestic export prices are raised. The taxable base and tax yield will expand, 
(IMF, Sudan: Memorandom on Exchange Rate and Related Measures, Undated 
Note). 
Reliance on foreign borrowing by public entities and credit expansion are to 
be adjusted. The credit expansion by commercial banks in support of the private 
sector also needs to be controlled. The IMF went ahead in detailing the impacts 
of the proposed programme on different aspects of the economy: 
(I) Internal imbalance 
An increase in investment outlays in the economy has not been matched by an 
increase in savings. This is mainly because of extravagant spending. In addition, 
public entities have been incurring losses, and their financial position deteriorated. 
Both the deficit financing and reliance on external loans increased remarkably. 
Borrowing raised the country's indebtedness abroad which is too difficult to 
be sustained by the current available receipts. Moreover, the above factors led to 
a sharp rise in domestic prices exceeding the price inflation experienced by the 
Sudan's main trading partners. Labour costs rose as a consequence. 
(II) External imbalance 
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In addition to the government's direct expenditures on imports for develop- 
ment, the build-up of inflationary pressures and the undervaluation of import prices 
increased the importation of consumption items and raw materials while at the 
same time reducing supply availabilities for exports. 
Balance of payments deficits rose over time. Therefore, the IMF recommended 
that urgent steps should be taken to reduce inflation and restore viability to the 
balance of payments in the medium term, otherwise it would be difficult for the 
country to acquire further external loans and development programmes will be 
jeopardised. 
(III) The exchange rate adjustment 
The IMF argued that the strengthening of the United States dollar which 
started in the early 1975, made it important to review the exchange rate of the 
Sudanese pound. 
In the six months ended September 1975, the value of the Sudanese pound as 
measured by the trade weighted effective exchange rate had appreciated by about 
10%. The IMF maintained that calculations based on restoring profitability of 
production for exports would suggest a depreciation of the Sudanese pound to 
about LS. = US. $ 2.00. This rate would entail a 30% reduction of the official 
rate of LS. = U. S. $ 2.872 and a 20% reduction of the official rate of LS. = US. $ 
2.50. This rate, it was argued, should be adequate to realign the Sudan's cost 
structure with international prices. Thus it would assure the competitiveness of 
the Sudan's major crops (cotton, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame and sugar), and 
generate substantial opportunities for the expansion of agro-industries, thereby 
expanding export capability. 
However, for the devaluation to bear its full impact on the allocation of re- 
sources, it is necessary to allow the price mechanism to adequately reflect costs of 
production. In particular, a land and water charge imposed on all crops grown in 
the Gazera scheme should be substituted for the present cost sharing adopted for 
cotton production. Moreover, these measures depend largely on the restoration of 
domestic monetary equilibrium. 
(IV) Impact on the balance of payments 
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In the short-run, the devaluation would result in moderate improvement in the 
trade balance and it will be greater overtime. As the cropping pattern is adjusted, 
new land is brought under cultivation, and the Sudan moves into the production of 
elastic demanded products. Devaluation would help in relaxing import qualitative 
restrictions and allows for imports to be largely determined by market forces; 
hence an efficient use of the country's scarce foreign exchange resources would be 
the result. Production of import substitutes would be stimulated and would also 
encourage foreign investments. 
(V) Stabilisation and budgettary impact 
The IMF Note analysed the stabilisation and budettary impact of devalua- 
tion. The first objectives of stabilisation programme taken in conjunction with a 
devaluation will be to improve the financial position of the government and the 
public entities in order to reduce sharply the rate of domestic credit expansion. To 
improve the government's financial position it will be necessary to: 
(1) Curb the rise in current expenditures at all levels; 
(2) Limit the local governments' reliance on budgettary transfers from the 
central government; 
(3) Raise taxes and certain prices charged by the public sector enterprises; 
(4) Keep the development budget expenditures to a level that can be financed 
from a non-inflationary domestic sources and external loans on favourable terms; 
(5) Finally, the Bank of Sudan must control credit expansion. An improvement 
in the government's financial position requires additional tax measures. 
The IMF Note included also a comment on the impact of devaluation on the 
cost of living. It recommended an increase in domestic prices of wheat and sugar. 
Devaluation was expected to reduce profit margins of importers, and increase do- 
mestic production of import substitutes. 
5.7.2 A Sudanese counterargument 
At the time when the IMF prepared its note, a group of Sudanese economists 
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argued against it, (El Hassan, A. M., 1977). The counterargument stated that: 
(a. ) Devaluation as a measure to bring about improvement in the balance of 
payments gives the best results when the demand for exports and imports is highly 
responsive to price changes as measured by the price elasticity of demand. The 
resulting improvement in the balance of trade from a given devaluation would be 
more prounced the higher the price elasticities of demand for both imports and 
exports. A worsening of the balance of trade would occur. following a devaluation 
if the absolute value of the sum of the price elasticities of imports and exports is 
less than unity. 
Despite the importance of checking the elasticity magnitudes, the IMF did 
not make any attempt to see the values of the elasticities in question. This is so 
because computation of Sudan's exports and imports prices elasticities of demand 
indicates that: 
The cotton export elasticity and that of oil seeds are -0.47379 and -2.38585 
respectively. The resulting weighted exports price elasticity is -0.75070. As for 
imports, calculations reveal that the import elasticity for consumer goods is ex- 
tremely low, -0.11258. Thus the argument for the devaluation of the Sudanese 
pound no longer stands. 
Even if the elasticity criterion for exports is satisfied, the next thing to consider 
is the supply response of the economy to the devaluation measure. The IMF tends 
to assume that subsequent to devaluation the economy will almost immediately 
react by increasing the supply of the export products. But the numerous rigidities 
that characterise the Sudanese economy, together with the highly inelastic nature 
of the supply of agricultural produce which dominates Sudan's exports, mitigate 
against an immediate or even a medium term increase in exports, (Ali, A. A. G., 
1985). 
Besides, the demand for imports is likely to be inelastic in the short run as 
imports have already been reduced to essentials by quantitative restrictions. More- 
over, since Sudan's import policy is centrally controlled, any reduction in imports 
which the devaluation is supposed to bring about can be equally or better achieved 
by administrative decisions. 
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Devaluation will increase the budgetary cost of development expenditures sub- 
stantially because of the large import content of such expenditure. 
It is held that the proposed devaluation would result in an improvement in 
the financial position of some of the Sudan's commercial entities (i. e. revenues of 
the Sudan Cotton Board). This improvement would be negligible because of the 
induced inflation which will come after devaluation. 
The price increase of the major imported commodities which the IMF assumes 
will result from the depreciation measures are likely to be even higher. This is 
because of the various rigidities and the low supply response characterising the 
Sudanese economy. 
The IMF proposals assume that for the lower income groups the import content 
of expenditure amounts to little so that the increase in the cost of living from the 
devaluation would affect mainly the urban population, particularly the high income 
groups. This is indeed incorrect because most of the import items subjected to 
depreciated exchange rates are in the consumption basket of the low income group. 
Moreover, inflation by its nature is not selective and cannot be controlled and 
directed to particular groups. 
5.7.3 An alternative 
As an alternative to the IMF measures the same group of economists argue 
along the following lines: 
First, the Sudanese economy, despite the distortion that characterise it, is not 
suffering from a fundamental disequilibrium. The core- of the problem is generally, 
(1) the need to restore monetary equilibrium, (2) the need to rationalise govern- 
ment expenditure, (3) the need to curb domestic inflation. 
Second, the IMF stated that cotton has been disproportionately taxed in rela- 
tion to other crops, creating disincentives for producers to grow it and explaining 
to a large extent the stagnation in yields. This is true but the solution is not, 
however, devaluation. There is a case for reviewing the taxes on cotton with the 
aim of reducing their burden on the producer. In particular, the dual exchange 
rate treatment of exports and the export duty on cotton should be abolished. The 
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resulting increase in the tenant's income would reduce resort to practices such as 
freezing and liquidation of tenants' debts, production incentives, - etc. 
Third, as for the need to curtail government current expenditure, the alterna- 
tive is to make a downward adjustment of wages and salaries in the public corpora- 
tions. In addition, the government can manipulate import duty rates so that they 
can be selective and applied to only a proportion of commodities. There is also a 
need for rationalising central/local governments financial relations with the aim of 
reducing central government's budgetary transfers to local governments. As far as 
development expenditure is concerned, the rate at which new development projects 
are contracted and executed is far greater than the economy can absorb. There 
is, therefore, a case for keeping the development budget expenditure at levels that 
can be financed from inflationary sources and better external soft loans. 
5.7.4 An ill-concerned exchange rate policy 
The IMF introduced its arguement to the Sudan Government. After then the 
Mininstry of Finance announced new financial and exchange control measures in 
June 1978. At the heart of the new measures adopted by the IMF lies the relaxation 
of the foreign exchange regulations. 
The exchange rate was adjusted so that one Sudanese pound would equal to 
US$ 2.5 instead of US$ 2.8715. In other words, the adjustment in the official rate 
is approximately 15%. It was also decided to impose a subsidy of LS. 0.10 per 
dollar for all remittances except those for cotton exports and a tax of LS. 0.10 per 
dollar for all payments. 
Prior to this devaluation there were four exchange rates for the Sudanese pound 
viz: 
(1) The official rate, equivalent to US$ 2.8715 per LS. or approximately LS. 
0.35/US$. This rate was applied to cotton exports. 
(2) The effective rate, equivalent to US$ 2.5 per LS. or approximately LS. 
0.4/US$. This rate was applied to all banking transactions except cotton. 
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(3) The incentive rate for Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad (SNWA) equiv- 
alent to LS. 0.57/US$. 
(4) The exchange rate for nil-value imports which ranged between LS. 0.6/US$ 
to LS. 0.65/US$. 
The resulting post-devaluation exchange regime was still a multiple exchange 
rate system. The IMF was unhappy with this system and as such a new and 
exchange liberalisation policy package was announced on September 1979. Ac- 
cordingly the new measures include the following: 
i. A unification of the official exchange rate by removing the exchange-tax/subsidy 
scheme. 
ii. Abolishing the SNWA remittance exchange rate. 
iii. Establishment of a dual exchange rate system such that the official rate is 
to be used for a specific list of exports, imports and remittances while an incentive 
rate - to be determined in accordance with market signals - is to be used for 
exports, imports and remittances not specified in the aforementioned list. 
iv. Foreign currency purchase from or sale to licensed banks and on the basis 
of realistic and flexible prices is authorised. The rate of exchange determined for 
these dealings is LS. 0.8/US$. 
Thus as far as foreign exchange is concerned, the Sudan, on the basis of this 
package, was to operate a dual rate system with an official rate of LS. 0.5/US$ 
and a parallel rate of LS. 0.8/US$. 
After applying this dual exchange rate regime, trade was liberalised and a new 
economic programme was announced in November 1981 which included further 
economic measures. As for the exchange rate, it was declared the unification of 
the exchange rate for the Sudanese pound such that the then new rate was LS. 
0.90/US$. Thus, the Sudanese pound was devalued for the third time within three 
years. 
On 15nth November 1982 a new exchange rate was declared for the Sudanese 
pound such that US$ = LS. 1.30. This was, however, the fourth devaluation of 
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the pound in a span of four and a half year. The last devaluation was executed 
in late 1987 when the official rate was changed so that US$ = LS. 4.00, that is a 
devaluation of 80% from US$ = LS. 2.50. The latest devaluation has been in 1989, 
so that US$ = LS. 12.5. 
5.7.5 A critique 
Over the period 1978-1982, the objectives of the repeated devaluations revoloved 
consistently around restoring the profitability and competitiveness of the Sudan's 
major export crops. 
No attempt was made to indicate the period over which such an objective 
could be attained nor was there any attempt to indicate whether there existed an 
optional exchange rate for the Sudanese pound, the achievement of which could 
possibly be said to solve the problem of macro-economic management. 
The IMF goal of achieving the ideal of a unified exchange rate for the Sudanese 
pound proved to be an illusion. Instead, after applying IMF proposals, this re- 
sulted in a much more complicated multiple exchange rate system with at least 
three exchange rates prevailing at one time. It helped the growing (black market) 
informal sector of dealers in foreign exchange. In the mid-1989, those street dealers 
in foreign currencies sold one dollar for twenty Sudanese pounds. 
5.8 The Economic Performance After Implementing IMF Policy 
The broad lines of the Fund's policy are, (1) cuts in government expenditure, 
both current and developmental; (2) a reduction of deficit financing; (3) limitting 
growth of the money supply; (4) abolition of trade controls and prices; (5) elimi- 
nation of subsidies; (6) removal of export and import monopolies; (7) devaluation 
of the pound to its realistic levels; (8) liberalisation of the foreign exchange and 
reduction in government trading activities. According to the IMF, if all these 
policies are implemented, they would result in both internal and external balance. 
Unfortunately, none of these is realised in the Sudan. Cash crops production 
deteriorated sharply after implementation of the IMF programme, while imports 
increased tremendously and the trade deficit widened, (see Table 5.6). 
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Devaluation policy failed as well in accelerating capital inflows. Remittances 
by the SNWA were reduced on expectation of a series of devaluation. Capital fled 
outside the country. 
Inflation rates in the Sudan are now amongst the world's highest. In 1975-1976 
the inflation rate was only 3.5% per year, one of the lowest in the developing world, 
(see the table on consumer price inflation). Internal deficit financing was growing 
over time. The public sector's overall deficit increased from LS. 139.3 million in 
1977/1978 to LS. 179.3 million in 1978/1979 and accelerated to LS. 639 million in 
1981/1982, (Bank of Sudan Annual Reports). The position of the public entities, 
which was expected to improve, deteriorated further. Their financial position with 
the Bank of Sudan declined from a deficit of LS. 42.7 million in 1979/1980 to LS. 
131.5 million in 1980/1981. Moreover, spending on economic services declined and 
debt service payments increased, which had an adverse impact on the economic 
growth. 
The consequences of adopting the IMF policies can therefore be summarised 
as : 
(1) Increasing cost of living. 
(2) Redistribution of income from the poors to the rich groups. 
(3) Increased capital flight and encouragement of risk averse investment 
(4) Incentives to deal in luxurious consumption goods at the expense of neces- 
sary commodities. 
Instead of having a stimulating effect on exports and import substitution, 
devaluation reinforced inflationary pressures and increased costs of production. 
Cotton which is heavily dependent on imported inputs, was most affected. In ad- 
dition, industrial production was affected by devaluation as it depends on imported 
inputs. 
The problem of the Sudanese economy needs more than concentrating on short 
term and price signal solution. Both the public and private sectors need to be 
promoted, efficiency of the public enterprises improved, and bottlenecks eliminated. 
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Chapter VI 
Financial Intermediaries In The Sudan 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the financial intermediaries in the Sudan in 
general and the banking system in particular. At the outset is a theoretical back- 
ground for monetisation. The chapter then shows the financial development of the 
economy in a historical perspective with reference to the Central Bank of Sudan, 
the commercial banks and the specialised development banks. As far as the Central 
Bank is concerned, the chapter discusses basically the monetary and credit policies 
followed by the Bank of Sudan, and for commercial banks it discusses their role in 
the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources. Section 6.8 deals with the 
informal monetary sector in rural areas whose existence might be regarded as a 
symptom of `financial repression'. The section discusses the factors affecting the 
cost of lending in rural areas in general. 
6.2 Atheoretical Basis for Monetisation 
6.2.1 The concept of monetisation 
The term monetisation is subject to a variety of usages. It refers to 
` the rate of use of money', (Sengupta, J. K., 1957, p. 19). This definition would 
make it identical to the concept of velocity of circulation . Sometimes a distinc- 
tion is made between monetisation in the sense of using an object as a currency 
and monetisation meaning the evolution of monetary structures, with a further 
subdivision between internal monetisation (i. e. in a closed economy) and exter- 
nal monetisation involving the evolution of the external monetary relations of an 
economy. Monetisation is regarded also as a' hinge concept ' in that it analy- 
ses monetary structures, that is the transaction from barter to fiduciary currency, 
credit and financial intermediation. 
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Monetisation is different from commercialisation as it denotes the enlargement 
of the sphere of use of money but there are no necessary implications about specific 
uses of the money or specific consequences of monetisation, (Neale, Walter, 1971). 
Commercialisation indicates the pervasiveness of the behavioural assumption of 
profit maximisation, regardless of the degree of monetisation of either inputs or 
outputs. For any operation to be largely commercialised, the bulk of the output 
must be on the market. However, it is this dependence on the market rather 
than interest in the market that is a distinguishing feature of commercialisation, 
(Neale, Walter, 1971). Consequently, monetisation (measured by the proportion of 
the aggegate value of goods to services that is paid for in money by the purchaser) 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of commercialisation which is measured 
by the proportion of production sold to total production. 
Monetisation is also made distinct from financial intermediation, which is de- 
fined as the process of mediation through institutions and instruments between 
primary savers and ultimate borrowers and is measured, for instance, by the fi- 
nancial interrelation ratios. This ratio is obtained by dividing the total value of 
tangible assets plus net foreign balance by national wealth. Financial intermedia- 
tion implies financial deepening rather than widening (enlargement of the money 
exchange economy) which is the phenomenon expressed in the term monetisation. 
To conclude, monetisation, commercialisation and financial intermediation, 
while distinct phenomenon, can also be interdependent and correlated in a de- 
veloping economy. Still it is important to identify those indicators of monetisation 
which measure the `widening' of the monetary economy, through the substitution of 
monetised for non-monetised transactions, as distinct from its ' deepening' which 
would only indicate the increase of economic activity in the already monetised 
sector. 17 
6.2.2 Monetisation and interest rates 
The share of credit transactions in kind is an important indicator of the extent 
of monetisation. In such transactions, which are characteristics of the informal 
credit sectors in the less developed countries (LDCs), the principal and interest 
27 For the problems of measuring monetisation see Chandavakar, Anand G., " Monetisatiou Of De- 
veloping Economies", IMF Staff Papers, vol. 24,1977, pp. 665-722. 
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are all repaid in commodities such as food grains or oil seeds. Quite often, loans 
are made by money lenders in cash but the repayments are in kind at a stipulated 
price which is usually well below the market price of the commodity. Hence, 
the lending and borrowing mechanism in the informal credit sector which is less 
monetised involves payments of high interest rates, and monetisation is understood 
to reduce interest rates. Goldsmith mentions that 
`while empirically a negative association exists in the intercountry comparison between the 
monetisation ratio and the interest rate level, one could not claim that the former depends on 
the level of the latter. The causal relationship rather runs in the opposite direction, the process 
of monetisation tending to decrease the level of interest rates as a capital market develops', 
(Goldsmith, Raymond W., 1969, p. 93). 
This viewpoint was rejected, however, on the ground that the relationship 
between monetisation and interest rates is difficult to test because of the lack of 
any clearly defined channels of transmission between them. It has been argued that 
monetisation by itself has no direct bearing on interest rates. The more significant 
causal relationship would seem to be between the degree of financial intermediation 
and the level of interest rates. It is the process of financial intermediation rather 
than monetisation that will lower interest rates by broadening the capital market 
(Chandavakar, Anand G., 1977). 
Therefore countries with high monetisation ratios are regarded as those with 
highly developed capital markets and, consequently, low interest rates. The rela- 
tionship would seem to lie between high saving ratios and broad and active capital 
markets, on the one hand, and the level of interest rates on the other hand. The 
different components of interest rates in the LDCs, namely, the unit opportunity 
cost of lending money, the unit costs of administering loans, the unit risk premium 
and the unit monopoly profits of money lending are not direcrtly affected by the 
monetisation factor. However, the prevalence of loans in kind no doubt raises the 
effective cost of credit to the borrower. But this is not because of the repayments 
in kinds, per se. Rather, it is the combination of money lending and trading that 
enables the lender to appropriate monopolistic profits. 
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6.2.3 Implications of monetisation for monetary policy 
Broadly, the following variables are relevant for determining the optimal rate of 
monetary expansion consistent with relative price stability: (i) the rate of increase 
in the monetised GDP, (ii) the growth of population, (iii) the rate of monetisa- 
tion and (iv) the demand for larger cash balances, with rising per capita incomes 
resulting from (i) and (ii). 
Taking monetisation, this variable can affect money supply and velocity through 
(i) the transaction motive and (ii) the precautionary and speculative motives (the 
asset motive) leading to an increase in the corresponding type of cash balances. 
The replacement of payments in kind by wages, rent, interest and taxes would 
clearly lead to an increase in the transaction balances. Likewise, there will be an 
increase in cash balances owing to the replacement of savings in kind by monetary 
savings. 
Aghevli attempted to study the effects of monetisation on the demand for 
money by using the number of banks as a proxy for monetisation, (Aghevli, Bijan 
B., 1973, ). But this could be criticised as not a suitable proxy, because the number 
of banks has no empirical relationship to the rate of absorption of the subsistence 
sector into the monetary sector. It is basically a measure of institutional banking 
development. 
However, monetisation would be a significant determinant of the demand for 
money in economies that still have a substantial subsistence sector and are there- 
fore likely to undergo further monetisation. The future trend of monetisation in the 
LDCs would depend on the net outcome of opposing tendencies in the main com- 
ponents of non-monetary income. Thus, in the absence of countervailing official 
policies, the consumption of home-produced goods in agriculture, with sharecrop- 
ping would decline and would accelerate monetisation. 
The effect of monetisation on the portfolio behaviour of households and finan- 
cial institutions would be governed by its effects on the distribution as well as the 
composition of monetary aggregates. But it is difficult to determine the quantita- 
tive distribution of the increase in the money supply as a result of monetisation 
between different sectors and financial intermediaries. 
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Some qualitative judgement can be made regarding the impact of monetisa- 
tion on the composition of monetary aggregates. Thus, given the high ratio of 
currency to money supply in most LDCs, the inadequacy of banking facilities and 
the backwardness of the banking habit, the short-run impact of monetisation on 
the composition of money supply is more likely to be an increase in the demand 
for currency rather than increased bank deposits. This is so because the transition 
from transactions in kind to transactions in currency is institutionally easier than 
that from barter to bank money which involves a big jump in institutional and 
behavioural patterns. 
Since savings banks tend to be more widespread in rural areas than are com- 
mercial banks, the choice of assets would in most cases not be between currency 
and demand deposits as much as between currency and savings deposits. Thus, the 
immediate impact of monetisation in rural areas would be primarily on currency 
holdings and secondarily on the deposit base of the savings banks, (Chandavakar, 
Anand G., 1977). Since, however, there is no determinate transmission mechanism 
between monetisation and the degree and composition of financial intermediation, 
it is difficult to generalise even on the direction of impact of initial monetisation 
on the portfolio behaviour of financial intermediaries. 
6.3 Money Supply and Monetary Policies 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In the Sudan, as in many LDCs, banks during the colonial periods served 
mainly expatriates who were engaged in developing exports of raw materials. In- 
digeneous people participated in the process of intermediation as depositors only 
rather than borrowers. 
With independence, colonial domination of the banks began to disappear but 
colonial legacy was obvious on national banks. Hence, a very similar banking 
system has evolved where favoured private and official borrowers still absorb the 
limited finance available at low rates of interest, which are often far below the 
opportunity cost of scarce capital. The mass of small farmers and small-scale 
industry remains financially repressed. 
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Few agricultural loans are made by the organised banking system; and facilities 
for holding deposits offer limited physical accessibility in rural areas, and rates of 
interest paid on deposits are low. This limited existence of organised banking in 
rural areas, on both the deposits and lending sides, raises the costs of financing 
inventories of agricultural produce, making it high for traders as well as farmers 
and ensures marked seasonal variation in grain prices. 
Together with the government, urban borrowers absorb virtually all of the 
banks' lending resources. Huge interest differentials between organised banking 
and informal rural credit is usual in the Sudan as in other LDCs. 
However, characteristic features of the financial system in general can be sum- 
marised as: 
(i) Government-owned financial institutions have a major role in the financial 
system. 
(ii) The financial system is relatively limited, typically being composed of a 
number of commercial banks, a few specialised banks, and a saving bank. 
(iii) Another key feature is the borrowing requirements of the public sector. 
Irrespective of the political system, the public sector tends to be by far the major 
borrower in the financial sector. Although the large credits to government in the 
Sudan is a direct consequence of the large proportion of government investment in 
total investment, an important part of these funds also goes to finance the current 
budget deficit. 
(iv) A further striking characteristic of the financial system is the importance 
of the central bank as a primary source of funds to the economy. 
(v) Traditional money-lenders are an important complement to the organised 
financial markets. These money-lenders provide financial services to the rural 
areas. High administrative costs and risks associated with the handling of the small 
loans required by these sectors make them unprofitable to the organised financial 
sector. These informal markets charge interest rates substantially in excess of the 
maximum lending rates allowed on loans by the organised markets. 
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(vi) Foreign participation in the financial system is important. There is a 
tendency for the government-owned banks to cater to the non-financial public en- 
terprises, while the foreign-owned banks deal with the foreign-owned firms. These 
foreign banks also tend to concentrate their activities in the financing of export- 
import operations, while showing only marginal interest in financing other ven- 
tures, (Leite, Sergio P., 1982). 
(vii) Finally, domestic savings in general, but financial savings in particular, 
have been declining in recent years, and gross domestic savings registered negative 
growth. 
6.3.2 Growth of money supply 
Prior to independence the currency circulated in the Sudan was the Egyptian 
pound which had been established in 1949 at the par value of U. S. $ 2.8716 to the 
pound, ( Lees, Francis A. and Brooks, Hugh C., 1977). The Sudanese pound was 
introduced in 1957, retaining the same par value relative to the U. S. dollar. When 
the United Kingdom and other important partners devalued their currencies the 
Sudanese pound retained its valuation relative to the dollar, thereby achieving an 
upward revaluation in terms of the devalued currency. 
Up to 1977 the Sudanese pound retained its previous value. In 1978, it was 
devalued to an equivalent of U. S. $ 2.50. After then it has been devalued repeatedly 
due to the financial difficulties, (internal and external imbalances) facing the Sudan 
economy (see Chapter V). Exchange control is administered by the Bank of Sudan, 
with responsibility for effecting detailed transactions delegated to the authorised 
banks. 
The money supply and liquid asset holdings by the public have expanded 
noticeably over years. This reflects growth of the banking system, further develop- 
ment of a money-oriented economy and favourable incentives towards saving and 
capital formation. 
Table 6.1 contains data pertaining to the growth of money narrowly defined as 
ml (currency and current deposits) and more broadly defined as M (including ml 
plus m2 where m2 is quasi-money), compared with the expansion of GDP from 
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Takle 6.1: Growth of Money Supply & GDP (LS. million) 
Year Narrow money 
(ml) 
Quasi-more 
(m2) 
Total money 
supply (M) 
GDP P P 
GDP 
1960 43.18 8.90 52.08 386.80 0.11 0.02 0.135 
1961 51.83 4.30 56.13 420.00 0.12 0.01 0.134 
1962 60.23 4.80 65.03 456.20 0.132 0.011 0.14 
1963 69.44 6.00 75.44 464.10 0.15 0.01 0.16 
1964 60.55 4.40 65.75 476.80 0.12 0.011 0.13 
1965 64.72 6.50 71.22 496.90 0.13 0.01 0.14 
1966 71.98 8.40 80.38 497.60 0.145 0.01 0.162 
1967 77.57 11.00 88.57 536.30 0.14 0.02 0.165 
1968 80.66 12.00 92.66 582.20 0.13 0.02 0.15 
1969 96.92 13.40 110.32 602.60 0.161 0.022 0.18 
1970 103.01 13.60 116.61 637.60 0.162 0.021 0.18 
1971 117.93 15.40 133.33 701.30 0.16 0.02 0.18 
1972 142.51 21.40 163.91 707.30 0.201 0.03 0.231 
1973 172.46 29.40 201.86 832.70 0.20 0.035 0.242 
1974 224.07 40.30 264.37 1136.90 0.19 0.035 0.23 
1975 256.32 47.60 303.92 1379.70 0.18 0.035 0.22 
1976 315.75 66.90 382.65 1661.80 0.19 0.04 0.23 
1977 438.70 99.80 538.50 2599.10 0.16 0.03 0.20 
1978 590.37 127.00 717.37 3007.50 0.19 0.042 0.28 
1979 770.82 145.70 916.52 3253.80 0.23 0.045 0.282 
1980 1061.45 166.70 1228.15 4072.10 0.26 0.041 0.302 
1981 1330.25 268.90 1572.15 4792.70 0.272 0.05 0.32 
1982 1696.31 428.90 2125.21 6217.90 0.27 0.06 0.34 
1983 2181.49 624.30 2508.79 9185.80 0.23 0.06 0.305 
1984 2629.90 650.55 3310.40 11329.0 0.232 0.06 0.292 
1985 4400.55 867.80 5322.50 12788.0 0.34 0.06 0.41 
1986 7756.10 1837.10 9593.20 21354.0 0.45 0.011 0.46 
1987 7773.30 2634.10 10407.40 30676.0 0.25 0.09 0.34 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, varius issues. 
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1960 to 1987. ml increased from approximately 11% of GDP in 1960 to nearly 
20% of GDP in 1975, and to about 46% of GDP in 1986. Over the same period, 
m2, including time and saving deposits, rose from an extremely low base, 2% of 
GDP in 1960 to 11% of GDP in 1986. Consequently ml increased more rapidly 
relative to GDP over the 27-year period. 
However, the increased relative importance of ml and M to GDP is to be 
expected at this stage of development for the Sudan. Moreover, the growth of 
M relative to GDP should continue as financial savings accumulate in the form 
of bank deposits. Inflationary pressures threaten the financial position of the 
economy. If, however, unchecked they would strongly discourage accumulation 
of financial savings via the growth in time and savings deposits. 
6.3.3 The Monetary policies 
The government follows a low interest rates policy taking into consideration 
three objectives: (i) the desire to increase the level of investment; (ii) the desire 
to improve the allocation of investment among sectors; and (iii) the desire to keep 
financial costs down so as to avoid the possible inflationary effects of interest rate 
liberalisation. But the interest rate policy was not effective. The Central Bank has 
relied primarily on control of rediscounting, and on quantitative credit controls for 
control of the money supply. 
Because the public sector was a major borrower during most of the 1970's 
and till now, monetary policies have in general been accommodating and have 
only become more restrictive under the pressures from external imbalances and 
inflationary tendencies which have required stabilisation programmes. The need 
to provide for the credit requirements of the public sector while at the same time 
curtailing, to the greatest extent possible, the increase in the money supply, has 
forced the authorities to crowd out the private sector through the use of selective 
rediscounting and qualitative credit controls. 
Faced with a deteriorating balance of payments situation and an increasing 
inflation rate, the monetary policy in the Sudan has become stricter. Each bank 
was given a monthly ceiling on credit expansion and is required to keep high 
liquidity ratios with the Central Bank. Despite this high liquidity requirement, the 
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banking system continued to have excess liquidity for two reasons: first, a large 
portion of commercial banks' credit to the private sector went for the financing of 
imports and, second, the lack of foreign exchange caused payments arrears which 
both decreased the use of import financing and left the banks with large deposits 
which corresponded to the domestic counterpart of foreign imports payments. 
In the Sudan, the financial market distortions were often accentuated by in- 
tervention policies directed towards keeping the nominal interest rates unduly low 
and by the enlargement of government deficits financed by recourse to the banking 
system. 
6.4 Growth of Banking System 
The financial super-structure that needs to be built by the Sudan, like other 
LDCs, with the real infrastructure can best be evaluated by the opportunity of 
spreading financial institutions and the benefits that would be derived from in- 
creased savings and more efficient allocation of funds for financing investment. 
The banking system in the Sudan has undergone significant development since 
the establishment of the Bank of Sudan on February 22nd 1960. Now, beside the 
Central bank, there are 24 commercial banks of which 5 are foreign banks. In 
addition, there are also 4 specialised banks. Commercial banks were nationalised 
in 1970; and although they were denationalised after a while, the entire banking 
system has been placed under the auspices of the public sector. 
6.4.1 The Bank of Sudan 
6.4.1.1 Establishment 
Traditional functions of any central bank are summarised as: issue of currency 
and control of its purchasing power through monetary policies; act as the govern- 
ment bank and as a consultant in monetary affairs; acts as the banks' banker (that 
is, lender of last resort) and, finally, it manages the government's foreign reserves 
balances. 
However, the Bank of Sudan as a central bank working in a developing economy 
is entrusted with other functions. It was required to undertake an effective role in 
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the economy by using all monetary and credit policies to enhance and push ahead 
economic and social development. 
The start of the Bank of Sudan was syncronised with the launching of the 
first `Ten-year Plan(1960/61-1969/70). The Bank of Sudan undertook the respon- 
sibility of adopting monetary policies that could increase production and create 
a surplus in the central government's budget so as to finance the projected plan. 
Therefore, it formulated monetary and credit policies designed basically to direct 
credit financing to the different productive sectors and to foreign trade, in par- 
ticular exports which, using exports proceeds, finance imports of machinery and 
equipments and other production inputs. At the same time the Bank of Sudan 
restricted financing of imported non-essential consumer goods and of unproductive 
activities like residential investment and personal loans. 
6.4.1.2 Monetary and credit policies 
There is no record of the use of monetary and credit policies in the official 
notes and records of the Sudan Government before the establishment of the central 
bank. The reason for this is that, beside the absence of a central bank vested with 
the power of administering and controlling the money and credit flows, the then 
existing commercial banks were branches of foreign banks with almost full control 
on their operations by their head-quarters abroad. 
The Bank of Sudan was established in 1959 by its Bank Act of that year and 
it started operation in 1960. It concerned itself from the start with formulation 
of monetary policies which aim at the realisation of monetary stability and at 
directing bank credit to useful and strategic economic activities in the interest of 
orderly and balanced economic growth. 
In the sphere of direction and management of credit, section 5 of the Bank 
of Sudan Act (1959), stipulates that among the main purposes of the Bank is to 
assist in the promotion of banking system and a system of money and credit in 
the Sudan and looking after its stability with a view to realising the economic 
development of the country in an orderly and balanced manner. To realise this 
important monetary and economic objective the Act has secured for the Bank all 
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the measures and powers which enable it to control the size of credit and direct it 
into the proper direction. 
One of the credit control tools made availabe by the Bank of Sudan Act is 
the rate of interest or rate of discount or rediscount, known as the bank rate. 
Section 42 of the Act enables the Bank to establish differential rates for various 
classes of transactions or maturities. It is important to note here what has been 
stressed elsewhere about the ineffectiveness of interest rate policy in a country like 
the Sudan. This can be attributed to: (i) the highly restricted spread of banking 
habit, (ii) the religious and social causes which regard interest rate as usury, (iii) the 
short experience of the banking system and (iv) the limited non-banking finance. 
Another tool of monetary control is the power to fix and manipulate the cash ratio 
observed by commercial banks. Section 44 of the Act states that 
`the Bank may require banks to maintain reserves in the form of deposits at the Bank or in 
such other forms as the Bank may stipulate in a specified ratio to their sight and time liabilities'. 
However, this monetary policy tool is not effective because most of the banking 
operations are short-term seasonal operations related to the seasonality of agricul- 
tural production. This, thus, makes it necessary for most of the banks to hold a 
high percentage of liquidity for most of the year. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that 
`this tool of manipulating minimum fixed cash-ratios has never been popular with the Bank 
of Sudan from the date of its inception to the present time', 
(Ibrahim E., p. 8). 
Since the above mentioned tools of open-market operations, that is interest 
rate adjustment and manipulation of cash ratios, depended for their effectiveness 
on the existence of a sophisticated structure of financial markets that do not exist 
in the Sudan, the Bank of Sudan relied significantly and, almost exclusively, on the 
tools of direct management and control of credit ceiling for each bank. Moreover, 
sub-ceilings for financing imports, and private and professional loans are also fixed 
within the overall ceiling for each bank, in consequence of requirements of the 
stabilisation and financial reform programmes imposed by the I. M. F. Within the 
framework of these programmes the total expected increase in commercial banks' 
credit to the private sector is determined. These ceilings are subjected to strict 
follow-up and survelliance to safeguard against banks exceeding the limit or misuse. 
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This monetary policy tool enjoys high degree of flexibility since the ceilings are 
reviewed periodically every three months. 
Within the framework of setting ceilings on bank credit the Central Bank 
follows a policy of controlling not only the size of banks' lending but its type. The 
Bank of Sudan issues its directives to these banks to direct the greater part of 
credit to productive sectors. Moreover, an advisory committee for bank credit has 
been set up since March 1980 to take a final decision on all submissions for large 
credit facilities coming to the commercial banks. 
So far, these are scope and tools of monetary policy exercised by the Bank of 
Sudan. One more notice can be added. During the period 1960-65 when public 
expenditure increased with launching of the first Ten-year Plan, and consequently, 
money supply increased as well, there were no strict monetary and credit policies. 
The period 1965/66-1970/71 was characterised by a substantial increase in the size 
of the obligation of the public sector to the banking system. In addition, there was 
deterioration in the position of foreign reserves, and an increase in current expen- 
diture at the expense of capital expenditure. The monetary authorities decided to 
take severe measures towards the banking system which was nationalised in 1970. 
6.4.1.3 Lending the government 
Apart from controlling credit in the economy, the Bank of Sudan has a vital role 
in lending to both the government and public sector corporations. The Central 
Bank's law guarantees to the government the right of short-term borrowing to 
bridge the gap in the budget, (Act No. 57). 
There are, however, similar acts in the laws of central banks in other Arab 
countries. For instance, the Act 49 of the law of Central Bank of Jordan, Act 53 
of the law of Central Bank of Algeria, and Act 4 of the law of Central Bank of 
Iraq, (El-Shoosh, Tag Elsir, 1977, p. 47). Governments in these countries make 
use of these acts in a reasonable manner; but the Sudan Government continues to 
abuse this facility and, consequently, to contribute to the distortion of the financial 
system. 
The original Act 57 allowed the government to borrow for short-term pur- 
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poses, up to 15% of its estimated revenue in a specific fiscal year, and the amount 
borrowed should be repaid within six months following an end of the fiscal year. 
Because of the increasing need for borrowing, the Act 57 was amended repeatedly. 
In 1962 the Act 57 was amended and added to by the Act 57(A) which allowed 
also the government corporations to borrow from the Bank of Sudan, so that their 
borrowing would be within the limits specified to the central government (i e, 15% 
of its estimated revenue). In 1969 this Act 57 (A) was amended remarkably so that 
government corporations could borrow outside the limits specified for the central 
government borrowing. 
The Act was amended for the third time in 1970 by the then new government 
for the purpose of restricting borrowing. The government borrowing limit was then 
reduced to 10% of its estimated current revenue and to be repaid within six months 
following closing accounts of the indicated fiscal year. This restriction extended 
for three years only and the Act, under pressures, was amended in May 1973 
in such a way that the government, apart from temporary loans, could borrow 
to finance productive sectors. This was, in fact, a drastic change because the 
government was enabled to borrow without limit. Moreover, the government felt 
that it failed to repay debts, and this constrained it to borrow more, therefore it 
amended the Act automatically in 1974 to postpone repayment of debts to the 
Central Bank. Other amendments were made in subsequent years and debts of 
the government to the Bank of Sudan were frozen following a serious deterioration 
in financial position. In this way, these debts became long-term loans, instead of 
being of a short-term nature as stipulated by the Act 57. Financial records show 
that the government started borrowing since early 1964, and with the subsequent 
amendments the government depended wholly on deficit financing. Cumulative 
debts amounted to LS. 5798.2 million in 1985 compared with LS. 610.8 million 
in 1977. Public corporations borrowing increased from LS. 143 million in 1977 
to LS. 1051 millions in 1985 and LS. 2099 million in June 1988 (Bank of Sudan, 
Economic and Financial Statistics Review, April-June 1988). 
In this way, the size of the obligations of the public sector to the banking 
system increased substantially. The government, who had been a net creditor to 
the banking system, became a debtor. Under such curcumstances of compound 
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internal and external imbalances in which the foreign reserves have fallen down 
to unprecedented low levels and in which the inflationary pressures have been 
obstructing the growth of the economy, the government resorted to the I. M. F. 
programmes of financial reform and stabilisation. The Bank of Sudan adjusted 
its policies - as mentioned earlier- to be consistent with the objectives of these 
programmes. 
6.4.2 Nationalisation of commercial banks 
Before the Nationalisation Act of 1970, the commercial banking system in the 
Sudan consisted of seven banks. 18 The Nationalisation Act was an outstanding 
landmark in the development of the Sudanese banking system and the monetary 
and credit policies emanated from it. The government argued that banks were 
nationalised because of: (i) foreign domination and the drain of national economic 
surpluses; (ii) geographical imbalance in banks' distribution and their concentra- 
tion in urban areas only; (iii) meager contribution to development and (iv) an 
absence of effective central control, ( Bank of Sudan, Nationalisation of Banks in 
the Sudan, undated report, p. 4). The nationalisation resolution aimed at develop- 
ment and improvement of banking services to various economic sectors, particularly 
in the traditional areas; putting an end to foreign domination and providing the 
Central Bank and the government with full power to control credit policies. 
As was argued, the main disadvantage of foreign domination was that com- 
mercial banks operated mainly with deposits of the Sudanese and transferred the 
profits abroad. The capital of these banks were insignificant when compared with 
their deposits. It was found that total capital of these banks amounted to LS. 
9.24 million only while their deposits were LS. 49.9 million. The total profit they 
transferred amounted to LS. 7.2 millions during the period 1960-1967. 
Measured in terms of a number of branches and deposits mobilised and credit 
disbursed, banking facilities were concentrated in Khartoum and the central Su- 
dan, while regions such as Darfour and the South remained backward so far as 
18 These are Barclays Bank D. C. O. (British); National and Grindlays Bank (British); Bank Misr 
(Egyptian); The Arab Bank (Jordan); Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (Ethiopia); The Credit Lyon- 
nais Bank (French, but 60% of its capital was owned by the Bank of Sudan); Sudan Commercial 
bank (founded in 1960 by the Sudanese private sector). 
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the growth of banking was concerned. It was found that out of 62 branches of 
commercial banks, 48 branches were in Khartoum, Gazera and Kassala provinces. 
Moreover, banks failed to convert very liquid assets into medium-and-long-term 
loans. Over the period 1960-1970,80% of commercial banks' loans were short- 
term finance to the foreign trade sector only. 
However, the nationalisation resolutions necessitated revising the relation be- 
tween the central bank and the commercial banks, changing it from one of su- 
pervision and technical instruction to an organic relation of actual ownership. In 
1971 the Bank of Sudan advanced another step in its strategy of controlling credit 
extended by commercial banks by raising cash deposits on imports to 40% of the 
value of imported commodities. 
In the first two years of nationaltion the Bank of Sudan had followed in its 
monetary and credit policy a strictly independent path free from any commitment 
to the IMF. But in February 1972 the Sudan entered into a new stabilisation 
programme with the IMF as the government was faced with difficulties in carrying 
on nationalisation. These difficulties included the loss of foreign reserves to finance 
development projects, and inadequate trained staff to run the projects which were 
already supervised by the commercial banks. 
6.4.3 Regulation of banks 
While the position of the Central Bank to control banking system was enhanced 
after nationalisation, it was weakened relatively during the years 1973-1975. The 
year 1973 witnessed a passing of the `Regulation of Banks and Savings Act', with 
a justification that the control of the Bank of Sudan over administrative matters 
of commercial banks was not one of its basic functions. Thus, the Bank of Sudan 
was left only with technical powers and functions. 
However, an immediate outcome of this weakening of the Central Bank was 
that some banks expanded credits exceeding their limits. Among the harmful 
consequences of the Act was the huge rise in the size of bad debts of some commer- 
cial banks which unduobtedly resulted from the liberal and unguaranteed credit 
facilities. 
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In 1975 the government withdrew the `Regulation of Banks and Savings Act' of 
1973 by passing `Banks Nationalisation (Amendment) Act 1975'. It also dissolved 
the `Saving and Investment Council' which was established earlier. By doing so, 
however, the Bank of Sudan was vested again with powers of control over banking 
system. 
The banking system was affected latter by the programmes of economic con- 
centration and financial reform agreed upon with the IMF. Among the objectives 
of these programmes were to check borrowing from the banking system and ma- 
nipulation of the exchange rate for the Sudanese pound. The government, on 
recommendation from the I. M. F., set up a parallel market for foreign currencies 
side by side with the official market. It did so, however, without any preparatory 
or regulatory work for this market and without any stabilisation mechanism ( for 
instance, an equalisation account or stabilisation fund) to enable the Bank of Su- 
dan to interfer so that it could crowd out fluctuations and differentials between 
the two markets. Therefore, speculative and parasitic dealings predominated in 
the exchange market. 
Thus far, this is a brief account of development in monetary and credit policies 
in the Sudan, which left their impact on the performance of commercial banks. 
What follows is a survey of the role of commercial banks in the mobilisation and 
allocation of savings. 
6.4.4 Commercial banks 
The influence of financial intermediation in the process of capital formation 
is reflected in three main functions: first, there is the role of collecting additional 
savings - especially from the household sector; second, their impact on the finan- 
cialisation of of these savings (i. e. savings in financial form); and third their ability 
to ensure the most efficient transformation of mobilised funds into real capital. 
With regard to generating savings and allocating them efficiently, McKinnon 
argues 
`By paying a rate of interest on financial assets that is significantly above the marginal 
efficiency of investments in existing techniques, one can induce the entrepreneur to disinvest from 
inferior processes to permit lending for investment in improved techniques and increased scale 
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in other enterprises. Even though all entrepreneurs will continue to do some internal investing, 
a higher proportion of gross savings will pass through the external capital market. The release 
of resources from inferior uses in the underdeveloped environment is as important as new net 
savings per se. ', (McKinnon, Ronald I., 1973, p. 15). 
A similar argument was expressed by Shaw when he writes 
`Savers may ignore a possible transitory increase from say, 4 to 6 per cent in rates of return, 
but they are less likely to maintain consumption saving pattern when rates of return change, in 
a context of economic reform, from negative levels to positive 10 - 15 per cent and more. Given 
the relative scarcity of wealth in lagging economies, the income effect of return should not be 
expected to overwhelm the substitution effects of more wealth for less consumption now' (Shaw, 
E., 1973, p. 73). 
However, the financial super-structure that needs to be built by the Sudan, as 
a developing economy can best be evaluated by the opportunity cost of spreading 
financial institutions and the benefits that would be derived from increased savings 
and more efficient allocation of funds for financing investment in the Sudan. 
Theoretically, these are the basis on which the commercial banks should work. 
Performance of commercial banks can now be evaluated from this point of view. 
6.4.4.1 Sectoral distribution of banking network 
Banking system is composed mainly of commercial banks whose number is 
now 24 banks distributed as follows: 9 banks owned by the government, including 
three specialised banks and a saving bank, 5 foreign banks, 10 joint-venture banks 
owned by foreign and Sudanese shareholders. The banks maintain 315 branches 
102 of these branches are run by joint-venture banks and 8 by foreign banks. 
As for the public sector banks, these include the 4 foreign banks that were na- 
tionalised in 1970 and since then have been owned by the government. "' In 1983 the 
National Bank for Export and Import was set to finance foreign trade particulary 
commodity loans received by the government from foreign donars. The government 
established also the Islamic Co-operative Development Bank as a joint-venture with 
19 Bank of Khartoum, El Nilien Bank, Unity Bank and the Sudanese Commercial Bank. 
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the co-operative unions and now the bank is offering shares for subscription by the 
private sector. 
Joint commercial banks are owned by the Sudanese private sector and its 
foreign counterpart (both individuals and corporations). There are 10 joint banks 
including 6 Islamic banks. 
On the other hand, foreign commercial banks are, generally, branches for for- 
eign banks. They have been authorised to expand the base of the national economy 
by providing capital for the needy public and the private sector. Any foreign bank 
is required to transfer inside the country a minimum of U. S. $ 10 million of its cap- 
ital, and it should concentrate on financing medium-and-long-term investments. 
In addition, a foreign bank is not allowed to receive any type of deposits in local 
currency unless a customer needs it for foreign trade operations or he/she is an 
expatriate. 
Besides commercial banks there are four specialised banks, the Agricultural 
Bank, the Industrial Bank, the Real Estate Bank and the Sudanese Saving Bank. 
As for non-banking financial intermediaries, the Post Office Savings Banks 
are also involved in various credit activities which include the selling of premium 
bonds. Insurance companies have also played a relatively limited role in attracting 
private savings. In addition there is the Sudanese Development Corporation and 
the Sudanese Rural Development Company for financing develpoment projects. 
6.4.4.2 Geographical distribution of the banking network 
Although the growth of financial intermediaries in absolute terms is essential 
for achieving economic transformation, the geographical dispersal of their expan- 
sion among various regions is central to the realisation of full monetisation of the 
entire economy. 
In terms of an absolute growth of banking branching, the number of branches 
increased from 91 in 1977 to 176 in 1980,265 in 1986 and 315 in 1988. However, 
most of the reasons for nationalising commercial banks in the Sudan was their 
concentration in urban areas. The available evidence reveals that efforts to achieve 
the latter objective in the Sudan have been meager. It is obvious that banking 
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facilities have almost exclusively been concentrated in Khartoum province. Out 
of 176 branches operating various banking facilities in 1980,59% were founded 
in Khartoum. In recent years, there is an improvement with regard to banking 
services in rural areas. In 1988, out of 315 branches of operating banks, 33% 
were placed in Khartoum and 54% of their services in Khartoum and the Central 
Region, (Table 6.2). 
On the other side backward regions, which include the bulk of the inhabitants 
of the subsistence sector, were suffering from a scarcity of banking services. This 
has led to the concentration of credit activities on a tiny fraction of the economy, 
(El Shibly, Mekki M., 1984). 
This limitation of banking services hindered the promotion of the banking 
habit in rural areas as long as banking facilities are physically absent. One study 
found that in 1977,79% of total deposits with commercial banks originated in 
Khartoum province, (F. An Idris, 1977). This is an evidence, however, that the 
amount of savings depends partly on how widespread these facilities are. People 
are expected to save more when financial institutions are nearer than if they are 
distant. 
6.5 Deposits Liabilities and Interest Rates 
Since deposit liabilities of non-banking financial institutions are relatively in- 
significant, a close approximation to the community's aggregate savings in financial 
form can be observed by the size of deposit liabilities of commercial banks. Table 
6.3 portrays the growth of central government and private sector deposits with 
commercial banks between 1960-1987. 
It is readily obvious from the table that private deposits dominate the total 
deposit liabilities of the commercial banks, reaching 99% of the total in 1982 and 
86.1% in 1986. Authorities of the Central Bank attributed this substantial increase 
in deposits to the spread of banking habits, associated with the expansion of com- 
mercial banks' services in addition to an increase in foreign currency deposits. 
Authorities of the Central Bank also attributed this increase to the rise of the 
interest rates in commrcial banks. This claim calls for an examination of the 126 
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Zh3kle 6.3: Growth of Deposits (LS. 000s) 
Year Government Deposit 
Amount % 
Private Deposit 
Amount % 
Total Index of tots 
deposits 
1960 13606 44.7 16855 55.3 30471 100 
1961 10200 33.7 20106 66.3 30306 99 
1962 12054 33.8 23608 66.2 53662 177 
1963 15597 36.5 27159 63.5 42756 141 
1964 2542 8.2 28319 91.8 30861 102 
1965 2177 6.2 32607 93.8 34883 115 
1966 1294 3.4 36281 96.6 37575 124 
1967 1539 3.5 42822 96.5 44361 146 
1968 1295 2.9 42864 97.1 44159 145 
1969 1399 2.8 48485 97.2 49884 164 
1970 2249 3.9 54875 96.1 57124 186 
1971 3332 5.4 58360 94.6 61692 202 
1972 4933 5.7 81352 94.3 86285 283 
1973 4272 4.0 101538 96.0 105810 347 
1974 5136 3.6 136231 96.4 141367 464 
1975 5952 3.5 165231 96.5 171917 564 
1976 8057 3.6 213058 96.4 221115 726 
1977 16014 4.9 313150 96.1 329164 1080 
1978 19858 4.8 405296 95.2 415154 1395 
1979 15650 2.9 528805 96.4 544455 1786 
1980 13059 1.8 694824 98.2 707883 2323 
1981 25234 2.7 908500 97.3 933734 3064 
1982 12379 1.0 1305044 99.0 131742 4323 
1983 21503 1.2 1709015 98.8 173051 5679 
1984 24437 1.2 1964073 98.8 198851 6526 
1985 261039 7.3 3280817 92.7 354185 11623 
1986 688066 13.9 4243712 86.1 493177 16185 
1987 1381605 19.3 57863 80.7 716797 23524 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues. 
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breakdown of deposits between current, demand and savings deposits (Table 6.4). 
In 1960, the percentage distribution of these deposits was as follows: current 
deposits 70%, time deposits 25.6% and savings deposits 4.2%. In 1975 these per- 
centages were 72.1%, 4.8% and 23.1% respectively. 
Considering that time deposits were exceptionally high in 1960, the figures 
imply that this particular type of deposits has kept a relatively constant small share 
out of the total. The reason behind this is that time deposits are not particularly 
attractive to commercial banks as they are deposited only for short periods. 
Savings deposits have shown an impressive growth up to the year 1977. Al- 
though monetary authorities in the Sudan believed that this growth was due to 
increases in interest rate, but there is no evidence, however, to suggest that this 
steady increase was coming from the manipulation of the nominal interest rate. 
Prior to 1974, the money interest rate on savings accounts was 4%. It was 
raised to 6% in 1974,8% in 1975,12% in 1981 and to 15% in 1983. Nevertheless, 
although the nominal interest rate increased by 100% between 1973 and 1975, the 
share of savings deposits in total deposits rose by less than 10% over the same 
period. Moreover, the share of savings deposits declined between 1975 and 1985 
though the interest rate was increased by about 100% over the same period, (Table 
6.4). 
This small increase in the share of savings in total deposits is not, however, 
surprising if it is realised that the real rate of interest actually fell in those three 
years - 1973-1975 - from 0.5% to 0.4%. A subsequent fall in the real interest rate 
which characterised the period 1976-1986 had led to an even further decrease in 
the share of savings deposits untill they reached only 12.3% in 1985 and 12.6% in 
1987. 
The Sudanese economy is lacking high savings ratios. According to the World 
Bank, projected gross savings will not exceed 13% of the GDP, (The World Bank, 
1985). Gross savings as a ratio of the GDP were 12% during the period 1970-1974, 
18% during 1974/75-1977/78 and 14% in the year 1985. 
Given this fact, improving resource mobilisation in the private and joint sectors 
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Ta! nle 6.4: Types of Private Deposits (LS. million) 
Years Current 
Amount % 
Time 
Amount % 
Saving 
Amount % 
1960 21.4 70.2 7.8 25.6 1.3 4.2 
1961 26.1 86.2 2.6 8.2 1.7 5.6 
1962 30.8 86.5 2.1 6.0 2.7 7.6 
1963 36.8 86.1 2.4 5.5 3.6 8.4 
1964 25.7 83.2 0.8 2.7 4.4 14.1 
1965 28.3 81.1 1.3 3.9 5.2 15.0 
1966 29.2 77.1 1.6 4.3 6.8 18.0 
1967 33.3 75.2 3.0 6.8 8.0 18.0 
1968 32.2 72.9 2.3 5.2 9.7 21.9 
1969 36.5 73.1 2.2 4.4 11.2 22.5 
1970 34.5 76.2 2.0 3.5 11.6 20.3 
1971 46.3 75.0 1.3 2.1 14.1 22.9 
1972 64.6 75.2 2.4 2.8 19.0 22.0 
1973 76.4 75.2 5.1 4.8 24.3 23.0 
1974 101.1 71.5 5.9 4.1 34.4 24.3 
1975 124.0 72.1 8.2 4.8 30.7 23.1 
1976 157.9 70.3 14.2 6.3 52.7 23.4 
1977 233.2 70.9 22.3 6.7 77.5 23.3 
1978 303.3 70.3 33.5 7.8 93.6 21.8 
1979 404.2 73.4 39.7 7.2 106.0 19.3 
1980 553.3 76.8 51.0 7.1 115.7 16.1 
1981 673.5 71.5 115.0 12.2 153.9 26.3 
1982 875.9 67.1 218.1 16.7 210.9 16.2 
1983 1157.0 64.9 275.0 15.4 349.3 19.7 
1984 1382.9 67.0 378.1 18.3 302.4 14.7 
1985 2754.7 76.0 423.6 11.7 444.2 12.3 
1986 3299.8 64.2 1107.1 21.5 730 14.3 
1987 3530 61 1530 26.4 726 12.6 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues. 
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involves encouraging them to lower consumption. The primary policies for achiev- 
ing this are raising real interest rates and altering prices. At present, interest rates 
are used neither to allocate credit nor to manage aggregate demand. All interest 
rates are negative in real terms and encourage consumption rather than savings. 
All of the intermediation between the private and public sectors, and within the 
public sector, occurs at much lower nominal interest rates. Rather than impos- 
ing real interest rates, the government has chosen to impose quantitative controls 
on credit for the short-term and to seek to reduce the rate of inflation over the 
medium-term, thereby increasing the real interest rate. The lack of real interest 
rates and capital charges had adversely affected both the mobilisation and use of 
domestic resources. Important evidence comes from the private sector investment 
patterns. Recent tendencies in holding of foreign assets by the private sector in- 
dicates the private sector lack of interest in investing in domestic assets, be they 
real or financial. Since most of these foreign assets probably consists of increased 
holdings of foreign currencies, 
` it is likely that the build-up reflects the potential earnings that can be made by investing 
in greater stocks of imports and/or of taking advantage of expected exchange rate devaluations', 
(The World Bank, 1985, p. 77). 
Another evidence of the impact of negative interest rates in the economy is the 
increasing amount of investment in residential construction and stocks of traded 
items. Both of these are profitable during periods of rapid inflation and negative 
interest rates, but do little to help the production of tradeable goods. 
Positive real rates would encourage savings and productive investments and 
would discourage hoarding of goods. 
It is important, however, to mention here that during the ten-year period 1975- 
1985, there was a remarkable change in the distribution of deposits between the 
public sector banks on the one hand, and the private, foreign and joint, banks on 
the other hand. The portion of deposits in government banks to total deposits 
declined from above 95% in 1977 to less than 59% in 1985. This came from an 
increase in the number of foreign and joint-venture banks. In 1976 there were only 2 
foreign banks, now there are 16 private banks. Hence some depositors shifted their 
balances to these banks, especially those who work in the field of foreign trade and 
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this section of depositors is from the high-income group. In addition, the majority 
of Sudanese Nationals Working Abroad transfer their savings through the foreign 
banks which have branches in the areas of concentration of these Sudanese workers, 
and the deposits of foreign banks are inflated as a result if subsequent devaluation 
of the national currency, the Sudanese pound. 
6.6 The Allocation of Deposits 
Turning to investigate how the deposits mobilised have been channelled to 
finance investments, this provides a test to whether the Sudanese commercial banks 
have performed successfully as a conduit for transferring resources to the most 
socially desirable investment activities. 
Between 1960-1986 commercial banks advances to the private sector grew 
seventy-fivefold from LS. 34.8 million to LS. 2644.3 million. A big jump occured in 
1974 and since then there are successive increases especially since 1977, the period 
that witnessed the start of a number of banks. Another jump was synchronised 
with a second expansion in banking services in early 1980s. 
For the most part these advances have been of short-term nature (maximum 
12 months). On average commercial banks have been issuing 60% of their to- 
tal advances on a short-term basis during the period 1980-1986. This tendency 
originated during the colonial era and had been one of the causes leading to na- 
tionalisation of the banks as shown earlier in this chapter. There is no reason why 
this trend should have continued since the entire banking system has been placed 
under the supervision of the Bank of Sudan. 
The whole pattern of lending has been dominated by the financing of foreign 
trade, (Table 6.5). That has been particularly the case with respect to advances 
to finance exports which increased from LS. 67.7 million in 1975 to LS. 149.5 
million in 1980 and to LS. 775.1 million in 1986. On the import side, despite the 
restrictive monetary policy imposed by the Bank of Sudan, advances to finance 
imports increased up to 1984 while they were slowing down in 1985 and 1986. 
It is also readily evident from the table that there is an obvious bias against 
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Tame 6.5: An Analysis of Banks Advances (LS. million) 
Year Short-term Advances (max. 12 months) 
Financing working capital Financing foreign trade 
Agriculture Industry Total Export Import Total 
Others Medium 
long-term 
Grand 
Total 
1960 437 4245 4682 15945 5926 21871 790 7548 34791 
1961 565 4497 5062 21241 6895 28136 1542 1198 38938 
1962 412 5114 5526 20506 9554 30060 4239 6862 46587 
1963 722 7959 8691 25936 12523 38459 6282 6499 59881 
1964 864 7205 8069 22451 11261 33711 6031 7544 55355 
1965 930 7575 8505 15916 9452 25368 5119 6756 45748 
1966 722 8430 9152 19031 8331 27362 4770 8235 49419 
1967 584 10534 11118 26714 10322 37036 4878 9457 62489 
1968 362 12251 12613 35964 7128 43146 5379 9685 70817 
1969 279 14271 14550 32974 5463 38437 5391 8687 66065 
1970 215 14970 15285 31554 8521 40075 6256 9214 70830 
1971 358 7709 18067 24808 10117 34925 6943 9895 69830 
1972 445 21874 22319 35053 7053 42106 9771 10591 84787 
1973 513 31109 31622 30421 8799 39220 20014 7924 98780 
1974 436 39992 40428 38975 10691 49666 21749 11372 123215 
1975 455 59456 59911 67708 14603 82311 32637 11212 186071 
1976 466 74028 74527 81915 15849 97764 37738 18365 201394 
1977 439 75138 75875 85298 22976 10827 38752 41421 265322 
1978 637 106979 10761 93080 39193 13227 51222 52117 343228 
1979 2575 135492 13806 111101 47950 159051 68119 95666 460903 
1980 4828 170430 17525 149513 60977 21044 77018 130145 592861 
1981 1481 227101 22858 162084 125172 28725 95324 166364 777526 
1982 3478 268256 27173 298195 204300 50249 125291 243017 114252 
1983 4394 276177 280571 311769 241987 55374 167385 375218 137692 
1984 5418 255850 26126 357860 298309 65616 20770 454047 1609191 
1985 2619 384537 37815 342790 230188 57297 24575 570819 177670 
1986 6734 424171 43090 775120 157009 93212 646551 634746 2644331 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, menus issues. 
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financing working capital in agriculture. 20 In 1960 advances for this purpose 
amounted to 9.3% of the total sum allocated to finance working capital. This 
share has declined consistently reaching less than 1% in 1975, it was 0.5%. It rose 
slightly to 0.8% in 1980, but declined again to an insignificant share of 0.3% in 
1986. 
Taking into consideration the extreme difficulties encountered by the Agricul- 
tural Bank in meeting the excessive demand for loans, the impact of this attitude 
of commercial banks on the overall development is largely unfavourable. It is a 
fact that loans to the agricultural sector are surrounded with uncertainty. But it 
must not be forgotten that agricultural activities are still the cornerstone of the 
Sudanese economy. Moreover, by adopting such a policy, the commercial banks 
are drifting away from achieving a major role in modernising the economy, that 
is, through monetising the traditional sector. As will be disclosed in section 6.8 
below, farmers in rural areas are exposed to money lenders who charge exhorbitant 
interest rates which are carried out through the shail (agricultural credit) system 
characterising rural credit activities in the Sudan as, similarly, in a number of other 
developing economies. 
However, although commercial banks are blamed for shying away from long- 
term investment in productive activities, some obstacles forced commercial banks 
to concentrate on short-term financing. One obstacle is an absence of capital and 
money markets for exchanging of local shares and securities. If such markets were 
formed, commercial banks could have issued long-term securities and could avoid 
liquidity difficulties that might be encountered in financing development projects. 
Moreover, commercial banks suffer a lack of versed-staff to design, implement and 
follow-up studies of long-term investments. 
6.7 Lending Activities by the Specialised Banks 
As the commercial banks credit operations are largely motivated by liquidity 
and profitability, the establishment of development-oriented banks is necessary. In 
the Sudan four specialised banks were subsequently established to help promote 
20 Figures on Table 6.5 exclude advances by specialised banks. 
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economic development in the agricultural, industrial and housing sectors of the 
economy. 
" The Agricultural Bank was established in 1959 with an authorised capital of 
LS. 5 millions. By 1985, the paid-up capital has been increased to LS. 35.8 
millions, and is fully paid; part of it is subscribed by the Bank of Sudan. It 
grants loans to small and medium farmers as well as co-operatives; while public 
corporations (e. g. the Sudan Gazera Board) borrow directly from the Central 
Bank. The Agricultural Bank provides different kinds of loans: 
(i) Short-term loans, the purpose of which is to make it easy for both farmers 
and producers to meet production expenses of harvesting, marketing and others. 
These loans are repaid within a 15 month period or immediately after harvesting 
the crops. 
(ii) Medium-term loans for purchasing agricultural equipment and the im- 
provement of irrigation devices like digging of wells, purchase of pump machines, 
construction of small stores, loans for animal production (dairy and beef cattle). 
These are repaid in a maximum period of 5 years. 
(iii) Long-term loans for the construction of new large schemes, or maintainence 
of the existing ones and the digging of canals, (The Agricultural Bank of Sudan, 
1979, p. 11). 
Total loans granted by the bank in 1980 amounted to LS. 4.7 million and 
jumped to LS. 76 million in 1986 and LS. 85 million in 1987,79% of which were of 
short-term nature. A big share of the bank's credit did favourably go to farmers 
in rural areas, especially in the Central and Eastern regions of the country. 
" The Industrial Bank of Sudan was established in 1961. The main objectives of 
the Bank as it is specified by its Act are: 
(i) Providing financial assistance for the modernisation or expansion of existing 
industries, and the promotion of private industrial enterprises. 
(ii) Furnishing technical assistance and investigating the economic and techni- 
cal feasibility of new industrial projects. 
135 
The authorised capital was LS. 5 million, increased in 1985 to LS. 18 million 
and is fully paid-up. The bank concentrates on industries that are in rural areas 
and use local materials like edible oil, textiles, glucose and starch industries, and 
workshops and crafts. 
Loans are ordinarly granted for periods less than 2 years and not exceeding 
15 years (2 to 6 years for medium-term and 6 to 15 years for long-term loans). 
The rates of interest charged were 8.5% on medium-term and 9.5% on long-term 
loans throughout the period 1962-1970. Commitment charges on undisbursed loans 
amount to 0.75%. The bank can invest up to two-thirds of the capital of any 
enterprise (see Chapter X, section 10.4.2). 
" In 1967, the Real Estate Bank was established for the purpose of providing 
financial assistance in the housing sector. Its authorised capital, which was LS. 
7 million, has been increased to LS. 15 million which is now fully paid-up. The 
bank granted loans amounting to LS. 2.8 million in 1980 and LS. 3.9 million in 
1986 and only LS. 1.2 million in 1987. Only 13% of these loans were extended 
to low-income groups in 1986. The interest rate charged by the Bank are 4.5% 
for loans to low-income groups, 5% for middle-and-high income groups, and 
10% for commercial loans. In order to meet its increased lending operations, 
the Bank recently liquidated its fixed assets. 
" At the end of 1974, the Sudanese Savings Bank was established by the govern- 
ment in a rural town, Wadi Medani, the capital of the Central Region, as a pilot 
scheme. The authorised capital, being LS. 3 million, has been increased in 1987 
to LS. 15 million and is fully paid-up. The Bank receives saving, investment 
and current deposits. Its saving deposits recorded a pronounced rise of LS. 41.7 
million from LS. 88.4 million in 1985 to LS. 130.1 million in 1986, (Bank of 
Sudan, Annual Report, 1986). This was attributed mainly to an expansion of 
the Bank's branches. Total facilities extended to customers were LS. 8 million 
in 1980 and rose to LS. 96.6 million in 1986. 
6.8 The Informal Money Market 
Interest rates on privately made loans in underdeveloped rural areas are no- 
toriously high, and this is understood as a serious hindrance to economic growth. 
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However, the explanation for why non-monetary economic activities survive so ex- 
tensively in many LDCs has been sought in terms of poverty, isolation, tradition 
and inflationary pressures. While these factors are partly relevant, the more basic 
rationale is that under conditions of high risk and uncertainty in these economies, 
what the farmers seek , according to Lipton, are 
`survival logarithms, not maximising ones', (Lipton, Micheal, 1968, p. 331). 
However, before examining the factors affecting rural interest rates, here are, first, 
the main features of this market. 
6.8.1 Main features 
The following are the four prominent features of rural agricultural credit char- 
acterising many LDCs: 
Sharecropping 
The method of sharecropping is very extensively used. The land-owner leases 
his land for at least one full production cycle and the net harvest is shared between 
the tenant and the land-owner on some legally stipulated basis. The tenant may 
also have his own land and may supply working or fixed capital. There are, on the 
other hand, agricultural workers who work on a daily or weekly wage basis - paid 
in kind or in cash. 
Perpetual indebtedness 
The tenant is almost always heavily indebted. A substantial portion of the 
tenant's legal share of the harvest is taken away immediately after the harvest as 
a repayment of past debts with interest, thus reducing his actual available balance 
of the harvest well below his legal share of the harvest. This does not usually 
leave the tenant with enough food to survive from this harvest to the next and 
the serious problem of survival from harvest to harvest can only be overcome by 
borrowing for consumption. This perpetuates the indebtedness of the tenant on 
his regular requirements of consumption loans. 
Landowner as the lender of consumption loans 
The lender of the consumption loan is also typically the tenant's landowner. 
Thus the tenant leases his land from the same man to whom he is perpetually 
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indebted. 
Inaccessibility to the market 
First, the tenant is usually not creditworthy in any commercial banking sense 
because he has no asset to borrow against. Second, the tenant does not usually have 
access to the `commodity market' as a seller of his product. Unlike a proper trader, 
he cannot usually take advantage of price fluctuations in selling his products. In 
the local village market, prices of crops show wide seasonal fluctuations. Lower 
prices are reached right after the harvest, while peak prices prevail sometimes 
before the harvest. Having run out of his available balance of crops from the last 
harvest, the tenant typically borrows at a time when the current market prices are 
very high, while he has to pay back just after the harvest when current prices are 
at their lowest. This practice, however, 
`implies a fantastically high interest rate', (Amit, Bhadri, 1983, p. 124). 
6.8.2 Factors affecting rural interest rates 
Though high rural interest rates are attributed to the uncertainty involved, the 
premium for risk is not, of course, the only factor involved in the determination of 
rural interest rates. The reward for sacrificing liquidity as well as the administrative 
costs on the funds loaned will also play their part in forcing up the cost of lending. 
Moreover, wherever interest rates more than cover these charges, they will contain 
an element of monopoly profit. It seems likely, however, that administration and 
risk will be the more important factors governing interest rate determination in 
the developing economies in general. 
A. Bottomley concentrates on (a) risk and (b) administration costs as causes 
of high rural interest rates in underdeveloped countries. He discusses risk as a 
determinant of these high rates under two broad headings, namely secured loans 
and unsecured loans. 
Secured loans 
Naturally the premium for risk will be smaller where the collateral on a loan 
is considered to be more adequate. The lender's risk will decline as the estimated 
value of the security offered first approaches and then exceeds the value of a loan. 
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Generally speaking, therefore, a building up of the value of a borrower's assets 
relative to the amount of credit which he needs will allow him to offer even better 
security and this will encourage the lender to reduce his premium for risk progres- 
sively. 
In underdeveloped countries two major considerations stand out in this respect. 
They are the marketability of collateral and movements in the market value of 
collateral. 
Security on rural loans will comprise either a farmer's fixed assets such as land, 
capital equipment and gold ornaments; or his current assets such as crops in the 
process of production or storage. In the case of fixed assets, certain problems re- 
garding their marketability arise. It is, for instance, frequently difficult to establish 
title to land in poor countries and it may, therefore, stand as a doubtful security 
on a loan. Even where titles are clearly defined, it often happens that no one will 
bid on land when it is offered for sale upon foreclosure. In many Muslim states it 
would be against the prevailing code for any one to try to purchase the assets of a 
neighbour which might be put on the market in this way. 
The absence of clearly defined legal rights to assets offered as collateral, and 
the existence of the kind of social pressures mentioned above will raise the risk of 
lending against security. Such coniderations as these must, as put by Bottomely 
`share the responsibility of the prevalence of high interest rates throughout the underdevel- 
oped world', (Bottomely, Anthony, 1963, p. 634). 
Farmers in underdeveloped countries usually allow the value of collateral under 
their care to decline. This is particularly likely to happen where loans are made for 
mechanical innovations, or against crops which are in store. For instance, farmers 
in the Sudan are in the habits of storing their harvested crops in holes in the 
ground, `matameer', and these crops commonly deteriorate by as much as 25% a 
year. 
It is also obvious that default will most probably occur when produce prices 
fall. Not only will security in growing crops decline in value at such a time, but 
the desire and the ability of otherwise solvent farmers to bid on assets offered for 
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sale upon foreclosure will be much reduced. Furthermore, the sharpness of this 
tendency will always be correlative with the narrowness of the market. 
If, however, the the sale of crops or land faces the narrowly inelastic demand of 
a market which is narrowly limited in terms of areas as well as purchasing power, 
such as commonly occurs in poor countries, then relatively small fluctuations in 
supply will drastically alter the value of either current or fixed asset collateral when 
it comes to a sale. 
Unsecured loans 
In many parts of the underdeveloped world, loans are often made against no 
better security than the farmer's verbal promise to discharge his obligations. In 
these circumstances the question of risk narrows to the farmer's willingness to pay 
and his ability to repay. One of the main reasons why government banks and 
co-operatives in LDCs frequently fail to cover their costs of operations, is the fact 
that farmers very often regard an advance in which the government has a hand 
more as a gift than as a loan. Costs of recovery are therefore high and the risk 
of default is considerable. However, this problem is minimised when the village 
money lender is concerned because, first, there is little chance for a borrower to 
escape the money lender's eye and, second, the money lender has different degrees 
of hold on those to whom he chooses to lend. All of these forces will be in operation 
to induce repayment to private money lenders. 
A farmer's ability to repay is not always commensurate with his willingness to 
repay. In the long-run 'a farmer must provide for his family subsistence regardless 
of whether he can repay his debts or not. If a farmer's harvest fails again and 
again, there will come a time when he will feel that he has accumulated debts, 
together with the interest owed, which cannot possibly be repaid. 
However, increasing the actual marketable surplus out of which the farmer can 
pay his debts will only be of small avail, and may be harmful, if the increased 
supply of produce meets a highly inelastic demand when it is offered for sale. 
Therefore, the failure to grade, store and freeze together with the lack of transport 
facilities, will tend to perpetuate narrow market conditions, under which added 
production may also be sold at sharply falling prices. 
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Administrative costs 
Confining the enquiry to the administrative costs on private money lending, 
why then do these costs in underdeveloped rural areas appear to be so high and 
what can be done to reduce them? 
The money lender will have a schedule of costs per unit of his operations, and 
a part of this cost schedule will arise from the charges on administering his loans. 
The money lender is unable to fully utilise his capacity to administer loans 
and the high cost of adminisration even where the money lender's capacity is 
fully employed. Subbordinate to these basic considerations are : the number of 
individual loans which the money lender makes; the size of each loan; the average 
length of time for which he makes them and, finally, the administrative cost of 
providing the money lender with whatever additional reserves he may feel he needs. 
6.9 Shail System in the Sudan21 
The nature and extent of Sudanese banking facilities in the organised market 
have been examined. Significantly, only 25% of the total population are able to 
benefit from the credit facilities provided. The rest of the community who live 
in the unorganised money markets are either unaware or largely unable to make 
use of the financial credit which most of them desperately need. As a result they 
find themselves exposed to money-lenders who charge exhorbitant interest rates. 
The bulk of the farmers in the Sudan have limited access to the credit facilities 
provided by commercial banks and the Agricultural Bank; and in view of their 
low level of income - which hardly allows for a margin of savings - these farmers 
accept the shail credit. Thus, agricultural credit in the Sudan can be divided into 
two broad categories according to the source : the modern institutional credit and 
the traditional system of shail. The domain of the traditional system is among the 
subsistence farmers, and it is operated by village merchants, landowners, butchers 
and relatively affluent villagers. The impact of the shail system is marked in 
Northern Sudan, Eastern and Western regions and the Central Sudan, especially 
in the Gazera Scheme. 
21 Shail system is a form of agricultural credit practised in Sudan. 
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There are two identified forms of shail in the Sudan: the oldest form, that of 
an advance of grain or seed valued at a price substantially above the estimated 
price of the next harvest. A borrower must settle the loan by returning at harvest 
time enough crops, to make up the money equivalent of the loan. If a good harvest 
follows a bad one, with a resulting drop in market price, the lender may get back 
as much as five to six times the goods he loaned out. 
A second form of the shail involves the advance of money against future crops. 
At the beginning of the season, the farmer will request a sum of money (or some- 
times consumer goods) to be repaid in a specified quantity of produce. The money- 
lender will set the amount to be lent against the future delivery substantially below 
the last harvest price or the anticipated value at the forthcoming harvest, whichever 
is lower. Thus, when the borrower discharges the pledged quantity of produce, the 
lender should derive a substantial windfall from the operation, namely the differ- 
ence between the harvest value of the commodity pledged and the shail value set 
by him. 
6.9.1 Shail system in the Gazera 
In the Gazera a tenant needs credit for the production of cash and food crops, 
for marketing his products and for maintaining his household. The Sudan Gazera 
Board gives credit for cotton and wheat only. Little institutional credit is available 
to a tenant for the production and marketing purposes, and he is not able to obtain 
consumer credit from institutional sources by any means. Consequently, the tenant 
turns to village lenders for much of his credit needs, either for production and 
marketing or for consumption. 
The practice of shail is widespread and deep rooted in the Gazera, and it is 
the main source of agricultural credit. The earliest record of incident of shail in 
the Gazera was during the World War II when the shortage of dura (sorghum) in 
the Gazers and the whole Sudan was partly blamed on shail, (F. Hassan Adam 
and Andrea Apaya, 1973). 
The shail merchant in the village does not provide all the credit from his own 
sources, but draws from a more substantial merchant in nearby towns. These in 
turn acquire capital (as goods) from sources in Khartoum. As mentioned above, 
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the recourse of shail operator to other sources of finance increases his administrative 
costs and in turn raises his interest rates on the loaned funds. 
In the Sudan an establishment of the Sudan Oilseeds Company has helped, to 
a limited extent, in reducing the level at which shail is practiced. The company 
lacks money and it depends on agents to buy and collect crops from farmers. The 
agents do practice shail by offering lower prices to farmers. 
Tenants in the Gazera aquire shail credit for different agricultural operations, 
but the heaviest incidence of it occurs in August and September when work in the 
field is heavy and labour is in short supply or expensive. November and December 
are another heavy shail periods. 
The prices obtained by farmers in the shail system are generally lower than 
current market prices. Table 6.6 gives the shail market price ratios for the three 
farmers groups in the sample with respect to dura (sorghum), wheat, groundnuts 
and lubia (cajanuscajan). The ratios for the low-income farmers are lower than 
for the other two groups, with regard to each crop. The average ratios also in- 
dicate that the low-income farmers have a lower price ratio. This implies that 
their bargaining power with the shail operators are weaker than the position of the 
middle-and-high income farmers. However, if the Sudan Oilseeds Company is pro- 
vided with enough capital and if it sends its own represntatives to the production 
areas and buys directly from farmers, it could enhance the farmers' position and 
the shail operators might disappear. 
Table 6.6: Shail Market Price Ratios 
Tenant Group Sorghum Wheat Groundnuts Lubia Average* 
5-9 feddans 46.2 40.0 45.2 29.1 43 
10 - 19 feddans 48.8 44.8 55.2 42.0 49 
20 feddans and above 62.5 - - - 63.3 
All tenant groups 52.8 28.3 35.5 23.7 34.6 
* Figures for the average are weighted. 
Source: F. Hassan and Andrea Apaya, 1972. 
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Other forms of rural credit are practiced in the Gazera. The most common 
form is tenants making arrangement with merchants or butchers to sublet a portion 
of the tenancy to the latter. Others join in a partnership in a rotation garden with 
a merchant who finances the project. There may be a simple division of profits or 
the loan plus a substantial share of the profits may be a first charge paid to the 
merchant. 
To conclude, it is obvious that the only source of institutional credit of im- 
portance to the tenants is that from the Sudan Gazera Board. The Sudan Gazera 
Board advances cashes to the tenants for sowing, weeding, harvesting and for clean- 
ing the cotton fields. On behalf of the tenants, the Board finances land tillage by 
mechanical power, provides chemically-treated seeds, fertilisers, chemical spray. 
No interest rates are paid to the Sudan Gazera Board, only the face value is de- 
ducted. Commercial banks' credit is rarely given to the Gazera tenants. Like 
his counterpart in the traditional sector, the average tenant does not possess the 
necessary equitable assets to pledge as security for loans from commercial banks. 
In order to eliminate shail system it is necessary to increase the actual mar- 
ketable surplus out of which the farmers can pay their debts. This should be 
supported by efforts to raise the demand for these surpluses. The failure to grade, 
store and freeze together with the lack of transport facilities will tend to perpetu- 
ate narrow market conditions under which added production may only be sold at 
sharply falling prices. 
The government needs to increase the capital of the Sudan Oilseeds Company. 
Moreover, it might be reasonable for the Central Bank to relax its regulations 
covering the provision of rediscount facilities, and this consideration should be 
closely examined. Commercial banks could extend production credits and even 
consumption credits to farmers if the government helps farmers to warehouse, 
grade and transport crops and if the land titles are well defined and provide a 
suitable collateral. The volume of cheap loan from the Agricultural Bank needs to 
be increased and widely dispersed. 
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Chapter VII 
Islämic Banks In The Sudan: Problems And Prospective Development 
This chapter incorporates a number of issues concerning the problems facing 
IBs in the Sudan, and discusses basically their market share and, consequently, 
their role in monetising the economy. It may be true that IBs have been successful 
in mobilising resources either through paid-up capital or through deposits, but are 
they capable of maintaining this share? What is the nature of the. deposits they 
mobilise; are they short-term or long-term? What is the degree of their utilisation? 
Are these mobilised resources available for all depositors to use in form of credit 
facilities? Are there problems caused by the Central Bank which hamper the IBs 
in their use of these resources? 
The focal point is the market share of these banks and its determinants. The 
author assumes that there are three chief elements that affect this share directly 
and determine its magnitude, structure and upholding. These are: (i) customer 
behaviour, (ii) management behaviour; and (iii) attitude of the authorities. There 
is, however, another set of determinants that influence this market share. These 
are considered to be: 
Can IBs manage to deal with interest-based banks? 
How can they manage their portfolio? 
What are the profit distribution methods or policies? 
What are problems of management and the set-up of branches? 
In fact, an examination of the market share will answer the question: do the 
IB contribute to economic development22 in one side, that of tapping savings and 
monetising the economy? This will be discussed here in this chapter. The next 
22 The main theme of this work is to examine the role of IBs in economic development in the Sudan. 
However, it is the perception of the author that their contribution to economic development would 
be in broad sense, i. e. to mobilise resources on the one hand, and to allocate these resources on 
the other hand. Therefore the last word on this point will be in the next chapter 
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chapter will answer the question: do the IB contribute to economic development 
in its other side, that of financing medium and long-term investments? In other 
words, do they allocate mobilised resources efficiently and productively? 
According to its objectives, this chapter will concentrate wholly on the role of 
IBs in absorbing financial resources and on the factors affecting this role. Hence, 
its sequence will be as follows: 
"a general background on IBs, especially IBs in the Sudan 
" their market share magnitude 
" market share determinants as perceived above. 
7.1 General Background: 
The past two decades have witnessed important developments in the field of 
Islamic banking. During the 1970's there was spectacular growth both in the num- 
ber of Islamic banks (IBs) and in the volume of their global activities. The emer- 
gence of substantial balance of payments surpluses in a number of oil-exporting 
Muslim countries paved the way for the formation of giant multi-national IBs and 
helped the spread of Islamic banking in other Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
At the time it was suggested by some financial analysts that the unprecedented 
surge in Islamic banking activities was bound to be a short-lived phenomenon 
and that with the drying up of the oil-exporting countries' surpluses, the initial 
progress would not be sustained, and there would be a risk of a sudden financial 
collapse. Subsequent events, however, have proved them wrong. Islamic banking 
is 
'no longer a negligible phenomenon', (Nienhaus, Volker, 1988, p. 84). 
The severe international economic recession of the early 1980's posed a real 
challenge to the viability of the IBs which, true enough, had grown under the 
favourable economic conditions of the previous decade. With the economic reces- 
sion IBs came under pressure from two sides. Firstly, recession at home led to a 
squeeze on their sources of finance. This was particularly the case for the large 
multi-national banks whose main sources of finance, both in terms of share capital 
and deposits, came from the surplus-oil economies of the Middle East. The second 
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source of pressure was the squeeze on profits resulting from the slump in world 
trade and the decline in returns on real investment which comprised the main 
sphere of activity of IBs in their earlier years, (Inquiry Magazine, vol. 4, No. 11, 
November 1987). 
Despite such pressures, IBs appear to have successfully passed through these 
difficult phases. Their future growth, however, depends on their ability to mobilise 
savings and allocate them into medium-and-long-term investments. In this regard, 
IBs are challenged by certain kind of constraints, namely an absence of developed 
money and capital markets working on an interest-free basis. In other words, the 
future growth of Islamic financial institutions requires 
`some financial innovations,, (Nienhaus, Volker, 1988, p. 84). 23 Detailed theoret- 
ical aspects of IBs and their development have been elaborated in the preceding 
chapters. 
7.2 Islämic Banks in the Sudan: 
Like other Islamic financial institutions, IBs in the Sudan adopt the theoretical 
models of interest-free banking: they carry on their business activities on the 
basis of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) which is permitted in Islam. Islamic legal 
concepts of mudäraba, mushäraka, muräbaha and other forms, are translated into 
institutionalised banking practices. IBs in the Sudan replaced the interest rate with 
the rate of return on real activities, sharing risk and incentives with their clients, 
and have, therefore, followed the fundamental premise of Islamic banking. They 
are expected, as IBs, to participate actively in achieving the goals and objectives 
of Islamic economics. As a result of the spectacular growth of IBs in the 1970's, 
and an increase in their international activities, the concept of Islamic banking 
was introduced first in the Sudan in August 1977. At that time, the Faisal Islamic 
Bank (Sudan) (FIBS) was established under the FIBS Act of the National People's 
Council. 
The initial success of the FIBS encouraged policy makers in the country to 
support the IBs movement. As a result, three other IBs opened in 1983, namely the 
23 For detailed discussion on this point see Wilson, Rodney J., Expansion- Recent Devel- 
opments and Scope for Further Financial Innovations, Department of Economics, 
University of Durham, May 1988. 
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Tadamon Islamic Bank, the Sudanese Islamic Bank and the Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank owned by Co-operative Unions. In 1984, two more IBs started 
operation: the Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan) and the Islamic Bank of Western Sudan. 
The former regime in the Sudan launched Islamic Shari `a laws in September 
1983. Following this enactment, banks were asked to change their business activ- 
ities so as to be consistent with the Islamic Shari `a, and in September 1984 the 
whole banking system was Islamised by a presidential decree. However, in prac- 
tice, managements of the originally non-Islamic banks did not apply Islamic modes 
of operation properly since they were unsatisfied with the viability and feasibility 
of these kinds of modes. The Islamised banks applied mudäraba, mushäraka and 
muräbaha only formally in their ledger books and in reports submitted to the Cen- 
tral Bank. Moreover, even the policy makers in the Central Bank of Sudan were, as 
well, discontented with the procedures for transforming the banking system. They 
considered it as a mere political decision imposed by the government without being 
preceded by adequately detailed and deeply rooted studies. In 1985, the regime 
was overthrown and many Islamised banks neglected Islamic modes of operating 
much more than they had. 
Like their counterparts in other countries, IBs in the Sudan were affected 
greatly by the regulatory measures imposed. These were first enacted by intro- 
ducing a special law24 exempting them from a number of existing banking rules. 
After Islamising the banking system, the authorities withdrew all the concessions. 
Unfortunately, after a number of years of operation, the relationship between IBs 
and the central bank still remains unstable, and the latter sought to regulate their 
activities and resorted to the legislative authorities to bring them under control. 
Effectively, these regulations hampered the development of IBs, which were also 
affected by the press campaign against IBs internationally and in the Sudan, par- 
ticularly after 1984. 
In the Sudan there existed for a long time a system of lending to farmers 
which is even worse than interest lending in terms of the extravagant interest rates 
that are usually charged, (see chapter six). The system of `shaill' has survived for 
quite a long time despite its prohibition by the shari `a. Therefore the major role 
24 See the chapter on FIBS. 
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assigned for IBs is that they should eliminate this informal sector by extending 
their banking services and credit to a large number of the population, especially 
in the rural areas. 
7.3 IBs as Contributors to Development: 
The quantitative expansion of Islamic banking could do more than merely 
passively permit the growth of the real economy. Financial growth of IBs could be 
an active contributor to more rapid real economic growth. Active contribution can 
take two forms: (a) increasing the productivity of existing capital and (b) raising 
the supply of savings. 
7.3.1 Increasing the productivity of capital: 
The most significant improvement in the productivity of existing capital could 
come about if IBs (as well as for other commercial banks) use to provide liquidity 
through transactions balances as a substitute for barter. When used as a medium 
of payment, commodities have several disadvantages, being costly and risky to 
transport from place to place, or to store away as a form of wealth. In the Sudan, 
commodity barter is already limited to remote rural areas. This is fortunate given 
that commodities represent idle capital and seem to earn no return for their own- 
ers. Banking money, by contrast, costs almost nothing to produce and (through 
loans) represents savings put to work; it is active capital. With the spread of 
IBs in rural areas, the use of bank intermediation may be expected to displace 
commodity barter and thus enhance the productivity of the society's existing real 
capital. When these commodities (including gold) are drawn from the private 
hoards of planters and merchants and transferred to bank vaults, they serve more 
productively as `high powered' reserves rather than as `low-powered' money in cir- 
culation. The IBs have a favourable record in this respect,. for they have attracted 
new (petty) savers into the banking cycle; however, their role in rural areas is still 
limited (see below). 
Expansion of IBs could also enhance the productivity of existing physical and 
human capital. By improving access to equipment and markets, IBs credit could 
enable those in traditional sectors to give up subsistence-oriented agriculture in 
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favour of more profitable crops. At a slightly more advanced stage of develop- 
ment, external finance (by IBs) sometimes permits a planter to change from the 
less productive to the more productive practices. This may involve more capital- 
intensivity, or the adoption of a more efficient technology. In such cases the land, 
labour and other forms of capital can gain in productivity. Here, IBs have started 
to finance small farmers and handicrafts. The Sudanese Islamic Bank is now fund- 
ing small planters to produce cash crops, but the attempt has only just begun and 
is limited mostly to urban areas. The Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan is participating 
in one of the agricultural schemes, which is using capital-intensive techniques; it is 
also funding small handi-crafts. 
To summarise, IBs are required to participate more in improving the produc- 
tivity of the existing capital by extending their services, especially to the rural 
areas, and by improving access to equipment and markets by extending funds to 
those in traditional sectors to finance more productive inputs. 
7.3.2 Raising the supply of savings: 
The contribution of IBs to economic development is measured not only by 
increasing the productivity of capital, or allocating resources to productive sectors; 
it is important also to examine their size in relation to the banking system and the 
economy as a whole, i. e., the size of resouces they can mobilise and their capability 
to raise the supply of these savings. One point will be elaborated upon in this 
regard, namely the role of IBs in monetising the economy. 
7.3.2.1 Monetising the econmy 
. IBs' density 
Increasing the supply of savings depends on the degree of monetisation of the 
economy. IBs have a role to play in a country like the Sudan, where the traditional 
sector is still dominant. This role depends on their expansion and spread in the 
rural areas instead of concentrating in urban areas. Expansion is important for 
economic development in terms of reducing costs of borrowing. 
Therefore, IBs' density (i. e. spread) is significant primarily in terms of their 
accessibility. The larger the proportion of the population which have access to bank 
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facilities (and the larger the share of financial assets passing through the hands of 
bankers), the more effectively the banking system can discharge its functions. 
Density can be measured in various ways. These include the number of offices 
per unit of area or per number of inhabitants. However, this method of measuring 
density is by itself inadequate because the number of offices per unit of area or 
inhabitants says little about the volume of bank resources available to the area 
and its inhabitants. 
The simplest measure of the degree of banking spread is one which relates 
the number of branches to area. A somewhat more significant measure of density 
relates banks' offices to total population. The actual index used here is constructed 
as follows: 
Number of offices x 10,000 
total population 
A ratio over 1.0 - i. e. more than one branch per 10000 inhabitants - is `high'. 
A ratio between 0.5 and 1.0 is `moderate', whereas one below 0.5 is `low'. A ratio 
less than 0.1 is `very low', (Cameron, R., 1967). 
Table 7.1 shows the spread of banking branches by region. IBs branches consti- 
tute 25.8% of the banking system branches, which indicates the importance of IBs. 
Both IBs and the commercial banks have the same degree of concentration in the 
urban area of Khartoum. The banking system is concentrated more in the Central 
Region and the Southern Region. Apart from that, IBs predominate the backward 
rural regions more than in other regions. This might signify their contribution to 
monetising the traditional sector and would, therefore, have a favourable impact 
on economic growth. 
It is, in fact, a favourable indication of their contribution to economic develop- 
ment that IBs have spread to the rural areas. But this is not to say that they have 
developed the `banking habit' to such a high degree that individual savers can be 
attracted increasingly to holding their savings in financial rather than real form. 
The consequence of this can be observed in backward regions such as Darfor and 
Kordufan, where the general public still makes relatively infrequent use of cheques. 
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Taking the more appropriate banking density measure - i. e. the actual index-, 
banking density in Khartoum is moderate, between 1.0 and 0.5, and it is low for 
the Central, the Northern and the Eastern Regions, being less than 0.5. More 
important, it is very low for the most backward regions of Darfor, Kordufan and 
the Southern Regions, being less than 0.1. This is the finding for all banks and 
can be generalised for, IBs as well. Thus, one may conclude that IBs still have a 
very low density, especially in the more backward regions. 
In this respect, the purpose of IBs, as financial institutions in an under- 
developed economy, would be to provide collecting points for savings of a relatively 
small average amount from a large number of individual sources. So long as the 
means to utilise savings safely and profitably are not available in remote rural 
areas, funds will either be sterilised in useless hoards of cash or precious metals, 
or, more likely still, will not accumulate at all, (Navin, E., 1961). Since the Sudan 
is a poor country, there is a great need for IBs and for other financial agencies to 
collect and invest the savings of the people and institutions within its borders. 
Table 7.1: Banks' Density by Regions 
Regions Branches by region population Bank density 
all banks (1) IBs (2) 2/1 (million) 
number % number % 
Khartoum 96 33.9 25 34.2 26.0 1.802 0.53 
Central 60 21.1 10 13.7 16.6 4.026 0.15 
North 27 9.5 12 16.4 44.0 1.074 0.25 
East 44 15.5 12 16.4 27.2 2.208 0.20 
Kurdofan 24 8.5 01 11 04.0 3.093 0.08 
Darfor 15 5.3 05 07 33.3 3.094 0.05 
South 17 6.1 08 1.3 47.0 5.271 0.03 
Total(1987) 283 100.0 73 100.0 25.8 - - 
Source: Bank of Sudan Reports; IBs' Reports; Department of Statistics 
However it is not enough just to extend services to rural areas, mobilising 
savings there and placing them in investment activities outside these rural areas. 
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Not only should the spread of IBs improve the interregional flows of funds, it 
should also reduce the disparities in the cost of borrowing, and invest the mobilised 
resources in the rural areas. IBs managers have indicated that they use deposits 
of branches in rural areas in one way or another to fund investments in urban 
areas. This `export' of rural area savings will have an adverse effect on the growth 
rates of these backward areas. In this respect, one might argue that IBs should 
adopt a growth-from- below policy, with more emphasis on the financing of small- 
scale economic activity in industry and agriculture. They should open branches 
in rural areas so that every branch could carry out specific functions and thus 
activate stagnant potentialities for growth. This growth-from- below policy should 
be through the branch banking expansion rather than unit banking expansion. 
Branch banking has the advantage of widening the resource base which enables 
sudden emergencies to be dealt with more easily, diversifying their risks to a greater 
extent. Hence IBs could be less susceptible to difficulties. The expansion of branch 
banking can also enable lBs to shift resources geographically with greater ease and 
less cost, which in turn can help to equalize rates of returns on capital in different 
regions and industries. 
IBs face the challenge of finding ways in which their system can interact with a 
traditional banking system dominated by Hba, without themselves being commit- 
ted to interest-bearing dealings. The question is: What is the size of IBs' deposits 
and what are the determinants of this market share? 
7.4 Market Share Magnitude: 
The market share, is meant here to include the paid-up capital and deposits of 
IBs as compared to that of the banking system as a whole. Below is an examination 
of the volume of the paid-up capital, and the size of deposits and their components. 
7.4.1 Paid-up capital 
7.4.1.1 IBs and commercial banks: 
IBs' paid-up capital, as a percentage of that of commercial banks, increased 
from 9% in 1980 to 51% in 1985, falling slightly in the years 1986 and 1987. 
However, this fall was not significant as it was attributed partly to a re-valuation 
153 
of paid-up capital of some foreign banks whose capital is in foreign currency, (Table 
7.2 and Figure 7.1(a)) 
Table 7.2: IBs & Banking System: Paid-up Capital (1980-1988) (LS. million) 
Ms (1) Bankingsystem*(2) Bankingsystem'(3) (1)/(2) % (1)/(3) % 
1980 5.6 65.8 60.2 9 9.3 
1981 11.3 73.3 62.0 15 18.2 
1982 14.7 94.4 79.7 16 18.4 
1983 70.1 246.7 176.6 28 40 
1984 154.8 328 159.7 51 105 
1985 168.3 328 159.7 51 105 
1986 175 425.6 250.6 41 70 
1987 178 466.5 288.5 38 62 
Total 777.8 2026.3 1248.5 38.4 62.3 
Rt % 62 38 14 - - 
* Including IBs.; * Excluding IBs. 
tGrowth rate, as calculated by the author. 
Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, lBs Reports 
More importantly, IBs'. paid-up capital grew at faster rate than that of the 
commercial banks. The former grew at 62% while the latter grew at 38% over the 
period under review. However, when excluding IBs, other commercial banks grew 
at 14% . This 
implies that IBs boosted the growth of the banking sector in terms 
of increasing the paid-up capital; they therefore have played a significant role in 
monetising the economy. 
7.4.1.2 IBs and joint banks 
There are eleven joint banks working in the Sudan, six of which are IBs. It is 
clear enough that IBs have the lion's share of paid-up capital of these banks, to 
the extent that in 1985,83% of these banks' paid-up capital was that of IBs, (see 
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1(b)). 
Moreover, the growth rate of paid-up capital of the IBs was 18.8% while that 
of all joint banks was 22.6% over the period 1983-1987. Thus an introduction of 
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IBs as a joint-venture between Sudanese nationals and foreign subscribers has been 
beneficial to the economy, since the experience of introducing IBs attracted foreign 
resources and mobilised the stagnant local resources. 
Table 7.3: IBs & Joint Banks Paid-up Capital (1983'/1987) (LS. million) 
IBs (1) All joint banks (2) (1)/(2) % 
1983 70.1 90.7 77.3 
1984 154.8 184.4 84 
1985 168.3 203 83 
1986 175 219.5 80 
1987 178 256.3 69.4 
Total 746.2 953.9 78.2 
R 18.8 22.6 - 
* Most of joint banks started operation in 1982. 
Source: Ibid 
IBs are characterised by a relatively high degree of capitalisation compared 
with other commercial banks. What then is their share in the deposit market? 
7.4.2 Deposits 
Commercial banks usually use both paid-up capital and deposits in carrying 
out their business. Therefore, it is important to see the size of deposits. Table 
7.4 below (and Figure 7.2) shows deposits for lBs and the banking system for the 
period 1980-1987. 
Firstly, IB deposits, as a percentage of commercial banks' deposits, increased 
successively from only 7% in 1980 to 11% in 1981,15% in 1982 and 18% in 1983. 
It then began to fluctuate, but remained at a level of 18% in 1987. The annual 
percentage change of IB deposits was higher in the early years, but declined later, 
particularly in 1984-85 when the annual change was only 4%. Commercial banks' 
percentage change increased steadily up to 1985. 
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Secondly, the growth rate of IB deposits exceeded that of commercial banks. 
Deposits of the former grew by 42% while those of the latter grew by 30% over the 
same period under review. 
Table 7.4: IBs & Banking System Deposits, (1980-1987) (LS. million) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Banking system (1) 720 943 1340 1781 2064 3623 4243 5786 
Annual change (%) - 31 42 33 76 76 17 36 
IBs (2) 50 102 202 318 596 619 763 1044 
Annual change (%) - 104 98 57 33 4 23 37 
(2)/(1) % 7 11 15 18 16 17 18 18 
RBS = 0.30; RIB, = 0.42 
Source: Commercial Banks Reports; Sudanese Islänaic Banks, Facts and Figures 
Therefore one would, say that IBs have a relatively good market share. They 
can claim nearly two-fifths (38.4%) of banking system paid-up capital and one-fifth 
(18%) of deposits. This is in general a good market share for the IBs to maintain, 
let alone an efficient allocation of resources. The question of upholding the market 
share is discussed below within the context of its perceived determinants. 
(A. ) Market share: chief determinants 
Given the size of the market share of IBs and its structure, what then are 
the determinants which, affect the maintenance of this share? There are three 
factors perceived to have an impact on both the market share magnitude and its 
form. These are: (1) the relationship between banks and their customers, which 
referred to here as customer (depositor) behaviour; (2) managers' efforts to raise 
and encourage savings, referred to here as management behaviour; and (3) the 
relationship between banks and monetary (and financial) authorities, referred to 
here as public authorities attitude. 
7.5 Customer Behaviour 
An analysis of this factor is the result of a fieldwork done in Sudan during the 
period February-April 1989. The aim of the questionnaire is to evaluate the role of 
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the IBs in mobilising savings. Accordingly, the questions that would be included 
in a questionnaire of depositors would be expected to cover points such as: To 
what extent did IBs attract new funds and help in extending banking services, 
especially in rural areas; to what extent did the activities of IBs complement those 
of conventional banks; did some depositors use both types of banks or did IBs 
attract new categories of clients? The questionnaire was adressed to the depositors. 
7.5.1 Depositors: sampling and characteristics 
7.5.1.1 Piloting the questionnaire 
(a) Structure and comment: 
The structure of the depositors questionnaire was intended to be flexible, sim- 
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ple and straightforward, since as depositors may be illiterate. The questionnaire 
was thus first structured then commented on by some colleagues who were studying 
the relevant subject, and then revised again by the supervisor. There was a room 
left for changes expected to be done by managers of IBs. Fortunately, however, 
they made only minor amendments. Generally, the questions were all closed sure 
for the last one where depositors were allowed to comment if necessary. 
(b) Pre-testing: 
Before actual administration, the questionnaire was pre-tested by ten depos- 
itors with IBs whom the author knows personally. Pre-testing was intended to 
reveal the practicality of the questionnaire and the time it might take to fill in. 
The average time was found to be fifteen minutes. Pre-testing was useful since it 
uncovered the fact that depositors did not like to disclose or give information on 
their deposit size. They were either uncertain about it or, as in most cases, re- 
frained deliberately from giving information. Consequently, the question regarding 
deposit size was cancelled. 
7.5.1.2 Population and sample (characteristics) 
(a) Total and sampled population: 
The target population consists in IB depositors. In fact, there were difficulties 
encountered in reaching depositors in rural areas, difficulties attributed to the 
inability of transport to get through to rural and remote areas where bank branches 
are found, plus the time constraint. Therefore, the total population was sampled so 
that the sampled population comprises IB depositors in the capital, Khartoum. 25 
(b) The sample: " 
The sample size was calculated as follows: 
d=° in and therefore, 
a l-a n= 
25 Great Khartoum is actually three big cities, Central Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. 
26 See Moses, C. A., (1965), Survey Methods in Social Investigation, London, Heinemann, 
Educational Books, p. 116. 
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where: 
d= the margin of sampling error that is tolerated. 
a= the proportion with the particular attribute in the population. d can be 
estimated using a pilot survey. 
n= sample size. 
Depositors of IBs in urban areas represent the particular attribute in the pop- 
ulation which was the basis for calculating the sample size. The author was unable 
to obtain certain figures on the number of depositors with IBs or their distribution 
between rural and urban areas. However, because of the relatively heavy concen- 
tration of banking activity in urban areas, the `sampled population' was expected 
to be large as a proportion of `total population', not less than 60%; therefore the 
proportion was (using a pilot survey) around 65%. 
The margin of sampling error tolerated was 3%. Accordingly the sample size 
was calculated as: 
n=0.65(1-0.651 - 252 (0.03 - 
The total number of questionnaire forms distributed was 300. The actual 
number collected was 205. Seven of the forms filled in by depositors were either 
incomplete or inconsistent. The net outcome of the sample size was 198. 
(c) Method of selecting a sample: 
The method used in selecting our sample was simple random sampling, in 
which each of members of the population has an equal chance of being chosen. 
To increase its adequacy, random sampling was stratified so that our sample is a 
stratified random sample. The process was as follows: 
Firstly, the sampled population (depositors in urban areas) were stratified into 
sub-population, which was taken here to be depositors with branches of IBs in the 
three towns which make up Khartoum: Central Khartoum, Khartoum North and 
Omdurman. 
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Secondly, each strata (or sub-group) was sampled so that names of deposi- 
tors were chosen. The method of stratification still assures that each item in the 
population has a chance of being chosen in the sample. 
(d) Administration of the questionnaire: 
The total number of questionnaire forms distributed was 300 as mentioned 
above. It was administered as follows: 
75 forms were given by the author directly to the chosen depositors, 
95 forms were filled in by chosen depositors with the help of bankers (junior 
employees) at the counters of IBs. 
28 were filled in by depositors with the help of branch managers. 
(e) Depositors classes: 
At the pre-testing stage, as seen before, depositors refrained from giving in- 
formation on the size of their deposits. For this reason, the completed forms were 
collected and given to branch managers to classify depositors according to the size 
of deposits they have; (Table 7.5 below). 
Table 7.5: Depositors' Classes 
Class limit (deposit size LS 000) 1- 10 11 - 20 above 20 Total 
No. of depositors* 84 
45.1% 
59 
32% 
42 
22.9% 
185 
100 
* Holders of current accounts only. 
Source: Depositors Survey. 
The classification. was done for those holding current accounts (185 deposi- 
tors) and without mentioning names of depositors. According to their experience, 
branch managers classified the size of deposits as: (a) from LS 1000 to LS 10000 
a small deposit, (b) between LS 11000 and LS 20000 a medium-sized deposit and 
(c) above LS 20000 a first class account. Depositors were found to be distributed 
among these groups as shown by Table 7.5 above. 
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(f) Distribution of depositors among banks: 
When the questionnaire forms were first distributed, the intention was to con- 
sider the estimated number of IBs depositors so that a bank such as FIBS would 
be given more weight. In actual fact, this was the result for FIBS and Tadamon 
Islamic Bank only. For other banks, the number of depositors who responded and 
returned their forms was not in proportion to a number of bank depositors. The 
distribution of those banks who were addressed is: 
Table 7.6: Depositors among Banks 
Name of a 
bank 
Number of addressed 
depositors 
percent 
Al Baraka Bank 10 5.1 
Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank 13 6.6 
Islamic Bank for 
Western Sudan 15 7.6 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 20 10.1 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 50 25.3 
FIBS 90 45.5 
Total 198 100 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
(g) Difficulties and short-comings: 
The purpose of the survey is to examine the role of the IBs in expanding 
banking services, mobilising savings - especially petty savings in rural areas -, 
and to see whether depositors have more access to banking credit facilities. Rural 
depositors were not addressed for the following reasons: 
(1) It was physically difficult to reach depositors in rural areas because these 
areas are far from the capital and access was quite difficult; 
(2) To contact depositors there, would be time-consuming, and the cost is 
prohibitive. 
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The fact that only depositors in urban areas were addressed may be seen as 
a short-coming. Even then, it is certain that some of the depositors who were 
addressed in urban areas were actually from rural areas. 
Another type of difficulty was that some depositors took the forms but did 
not complete or return them: out of 300 questionnaire forms distributed, only 205 
were filled in. 
The actual number of customers addressed was less than the calculated sam- 
ple size. Moreover, unwillingness and negligence on the part of some depositors 
resulted in seven incomplete and unclear forms, reducing the sample size to 198. 
7.5.2 An analysis of survey results 
The question now rises: Could IBs maintain their deposit market share pro- 
vided that they continue managing deposits at their disposal on a PLS basis? This 
depends to a great extent on their relationship with their customers. At this level, 
an answer to such an important question might be approached by examining the 
attitude of customers (depositors). 27 Depositors were thus asked to answer ques- 
tions about, (i) their motives in dealing with IBs; (ii) their choice from different 
accounts; and (iii) their views about the level at which IBs are extending services. 
Discussion of the research findings aims at establishing whether IBs attract 
new depositors into banking circles and defining the exact nature of a relationship 
between depositors and the banks. There now follows, an analysis of the role 
of IBs in attracting new customers. Customer behaviour, as a factor affecting 
the market share will be explored via: customers' motives and preferences, their 
attitude towards investment account and their views regarding the level of services 
extended. 
7.5.2.1 Attracting new depositors 
Did IBs attract new depositors to banking business, i. e. those who might in 
the past have eschewed dealings with banks on religious grounds or purely through 
unfamiliarity? 
27 A different set of questions was answered by IB managers to gauge their efforts towards maintaining 
the bank-customer relationship. This will come later. 
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In order to answer this question, customers were asked to indicate if, in addition 
to their dealing with IBs, they were involved with conventional banks in any sort of 
banking business. In particular, did they have accounts with conventional banks? 
Of the 198 depositors, 70 had accounts with both traditional banks and IBs, 
i. e. 35.4%. 64.6% (128 depositors) had been prompted to establish bank realtions 
for the first time by IBs. 
This is a positive sign of contribution to monetisation, but it should not be 
taken for granted. The reason is that, those with accounts with traditional banks 
and IBs were asked to show whether their dealings with the former preceded or 
followed those with the latter. 60 out of 70 depositors, stated that they dealt first 
with conventional banks. But it still remains to the credit of the IBs that they 
attracted not only new depositors, but even those who had already been customers 
of traditional banks. 
7.5.2.2 Depositors: low and high-income groups 
A contribution which could be attributed to IBs was that they attracted not 
only new depositors, but small depositors as well. This finding was evident from 
the distribution of depositors according to the deposit size. 
Out of 185 customers holding current accounts, 84 (45.4) were low-income de- 
positors, 59 (32%) middle-income depositors, and 42 (22%) high-income depositors 
(vide supra). 
As seen above, there were 70 depositors who dealt first with conventional 
banks before having any relation with IBs. What was noticed is that 38 depositors 
(54.3%) were from the high-income group; 20 (28.6%) were from the middle-income 
group; and only 12 (17.1) were low-income depositors. Thus one could say that 
conventional banks, as compared with IBs, are used to dealing with high-income 
groups of customers rather with those from the low-income group. This provides 
evidence for the above statement that IBs attracted new depositors to the banking 
system, and in particular low-income depositors. Of course it is not enough only 
to attract these petty savers; the question is, `Do they have access to get credit 
facilities compared to high-income group depositors? ' This will be answered latter 
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when discussing customers' motives in dealing with IBs and the types of services 
customers use (vide infra). 
7.5.2.3 Customer motives and preferences: 
(a) Frequency distribution analysis: 
(i) Motives: 
The problem of maintaining the market share raises the question of customer 
motives in dealing with IBs. As a rule, there are certain motives that move cus- 
tomers to any type of bank, be it Islamic or conventional: the good service; bank 
credit; wide spread of banking services - all these attract customers to the bank. 
However for IBs there is, in addition to these, a religious motive that prompts 
customers to deal with IBs, and this is especially important in the case of IBs in 
the Sudan, where the majority of people in the past obstained from banking on 
religious grounds. 
To test the impact of customer motives on their relation with IBs, the following 
objectives were listed in the questionnaire and depositors were asked to show the 
causes that allow them to deal with IBs: (1) religious reasons; (2) high return on 
investment deposits; (3) increased access to bank credit facilities; (4) competitive 
services; and (5) the spread of bank services. 
To see the effect of each of these factors, depositors were asked to indicate only 
two motives for their dealings with IBs. The SPSSX Programme was run, yielding 
the results shown on Table 7.7. 
The revealed responses, (see Table 7.7 below), show that the main factor behind 
customer dealing with IBs is the religious factor. Then comes the competitive 
service factor, the widespread of services, and greater access to bank facilities. 
The least important factor is the rate of return. 
Religious reasons are the dominant motive for depositors. This implies that 
IBs have convinced this sect of depositors to deal with"banking, who in the past 
refrained from doing so because banks are interest-based. The dependence of IBs 
on this religiously-motivated section of depositors is crucial for them if they are to 
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continue supporting their market share. Serious problems would arise if, however 
unlikely, a majority of depositors were to change their mind and decide to disregard 
the religious factor, or, more importantly, if all banks began to work on interest-free 
basis. 
Table 7.7: Depositors' Responses: Ranking of Motives 
Motive Frequency Valid percent Rank 
Religious element 149 38.6 I 
Competitive services 98 25.4 II 
Widespread of services 56 14.5 III 
More access to credit 
facilities 49 12.7 IV 
High return 16 4 V 
Total 386 100 - 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
The second, most important factor for depositors is the competitive service 
extended by IBs. 98 depositors (25.4%) indicated that the high quality of services 
offered by IBs was instrumental in their decision to deal with IBs, a result which 
shows that IBs are relatively competitive in extending services compared to other 
banks. This fact was proved elsewhere by depositors when they were asked again 
to show the level of services by IBs. Only 5 depositors (2.5%) said that services 
were bad, 41 (20.7%) said services were fair, 97 (49%) replied that they were good 
and 55 (27.8%) thought that services were very good. Thus over 75% of depositors 
were satisfied with the level of services offered by IBs and that these banks are 
competitive. 28 
The spatial reason (wide spread of bank services) is the third most important 
factor for depositors. It means that the density of IBs is relatively higher than that 
of other banks (see next chapter). If, as usual, banking services are easily acces- 
sible to depositors, the number of customers who deal with the bank in question 
increases. 
28 Competitiveness was meant here to imply that depositors do not encounter delays in, for instance, 
depositing or withdrawing money, or in handling other banking services. 
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Therefore, the bank-customer relationship in the case of IBs depends predom- 
inantly on three factors: religious considerations, competitive services, and the 
relatively wide spread of these services. Few customers come to these banks solely 
for credit facilities or for high returns. The responses of the depositors revealed 
that only 12.7% came to deal with IBs in order to obtain credit facilities, while 
only 4% deal with IBs for the high rate of return on investment deposits. This 
finding may indicate that IBs still extend less credits compared with other banks, 
and also that the return on investment deposits are still low. 
The lower amount of credits extended by IBs might be attributable to their 
lack of experience compared with other banks. Thus the number of depositors who 
come to IBs for credit facilities is still small, and in this regard IBs are required to 
adopt credit facility policies which are flexible, convenient and simple. It is also a 
fact that the rate of return is still not attractive enough to prompt customers to deal 
with IBs primarily for this purpose. In fact all rates of return, including interest 
rates, were not high enough to attract depositors either for IBs or conventional 
banks. Furthermore, rates of return were negative in real terms because inflation 
is high. 
Consequently one is able to say that IBs now maintain their market share 
thanks to, religious considerations, to the competitive service they provide and, to 
the wide spread of services relative to conventional banks. 
The first reason is peculiar to IBs: that customers deal with these banks since 
they do not charge or give interest. The second and third reasons are economic 
ones, and IBs should do more to enhance their good reputation in this respect. 
But the bank-customer relationship of IBs and, consequently, their market share, 
might be endangered if they do not attract more customers through extending a 
wide range of credit facilities and realising high returns on investment deposits. 
The responses of depositors on these two motives showed that these factors are 
still less attractive to depositors. 
(ii) Preferred accounts: 
The link between banks and their customers might be reflected by the types of 
accounts depositors have. There are three types of accounts: a current account in 
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local or foreign currency, or both; a savings account also in either local or foreign 
or both and an investment account. Depositors were asked, to indicate the types 
of accounts they hold with IBs, and their preferences are displayed in Table 7.8. 
It is clear that the majority of customers hold current accounts. However, 
what is worthy of note here is the fact that the share of investment accounts is 
low where seen against the total distribution of accounts. The small share of 
investment account implies that still IBs have not been attractable to customers 
to this account either because of the uncertainty surrounding the guarantee of the 
value of deposits or the guarantee of a fixed (certain) rate of return, or because of 
the low return on investment deposits. 
Table 7.8: Depositors' Preference of Account 
Type of account Local (L) Foreign (F) L& F Total % 
Current 137 13 35 185 75.2 
Saving 29 3 2 34 13.8 
Investment 19 7 1 27 11 
Total 185 23 38 246* 100 
* Some depositors have more than one account; thus the total is 246 and not 198. 
Source: Depositors Survey. 
If this small share is attributed to the low return, this confirms the above 
finding that fewer customers came to IBs for return on deposits, a motive which 
was found (vide supra) to be the least atttracive factor to depositors. If, on the 
other hand, the small share of investment deposits is attributed to the risk element 
involved in investment accounts, this possibility would be tested (vide infra) using 
more indicative statistical methods. 
So far, what has been stated above shows the strength of impact of each motive 
on the bank-customer relationship depending on frequency distribution analysis. 
It also shows the preference by customers for different accounts. This may not 
be enough to disclose the effect of each motive on the bank-customer relationship 
since frequency distribution is descriptive statistics. To test the exact effect of 
these motives as determinants of this relationship, another; method of statistical 
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analysis, crosstabulation, was used here. Crosstabulation is, in short, a statistical 
method, using the SPSSX programme, of finding associations between variables. 
More precisely, it is a way of finding out chi-square values, since chi-square test 
is a technique for discovering whether there is a relationship between two or more 
than two nominal- level variables, (Susan H. Gray, 1983). 
(b) Crosstabulation analysis: 
(i) Motives by preferred accounts: 
To examine closely the effect of clients' motives on their relations with banks, 
their revealed responses were crosstabulated by their preferences for different ac- 
counts. Then the motives were crosstabulated by the types of accounts that depos- 
itors hold, the SPSSX programme gives different results for different accounts. The 
aim here is to scrutinise the strength of each motive, compared with the others, 
on the choice of accounts by customers, and, hence, on the bank-customer rela- 
tionship. Each account was crosstabulated with the relevant motives that might 
affect it. The following tests were carried out using chi-square tests by running the 
SPSSX programme. 
(I). Current account: 
For current accounts, the assumption is that the following motives determine 
the decision of depositors to deal with IBs: (1) religious reasons, (2) great access to 
use bank facilities, (3) competitive service and (4) wide spread of services. These 
responses were crosstabulated by responses for preference of the current account 
as shown on Table Crosstabulation (A). 
The hypothesis testing steps were set up in the usual manner: 
- The null hypothsis is that there is an equal impact for each motive on the 
decision to choose a current account. That is to say, the religious reason, for 
instance, is not a more powerful determinant in the decision of depositors (as 
shown by frequency distribution analysis) to deal with IBs, and in this case to 
have current account. (x2 is not larger than would be expected by chance). 
- The alternative (or research) hypothesis is that the impact of motives is not 
equal for all motives, (X2 is larger than would be expected by chance). 
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Crosstabulation (A): motives by current account preference 
Motives 
religious access for credit competitiveness widespread 
current account 139 45 93 54 
(82.75)* (82.75) (82.75) (82.75) 
* Expected frequencies. 
Chi-square (X2) values are: 
a. 66.7 for all motives, degree of freedom (df) equal 3 
b. 37.44 for religious element and wide spread of services only, df =1 
c. 9.12 for religious element and competitive services only, df =1 
- the test statistics is the chi-square one variable test. 
- the significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01 would be chosen. 
- the sampling distribution is the chi-square 
distribution. 
- the degrees of freedom (df) are the number of categories minus one, 
in this 
case the df = 4-1 = 3. 
- the critical (tabulated) value(s) with which our calculated 
(x2) value(s) will 
be compared is looked up on the chi-square distribution table according to the 
significance level selected and the df. 
- expected frequencies in this case are equal for all categories - equal the sum 
of observed frequencies divided by the number of categories. 
" First: for all motives 
Comparing the calculated value of X2 (X2 = 66.7) to the tabulated values (= 
7.815; 11.314) at 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance. Since the calculated value is 
higher than the tabulated values (66.7 > 7.815,66.7 > 11.314) the decision to be 
made is to reject our null hypothesis that motives have equal impact (on current 
account) and accept our research hypothesis. The conclusion is that the effect of 
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motives on current account is not equal and that the religious motive is stronger 
than others. 
" Second, the religious motive and wide spread of services: 
Even if only the religious cause and the wide spread of services were taken, 
the statistics show that their impact is different, rejecting the null hypothesis, and 
that the religious motive is dominant. Here, x2 = 37.44 > 3.841 and 10.827 at 
0.05 and 0.01 significance levels with df = 1. 
e Third, the religious element and competitive services: 
It was shown earlier with the frequency distribution analysis that the com- 
petitive service motive is second in importance for depositors, ranked next to the 
religious reason. Therefore although the null hypothesis about the impact of these 
two elements is to be rejected at 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels (X2 = 9.12 > 
3.482 and 6.635), it is to be accepted at 0.001 level of significance (X2 < 10.827) 
implying that their impact is nearly equal. But it still remains a fact that the im- 
pact of the religious motive is greater than that of other motives, even for current 
account. 
(II). Saving account: 
The frequency distribution of revealed responses of depositors shows that the 
majority of depositors deal with IBs for religious purposes (Table 7.6). Moreover, 
even for the preference among different accounts, the religious motive is the deter- 
mining factor. The statistical test above showed that even for current accounts, the 
religious motive was strong compared with those motives which affect depositors 
decision to open a current account (table of crosstabulation (A)). 
The factors expected to affect the decision of depositors to choose a savings 
account are: (1) religious reasons, (2) competitive services and (3) the wide spread 
of bank services (bank density). 
Responses regarding the impact of these three elements indicate that depositors 
held these accounts for religious motives rather than for other reasons. What is, 
then, the finding for chi-square tests? 
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Constructing assumptions: 
- The null hypothesis should state that the variables are unrelated or inde- 
pendent of one another, so that the savings account is not affected by the above 
motives. In other words, motives have the same impact on savings account hold- 
ings, (x2 is not larger than would be expected by chance. ) 
- The alternative hypothesis should state that the variables are related or 
dependent (i. e. motives affect saving account holding) and that the religious motive 
is significant, (X2 is larger than would be expected by chance). 
Crosstabulation results were shown below as: 
Crosstabulation (B): motives by saving account preference 
account Motives 
religious competitiveness widespread 
saving 26 20 10 
(18.6)* (18.6) (18.6) 
* Expected frequencies; x2 = 7.03; df =2 
Tabulated (critical) values: 5.991 and 9.21 at 0.05 and 0.01 probability levels. 
Compare 7.03 (calculated value) to the critical values at different probability 
levels. Since the calculated value is higher than the the critical value (7.03 > 5.991) 
at 0.05 level of significance, one should reject the null hypohesis and accept the 
research hypothesis. The conclusion is that there is a relationship between savings 
account and motives and that the religious element is dominant. Figures in the 
table show that customers are more likely to have saving accounts for religious 
reasons. 
However, the null hypothesis is to be accepted and the research hypothesis 
rejected at 0.01 significance level, (X2 = 7.03 < 9.21). This does not, however, 
negate the dominance of the religious factor. 
(III). Investment accounts: 
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It is more important to test the degree of motives with regard to investment 
accounts. Investment accounts are vital for IBs as a component of total deposits. 
Again, the frequency distribution analysis and chi-square tests show that depositors 
deal with IBs basically on religious grounds. If, however, this is true in the case of 
current and saving accounts, is it the same for investment accounts? 
The argument is that IBs are competitive in attracting investment deposits 
since they are capable of realising profits and distributing high returns on invesment 
deposits. In other words, the argument should be that IBs depend not only on the 
religious factor to attract customers to open investment accounts, but also on their 
competitive rates of return. Hence the set of motives expected to affect depositors' 
decision on investment account are taken to be: (1) the religious element and (2) 
competitive rates of return. 
Put in statistical form, the above argument can be formulated as follows: 
- The null hypothesis should state that the variables are unrelated or inde- 
pendent of one another, so that the investment account holding is not affected by 
motives. In other words, motives have the same impact on investment account 
holding, (X2 is not larger than would be expected by chance). 
- The alternative hypothesis should state that the variables are related or de- 
pendent (i. e. motives do affect investment account holding) and that the religious 
element is more significant than the competitive rate of return, (x2 is larger than 
would be expected by chance). Table C below shows the results for the investment 
account tests using the SPSSX programme. 
Crosstabulation (C): motive by investment account preference 
Motives 
religious competitive return 
Investment 20 7 
account (13.5) (13.5) 
* Expected frequencies; X2 = 6.2; df =1 
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Following the same procedure of testing hypothesis, the calculated value of 
x2 is higher than the the tabulated value (x2 = 6.2 > 3.481) at 0.05 significance 
level, implying a rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance of the research 
hypothesis. Thus there is an association between these motives and investment 
account, which indicates that their impact is not the same. The effect of the 
religious motive was greater than that of the rate of return. Looking at the figures 
in the table, it is obvious that customers are more likely to hold investment accounts 
for religious reasons. 
o Summary: 
IBs were able to attract new clients and to convince others who already had 
banking relation with conventional banks to deal with them. 
IBs have a fairly good share in the deposit market. The point is how to main- 
tain this share. The logical step is for them to build on their relationship with 
their customers. This should be done by satisfying customer needs and require- 
ments. These motives were listed as : (1) religious, ie. interest-free transactions, 
(2) competitive (high) rates of return on investment deposits, (3) greater access to 
banking credit facilities, (4) competitive (good) services and (5)a wide spread of 
services (high bank intensity). 
However, the descriptive statistics (frequency distribution) analysis and other 
statistical tests prove that the religious element is ranked first in importance for 
customers. Fortunately for IBs, the competitive service and wide spread of services 
rank after the religious element. Thus customers deal with lBs basically for these 
three reasons. One finding which is unfavourable for IBs is that customers were not 
attracted by high returns or by greater access to credit facilities. Thus apart from 
the competitive service and widespread objectives, the religious element was found 
to be dominant even in the distribution of deposits among different accounts. 
The conclusion is that lBs should work to maintain their bank-customer re- 
lationship, and hence their market share, by giving more funds to customers - 
which is important since the majority of depositors are from low-income groups 
(vide supra) - and by distributing high profit rates. This is crucial since IBs can 
not, and should not, depend on the religious motive alone. Since they are now 
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relatively competitive in extending services, and since their intensity is fairly high, 
they can also be competitive in the returns they distribute and in giving more 
credit facilities to their customers. In this way, they can enhance their relationship 
with their customers and thus uphold their market share. 
It has been stated above that the investment account is an important compo- 
nent of total deposits. It is important in the sense that depositors put their savings 
in this type of account for the purpose of investment and the bank can use deposits 
in income-generating activities. The greater the share of investment deposits in 
total deposits, the longer the maturity of deposits. If deposits are predominantly 
of a long-term nature, the bank will be in a better position to undertake more pro- 
ductive (long-term) investments, and it will not encounter illiquidity difficulties. 
Therefore if IBs are to improve their position, they should encourage their 
customers to have investment accounts. What is the attitude of IB cusomers 
towards investment accounts? Do they hold these investment accounts without 
being willing to share the risk involved? In other words, do they open these 
accounts for religious satisfaction only, disregarding the economic element? Below 
is a discussion of this point and its implications for the bank-customer relationship. 
7.5.3 Customer attitudes towards investment accounts 
It was mentioned earlier that the investment account is a vital component of 
deposits with IBs. If IBs are efficient in carrying out their operations, they can 
convince depositors and attract a large number of depositors for investment ac- 
counts. If they can secure a relatively large proportion of depositors in investment 
accounts, they will be able to maintain their market share and be in a better 
position to carry out long-term investments. 
The assumption is now. that depositors of IBs are ready to take risks, but at 
the same time expect a reasonably high rate of return on their deposits. Their 
willingness to take risks might be attributed to a great extent to their religious 
motive, but the argument remains valid that these depositors are risk-takers in the 
purely economic sense of the word. Although depositors still did not receive high 
return on deposits, they had the will to accept uncertain return on investment 
accounts. This is a point which will be tested later in this section. 
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The purpose here, however, is to see how the bank-customer relationship is af- 
fected by the clients' attitude towards investment accounts., Customers' behaviour 
can be approached more closely by discussing their responses regarding invest- 
ment accounts (vs. time deposit account) as a risky account in the sense of being 
uncertain with regard to the guarantee of the value of deposit or of the return. 
Thus the tendency of risk-taking by IBs customers could be indicated through two 
steps: firstly, sacrificing guarantee by banks of the value of investment deposits (as 
do traditional banks) and, secondly by sacrificing the guarantee of a fixed rate of 
return (rate of interest). 
7.5.3.1 Risk-taking : via accepting loss of deposit value 
(a) Frequency distribution analysis: 
To elaborate this point, depositors were asked to answer certain questions as 
follows: 
Firstly, `Does non-withdrawal condition affect your decision to open an invest- 
ment account? ' 
Customers' responses showed that they can have investment accounts and sac- 
rifice `waiting'. This finding was supported by their replies that they accepted 
the non-withdrawal condition stipulated by IBs for those holding investment ac- 
counts. 29 Out of 198 depositors addressed, 116 (58.6%) replied that non-withdrawal 
condition did not affect their decision to open an investment account, while 82 
(41.4%) responded that this condition did affect their decision. 
Secondly, customer willingness to take risks was revealed more clearly by their 
responses to the question: `Does the probable loss on investment accounts affect 
your decision to open an investment account ?' 
As can be seen, from responses that were given (Table 7.9), the majority said 
that loss does not affect them, a result which provides evidence for their risk-taking 
tendency. 
29 The minimum period specified for non-withdrawal is three months. 
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Thirdly, depositors were asked to state whether they `prefer investment (PLS) 
or time deposit (TD) account'. Replies to this question are displayed in Table 7.10. 
below: 
Table 7.9: Loss Effect on Preference of Investment Account 
Responses Frequency Valid percent 
Yes (loss affects) 37 18.7 
No (does not affect) 161 81.3 
Total 198 100 
Source: Depositors' Survey, 1989. 
Table 7.10 Choice Between PLS & TD 
Replies Frequency Valid percent 
PLS 166 83.8 
TD 32 16.2 
Total 198 100.0 
Source: Depositors' Survey, 1989. 
As it appears, the majority of clients prefer the investment account, 83.8%, 
(whether, however, this is for religious reasons will be tested later). Only 16.2% 
prefer a time deposit account according to their experience with IBs and that with 
conventional banks and according to their knowledge on both types of account. 
Fourthly, in order to test how prepared depositors were to endure loss and take 
risk, they were asked again to indicate the relative importance of guaranteeing the 
value of deposit. Responses given by depositors to the question: `Is the guarantee 
of deposit value important? ' are shown below (Table 7.11). 
It seems that a reasonably large number of depositors (38.4%) would be pre- 
pared to take the risk of losing part or all of the deposit value. 
All the above findings support the opinion that IBs customers are not `risk- 
avoiders' and are willing to take risks with a bank, i. e. accepting loss of part or 
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all of the . value of 
deposits. This could allow IBs to uphold their market share 
persistently, and to mobilise resources which could be of a 'long-term nature and 
which would be placed in medium and long-term investments without the IBs 
facing any illiquidity situation. 
Table 7.11 Importance of Guaranteeing Deposit Value 
Relative importance Frequency Valid percent 
Not important 76 '38.4 
Important 72 36.4 
greatly important 50 25.2 
Source: Depositors' Survey, 1989. 
However, do other statistical tests support the argument that IBs depositors 
are `risk-takers'? This question can be answered by crosstabulating the frequency 
distribution of responses for different questions with each other. 
(b) Crosstabulation analysis: 
" Firstly, it has been shown above that IB depositors are willing to take risks. 
This was clear from: (i) their responses to the effect that loss does not affect 
their decision to open investment accounts and (ii) the fact that they prefer 
investment accounts to time deposits. To test this finding, responses regarding 
the effect of loss (only `yes' responses were taken, see above) were crosstabulated 
by responses on the preference for investment (PLS) and time deposit (TD) 
accounts. The following results were found: 
Crosstabulation (D): Loss effect by account preference 
Loss effect PLS TD Total 
Yes loss affects 
account preferenc 10 27 37 
(18.5)* (18.5) - 
* Expected frequencies; X2 = 7.8; df =1 
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The argument is that depositors prefer PLS account more than TD account and 
that the probability of loss does not affect their decision on investment account. 
Put in statistical form: 
- The null hypothsis is that there is no association between the expectation 
of loss and account preference (the variables are independent). In this case the 
expectation of loss has no influence on the customers when choosing between PLS 
and TD accounts. 
-The alternative hypothsis should state that loss expectation does affect cus- 
tomers' decision to open a PLS account or TD account. In this particular case it 
should be stated that the effect of the probable loss is less on the PLS account 
than on the TD account, and that IBs depositors are willing to take risks of loss 
(irrespective of the cause, the especially religious cause). 
Comparing the calculated value of x2 to the tabulated vlaues: 
X2 = 7.8 > 3.841 at 0.05 significance level 
x2=7.8 > 6.635 at 0.01 significance level 
Since the calculated value (X2) is higher than the critical value, the decision 
here is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research hypothesis. The 
conclusion is that the probability of loss does affect customer preference, but its 
effect on investment account holders is less (since they accept the risk of loss). 
If one looks at the figures in the table above, one can see that those who prefer 
investment accounts are less likely to say that loss affects their decision to hold 
PLS account, while those who prefer TD account are more likely to say that it 
does. 
" Secondly, as mentioned earlier in this section, when depositors were asked to 
indicate the relative importance of the guarantee of deposit value, those who 
prefer the PLS account gave less relative importance to the guarantee of deposit 
value. The argument is that the clients who prefer the (risky) PLS account are 
more willing to accept loss of part or all of the deposit value; therefore they 
gave less importance to the guaranteeing of deposit value as compared with 
those who preferred the TD account. 
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More evidence for this arguement can be supplied by crosstabulating account 
preference by the relative importance of guarantee of deposit value. The SPSSX 
programme produced the following result: 
Crosstabulation (E): Preferred account by guarantee of deposit value 
Preferred account Relative importance 
not important important greatly impotant 
Total 
PLS 75 61 30 166 
(45.2)*. (36.7) (18.1) - 
TD 1 11 20 22 
(3.1) (34.4) (62.5) - 
Total 76 72 50 198 
* Expected frquencies; x2 = 33.37; df =2 
Put in statistical form, the following assumption can be stated: 
- The null hypothesis should state that there is no relation between preferred 
accounts and the relative importance of guarantee of deposit value. That is to say, 
the variables are unrelated or are independent of one another. 
- The alternative hypothesis should state that there is an association between 
the variables and that the relative importance of guarantee of deposit value for 
PLS and TD accounts is different. In other words, those who preferred the PLS 
account gave less relative importance to the guarantee of deposit value. 
Since the calculated value is higher than the critical value at all levels: 
X2 = 33.37 > 3.841 at 0.05 probability level 
X2 = 33.37 > 6.635 at 0.01 probability level, 
The decision to be made is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research 
hypothesis. The conclusion is that customers who prefer the PLS account are 
genuine and serious in giving less relative importance to the loss of part or all of 
the deposit value of the PLS account. If one looks at the' figures in the cells of 
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the table, one can see that those who preferred the PLS account and who gave 
no importance to guarantee of deposit value outnumber those who preferred TD 
account. 
e Thirdly, is this risk-taking (accepting loss of deposit value) for religious rea- 
sons? 
The above chi-square tests prove that depositors are risk-takers and are willing 
to hold PLS accounts despite probable loss. Might this willingness to take risk be 
attributed to religious motives rather than economic factors? 
To test the validity of this point, responses of IB depositors who cited reli- 
gious reasons (vide supra, Table 7.7) and high returns (as an economic factor) 
were crosstabulated by the responses for the relative importance of guaranteeing 
deposits. Now the assumptions are as follows: 
- The null hypothesis is that both the religious reason and the rate of return (as 
an economic, not religious, element) are unrelated to the willingness of depositors 
to take risks (of accepting loss of part or all of the value of deposit), i. e. the 
variables are independent, with both religious reason and the rate of return having 
the same impact on customers' willingness to take risk. 
- The research hypothesis should state that there is a relationship between 
these two factors and the depositors' willingness to take risk, and that the religious 
element is stronger, i. e. customers accept loss on a religious rather than economic 
basis (economic factor is less important for depositors to accept risk). 
Using the minitab programme to calculate x2, the results obtained are shown 
on the Table Crosstabulation (F). 
Comparing the calculated value to the critical value: 
x2 = 1.85 < 5.991 at 0.05 probability level 
XZ = 1.85 < 9.21 at 0.01 probability level 
Therefore the decision is that the alternative hypothesis is to be rejected, and 
the null hypothesis accepted (X2 is lower than the tabulated value at all levels). 
The conclusion is that the religious element had no greater impact on willingness 
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to take risks than did the economic factor. This finding indicates that customers 
are willing to take risks even on economic basis. 
Crosstabulation (F): motive by guarantee of deposit value 
Motive Relative importance 
not important important greatly important 
Total 
Religious 67 55 27 149 
(66.8)* (56.9) (25.3) - 
High return 7 8 1 16 
(7.2) (6.1) (2.7) 
Total 74 63 28 165 
* Expected frequencies; x2 = 1.85; df =2 
The frequency distribution findings and chi-square tests have both indicated 
that IB depositors are willing to take the risks associated with PLS account not 
only for religious reasons but also on an economic basis. In other words, IBs could 
find depositors who are ready to have investment accounts, sacrificing the `waiting' 
and willing to accept loss when incurred. Thus, IBs are able to maintain their 
market share providing they carry out their operations efficiently, attracting more 
depositors through good service and the spreading of branches, and giving more 
credit facilities. In short, IBs can enhance their relationship with their customers 
since depositors have shown a desire to take risks. 
In fact, depositors of IBs are not only willing to risk losing their deposit value, 
they are ready to accept uncertainty on return. This point is discussed in detail 
below. 
7.5.3.2 Risk-taking: via accepting variable rerturn 
The survey finding revealed that customers prefer the PLS account to the TD 
account. Frequency distribution disclosed that 166 depositors (83.8%) preferred 
PLS account while 32 (16.2%) preferred TD account (see the above section). 
The point now is to discover whether this finding is strong enough to indicate 
that those who prefer the PLS account are genuine in accepting the probability 
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of not having a guaranteed rate of return. It was shown above that IB depositors 
are willing to accept loss of part or all of the value of deposits. In this respect, 
do they maintain the same willingness to accept a variable rate of return? This 
question can be answered by crosstabulating depositors' preference for the PLS 
account (which implies variable rate of return) and the TD account by depositors' 
attitudes to the relative importance of guaranteeing rate of return. The argument 
is that guaranteeing the rate of return on the part of the bank is important for 
both groups of customers, i. e. for those who prefer PLS account and those who 
prefer TD account. The assumption to be tested in statistical form is as follows: 
- The null hypothesis is that there is no relation between the type of account 
preferred by customers on the one hand, and the relative importance of guarantee- 
ing return as indicated by customers on the other hand; it should be understood 
that the PISS account involves uncertain returns while the TD account guarantees 
a fixed return. The null hypothesis implies that a guarantee of certain rate of 
return is as important for those who prefer the PLS account as it is for those who 
prefer the 'I'D account. 
- The alternative hypothesis should state that there is an association between 
the two variables (preference of account and guarantee of certain return) and that a 
guarantee of fixed return is less important for those who preferred the PLS account 
than it is for those who preferred the TD account. 
Running the SPSSX programme, the results obtained are shown on below: 
Croentlhbuiation (G): account preference by guaranteeing return 
Preferred account Relative importance 
not important important greatly important 
Total 
PLS 47 83 36 166 
(28.3) (50.0) (21.7) - 
TD 1 21 10 32 
(3.1) (65.6) (31.3) 
Total 48 104 46 198 
* Expected frequency; x2 = 9.32434; df =2 
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Comparing the calculated value to the tabulated values: 
x2 = 9.32434 > 5.191 at 0.05 significance level 
Xa = 9.32434 > 6.635 at 0.01 significance level 
Since, however, the calculated value is higher than the critical value(s), the 
decision to be made is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research hy- 
pothesis. The conclusion is that customers who prefer the PLS account are willing 
to accept variable (uncertain) rates of return. If one looks at the figures in the cells 
of the table (expected frequencies), one can see that those who preferred the PLS 
account and who attached no importance to a guaranteed rate of return outnumber 
those who preferred the TD account. 
Secondly, does this risk-taking (accepting uncertain rate of return) have a re- 
ligious motive? 
Again, as in the case of accepting loss on deposit value, it might be argued that 
depositors accept variable (uncertain) returns on religious grounds alone. However, 
in order to show that depositors accept uncertain returns not only for religious 
cause but also on an economic basis, the motives for dealing with IBs (religious 
element and return motive) were crosstabulated by the relative importance of 
guaranteeing the rate of return. The following contingency table reveals the results 
(using minicab programme): 
Croastabulation (H): motive by guarantee of return 
Motive Relative importance 
not important important greatly important 
Total 
Religious 41 77 31 149 
(42.4)' (75.9) (30.7) - 
High return 6 7 3 16 
(4.6) (8.1) (3.3) - 
Total 47 84 34 165 
* Expected frequencies; x2 = 9.32434; df =2 
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The argument, in statistical form, is as follows: 
- The null hypothesis should state that there is no relationship between the 
motives on the one hand and the importance of guaranteeing return on the other, 
i. e. the variables are independent and both the religious element and the rate of 
return motive have the same effect on the opinion of depositors when indicating 
the relative importance of guaranteeing return. 
- The research hypothesis should state that the variables are dependent and 
that the impact of religious element is stronger than that of the rate of return. 
Comparing the calculated value to the critical value(s): 
x2 = 0.71 < 5.991 at 0.05 level of significance 
x2 = 0.71 < 9.21 at 0.01 level of significance 
Since the calculated value is lower than the critical value(s), the decision to be 
made is to reject the alternative hypothesis and accept the null hypothesis. The 
conclusion therefore, is that customers accept uncertain rates of return not only 
for religious reason, but also on economic grounds. 
" Summary: 
One may conclude here by stating that IB depositors are risk-takers. They risk 
loss of deposit value and accep uncertain rates of return. This attitude is based 
on both religious and economic reasons. 
This finding is quite important since IBs should understand the behaviour of 
depositors so that they can forge a strong relationship with their customers. It 
should be clear that although customers are willing to accept the non-withdrawal 
condition imposed on investment accounts, and uncertainty on both deposit value 
and returns, they do expect a high return on their deposits. The fact is that despite 
not getting enough returns on their deposits, they continue hold these deposits, 
a fact which the IBs should take into consideration. This is vital since it affects 
directly the bank-customer relationship, a relationship which should be built on 
an economic rather than a religious basis. 
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One of the factors affecting the banks' market share is the level at which they 
carry out their services. If IBs are capable of serving clients efficiently, they will 
attract more customers and hence influence positively their market share. 
7.5.4 Bank-customer relationship: via competitive services 
To study every aspect of the relationship between IBs and their customers, it 
is appropriate to see the degree of competitiveness of IBs' services as one of the 
determinants affecting this relationship. 
If IBs, as competing financial institutions, are to maintain their market share, 
they must conduct and develop a strong and lasting relationship with their cus- 
tomers. The question now posed is, `How efficient are IBs in extending normal 
bank services? 
7.5.4.1 Competitiveness 
(a) Frequency distribution analysis: 
In order to gauge degree of competitiveness of services, depositors were asked: 
`What is the level of IBS services? ' Responses to this question are shown in Table 
7.12. It is clear that IBs carry out their services to a relatively satisfactory level. 
These responses can be said to have revealed the true situation to a great extent 
for two reasons: 
Table 7.12: Competitiveness of Services 
Level of service frequency Valid percent 
Bad 5 2.5 
Fair 41 20.7 
Good 97 49.0 
Very good 55 27.8 
Total 198 100.0 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
(1) Depositors had already indicated that the second most important reason 
for their dealing with IBs was that the services are good, (vide supra). 
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(2) Most of the depositors addressed by the questionnaire are found to be 
literate: 112 depositors (i: e. 56.5%) filled in the questionnaire by themselves. 
(b) Crosstabulation analysis: 
Depositors first indicated that the competitive service motive is second in im- 
portance as a reason for their dealings with IBs (see Table A), now they have shown 
that the level of services is good. Are depositors consistent in ranking competitive 
services as the second most important motive in their dealings with IBs while at 
the same time indicating elsewhere that the level of services is very good? This 
point will be tested below. 
However, not only frequency distribution, but even the crosstabulation con- 
firms the above findings and shows that depositors have been consistent in assessing 
the level of services. 
When affirmative responses on the competitiveness of services (as a motive to 
deal with IBs which was ranked second) were crosstabulated by responses on the 
question `What is the level of IBs services? ', the following results were obtained: 
Crosstabulation (I): motive of competitiveness by Level of Services 
Motive Level of service Total 
Bad Fair Good Very good Tod 
Competitive service 1 9 48 40 98 
(24.5)* (24.5) (24.5) (24.5) - 
* Expected frequencies; X2 = 62.9; df =3 
Assumptions are: 
- The null hypothesis should state that there is no relationship between de- 
spositors' responses on competitiveness of the services motive and their responses 
on the level of bank service, i. e. both variables are independent and customers are 
inconsistent in their estimation of the bank service. 
- The alternative hypothesis should state that depositors are consistent in their 
estimation and that IBs are truly competitive. 
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Comparing the calculated value (x2 = 62.9) with tabulated values, it is quite 
obvious that the former is higher than the latter at all levels of significance. There- 
fore the decision is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research hypothesis. 
The conclusion is that depositors are consistent in their opinion and that IBs are 
carrying out their services fairly adequately. 
If IBs are carrying out their services adequately, do their customers use all 
these services, and, if not, why not? 
7.5.4.2 Types of services used 
(a) Frequency distribution analysis: 
" First, depositors were asked to indicate the type of services they used with 
the question: `Which of the following banking services do you use: (1) different 
account services, (2) letters of credit and guarantee services, (3) money transfer 
and buying (selling) of currency; (4) credit facilities (loans). The following 
responses were revealed: 
Table 7.13: Depositors: Types of Service Used 
Type of service Frequency Valid percent* 
Different account services 159 50.5 
letters of credit and 
guarantee 70 22.2 
Money transfer 30 9.5 
Credit facilities 56 17.8 
Total 315 100 
* Valid percentages were taken here not from 198, which is the number of depositors, but 
from 315 since some depositors are using more than one type of service. 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
It is obvious that most depositors use account services only. This may, however, 
result either from the fact that customers are not granted credit facilities unless 
they have opened an account with the bank, or that they do not know about the 
other services. It is also clear that a fairly large number of depositors use letters of 
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credit and guarantee services because there is a great demand for letters of credit, 
particularly to finance foreign trade, and also a high demand to issue letters of 
guarantee. 
The above data confirms the earlier assertion that still few customers come 
to IBs to get credit facilities. Here only 56 depositors indicated that they use 
credit facilities. However, because of the importance of this as a service attracting 
more clients, depositors were asked to state `whether they know all policies of IBs 
on credit facilities? ' 79 (39.9%) replied that they know about all bank policies 
on credit facilities, while 119 (60.1%) replied that they did not know about these 
policies. This result confirms the finding that IBs still do not extend credit facilities 
to a large number of customers. 
It seems that not only the majority of depositors are ignorant of conditions 
and policies on credit facilities and that few of them use these facilities, but even 
the few who use these facilities are not from the low-income depositors, the group 
which is in desperate need of help. It is therefore appropriate to identify the classes 
of depositors who use credit facilities. 
It was mentioned earlier that IBs attracted new (low-income) depositors to the 
banking circles. However, do they allow them more access to credit facilities? Table 
7.14 below shows the distribution of depositors who used to get credit facilities and 
who indicated that they use credit facility services: 
s 
Table 7.14: Depositors' classes: access to and use of credit facilities 
Income class (LS 000) 1-10 11-20 above 20 Total 
I have access to 10 8 31 49 
credit facilities 20.4% 16.3% 63.3% - 
I use credit facility 10 12 34 56 
17.9% 21.4% 60.7% - 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
It is clear that the majority of depositors whose motive is to get credit facilities 
are from the high-income group. Moreover, those who 1 actually used to obtain 
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credit facilities are also those from high-income group. Therefore one would say 
that although Ms attracted new depositors from low-income groups, they did not 
grant them more credit facilities. 
Secondly, what attracts attention here is the fact that although customers are 
ignorant of the IBs' policies on credit facilities, they are generally aware of 
other services. 
Depositors were asked again to indicate `why they do not use all bank services? ' 
The reasons for this, as given by depositors, appear in Table 7.15. 
Thus although a large number (81) of depositors use only one service because 
they are unaware of others, those who know about but do not use them, or can 
not fulfil the conditions, are in the majority. This situation might be attributable 
to the relative wide spread of IBs as mentioned earlier (this point will be tested 
below). 
Table 7.15: Reasons for Not Using All Services 
Reason Frequency Valid percent 
I do not know other services 81 41 
I do not need others 86 43.4 
I can not fulfil conditions 
of services 31 15.6 
Total 198 100 
Source: Depositors Survey, 1989. 
(b) Crosstabulation analysis: 
" As stated above, customers use basically different accounts services and letters 
of credit and guarantee services, while fewer clients use credit facilities services. 
Crosstabulation confirms this finding. The statement `I deal with IBs to get 
credit facilities' was crosstabulated by the responses to the question `Do you 
use credit facility services? ' The crosstabulation results are shown in the table 
below: 
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Crosstabulation (K): Motive by Use of Credit Facility 
Motive Customers who use credit facility Total 
Yes No 
More access to credit 22 27 49 
facilities (24.5)* (24.5) - 
* Expected frequencies; x2 = 0.5; df =1 
The assumption to be tested is as follows: 
- The null hypothesis should state that the motive to have more access to credit 
facility has still no effect on the extent to which IBs' depositors use credit facility 
services. 
- The alternative hypothesis is that greater access to get credit has an impact 
on the use of credit facility services. In other words, IBs allowed customers greater 
access to credits. 
Comparing the calculated value to the critical value(s): 
x2 = 0.5 < 3.84 at 0.05 significance level. 
x2 = 0.5 < 6.635 at 0.01 significance level. 
Therefore, the decision is to reject the alternative hypothesis and accept the 
null hypothesis. That is to say, a limited number of customers were allowed to 
have access to credit facilities. IBs thus need to work harder to give more credit 
to customers. 
" As shown above, a large number of depositors did not use all of banks' services, 
not because they did not know about them, but because they might not need 
them or could not fulfil the conditions. To test this point, responses to the 
statement `I deal with IBs for their wide spread of services' (which affects 
positively clients' knowledge) were crosstabulated by responses to the question 
`Why you do not use all bank services? ' Crosstabulation gives the results shown 
in the following table 
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Crosstabulation (L): motive by reason for use of one Service 
Motive Reasons Total 
Ido not know Ido not need Ican not fulfil 
other other conditions 
Widespread of service 18 34 4 56 
(18.6)* (18.6) (18.6) - 
* Expected frequencies; X` = 24.4; df =3 
Assumptions: 
- The null hypothesis is that the wide spread did not affect the knowledge 
of customers, since a large number of them do not know about these services (a 
situation that may result from the limited spread of bank services). 
-The research hypothesis is that the wide spread did affect customers' knowl- 
edge, so that if there is a relatively large number of customers who do not use all 
bank services, it is not because of their ignorance of these'services, but either they 
do not need these services or they do not fulfil conditions. 
Compared to the tabulated value(s): 
x2 = 24.14 > 7.815 at 0.05 significance level 
x2 = 24.14 > 11.34 at 0.01 significance level 
Thus the calculated value is higher than the critical value at all levels. The 
decision is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research hypothesis. In other 
words, IBs did affect customers' knowledge through the wide spread of services, a 
finding which is in favour of IBs playing a role in monetising the economy. 
e Conclusion: 
IBs have to maintain their market share. One of the factors that affects main- 
tenance of market share is the attitude of depositors and their relationship with 
banks. Thus, the bank-customer relationship is a major determinant in upholding 
the market share. 
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The most crucial element in the relationship between IBs and their customers 
is the religious factor. This affects not only their decision to deal with IBs but 
also their choice of accounts. The survey finding has pointed out clearly that the 
religious factor is more effective in determining the bank-customer relationship and 
therefore affects the support of the market share. Customers still deal with IBs on 
religious basis. 
The survey findings also indicate that IBs are competitive in extending bank 
services, and that their services are relatively widely-spread compared with other 
banks. 
One finding which is unfavourable to IBs is that the rate of return on invest- 
ment deposits is still not high enough to attract more depositors. Moreover, the 
depositors' responses reveal that IBs have not extended credits to a large number 
of depositors, because the `access to use bank credit facility' is among the least 
important motives for depositors to deal with IBs. 
If, however, the relationship between banks and customers is still based on 
religious factor, and if IBs still do not attract clients by giving high returns on in- 
vestment deposits or by giving more credit facilities, this will discourage customers 
from dealing with these banks and thus affect their market share. 
IBs' depositors are risk-takers since they deal with PLS accounts. Responses 
given by depositors reveal that they are ready to accept' a loss on the value of 
deposit as well as an uncertain rate of return. This is for both religious and 
economic reasons. IBs can enhance this risk-taking behaviour in order to maintain 
their market share, absorbing more savings on a long-term basis which they could 
then direct into long-term investments. 
However, to this point; this is the first chief determinant of market share of 
IBs, via the attitude of customers. The second chief determinant is the attitude of 
IBs managers towards raising and encouraging savings, in other words, attracting 
more deposits and continuing to uphold the amount of savings absorbed. 
7.6 Management Attitude 
Management behaviour towards customers and their efforts to raise savings is 
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regarded as one determinant of the market share of IBs. However, to grasp the 
role of management in this respect, managers of IBs, like depositors, were given a 
different set of questions. The following procedure was adopted: 
7.6.1 Managers Questionnaire 
7.6.1.1 Structure and interview 
A questionnaire was formulated to address managers of IBs. It was composed 
of four parts: the first part concerning the role of IBs in savings mobilisation; the 
second part concerning-investment and savings allocation; the third part concern- 
ing IBs relation with the Central Bank and financial authorities; and the fourth 
concerning these banks' policies vis-a-vis the distribution of profits. 
In order to allow the managers to express themselves at some length, but 
without the risk of them giving lengthy aimless talks, the author also opted for a 
semi-structured type of interview, (see E. C. Wragg (1978), M. H. Agar (1980)). 
7.6.1.2 Administration of the questionnaire and interview 
It is worth mentioning here that in the case of the managers there was no sam- 
pling or pre-testing done. All six managers (total population) were addressed. The 
questionnaire forms were distributed and remained with managers for two weeks. 
They answered the closed questions and waited for interviews for the other ques- 
tions. Therefore, the interviewees (managers) and the author were often involved 
in discussion. 
The main difficulties encountered in administering the questionnaire was that 
the managers were always busy. On several occasions interviews with them were 
postponed. However, there is no doubt that they have been co-operative in an- 
swering the questions. 
7.6.2 Questionnaire: discussion 
What is the attitude of managers towards raising deposits and maintaining the 
market share? 
From the questionnaire responses reveal that: 
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For all IBs, except the Co-operative Development Bank, efforts to raise saving 
knowledge depend on advertisements in newspapers and a single television channel, 
and on direct contact and brochures. However, the method of raising savers' 
knowledge through the mass media is not very fruitful since the majority of people 
are illiterate, which means that few of them can read newspapers or watch TV; 
secondly, people's access to newspapers and TVs is limited because these media 
are available almost exclusively in urban areas. 
On the other hand, the Islamic Co-operative Development Bank invented a 
better method of raising funds, namely the `Fund of Productive Families. The 
idea behind it is that the bank accepts a small amount of funds, which are put in 
a special account, and the collected sum is used to buy productive equipment such 
as sewing machines, egg-producer machines etc. This method is attractive and has 
produced good results for the bank. 
From the responses of managers it appears that no one Islamic bank gives 
incentives to small depositors in the form of gratis loans or concessionary facilities 
to buy such things with nominal profits. 
No Islamic bank offers different investment accounts characterised by different 
risks. If this were provided, it would help encourage people to put their money in 
an investment account and have the same say in how these savings are allocated; at 
present, depositors of IBs have no influence on management decision, even though 
they are exposed to risk. 
The answers given by the managers reveal that no specified deposits were 
offered; all deposits are general, a practice which might affect the decision of de- 
positors to open investment accounts. It is also obvious that both depositor's funds 
and shareholders' funds are allocated in the same project, without differentiating 
between the motives of depositors who prefer less risky, short-term projects, and 
the motives of shareholders who look for more riskier and long-term projects. One 
explanation for this might be that it is difficult to manage these deposits sepa- 
rately and develop an accounting procedure which would enable the proper share 
of deposits in profits to be calculated. However, the policy of distributing profits 
is one of the factors which affects the market share (see below).,. 
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Thus it seems that the effort of managers (management attitude) to raise 
and maintain deposits is still not very effective. This limits the share of IBs 
in the deposit market. It is true, however, that the religious motive is a prime 
mover for the majority of depositors, but it has been seen earlier (vide supra) that 
depositors are risk-takers, not only for religious purpose, but on an economic basis. 
Thus management attitude should enhance the depositors' behaviour and make for 
more productive methods of raising savings. Dependence on religiously-motivated 
customers is serious and is much more likely to jeopardise IBs market share. 
The third fundamental determinant of market share is the attitude of the 
authorities towards commercial banks in general and IBs in particular. This de- 
terminant has its tangible impact on the form and allocation of deposits and, 
consequently, on the market share. The authorities' attitude will be dealt with in 
the discussion on credit policies. 
7.7 The Attitude of the Authorities 
By authorities here is meant the monetary authorities in particular; their at- 
titude implies the nature of the policies they adopt and implement. What is the 
nature of these policies; and what are their implications? 
7.7.1 Credit policies 
The tracing of credit policies adopted by the Central Bank shows that they 
have been gradually restricting the liquidity of commercial banks. The evidence 
for this will appear in the following review of these policies. 
In 1964, the Central Bank transferred the time deposit of the Sudan Gazera 
Board from the commercial banks, an action aimed at reducing the liquidity with 
the banks. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, credit policies became more stringent. In August 
1983, for instance, the Bank of Sudan issued a declaration to limit banks' liquidity 
by ordering commercial banks to keep cash balances with the Bank of Sudan of 
not less than 10% of their deposits. Funds of foreign importers with commercial 
banks were to be transferred to the Bank of Sudan. In 1985, the Bank of Sudan 
adopted other measures depending on past policies with respect to the limit of 
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banks' liquidity. In 1986, further credit measures were introduced to enhance the 
more rigorous former credit policies. 
7.7.1.1 Credit policy (1986): description and critique: 
In order to explore the nature of credit policies, the credit policy of 1986 is 
taken as an example. 
In general, credit policy covers a number of measures and directives issued by 
the Central Bank to commercial banks to control money 'supply and arrange bank 
lending to the private sector so that it can be used in the productive economic 
sectors. These measures and directives are concerned firstly with control and 
rationalisation of banking credit, and secondly with the control of commercial 
banks' liquidity. Measures which are concerned with the control and rationalisation 
of banking credit will be discussed in the next chapter. Here is an overview of the 
measures pertaining to control of banks' liquidity. 
(a) Objectives: 
To control liquidity of commercial banks, the Central Bank issued the following 
measures to monitor high liquidity: 
Raising the cash reserves of every bank from 12.5% to 20% of the total deposits. 
Transferring all funds of the foreign importers from commercial banks to a 
`frozen' account at the Central Bank. 
Prohibiting inter-lending between banks and keeping investment deposits with 
each other unless to finance development. 
Raising the minimum paid-up capital for foreign banks to 10% of their out- 
standing lending (or of their deposits) in local currency. Failure to comply would 
mean they would have to reduce their deposits. 
Foreign banks are not allowed to open any kind of account except for customers 
(importers and exporters) who are registered with the Ministry of Trade, (Bank 
of Sudan Declarations, November, 1985). 
(b) Critique: 
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Credit policies could play only an insignificant role, in solving some of the 
financial problems or in affecting the total demand, since the banking sector is 
insignificant in a developing economy like the Sudan. However, the credit policy 
might be criticised on the following grounds: 
The policy no longer suits an increasing volume of private sector savings (both 
in foreign and local currency) in the form of deposits that require profitable outlets. 
In other words, the policy is inappropriate with respect to the increasing need of 
the Sudanese economy to invest in different economic fields, and with respect to 
the role of commercial banks in extending development finance. 
The policy is aimed at attracting commercial banks to invest in productive 
sectors. This is a desirable and important step, but neglects the need of commercial 
banks to generate adequate profits, or at least to reward those who keep deposits 
and hold shares with commercial banks. 
7.7.1.2 Credit policy implications 
As a possible determinant, credit policy has implications for the market share 
of IBs and other banks at two levels: the level of deposit structure and the level 
of degree of utilisation of these deposits. 
(a) Deposit structure: 
Implications of credit policies for deposits in general, and their structure in 
particular, could be identified as follows. 
Firstly, although there was a fluctuating annual change for all bank deposits, 
the degree of fluctuation for IBs was higher, (see Table 7.4 above). This shows the 
formidable impact of credit policy on deposits. 
Secondly - and this is more important - deposit structure has gradually been 
dominated by the current account, and at the same time saving and time (in- 
vestment) deposits were shrinking (Table 7.16 and Figure 7.3 (a & b)). Current 
accounts increased for all banks from 63% in 1983 to 64.6% in 1984 and 73% in 
1985. As for IBs, current accounts have been on the increase, from 64% in 1983 to 
83% in 1987. 
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Saving and time (investment) deposits for all banks fluctuated, declining in the 
early years (1983-1985) and increasing in later years (1986-1987). This expansion 
is, however, attributed to the increase in saving and time -deposits of government 
banks which were not restricted by the credit policies, and is due, as well, to the 
establishment of a commercial bank with great support from the ruling party at 
that time. 30 
Table 7.16: Commercial Banks & IBs, Deposit Structure 1983-1987 (LS. million) 
Type of Account 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 
All banks: 
Current 1122 63 133 64. 2641 73 2549 60 3316 57 
R= 28.5% 
Saving 290 16. 317 15. 414 11. 714 16.8 1190 20.6 
R=36% 
Time deposit 369 20. 413 20 568 15. 980 23.2 1280 22.4 
R= 35% 
Total 1781 100 2064 100 3623 100 4243 100 5786 100 
IBs: 
Current 203 64 444 74 461 74 606 79 867 83 
R= 33% 
Saving 14 4 23 4 31 5 49 6 74 7 
R=-4% 
Investment 101 32 129 22 127 21 108 15 103 10 
R= -3% 
Total 318 100 59 100 619 100 763 100 1044 100 
Source: Economic Syrvey, Ministry of finance, various issues; 113s Reports. 
Although saving and time (investment) deposits for all banks expanded, they 
were shrinking in the case of IBs. This is obvious, especially for investment de- 
posits. Saving deposits increased as a percentage of IBs total deposits from 4% in 
30 The Umma Party was the government party for the over the period 1986-1989. It established a 
joint-venture bank with Saudi businessmen called Sudanese-Saudi 'Bank. 
200 
1983 to 7% in 1987. Investment deposits, on the other hand, declined from 32% 
in 1983 to 21% in 1985 and 10% in 1987, a result which confirms the fact that IBs 
were affected very much by the credit policies. However, this result is consistent 
with the fact that IBs have stopped receiving investment deposits since they were 
unable to invest them. 
Thirdly, a better indicator for the expansion of current accounts, as a result 
of rigorous credit policy and contraction of saving and time (investment) deposits 
could be the growth rate of these accounts. As revealed in Table 7.16, the com- 
ponent accounts of total deposits for all banks and for IBs showed various degrees 
of growth over the period in question. Current account grew by 28.5% for all 
banks and by 33% for IBs. Saving and investment accounts grew by 36% and 35% 
respectively for all banks and by -4% and -3% for IBs. 
Thus, although for all banks, saving and time deposits showed higher growth 
rates than those of current accounts, this is not a real growth rate because the 
foreign components of these deposits were revalued as a result of the devaluation 
of the Sudanese pound from $= LS. 2.5 to $= LS 12.5 in the mid-1989. For 
IBs, the growth rates were negative for both saving and investment deposits. This, 
again, proves that the credit policies affected banks in general and IBs in particular 
with regard to deposit structure; the progressive expansion of banking deposits in 
the Sudan has been in current accounts. Saving and time (investment) deposits 
were crippled by credit policies since they lowered the credit ceilings for all banks, 
especially IBs. 
However, the direct impact of credit policies has not been on deposit structure 
only, but more tangibly on the degree of utilisation of these deposits. 
(b) Degree of deposit utilisation: 
Degree of deposit utilisation is measured by the rate of deposit utilisation which 
is calculated as total investments divided by total deposits. 
A more important implication of credit policy has been the decline of the rate 
of deposit utilisation. Table 7.17 (and Figure 7.4) shows the extent to which all 
banks and IBs were able to place their mobilised savings into income-generating 
activities. 201 
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Table 7.17: IBs: Banking System: Degree of Deposit Utilisation 1980-1987 
All banks IBs 
Credits Deposits Utilisation Credits Deposits Utilisation 
1980 593 720 82 36 50 72 
1981 778 943 83 54 102 53 
1982 1143 1340 85 143 202 70 
1983 1377 1781 77 154 318 48 
1984 1777 2064 86 256 596 43 
1985 1876 3623 52 239 619 39 
1986 2612 4243 61 314 763 41 
1987 3793 5786 65 436 1044 42 
R 0.29 0.30 - 0.40 0.42 - 
Source: Economic Survey, Bank of Sudan, Ills Reports, as amended 
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Although the growth rates of banks' credit facilities and deposits were nearly 
the same, 29% for the former and 30% for the latter, the degree of deposit utilisa- 
tion has decreased over time. Deposit utilisation declined from 82.3% in 1980 to 
77.3% in 1983 reaching 52.9% in 1987. 
For IBs, growth rates of credits and deposits were similar: 40% for the former 
and 42% for the latter. However, their degree of deposit utilisation was fluctuating 
and declining. The rate of deposit utilisation decreased from 72% in 1980 to 48% 
in 1983, and 42% in 1987. 
It is obvious, therefore, that credit facilities affected not only deposit structure, 
but also the degree to which banks used these resources in financing investments. 
Of course, the lower degree of deposit utilisation resulted in a low return on de- 
posits, as will be seen later in this chapter. 
i. Conclusion 
The conclusion is that the attitude of authorities (through public policies and, 
in particular, credit policies) affected the banking system in general and IBs in 
particular. Thus, as has been stated above, IB credit policies affected firstly the 
deposit structure of IBs and secondly the degree of utilisation of these deposits. 
Both types of impact have direct implications for the market share of IBs. Now, IBs 
have stopped receiving investment deposits, since they are unable to utilise them. If 
IBs continue to reject new investment deposits, in the long-run they will have only 
meagre investment deposits and deposit-structure will be of short-term nature. As 
a consequence, IBs will not be able to finance long-term projects and this trend 
will surely jeopardise their existence in the market as financial institutions. Thus, 
one of the vital determinants of IBs market share is the attitude of authorities 
as expressed through the credit policies adopted and implemented by the Central 
Bank. These policies have crippled the size, form and utilisation of deposits. 
(B) Market share: Other determinants 
There is, as stated before, another set of determinants that are assumed to have affected the deposit share of lBs. These are: 
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7.8 Are IBs Able to Deal with Interest-based Banks? 
In this regard one would first ask what part IBs will be able to play in the inter- 
bank system and, secondly, how they can hope for any non-Islamic bank to place 
funds with them. In other words, how can IBs manage to deal with interest-based 
banks inside and outside the Sudan? 
Like other IBs, those in Sudan do not undertake interest-based transactions. 
No IB has any joint investment project with non-Islamic banks. This is, however, 
an obstacle to the growth and expansion of IBs. Therefore it remains a question 
for the managers and the Shari'a Supervisory Boards (SSB) of IBs to find financial 
instruments which are legitimate in the view of Islamic laws and at the same time 
are acceptable to the traditional banks. 
By the same token, their hope for non-Islamic banks to hold funds with them 
remains limited as long as IBs do not give interest on these deposits. Here unless 
IBs improve their work and become competitive, no traditional bank or financial 
institution will place money with them. Thus, they lose a great part of the market 
share that they could attract were they to pay an interest rate. 
IBs' funds will not be placed in term deposits, but merely on call. However, 
call money is capable of yielding interest, and as the IBs themselves would not 
pay interest on such deposited funds, they agree that they are unlikely to be 
beneficiaries when making such deposits. 
However, the question of dealing with the traditional financial sector is a vital 
one because IBs in the Sudan are considering a more international approach to 
their business. All IBs are involved in investing part of their capital abroad. The 
reasons for this are profit, safety, to facilitate financing their transactions abroad 
like imports, and to get foreign exchange returns. Furthermore any foreign invest- 
ment is not included in the ceiling of each bank. Therefore, unless IBs discover 
the appropriate finnancial tools, they will not be able to develop their business re- 
lations with the traditional financial system. At present IBs have only subscribed 
to the Islamic Banks' portfolio kept with the Islamic Development Bank in Jed- 
dah. Apart from that , the percentage of their 
foreign investments is very low, 
concentrated with other IBs in the Gulf States and Europe. 
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7.9 Portfolio Management: 
One of the elements liable to affect the market share of IBs is the way they 
manage their portfolio. 
The portfolio management problem of IBs is a sufficiently important issue. 
The objectives of an Islamic bank were taken to be (Bashir, B. A., 1982): 
(1). maximisation of returns to depositors 
(2). achievement of sufficient returns to depositors 
(3). minimisation of the bank's risk of loss. 
It was concluded that to achieve such objectives, the management of an Islämic 
bank would have to make its decisions on the following variables: 
(i). The proportion of each type of asset in its portfolio, 
(ii). The profit-sharing ratio to short-term depositors 
(iii). The premium to long-term depositors. 
However, for lBs in the Sudan there is no such classification of deposits be- 
tween short-term and long-term. Moreover, with the stringent credit ceiling policy 
adopted by the central bank, IBs are facing the constraints of over-liquidity, and 
have halted investment deposits because there are no investment outlets. 
IB managements face the problem of determining how much would be the share 
of depositors and shareholders in profit. The issue has considerable ideological 
implications since, 
" firstly, no system is adopted for offering a premium for long-term deposits, 
but IBs give depositors (holders of investment deposits) a higher percentage of 
profit; 
" secondly, no Islamic bank offers different investment accounts characterised by 
different risks, a service which is needed since depositors have no institution- 
alised influence on the management decision. IB managers think that deposi- 
tors are changeable over time, some new depositors come to deal with the bank, 
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while another group withdraw their deposits. Thus it is difficult either to offer 
different investments characterised by different risks or to allow depositors to 
have institutionalised influence on the management decision, 
" thirdly, all IBs manage their portfolio in the same way, so that depositors' 
funds and shareholders' funds are used to fund the same projects, be they of 
low or high risk. This might be unfair to depositors whose money is used in 
funding high-risky projects. There is no differentiation between long, medium 
or short-term deposits. 
If market share is assumed to be affected by the dealing of IBs with traditional 
banks and by the way they manage their portfolio, it is affected more by the way 
IBs distribute profits. 
7.10 Distribution of Profit: 
All IBs follow the same procedure: depositors take their share from gross profit, 
while the remainder, the net profit, is distributed among shareholders according 
to the rate of return specified by the bank's management. 
However, in calculating gross profits, IBs deduct any income generated with- 
out direct recourse to depositors' funds from the gross profit that are liable for 
distribution between depositors and shareholders. That is to say, depositors take 
their share from investment returns and returns from the buying and selling of cur- 
rencies. Thus, return on investment deposits is reached by applying the following 
criteria: 
Firstly, finding out the operation (utilisation) period for each of the following 
items to get their respective weight: 
Capital less fixed assets and shares in subsidiary companies, 
Investment deposits minus 12.5% cash reserves deposited with the Central 
Bank, 
Current deposits less 40% cash reserves, 
Saving deposits less 40% cash reserves. 
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Secondly, dividing total revenue generated from investment operations and for- 
eign exchange transactions by the respective weights of the aforementioned items, 
in order to find out the total income pertaining to each item. 
Thirdly, the gross return on investment deposits will then be discounted by 
30% representing the bank share against managing investment operations. The 
remaining 70% will be distributed among investment deposit holders by the end 
of the financial year. 
The point is that there is no specific criterion followed in determining the 
rate of return on deposits, and therefore the rates of profitability of investment 
deposits31 vary from one bank to another. Table 7.18 below shows these rates for 
the financial years 1985 and 1986. 
Table 7.18: Investment Deposits: Rate of Profitability 
Name of bank Rate of profitability (%u) 
1985 1986 
Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank 11 8 
FIBS 11 8 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 9 10' 
Islamic Bank for 
Western Sudan 6 5 
Al Baraka Bank n. a. n. a. 
Sudanese Islamic Bank n. a. n. a. 
*A rise is due not to an increase in profit but to fall in deposits. 
Source: as calculated from IBs' balance sheets. 
It is clear that the rates of profitability of investment deposits have declined 
for all IBs. If holders of investment deposits expect a lower rate of return on 
their deposits every year, they will clearly reduce their balances. This tendency 
is more likely to happen under the current circumstances of inflationary pressures 
31 Rate of profitability is calculated as share of holders of investment deposits divided by total invest. 
ment deposits. 
207 
prevailing in the Sudan. Therefore if IBs are not competitive in the rates of return 
they distribute among depositors, they will lose part of their deposit market share. 
There are conditions which entitle depositors to profits such as minimum con- 
tracted periods and minimum balances in deposit account. The period is almost 
three months for investment deposits. 
These conditions which entitle one to profit might be at the expense of those 
depositors or petty savers who have not got the minimum balance and/or who 
need to withdraw from their investment accounts to meet contingent spending 
before the three months elapse. Hence these savers were unable to open investment 
accounts, since even if they could, they would not be entitled to profits. Hence 
these conditions affect negatively the market share of IBs. 
It is, in fact, not enough to know about, as explained above, the procedure of 
distributing profit among depositors and the implication of this on market share, 
it is as well important to see the share of shareholders in profits and the guarantee 
of IBs' managements to safeguard them against bankruptcy. 
Firstly, the legal and general reserves are deducted from the net profits (of 
shareholders) and not from gross profits (of depositors and shareholders). This 
practice is fair since the depositors have no stakes in these banks. Therefore the 
bank should not deduct from gross profits to build up general reserves. 
Secondly, in order to safeguard shareholders against bankruptcy, IBs hold legal 
and general reserves higher than the normal level. That is, instead of 5% for the 
former and 10% for the latter, lBs hold 10% and 25% respectively. General reserves 
are built till they reach 100% of the bank's capital. The procedure of taking higher 
legal and general reserves benefits the shareholders and safeguards their position 
in case of bankruptcy. In this regard, IBs are enhancing positively their market 
share since they safeguard shareholders against bankruptcy. 
Thirdly, it is not enough that shareholders are safeguarded only against loosing 
part or all of their shares' value; they have to earn higher return on their shares. 
This is important for the maintenance of market share and it has a direct effect 
on shareholders' willingness to increase their holding of shares. Table 7.19 below 
shows the ratio of distributed profit to shares (RDPS) by IBs. 
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Table 7.19: IBs: RDPS (1985-1987) 
Bank name RDPS (%o) 
1985 1986 1987 
FIBS 16 6 1 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 6 2 2 
Sudanese Islamic Bank n. a. 6 2.7 
Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank n. a. 12.6 33.5 
Al Baraka Bank n. a. 4 3.8 
Islamic Bank for 
Western Sudan 7 7 3 
Source: as calculated from balance sheets of IBs. 
Shareholders of all IBs, except the Co-operative Development Bank, experi- 
enced a decline in shares' profit. For instance, FIBS distributed 16% in 1985 and 
in 1987 shareholders had only 1% as a profit per share. 
This decreasing tendency discouraged shareholders and resulted in delayed 
payment of the subscription that should be paid by them. Thus if one looks at the 
paid-up capital of IBs, will notice that there is almost no change over the years 
1985-1987. 
There is a very slow growth of paid-up capital of IB as returns were low. If, 
however, there were a money market in the Sudan, shareholders would by all means 
sell their shares in these banks. 
9 Summary 
Rates of profit on both deposits and shares affected the market share of IBs. 
Both depositors and shareholders faced declining rates of return in the last three 
years. This low return, coupled with a high inflation rate, discouraged both deposi- 
tors from holding investment accounts and shareholders from responding positively 
to calls for payment of price of shares subscribed for. It is consequently quite no- 
ticeable that investment deposits and paid-up capital of IBs grew slowly in the last 
three years. 
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It is, therefore, highly necessary that IBs maintain their market share by being 
competitive in returns on both investment deposits and shares. 
The last factor in this set of determinants of market share is the extent to 
which IBs are capable of extending their branches. 
7.11 Management and Set-up of Branches: 
There is a problem regarding branch expansion which affects negatively the 
market share. IB managers think that the reasons for slow expansion of their 
branches are security, communication difficulties, the sluggish procedure of the 
Central Bank to grant licences and the difficulty in raising capital. Such problems 
affect the growth of IBs and their market share as organised saving mobilisers. 
One of the serious problems facing IBs in establishing and managing branches 
is the lack of communication between branches in rural areas. Nearly all branches 
in rural areas are detached from the head-quarters. So there is a real problem 
of managing these branches, giving them directives, exchanging news of market 
conditions and prices with them, or changes in internal policies or policies of the 
Central Bank. 
Another serious problem faced by branches, especially in rural areas, is the 
reluctance of bankers to work in remote areas far from big cities. Moreover, the 
turn-over of bankers is high even among bank employees in urban areas. This high 
turn-over is attributed to inadequate salaries and the high prices of even the most 
basic needs. 
Yet, IBs do have branches in rural areas and the deposits of these branches 
are an important means of financing operations in urban areas. The point is that 
depositors in rural areas are poor compared with those in urban areas. Most of 
them are not investment account holders but have current accounts only. Therefore 
it might be unfair to use their savings and not to give them a share of returns. IBs 
could, by distributing profits, allow rural areas branches some privileges such as 
giving special profit margins to depositors in rural areas, or allowing some funds 
from total profits, to give some incentives, even in kind, to depositors in remote 
and backward areas. In this way IBs can mobilise more of the stagnant resources 
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in rural areas and increase their market share by penetrating these areas instead 
of competing with other banks for the same group of depositors in rural areas. 
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Chapter VIII 
The Role Of Isldmic Banks In The Sudanese Economic 
Development 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter five discussed the problems facing the Sudanese economy. Chapter 
six showed the nature and development of financial institutions in the Sudan, the 
degree of financial repression, and the possibility for financial institutions to play 
a vital role in monetising the economy. The chapter also contained a detailed 
analysis of the monetary policy and how it developed and become stricter over 
time, and the effect of this on the credit facilities of commercial banks. 
As mentioned in chapter seven, the main aim of this work is to examine the 
role of IBs in economic development. Chapter seven discussed the first aspect of 
this role, i. e. the mobilisation of stagnant resources. It showed the magnitude 
of these resources in the form of paid-up capital and deposits; it also showed the 
detrerminants of the magnitude and structure of these resources. 
This chapter discusses the second aspect of the role of IBs in economic devel- 
opment, i. e. the financing of medium-and-long-term investment projects. 32 The 
determinants that are assumed to have affected the contribution of IBs are: 
1. The magnitude and structure of resources available to IBs 
2. The character of demand (investors' behaviour) for productive investment 
projects. 
3. Management attitude 
4. the attitude of the authorities 
5. The nature and character of Islamic modes of finance. 
32 In order, however, to complete an assessment of the role of the IBs in economic development, the 
experience of FIBS in financing small crafts firms will be assessed' in the following chapters. 
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The contribution made by the IBs will be examined within a structural-functional 
framework to see whether or not these IBs have played the role expected of them 
in development financing, given their objectives and the circumstances in which 
they find themselves. 
The chapter comprises sections covering the following subjects: 
" Banks and economic development: theoretical framework 
" medium-and-long-term investments financed by the banking system and IBs in 
Sudan 
" medium-and-long-term financing: possible determinants. 
8.2 The Role of Banking 
Economists have expressed a variety of opinions on the effectiveness of bank- 
ing systems in promoting or facilitating economic development. Schumpeter, the 
first modern economist to study the relationship, regarded the banking system as 
one of two key agents (the other being entrepreneurship) in the whole process of 
development. Writers like John G. Gurley, on the other hand, think that banking 
systems as intermediaries are not highly essential to the growth process. However, 
Cameron says that 
`it is safe to say that the true importance of the banking function lies somewhere between 
these two extremes', (Cameron, R., 1972, p. 7). 
The banking system is one of many institutions that influence the economy 
and affect its performance for better or worse. Others are government, religious 
institutions, the educational system, ethics ... etc. As an economic institution, 
the banking system might be expected to be more directlyV and positively related 
to the performance of the economy than most non-economic institutions; however, 
this cannot be taken for granted. Religious institutions, for example, may have 
a more powerful influence on the economy, either positivc or negative, than the 
banking system. Certainly, this is true of the institution of government, which has 
the power to shape and control the banking system. 
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A banking system may make a positive contribution to economic growth and 
development, but its effect may be offset by other factors such as unfavourable 
resource endowments, or unhelpful government policies. Conversely, if other factors 
are sufficiently favourable, even a bad banking system may not hinder growth 
absolutely. What can be asserted is that any given banking system might, with 
different policies, be made more or less effective in its contribution to economic 
development. 
It may be worthwhile to review briefly the functions of a banking system. The 
first and essential function of any banking system is to act as an intermediary 
between savers and persons able and willing to borrow. What distinguishes banks 
from other financial intermediaries is that they alone furnish part or all of the means 
of payment or money supply. They do this either by issuing their own promises to 
pay or by holding and transferring the monetary deposits of the public. A third 
possible function, although not inherent in the definition of a banking system, is the 
provision of entrepreneurial talent and guidance for the economy as a whole. That 
is, instead of restricting themselves to a purely intermediary function, bankers may 
actively seek out and exploit profitable undertakings in manufacturing, commerce, 
or any other productive activity. This banking function is, and has been, of great 
importance in developing economies. 
The way in which banks perform these functions in underdeveloped and de- 
veloping economies may well determine the degree of succcess of the development 
effort: (i) as intermediaries, they may rigorously seek out and attract reservoirs of 
idle funds which will be allocated to entrepreneurs for investment in projects with 
a high rate of social return, or they may fritter away investment possibilities with 
unproductive loans; (ii) as creditors and providers of means of payment, they may 
redirect real resources into more productive activities, or, as a result of government 
pressures, they may flood the economy with inflationary dealings; (iii) as potential 
entrepreneurs, they may set the country on the road to continuing growth, or they 
may waste its resources in uneconomical or fraudulent activities. 
Historically, banks have contributed to economic growth in three different ways. 
Firstly, as intermediaries between savers and borrowers and, in some cases as credi- 
tors of means of payments, they provide credit for both fixed and circulating capital 
214 
for commercial and industrial enterprises, and frequently for agriculture as well. 
Secondly, banks have played a direct entrepreneurial role by, founding new enter- 
prises, providing them with finance and participating in their direction. Finally, 
as providers of all or part of the means of payment within a community, banks 
have facilitated the division of labour within a society that is necessary for higher 
levels of productivity than are found in closed subsistence economies, (Cameron, 
R. 1970). 
8.3 Banks & Economic Development: A Theoretical Framework 
One of the most original theories relating the banking system to economic 
growth is that of Josef Schumpeter. For Schumpeter, economic development is a 
process resulting from a new technique of production, and those who carry this are 
called entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur is not a businessman, a manager or a cap- 
italist; he is an individual who sees possibilities for profit in the new combination 
and who then borrows the financial resources necessary to carry it out. He bor- 
rows from banks, who create new means of payment to enable the entrepreneur to 
have a command over factors of production. Thus, in Schumpeter's theory, banks 
occupy a key role in the development process, (Schumpeter, J., 1934). 
Although Schumpeter's theory remains one of the best guides for the study 
of banking and economic growth during the earlier stages of industrialisation, its 
major shortcoming involves the formal relationship of the banking enterprise to 
the innovating entrepreneur. According to Schumpeter, the bank is not directly 
involved in the economic process, and the bank is to receive the stipulated inter- 
est rate, without being able to share in the profits, (see Chapter III). This also 
implies that the bank deals essentially in short-term `self-liquidating' loans, not in 
promotional investment. But there are numerous instances 'in the history in which 
banks have acted as innovating entrepreneurs. 
One of the most widely discussed explanations of the role of banking in the 
process of industrialisation (development) is that of Alexander Gerschenkron. Al- 
though the banking system is by no means the only element in Gerschenkron's 
explanation of the distinctive pattern of industrialisation in various European 
countries, he holds that it does play a key role at certain stages of the indus- 
trialisation process. In his approach to the problem of -understanding European 
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industrialisation in the nineteenth century, he views the role of banks in a different 
light than Schumpeter does. For Gerschenkron, although the role of banks is an 
important one, it is definitely subsidiary to the initial conditions existing at the 
onset of industrialisation, i. e. the varying degree of `backwardness'. 
Gerschenkron distinguishes three `typical cases' with respect to capital and 
entrepreneurship: England, the pioneer; Germany, an area of `moderate back- 
wardness' and Russia, an area of `extreme backwardness'. 
According to Gerschenkron, England began to industrialise with relatively 
small-scale enterprise, requiring little capital on specialised entrepreneurship. Ini- 
tial capital requirements came from the entrepreneur's own savings or from those 
of his relatives, friends, customers and suppliers. No outside agency was needed 
to supply either capital or entrepreneurship, because the enterprise itself was the 
source of both. 
But when Germany began to industrialise, technology and markets became 
more complex; the optimum scale of plants was larger, requiring larger blocs of 
investments; as a `moderately backward' area, Germany had fewer potential en- 
trepreneurs and less liquid capital. As a result, the banking system became the 
prime source of both capital and entrepreneurship. 
In Russia, which was more backward than Germany, not even the banking 
system was adequate to the task of providing capital and entrepreneurship for 
industrialisation. There the Russian government played the major role in initi- 
ating large-scale, capital-intensive industries in the late 1880's and 1890's, (Ger- 
schenkron, A., 1962). 
However, is this explanation applicable to other countries? More specifically, 
is it accurate for, and does it explain, the true situation in the countries for which 
it seems most appropriate? 
Cameron (1972) criticises Gerschenkron's explanation on the following grounds: 
Firstly, Gerschenkron misunderstood the nature of the English banking system. 
The relatively small-scale of English country banks during the classical industrial 
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Revolution, and their normal reluctance to make long-term investments in indus- 
trial enterprises, was due to legislation and not to the choice of either bankers or 
industrialists. Laws that limited banking partnerships to six persons and forbade 
them limited liability determined the structure of the English banking system and 
thus to some extent limited its functions. Even so, there were numerous instances 
in which banks made long-term commitments to industrial enterprises. 
Secondly, Gerschenkron's characterisation of Germany's banking system is 
more correct than his description of the English system. Yet it, too, is debatable. 
On the one hand, he exaggerates the shortages of entrepreneurship and capital in 
Germany; on the other hand, he overemphasises the spread of banks and says that 
`German banks accompanied their clients from the cradle to the grave, from establishment 
to liquidation', (Gerschenkron, A., 1962, p. 14). 
Thirdly, the Russian government had played a prominent role in the economy 
but with few beneficial consequences. The policy shift favouring economic mod- 
ernisation did not really begin to show tangible effects until the 1880's, that is 
until the banking system was already in a vigorous phase of development. 
However, because the hypothesis has been employed to explain the peculiarities 
of particular cases, it cannot be generalised. Moreover, Gerschenkron's organising 
principle, the `degree of backwardness', cannot be measured and thus it is not an 
operational concept. 
G. Gurley and E. Shaw have developed another model that allows for growth 
in both the financial system and the economy as a whole. The model delineates 
clearly the role of financial intermediaries (including banks) as both buyers and 
sellers of financial assets (including money) of varying degrees of security, liquidity, 
rentability etc., (Gurley, G. and Shaw, E., 1964). 
The work of D. R. Hodgman also discusses the role of banks in economic 
development. Although it is concerned with banking practices in the United States, 
the work is regarded as helpful in considering the role of banks , 
(Hodgman, D. 
R., 1963). 
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Whether or not the banking system makes a positive and substantial contribu- 
tion to economic development does not depend primarily upon the personal quali- 
ties of the bankers, although these qualities cannot be overlooked. The `structural' 
characteristics of the system, and the laws, regulations and customs that govern 
its behaviour, will normally be far more important determinants of its effective- 
ness. This approach is advocated by Rondo Cameron, but was first perceived as 
early as 1913 by officials of the J. P. Morgan & Company, who declared that the 
concentration of financial power in the United States was due not to the purposes 
and activities of men, but primarily to the operation of the antiquated American 
banking system. The experience of IBs with development financing in the Su- 
dan will be evaluated using this structural-functional approach. The point here is 
that the banking system is an integral, interdependent part of the total economy, 
and without a demand for its services, it would obviously not exist. But given 
that it does exist, its structure will be shaped very largely by the actions of the 
political authorities in the form of laws, decrees, regulations and by more direct 
participation such as government ownership. 
What follows is an account of the contribution of commercial banks and IBs 
to development financing and an evaluation of this contribution by accounting for 
its determinants as assumed above. 
8.4 Banking System and IBs: Development Financing 
With the advent of political independence in the Sudan, the argument against 
commercial banks, which were branches of foreign banks, was that these banks 
concentrated on financing the foreign sector to provide industries in the developed 
world with raw materials and to seek market outlets for their industrial products 
in the developing countries. This argument was one of the excuses for national- 
ising commercial banks in the Sudan in the early 1970's in order that the state 
might control the foreign sector and redirect total resources mobilised by these 
banks to social and economic development programmes, (see Chapter VI). Thus, 
in 1974, when the open-door economic policy was launched and foreign banks were 
allowed to set up branches or to establish joint and private banks, it was stipulated 
that banks granted licences should play an effective part in economic and social 
development. 
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Under these circumstances it is a must for IBs, in order to start their banking 
activities, to declare their intention to participate in financing economic develop- 
ment. They must also prove on a practical level that this contribution would be 
more effective and would operate through different modes of finance. Therefore 
the responsibility of IBs to participate in development, and the inclusion of this 
promise in their objectives and policies, originate from: (i) their legal responsibil- 
ity towards the central bank to fulfil the licence's conditions imposed on them to 
start Islamic financing in the Sudan; and, (ii) their moral responsibility to society 
in general and to those who deal with these banks since IBs would have a different 
approach to financing economic development by attracting new petty savers and 
investors. In the past such individuals did not deal with banks since they rejected 
interest-based transactions. 
One of the conditions for granting licences to establish joint banks (including 
IBs) and foreign banks is that the bank should concentrate on medium-and-long- 
term financing. 
The 1986 credit policy stated that the medium-term financing is that which 
would be liquidated within a period of more than one year and less than five years. 
Long-term financing is far a period of at least five years. The policy stipulated that 
the productive sectors include agriculture, industry and transport; in addition, the 
participation in the capital of companies and corporations which work in the field 
of agriculture, industry and transporting crops, (see the credit policy described 
latter in this chapter). 
Now, what is the contribution of the banking system in general, and the IBs 
in particular, to the funding of productive sectors? 
" The Allocation of Finance: Consumption versus Investment 
The developmental impact of any given supply of credit obviously depends 
upon the wisdom and efficiency with which it is allocated. Many have suggested 
that in the Sudan, in the 1970's, an excessive quantity of finance led to unwise re- 
source allocation, emphasising `speculative' investments in real estate. Conversely, 
the restricted quantity of finance in the 1980's also involved a shift in the compo- 
sition of bank credit towards short-term , strictly commercial loans. It is clearly 
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necessary that one keep in mind the underlying conditions of economy-wide sup- 
ply and demand for credit when discussing the allocation of IBs' credit to specific 
sectors or activities. 
The question is this: did credit allocation by IBs accelerate economic growth 
by raising the proportion of total output devoted to investment rather than con- 
sumption? For the economy as a whole, the evidence available permits only the 
most impressionistic answer to this broad question. Statistics on rates of savings 
or investment for the various sectors of the economy are simply not available. 
The typical institutions of the Sudan spend their incomes or borrowed funds on 
both consumption and investment. Farmers and other businessmen rarely sepa- 
rate `business' from `personal' expenses in their book-keeping. Records of financial 
institutions contain similar ambiguities. 
Despite the lack of quantitative evidence, some guesses can be made about the 
impact of IBs' finance on consumption versus investment. The type of collateral 
most acceptable for IBs loans (and commercial banks loans in general) - mortgages 
on land, buildings- were biased in favour of loans for investment. Most of the 
indirect finance of IBs and other intermediaries was at least intended to support 
investment spending. But what type of investments? This crucial question will be 
answered in the next section, where the structural-functional approach is used to 
evaluate the experience of IBs with medium-and-long-term finance. 
8.4.1 Banking System 
Table 8.1 shows the credit facilities extended by commercial banks over the 
decade 1978-1988. 
It is obvious that there has been only a slow change in the structure of credit 
facilities by commercial banks over the period under review. The percentage of 
short-term financing declined from 85% in 1978 to 64% in 1988. The percentage 
of medium-and-long-tern financing increased from 15% in 1978 to 36% in 1988. 
Although, however, it might appear that the share of medium-and-long-term in- 
vestments doubled over a decade, the statistics reveal that most of this finance was 
directed towards participation in companies and corporations that are commercial 
in nature and have little concern about development investments. 
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Table 8.1: Commercial Banks: Credit Facilities (1978/88) (LS. million) 
Years Short-term % medium-term &% Total 
loans long-term loans - 
1978 291.1 85 52.1 15 343.2 
1979 365.2 79 95.7 21 460.9 
1980 462.75 78 130.4 22 592.9 
1981 611.1 79 166.4 21 777.5 
1982 899.2 79 243.3 21 1142.5 
1983 1001.7 73 375.2 37 1376.9 
1984 1215.9 72 570.8 28 1776.7 
1985 1305.2 68 570.6 32 1875.8 
1986 2002.9 72 634.7 28 2612.39 
1987 2999.8 79 793.0 21 3792.8 
1988 3566.6 64 1986.0 36 5552.6 
Table 8.2: Medium & Long-Term Credits Structure (1978/1988) (LS. million) 
Years Capital % Particpation & other % Total 
investments investments 
1978 40.8 78 11.3 22 52.1 
1979 81.6 85 14.1 15 95.7 
1980 114.6 88 15.5 12 130.4 
1981 138.9 83 27.6 17 166.4 
1982 185.3 76 57.6 24 243.3 
1983 56.5 15 318.7 85 375.2 
1984 131.1 23 439.7 77 570.8 
1985 142.5 25 428.3 75 571.0 
1986 160.6 25 474.1 75 634.7 
1987 170.0 21 623 79 793 
1988 357.5 18 1628.52 82 1986 
Source: Department of Statistics and Economic Researches, Bank of Sudan, as amended 
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Years Short-term 
loans 
% medium-term & 
long-term loans 
% 
- 
Total 
1978 291.1 85 52.1 15 343.2 
1979 365.2 79 95.7 21 460.9 
1980 462.75 78 130.4 22 592.9 
1981 611.1 79 166.4 21 777.5 
1982 899.2 79 243.3 21 1142.5 
1983 1001.7 73 375.2 37 1376.9 
1984 1215.9 72 570.8 28 1776.7 
1985 1305.2 68 570.6 32 1875.8 
1986 2002.9 72 634.7 28 2612.39 
1987 2999.8 79 793.0 21 3792.8 
1988 3566.6 64 1986.0 36 5552.6 
Years Capital 
investments 
% Particpation & other 
investments 
% Total 
1978 40.8 78 11.3 22 52.1 
1979 81.6 85 14.1 15 95.7 
1980 114.6 88 15.5 12 130.4 
1981 138.9 83 27.6 17 166.4 
1982 185.3 76 57.6 24 243.3 
1983 56.5 15 318.7 85 375.2 
1984 131.1 23 439.7 77 570.8 
1985 142.5 25 428.3 75 571.0 
1986 160.6 25 474.1 75 634.7 
1987 170.0 21 623 79 793 
1988 357.5 18 1628.52 82 1986 
Table 8.2 above shows the structure of medium-and-long-term loans. It ap- 
pears that there is an increasing tendency for commercial banks to concentrate on 
participation in companies rather than on direct investments. Although capital 
investments were substantial up to the early 1980's, they have been declining and 
fluctuating over time, being only 25% in 1986 and as low as 18% of the total in 
1988. Conversely, participation in financial corporations and subsidiary companies 
increased from 22% in 1978 to 82% in 1988. 
Thus, in the banking system as a whole, there was a reluctance to participate 
in development financing. What was the attitude of the IBs? 
8.4.2 IBs: development financing: 
It was mentioned in Chapter V that the government development policy recog- 
nises the private sector: and its role in development financing, and that there is no 
obstacle for IBs to finance development. Moreover, it was also mentioned that the 
private sector has grown over time and its contribution to total investments has 
increased; however, the major share of its investments went to housing. To what 
extent did IBs contribute to the productive investments? 
Table 8.3 reveals the structure of credit facilities for the banking system as a 
whole and for IBs over the period 1980-1988. Medium-and-long-term credits for 
IBs grew by 25% while for the whole banking system the growth rate was 14%. 
The share of IBs in total credits in the economy increased from 6% in 1980 to 14% 
in 1984; it then began to decline, falling to 11% in 1987. Their share of medium- 
and-long-term financing increased from 4% in 1980 to 10% in 1984, reaching its 
maximum level in 1987 at 18% after which it declined to only 10% in 1988. 
Although IBs account for 20% of the banking deposits, their share in credit 
extension is, over time, far less than their market share. This is especially true 
in the case of medium-and-long-term financing. Medium-and-long-term financing 
grew by 14% for the banking system as a whole over the period under consideration. 
Excluding IBs, this growth rate was 11.4%; in other words, IBs added only 2.6% 
for the growth of real capital investments. 
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When IBs were founded, it was declared that their objectives were develop- 
mental. The objectives of FIBS included: 
(i) To help implement local development plans designed to accelerate growth 
in different regions of the country. 
(ii) To participate with small investors in their productive projects whether 
these are agricultural, industrial or handicrafts projects. 
(iii) To provide immediate help for small investors under emergent conditions 
that necessitate spending above the normal level. 
In the articles of the Tadamon Islamic Bank, it is stated that the bank would 
undertake all banking business, and all financial, commercial and investment deal- 
ings, in addition to participating in development projects in agriculture, industry 
and other sectors. Special concern was to be given to economic projects of medium- 
and-long-term nature. 
The objectives of the Sudanese Islamic Bank focus more on small craftsmen 
and investors, and on helping to improve the economic conditions for public and 
private investments. 
All these objectives imply a direct and specific responsibility on the part of IBs 
to play an effective role in social and economic development by adopting modes 
of finance that are different from those adopted by traditional banks. But what 
IBs have accomplished on the side of development financing is still far less than 
what was first declared and expected. It is apparent that IBs have concentrated 
on short-term commercial activities to maintain their existence in the market. IBs 
wished to convince their depositors and shareholders that they were capable of 
generating high returns and profits. There can be no doubt that the policy of 
achieving high profits is important for the success of IBs or any profit-making 
institution, but this should not be a permanent policy. The policy of convincing 
depositors and shareholders should be transitional, and IBs should redirect their 
objectives towards other real productive activities. 
There can be no doubt that the development goals adopted by IBs coincided 
with the needs of the national economy. IBs have been expected to extend finance 
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to small investors, producers, handicrafts and small industrialists, particularly 
those in rural areas. 
Although several years have passed since the advent of IBs in the Sudan, during 
which time IBs have mobilised fairly adequate financial resources, the fact remains 
that they still concentrate their investments on short-term commercial activities 
as do other commercial banks. Short-term financing by IBs amounted to 86% of 
their total investments in 1980; the percentage decreased to 70% in 1988. These 
percentages exceeded those for the whole banking system which were 78% and 64% 
in 1980 and 1988 respectively, (Table 8.3). The percentage of short-term financing 
exceeded 95% for some IBs in 1986, (Table 8.4). 
Table 8.4: IBs: Investments Distribution for 1986 (LS. million) 
Short-term 
investments 
% medium-term & long-term 
investments 
% Total 
Sudanese Islamic Ban 49.74 89 5.94 11 55.68 
Al Baraka Bank 44.44 88 5.92 12 50.36 
Islamic Bank for 
Western Sudan 25.92 96 1.08 4 27 
FIBS 130.41 78 27.94 22 127.35 
Tadamon Islamic 
Bank 12.64 53 11.34 47 23.98 
Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank 66.43 91 7.17 9 73.6 
Total 329.58 82 59.39 18 357.97 
Source: IBs' Reports, as calculated by the author. 
On the other hand, the medium-and-long-term financing, which never exceeded 
18% of the banking system's long-term investments throughout the period, (see 
Table 8.3) was for the most part participation in capital of banks and financial insti- 
tutions and subscriptions in subsidiary companies. These subscriptions amounted 
to 86% of the medium-and-long-term financing by IBs in 1986, (Table. 8.5). 
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What attracts attention here is the direction of financial resources to invest- 
ments outside the country., For instance, FIBS directed 53% of its medium- and- 
long-term financing to other financial institutions. Almost 50% of this was sub- 
scriptions to financial institutions outside the country, while the Tadamon Islamic 
Bank placed 47% of its medium-and-long-term investments abroad. However, all 
IB managers replied to the question addressed to them that investment through 
subsidiary companies is important. 
Table 8.5: IBs' Distribution of Medium-Term & Long-Term Investments for 1986 
(LS. million) 
Participationin' % Participationin* % Otherst % Tot 
Sudanese Islamic Ban 0.900 15 4.95 83 0.09 2 5.94 
Al Baraka Bank - 4.38 74 1.54 26 5.92 
Islamic Bank for 
Western Sudan - - 0.52 48 0.56 52 1.08 
FIBS 14.92 53 10.60 38 2.42 9 27.94 
Tadamon Islamic 
Bank 5.34 47 6.00 53 - 11.34 
Islamic Co-operative 
Development Bank - - 1.07 15 6.10 85 7.17 
Total 21.16 38 27.52 48 10.72 14 59.4 
* banks and financial institutions; * subsidiary companies; t other participations 
Source: IBs' Reports, as calculated by the author. 
Referring one more to Table 8.5, the remaining balance of medium-and-long- 
term investments which amounted to Ls. 10.72 millions by the end of 1986 (14%), 
was the amount which represented a contribution to direct investment of a pro- 
ductive nature. It is worth mentioning here that the dominant share was that of 
the Islamic Co-operative Development Bank, with some 40% of-the total medium- 
and-long-term investments by IBs. In general, for all IBs the share of medium- 
and-long-term corporate financing in total financing is regarded as low. If one goes 
beyond the short-term financing of working capital, the financing was provided not 
on the basis of participation but of muräbaha. 
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When examining further the contribution of IBs to the funding of productive 
activities, one realises the rather limited contribution of the IBs. For instance, the 
financing of small handicrafts never exceeded 2% of the total investments extended 
by FIBS (see Chapters IX and XI). The total sum extended to small investors and 
handi-crafts was Ls. 18 millions over the period 1980-1986. Most of this finance 
was commercial, usually for the selling or retailing of equipment and machinery. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank extended no more than LS. 2.49 million to small 
farmers in rural areas. in 1986. These amounts represent only seasonal financing to 
small producers. The Tadamon Islamic Bank, directed its medium-and-long-term 
investments to participation in financial institutions and subsidiary companies. 
e Summary: 
It is clear that the contribution of IBs to the real productive activities is in- 
significant. However, from a broad spectrum of possible forms of interaction be- 
tween the financial sector and the other sectors of the economy that require its 
services, one may isolate three type-cases: 
(a) The case in which inadequate finance restricts or hinders industrial and 
commercial development; 
(b) The case in which the financial system is purely permissive and accomma- 
dates all `credit-worthy' borrowers; 
(c) The case in which financial institutions either actively promote new invest- 
ment opportunities or encourage applicants for finance to come forward, provide 
them with advice and extra services, etc. 
Looking at the financial sector and the other real sectors of the Sudanese 
economy, one notices that all three cases are applicable to the Sudan. Firstly, 
inadequate finance is restricting industrial and commercial development. Most, or 
all, productive units lack finance. Secondly, almost all the financial institutions 
concentrate on financing the `credit-worthy' firms, especially those in urban areas, 
and extend little credit to the financially-starved productive uints, especially those 
in rural areas. Thirdly, financial instititions neither promote new investment op- 
portunities nor encourage applicants for finance to come forward and: provide them 
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with advice and extra services. 
The situation is more or less the same for IBs. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, of the many possible determinants of the banking role in economic devel- 
opment, the author assumes that four are of paramount importance: (i) the size 
and nature of the liability side of IBs, i. e. the financial resources available to them; 
(ii) the strength and nature of demand for financing long-term projects, i. e. the 
attitude of investors; (iii) the attitude of management; and (iv) the behaviour of 
authorities towards banking in general and IBs in particular. There is, however, 
another factor which may be regarded as being peculiar to IBs and which affects 
their role in economic development,, namely the nature of Islamic mode of finance. 
From the above, it is clear the contribution of the banking system as a whole 
and the IBs in particular to the finance of development is insignificant. Given the 
role that IBs play (the function) in financing real productive sectors, what is the 
impact of the determinants, i. e. the structure, on the role of IBs? In other words, 
what is the impact of a structural-functional relationship? 
8.5 Development Financing: Possible Determinants: 
As mentioned earlier, one would expect different responses from profit-motivated 
bankers, given the different objective economic opportunities. This may be the rea- 
son why IBs have tended to concentrate on short-term financing. But there may 
be other possible reasons: (i) the size and nature of the liability of IBs, i. e. the 
financial resources available to them, (ii) the strength and nature of the demand 
for financing long-term projects, i. e. the attitude of investors; (iii) the attitude of 
management; (iv) the behaviour of authorities towards banking in general and lBs 
in particular; and (v) the impact of Islämic mode of finance. 
8.5.1 The magnitude & structure of available resources: 
This is the first perceived determinant of contribution to economic develop- 
ment. If IBs cannot obtain adequate investible resources, they will not be capable 
of funding any productive investment projects. The question here is, can the in- 
significant contribution to development financing be attributed to the shortage of 
resources available to IBs? 
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In attempting to assess the importance of Islamic banking in economic de- 
velopment, it would be helpful to have a quantitative estimate of the size of the 
Islamic banking sector in relation to other banks and to the economy as a whole. 
Referring back to Table 7.2 in Chapter VII, it is worth noting the high average 
capitalisation. 33 The average capitalisation of the IBs is 29.6%, which is higher 
than that of both commercial banks (18%) and government banks (15%). More- 
over, IBs accounted for 41.7% of the total capital of the banking system. These 
figures indicate that IBs are able to attract savings in a form of equity (capital 
and reserves). 
Obviously, commercial banks do not operate primarily on their own capital. 
One of the distinctive features of banking as a business is that banks mobilise 
the temporarily idle funds of others and persuade the public to accept their own 
liabilities. Thus the total deposits of the IBs are a more indicative measure of its 
importance in economic development than is its equity capital. 
Compared to the commercial banks, IBs account for between 16% and 18% 
of the total deposits of all banks, (Chapter VII, Table 7.4). Moreover they are 
characterised by a favourably high average capitalisation, (Table 7.2). This is a 
fairly significant ratio. 
Given the relative size of the banking sector, in terms of the ratio of total 
assets (or liabilities) of the banking system and IBs to the total national wealth it 
is clear that this relative size is by no means insignificant. Table 8.6 shows banks' 
assets and national income over the period 1980-1987. 
What is clear from the table is the importance of the banking sector in general 
to the economy, and its vital role in economic development. The ratio of banks' 
assets to national income increased from 31.6% in 1980 to 41.8% in 1983 and 52.8% 
in 1985. IBs account for almost one-fifth of commercial banks' assets and nearly 
one-tenth of the national wealth. This ratio is relatively high and the banking 
system is in a position to play a major role in the development finance. 
What can be understood from the above discussion is that IBs are able to 
mobilise savings (in the form of capital or deposits) and that these resources can 
33 Average capitalisation equals banks' capital divided by the number of banks. 
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be used in funding economic real productive sectors. Thus in this respect one can 
say that the size of IBs in relation to the economy is not negligible, if one takes 
the ratio of bank assets to national income as a measure. This as Cameron says 
`is the best practical measure of its (i. e. the banking sector) efficiency in the perfor- 
mance of one of its two essential functions, securing control of disposable funds for investments', 
(Cameron, R., 1967, p. 300). But have IBs used these financial resources to fund 
economic development? 
Table 78: 6: Banks' Assets & National Income (1980/87) (LS. million) 
YEARS Banks' assets (1) National income (2) (1)/(2) % IBs assets (3) (3)/(1) % (3)/(2) % 
1980 1305 4122.8 31.6 - - - 
1981 1792.9 5431.3 33.0 - - 
1982 2496.7 6651.0 37.5 - - - 
1983 3486.9 8330.8 41.8 - - - 
1984 4178.4 10403.1 40.0 791.1 19 7.6 
1985 6217.3 11777.0 52.8 1053.5 17 9 
1986 7373.6 16425.3 45.0 1182.0 16 7.2 
1987 9883.5 20763.8 47.6 1696.0 17 8.2 
Source: Bank of Sudan Reports. 
With regard to the structure of these resources (deposits in particular), it is 
clear that the majority of IBs deposits are in current account form (see Chapter 
VII, Table 7.16 ). Although the ratio of investment deposits to total deposits 
declined, it still remains a fact that IBs have fairly adequate financial resources for 
sponsoring investment projects. 
Therefore, regarding closely the liability side of IBs, they are, as mentioned 
repeatedly, capable of financing investment projects of a long-term nature. This 
implies that IBs are financially able to invest in productive projects, and that there 
are no problems in this respect if other obstacles are removed. 
Thus, this factor as a determinant of the contribution to finance development 
was not an obstacle for IBs. Managers of IBs themselves indicated that no IB 
which wishes to invest in productive projects is faced with illiquidity problems. 
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8.5.2 Strength and character of demand: 
Banking systems are not `neutral' with respect to economic development. 
Where they exist, they do so because there is a demand for their services, and such 
demand is usually evidence of a growing, developing economy. Can the weak con- 
tribution of the banking system in general, and the IBs in particular, be attributed 
to the nature of the demand for medium-and-long-term investment projects? 
In order to examine the strength and, nature of demand, investors of IBs were 
asked throp, gh.. a questionnaire to indicate the factors that affect their decision to 
take loans from IBs, especially the demand for medium-and-long-term credits, and 
to comment on their experience with IBs. The characteristics of the sample and 
the procedure followed in selecting the sample and administering the questionnaire 
are discussed below. 
8.5.2.1 Investors: sampling and characteristics 
The same procedure adopted in the case of depositors was followed in the case 
of the investors' sample. That is to say, the same of questionnaire structure, and 
methods of pre-testing was adopted here, (see Chapter VII, sections 7.5.1.1 and 
7.5.1.2). 
(i) Total and sampled population: 
The target population consists in the IBs' investors. As in the case of deposi- 
tors, the main drwaback was the inability of transport to get through to rural and 
remote areas where bank branches are found. The total population of investors was 
sampled so that the `sampled population' comprises IBs investors in the capital, 
Khartoum. 
(ii) The sample: 34 
The sample size was calculated as follows: 
SE =n and therefore n= r(1 
34 See C. A. Moses, (1965), Survey Methods in Social Investigation, London, Heinemann 
Educational Books, p. 116. 
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where 
SE = the margin of sampling error that is tolerated 
7r = the proportion with the particular attribute in the population. SE can be 
estimated using a pilot survey. 
n= sample size. 
IBs investors in urban areas represent the particular attribute in the popula- 
tion which was the basis for calculating the sample size. The author was unable 
to obtain certain figures concerning the number of investors with IBs or their 
distribution between rural and urban areas. However, because of the relatively 
heavy concentration of banking activity in urban areas, the `sampled population' 
was expected to be large, as a proportion of `total population' not less than 80%; 
therefore the proportion was (using a pilot survey) around 85%. 
Again, the margin of sampling error tolerated was 3%. Accordingly, the sample 
size was calculated as 
n=0.85(1-0.85) -140 (0.03) 
The method used in selecting the sample was simple random sampling, and the 
random sampling was stratified so that our sample is a stratified random sample. 
However, the same process of stratification and choice of the sample that was used 
for the depositors was also adopted here. 
(iii) Administration of the questionnaire and investors classes: 
The total number of questionnaire forms distributed was 150. It was difficult 
to meet investors in person since their addresses are not clear and at the same time 
many were reluctant to respond. Of the 150 investors chosen, only 55 filled in the 
forms and returned them. 
Investors were asked to indicate the size of investment operations they actually 
undertook. Branch managers were consulted to determine classes of the investment 
operations according to size. Operations were classified as follow: 
LS 50000- 100000 - small size operations 
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LS 201000- 400000 - medium-size operations 
Above LS 400000 - large-size investment operations. 
According to this classification, investors were found to be distributed as fol- 
lows 
Table 8.7: Investors Classes 
Range (LS 000) & classification Number Percent 
50-100} small-size 36 65 
101-200} small-size 7 13 
201-300} medium-size 5 9 
301-400} medium- size 3 5 
401-500} large-size 2 4 
500-million} large-size 2 4 
Total 55 100 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989 
8.5.2.2 Survey results: analysis and discussion 
" Frequency distribution analysis 
The strength and nature of demand, as a determinant of the role of IBs in 
financing economic development, could be interpreted by (1) examining investors' 
attitudes towards investment conditions specified for obtaining credit, thus as- 
sessing the strength of demand, and (2) by seeing whether investors are ready to 
take credit for productive investment projects, thus learning something about the 
nature of demand. 
It is worth mentioning that the group of investors who filled in the questionnaire 
forms indicated that they already enjoy business relations with conventional banks. 
Thus, of the new depositors attracted to the IBs, (see Chapter VII, section 7.5.2.1), 
the majority (51%) are investors who have already had dealings with banks. 
(A) Strength of demand 
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(i) Factors affecting investors decision: 
As a rule, there are certain conditions that attract customers (investors) to a 
bank, be it Islamic or conventional. 
To ascertain the most important factors that affect an investor's decision to 
have credit, the following conditions were listed in the questionnaire and investors 
were asked to show which of these, in order of importance, affect their decision 
whether to obtain credit: 
- The repayment period 
- The period of grace 
- Profit margins taken by the bank 
- Type of guarantee required by the bank 
- Freedom to use the credit fund. 3b 
The customers' responses were as follows: 
Table 8.8: Investors Responses on Credit Conditions 
Frequency Valid percent Rank 
Repayment period 53 27.7 I 
Grace period 40 21 II 
Profit margin 40 21 II 
Type of guarantee 39 20 III 
Freedom to use credit 19 10.3 IV 
Total 191 100 - 
* Total is not 55 because a customer indicated more than one condition. 
Source: Investors Syrvey, 1989. 
35 If a customer deals with a conventional bank, he has more freedom to use the loan fund; an Islämic 
bank does not allow customers to use the credit fund except for its purposes. This procedure 
sometimes discourages investors to deal with IBs. 
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It is clear that the most important factor affecting investors' decisions is the 
repayment period, (27.7 %); this is followed by the grace period and profit margins 
taken on loans (21 % far each). The type of guarantee is only slightly less important 
for customers (20 %). Few customers mentioned the importance of freedom to use 
a credit fund. Thus one might conclude that investors are assumed to increase 
their demand if, firstly, the repayment period is long enough; secondly, if the grace 
period is long enough and profit margins on loans are reasonably low; and thirdly, 
if the type of guarantee required by the bank is easy to provide. 
(ii) Customers' experience with IBs: 
Given that the customers indicated the importance of the credit conditions as 
shown above, what then is their experience with IBs? 
Customers were asked to show the length of repayment period for the invest- 
ment operations they undertook with IBs. Period lengths for repayment were 
specified and customers gave the responses shown in Table 8.9. 
Table 8.9: Repayment & Grace Periods of Investment Operations 
Period length (months) Frequency` Valid percent Frequency* Valid percent 
1-2 5 4.8 45 43.3 
3-6 80 76.9 52 50 
7-9 8 7.7 4 3.8 
10-12 4 3.8 3 2.9 
above 12 7 6.7 - - 
Total 1041 100 104 100 
* Investment operations with regard to repayment period 
Investment operations with regard to grace period 
t The total is 104 and not 55 since some customers deal with more than one bank and were 
asked to show all investment operations they had. 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
The experience of customers with IBs shows that for all IBs the repayment 
period is too short, i. e. between one and six months. Thus nearly 82% of the 
investment operations undertaken by customers have repayment. periods of six 
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months at the most. Investment operations that had fairly long periods (between 
ten and twelve months or more) were only 10%. 
On the other hand, the grace period of 93% of investment operations did not 
exceed six months. Only 3% of investment operations had grace period of between 
ten and twelve months. 
The point here is that although customers ranked the repayment and grace 
periods as the most important factors affecting their decision to apply for credit, 
their experience with IBs shows that the repayment and grace periods were short. 
This may be one of the reasons why demand for financing medium-and-long-term 
investments was low. 
However, profit margins imposed by banks on credit was, according to the cus- 
tomers, equally important for them in their decision to obtain finance. Customers 
were asked to show profit margins on operations they had with IBs; the results 
obtained are shown on Table 8.10. 
Table 8.10: Profit Margins on Investment Operations 
Profit margins (%) Frequency Valid percent 
0-5 20 19.2 
6-10 65 62.5 
11-15 7 6.7 
16-20 3 2.9 
21-25 7 6.7 
25 2 1.9 
Total 104 100 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
It seems from the above figures that the profit margins were, in general, not too 
high. Almost 82% of investment operations had profit margins ranging between 
five and ten percent. In fact, it cannot be said that the profit margins of IBs were 
low, since the margins depend on the liquidation period of investment operations. 
Almost all customers agreed that the profit margins of lBs are high;: and . thus 
it 
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is possible to attribute low demand by customers to the profit margins imposed 
by IBs on investments in general and on medium-and-long-term investments in 
particular. 
The type of guarantee also affects customer demand. Customers were asked to 
indicate, according to their experience with IBs, whether they were able to provide 
the guarantees required by IBs. 71 out of 104 investment operations, i. e. 68.2%, 
were obtained on difficult guarantee; 32 (30.8%) were extended on easy guarantees 
and 1% of investment operations were funded without guarantees being required. 
From the above argument the following can be deducted: 
(a) Customers give priority, in order of importance, to the repayment and grace 
periods; profit margins; and to the type of guarantee required by a bank. 
(b) Customers' experience-with- IBs- shows that the repayment and grace pe- 
riods were short, so that they sometimes refrained from demanding credit for 
medium-and-long-term investments. 
(c) Customers acknowledged the considerable influence of profit margins on 
their decision to ask for credit. Again, the profit margins imposed by lBs on invest- 
ment operations that customers had were high, so that investors were discouraged 
from having more credits, especially for medium-and-long-term investments. 
(d) The type of guarantee required by a bank is not less important for cus- 
tomers. In this respect investors indicated that the type of guarantee required 
by IBs is difficult one. If demand was constrained by the short repayment and 
grace periods and by high profit margins, they were also hindered by the type of 
guarantee required by IBs. 
(e) it is clear from the above analysis that demand is in general low since 
customers were constrained by the conditions specified by IBs for granting credits. 
If IBs wish to encourage customers to increase demand, these conditions should 
be relaxed so that customers would be able to fulfil them. 
Hence, the strength of demand is likely to be weak. What then is the nature 
of demand? In order to examine this, it is important to see whether investors are 
willing to ask for medium-and-long-term investments. 
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(B) Character of demand: 
Firstly, investors were asked to show the distribution of their investment opera- 
tions between the following sectors: trade, agriculture, industry and transport. An 
investment in any of the sectors except trade is regarded as productive investment. 
The following responses were given by customers: 
Table 8.11: Sectoral Distribution of Customers Demand 
Frequency Valid percent 
Trade 61 58.7 
Agriculture 10 9.6 
Industry 25 25 
Transport 8 7.7 
Total 104 100 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
Trade constituted 58.7% of the total of investment operations undertaken. Cus- 
tomers would like to take credit for trade rather than for productive investments. 
In order to provide further evidence for the general tendency to avoid produc- 
tive investments, customers were asked to state whether they brought feasibility 
studies for banks to finance medium-and-long-term investments. Only 28 (26.9%) 
replied that they had applied for credit in productive sectors, while the majority 
(73.1%) answered that they had not. Among those who applied for productive 
credit, 18% wanted the credit to undertake agricultural projects, 50% planned to 
finance industrial enterprises and 32% wanted credit for transport. 
Third, customers were found to prefer muräbaha to mushäraka. 70 customers 
(67.3%) said that they used muräbaha while 34 (32.7%) used mushäraka. How- 
ever, it is known that muräbaha is in most aspects a trade finance and therefore 
customers use it more frequently than mushäraka. 
The preference for muräbaha over mushäraka may be attributed to the fact 
that banks impose a certain mode of finance on customers. But the responses of 
investors reveal that banks do not force them to be given credits according to a 
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particular mode. 77 customers (74%) said that the IBs they dealt with did not 
impose on them a specific mode of finance. In addition, the customers said that 
they preferred muräbaha since the procedure is an easy one and the bank does not 
share profit with them. 
Therefore it is the customers who determine to a great extent the nature of 
demand by preferring trade finance rather than productive loans. 
The question now is, what were the causes of the customers' reluctance to apply 
for productive loans and their preference for trade finance? The following causes 
were specified and listed, and investors were asked to say whether these affect their 
choice between trade finance and productive loans: (1) high and (mostly) certain 
profit on trade finance; (2) low risk of trade finance; and (3) inadequacy of capital 
to undertake productive investment. Customers gave the following responses: 
Table 8.12: Customers Preference for Trade Finance 
frequency Valid percent Rank 
Low risk 39 35 I 
Inadequacy of capital 37 33 II 
High profit 35 32 III 
F 
Total 111 100 - 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
For customers, low 'risk is a factor which determines the choice between trade 
finance and productive loans. This finding implies that investors are not prepared 
to take risks; therefore, they gave high priority to the low risk of trade. 
Another important factor is the inadequacy of capital required for medium- 
and-long-term investments. Thus, apart from the fact that customers are not 
prepared to take the risks involved in medium-and-long-term investments, they 
also lack the capital to do so. 
To conclude: (i) demand for medium-and-long-term investments is basically 
demand for trade finance; (ii) the two most important reasons for this tendency 
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were found to be the unwillingness of customers to take risks and the lack of capital 
to undertake this kind of productive investment. 
" Crosstabulation analysis 
(A) Strength of demand 
It was mentioned earlier that the repayment period, the grace period, the profit 
margins and the type of guarantee required all affected customer demand. In 
particular these factors affected investors from low-income groups. This finding is 
revealed when these factors are crosstabulated by the size of investment operations 
customers had with IBs. The SPSSX programme was used and the results obtained 
are shown on crosstabulation tables, (A) and (B). 
Crosstabulation (A): Repayment & grace periods by size of investment operations 
50-100* 201-300 401-500 
Repayment period: 
important 8 2 1 
Grace period: 
important 5 2 1 
* Investment operations in (LS 000) 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
Crosstabulation (B): Profit margins & type of guarantee by size of investment 
operations 
50-100 201-300 401-500 
Profit margins: 
important 5 1 1 
Type of 
guarantee: 
important 7 2 1 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
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It appears that customers from low-income groups put great importance on 
the impact of these four, factors on their decision to apply for credit from banks. 
The crosstabulation analysis confirms the frequency distribution analysis that cus- 
tomers, especially those from low-income groups, were constrained by the condi- 
tions specified for investment; consequently demand is low. 
(B) Character of demand: 
The frequency distribution analysis on character of demand, as shown above, 
shows that (i) customers were found to be avoiding risks involved in productive 
investments and (ii) that they lacked adequate capital to undertake these types 
of medium-and-long-term investment projects. Crosstabulation analysis provides 
more evidence for these findings. 
Firstly, regarding the aversion to risks, it was stated above that one piece of 
evidence for this is the high priority given by customers to the low risk as a factor 
determining the choice of trade finance. - Further evidence is that customers prefer 
muräbaha (as a trade finance) rather than mushäraka-as participation financing. 
However, when the mode of finance as preferred by customers was crosstabu- 
lated by the low risk element as a reason for choosing trade finance, the SPSSX 
programme came up with the following results: 
Crosstabulation (C): Type of mode by low- risk element 
`yes' risk is reason to prefer trade finance 
murdbaha 9 64.3% 
mushdraka 5 35.7% 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
This finding proves that customers are unwilling to take the risk of having 
credits for medium-and-long-term investments, and this is one of the reasons that 
might explain why the demand for such investments is low. 
The lack of adequate capital was found to be one of the causes of low demand 
for productive investments. Thus the nature of demand iis : such that customers 
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prefer trade finance to productive loans. Crosstabulation provides evidence for 
this argument. When the `size of investment operations' was crosstabulated by 
the `inadequacy of capital as a reason for preferring trade finance' the following 
findings were obtained: 
Crosstabulation (D): Size of investment operations by inadequacy of capital 
50-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 500-million 
`yes' inadequacy is 
a reason 
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. 
(6.5)* 
6 
(6.5) 
4 
(6.5) 
1 
(6.5) 
2 
(6.5) 
2 
(6.5) 
* Expected frequencies. 
Chi-square = 58.39; df = 6-1 =5 
Source: Investors Survey, 1989. 
Put in statistical form, the argument is as follows: 
The null hypothesis is that there is an equal impact for the indequacy of 
capital (as a reason for the avoidence of productive investments) on the classes of 
customers, so that both those who undertake small-size and those who undertake 
large-size investment operations avoid medium-and-long-term investments due to 
lack of capital. 
The research hypothesis is that the impact of the inadequacy of capital is 
greater on the group of small-size investors; therefore they are more likely to avoid 
medium-and-long-term investments. 
Applying the one-variable use of chi-square technique, x2 is 58.39. 
Comparing 58.39 (the calculated value) to the critical value(s): 
X2 = 
x2 = 
X2 = 
58.39 > 11.07 at 0.05 probability level (df = 5) 
58.39 > 15.08 at 0.01 probability level (df = 5) 
58.39 > 20.517 at 0.001 probability, level (df. = 5) 
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Since the calculated value is higher than the critical values at all levels, the 
decision to be made is to reject the null hypothesis and accept the research hy- 
pothesis. The conclusion is that the impact of inadequacy of capital is not equal 
for all customers. It is greater for low-income customers and therefore they are 
more likely to avoid productive investments and choose trade finance. 
" Summary: 
For investors of IBs, the following elements, in order of their importance to 
customers, affect their decision to demand credit: (i) repayment period, (ii) grace 
period, (iii) profit margins and (iv) the type of guarantee. 
IBs specified these elements as conditions for obtaining credit. But the field- 
work findings reveal that the repayment and grace periods are too short and that 
profit margins are high, which discouraged customers from applying for credit. 
Thus demand was affected especially demand for medium-and-long-term invest- 
ments. In other words, demand is weak. 
The findings of the survey show that customers refrained from applying for 
credits for productive investments and tended instead to go for trade finance. 
There are two reasons for customers' preference for trade finance rather than 
productive loans: (a) customers are not ready to take risk and (b) they lack ade- 
quate capital. Therefore the attitude of customers in this regard is characterised 
by low demand for medium-and-long-term investments and high demand for short- 
term or trade finance. 
Thus, part of the insignificant contribution to medium-and-long-term finance 
by IBs might be accounted for by the inability of customers to fulfil some conditions 
specified by IBs for investments, and their tendency to avoid risks and prefer trade 
finance. Moreover, most customers (investors) of IBs would not like the bank 
to share their profits, especially the more successful entrepreneurs. Thus, IBs 
managers showed that the demand by this group of entrepreneurs for participation 
financing is low. Investors prefer participation financing only when the risk is 
high. Managers also indicated that the traditional form of Islamic partnership is 
not attractive to some customers, since they do not like to disclose their secrets, 
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and this form of partnership gives the bank the right to interfer in the partners' 
affairs. 
8.5.3 Management attitude 
Management attitude is regarded as the second perceived determinant of the 
contribution of IBs to economic development. In this regard, how do managers 
behave? 
Firstly, IBs managers said that there is an insignificant contribution to financ- 
ing seed capital since it is highly risky, and at the same time there are no demands 
for such investments except in rare cases. They also said that financing is concen- 
trated on domestic and international trade and on some manufacturing projects 
in major cities, while ' no such financing is available for small farmers and crafts- 
men outside large cities. The cause, they said, is the weak infrastructure and the 
inability of management to control the small projects in rural areas. In fact, there 
have been some successful attempts by FIBS and the Sudanese Islamic Bank to 
fund small handicrafts and farmers. 
Secondly, collateral is : one of the 
determinants of demand for medium-and- 
long-term investments. For managers of IBs collateral is very important, and 
some investment operations could not be financed unless the customer (investor) 
provides the bank with adequate guarantees. Because most investors are unable to 
fulfil this condition, the banks are most likely to refrain from funding the projects3a 
Thirdly, the personal qualities of the clients affect the attitude of the bank 
towards accepting or rejecting an application. All managers of IBs agreed on the 
importance of clients in granting credits. This finding implies that in their decisions 
to give credits, IBs depend predominantly on qualified and sound customers. This 
might be necessitated by the nature of the Islamic mode of finance of mushäraka 
and mudäraba the execution of which depends heavily on the honesty and trust- 
fulness of customers (partners). This requirement also restricts the demand for 
credit. 
36 Usually, IBs require a guarantee not to cover losses, if incurred, but to make sure that there is no 
kind of negligence or dishonesty on the part of the clients. '; 
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Fourthly, all managers of IBs, except one, indicated that the low demand for 
productive projects by investors had a considerable passive impact on their decision 
to finance these types <of investments. It is true that the demand for productive 
investments originated partially from the principal weaknesses of the Sudanese 
economy which were identified as the shortage of human capital at the managerial 
or entrepreneurial level as well as throughout the labour force. The IBs and the 
banking system in general are almost powerless to solve these problems. But the 
fact remains the case that IBs should shoulder part of the responsibility of financing 
productive investments. 
Thus the demand for medium-and-long-term investment has a great impact 
on the contribution of . IBs to the funding of these productive activities. IBs are 
financially capable of funding medium-and-long-term investments; no IB is now 
facing a problem of short-term maturity of deposits when investing in productive 
projects. IBs have been successful in mobilising a high proportion of savings, and 
their financial position is strong since they have multiplied their fixed assets and 
built considerable reserves. These financial potentialities enable IBs to absorb 
disturbances or uncertainties inherent in financing development projects. 
Moreover, if demand is low, IBs should be `supply leading' rather than `de- 
mand following'. They do not have to concentrate on short-term self-liquidating 
commercial loans; rather; they should establish close ties with productive investors, 
especially those in rural areas, and provide funds for fixed investments as well as 
for working capital. 
This `supply-leading' policy is quite important, not only because demand for 
corporate financing is low, but also because IBs are able to finance this type of 
investment. They need only to maintain sound banking assets. The sound banking 
asset is one which is `self-liquidating'. A `self-liquidating' credit is one the debtor 
is thought sure to be able to repay, and this depends on the return which the op- 
eration realises. In short, to prevent difficult liquidation, IBs have to maintain the 
total volume of their lending. Only by maintaining their assets can IBs maintain 
the `self-liquidating' character of a substantial number of them. 
Fifthly, although managers indicated that the demand is low, they compete 
with each other for the same group of investors. To solve the problem of low de- 
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mand, and instead of competing with each other, IBs could follow a comprehensive 
financial approach, i. e. specific types of financial institutions for specific functions. 
IBs should differentiate between commercial capital which is liquid and has a high 
turn-over, and agricultural and industrial capital which is of a fixed nature. Since 
the functions of these different kinds of capital are different, so too should be the 
institutional sources of their financing and the kind of collateral used. 
Sixthly, IBs lack skilled staff to undertake feasbility studies for medium-and- 
long-term projects. Traditionally, bankers, as providers of short-term capital for 
traders, have been accustomed to consider primarily a borrower's honesty and 
good faith and his balance-sheet position. If the honest borrower has a reasonably 
liquid position, he can be counted upon to repay a temporary advance. It is 
not enough for IBs to concentrate solely on the trustfulness of the clients if they 
are to provide credits for long-term investments. A provider of long-term capital 
is concerned not so much with the balance-sheet position as with the long-term 
earning capacity of the borrower. Assessment of the earning capacity is a very 
different task from assessment of the current balance-sheet position. It calls for a 
long view of markets, both for raw materials and for products, and of technical 
possibilities of labour supplies. 
Assessment of these factors can be undertaken reasonably by a larger group of 
specialists. Therefore, IBs need feasibility study units, with experts specialising in 
one, or more industries. Because of the lack of feasibility studies units, productive 
financing given by IBs was for working capital. The financing was provided on the 
basis not of participation, but of muräbaha. 
Seventhly, IBs managers showed that they use, in one way or another, deposits 
of branches in rural areas when funding investment operations in urban areas. 
These operations, apart from being in urban areas and at the expense of rural 
areas, were in the form of trade finance. This attitude implies that IBs do not 
initiate or develop investment opportunities in rural areas; in actual fact they have 
deprived rural areas of their own resources. This tendency should surely affect 
demand in general and especially the demand for productive investments. 
Eighthly, IBs are now investing through customers and subsidiary companies, 
but no IB is involved in direct investment. Given that demand for medium-and- 
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long-term investments is weak, and IBs depend on investment through customers, 
the low contribution to financing productive investments is to be expected. 
IBs can initiate their own productive investment projects and involve them- 
selves in direct investments. Alternatively they can encourage investors who are 
risk-takers but who lack adequate capital. The experience of direct investments 
by IBs is still limited, especially in agricultural and industrial sectors. FIBs has 
attempted to invest in rain-fed mechanised agriculture on large scale. 
Ninthly, Sudan is a poor country in terms of per capita income and output, but 
it has potential for every productive investment since it is endowed with numerous 
and immense natural resources. One of the difficult problems of development is 
the inadequacy of capital. Even so, IBs are involved in investing part of their 
capital abroad and are considering a more concentrated international approach to 
business, (see the summary above). This sort of management attitude has deprived 
the Sudanese economy of the resouces and investible capital that it so desperately 
needs. 
Finally, profitability is affecting the decision of managers in allocating funds for 
both short-and-long-term, investments. IBs managers put great importance on the 
profitability of the projects they undertake. This, of course, affects their attitude 
towards productive investments that are of low, or uncertain, return. 
" Summary: 
One could conclude that the attitude of IBs managers is not conductive to 
medium-and-long-term investments. The lack of expert staff; the concentration on 
investors in urban areas; the great emphasis on collateral without differentiating 
between the nature of the proposed projects; the shifting of resources from rural to 
urban areas; the emphasis on the profitability of a project; and the moves towards a 
more international approach for business all of these are factors which influence IBs' 
managers to sponsor productive investments. Therefore the management attitude 
as a determinant of the role of IBs in medium-and-long-term investments has 
affected that contribution negatively. The insignificant contribution can thus be 
attributed partly to the behaviour of managers of lBs. 
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8.5.4 An Attitude of authorities: 
Chapter VI discussed the monetary policies follwed by the Bank of Sudan. 
Chapter VII discussed the credit policies which affect the liabilities and liquidities 
of commercial banks in general. It showed the implication of this for IBs and their 
market share. The question now concerns the nature of credit policies adopted by 
monetary authorities to regulate and control the asset side of all banks, and in 
particular IBs. 
If a banking system is to be effective in contributing to productive capital 
formation, the government must assure minimal financial and political order and 
refrain from the kind of random interference that increases uncertainty for large- 
scale investment planning. In order to examine the attitude of authorities, credit 
policies are explored below, and the credit policy of 1986 is taken as an example. 
8.5.4.1 Credit policies: description , critique and implications 
In general, a credit policy is a number of measures and directives issued by the 
Central Bank to commercial banks to control money supply and arrange banks' 
lending to the private sector so that it might be used in productive economic 
sectors. These measures and directives are concerned primarily with control and 
rationalisation of banking credit and to a lesser extent with the control of com- 
mercial banks' liquidity. The first part of these measures were listed and discussed 
in Chapter VII. What now follows is listing and elaboration of the second part. 
A credit policy should be developed in the context of monetary control. Mon- 
etary control implies the use of instruments such as the discount rate, variation 
in the legal reserves ratio, open market operations and liquidity ratios. In reality 
credit policy is not a substitute for monetary control. A credit policy is designed 
to direct funds to productive activities, but the policy is useless unless the overall 
expansion of credit is kept in check to prevent inflation. Credit policy is basically 
allocative. Monetary control is designed to determine the levels of economic ac- 
tivities. But there is no evidence to suggest that the Central Bank has depended 
increasingly on the credit policy because it is flexible and easy. It is, however, a 
mistake to believe that the Central Bank could achieve through it the objectives 
of monetary policy as quickly as possible. 
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In fact, the credit policy is important in this respect because of the impossibility 
of making use of the open market operations, the failure of discount rate policies, 
the manipulation of interest rate due to the absence of money and capital market, 
the publics' aversion to dealing with the interest rate, and the limitations inherent 
within the banking sector. 
(I) Credit policy (1986): 
The credit policy aims in general at reducing inflation and increasing growth 
rates by rationalising consumption and making optimum use of the resources avail- 
able. 
With regard to control of lending, the policy aims at: 
1. Promotion and encouragement of the export sector by allocating not less 
than 30% of each bank's ceiling to finance exports with easy conditions. 
2. Increasing the production and utilisation of excess capacities in local in- 
dustries by allocating not less than 25% of each bank's lending ceiling with easy 
conditions to give incentives to producers. 
3. Prohibiting financing and storage of some basic crops except for export or 
to provide local industry with its needs. 
4. Restricting any extension of finance to the import of non-essential com- 
modities. 
5. Confining the financing of local trade activity to the public sector and joint 
banks only. 
6. Directing finance to productive activities by granting medium-and-long- 
term loans and participation in the capital of productive projects, so that loans to 
this will not be less than 35% of the ceiling given to joint and foreign banks, and 
be about 20% of the public sector banks' ceiling. 
(II) Critique: 
The first thing that may be noticed about this particular credit policy is its 
inability to bring down inflation and increase the growth rate. The inflation rate 
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is almost continuously on the rise. The economic growth rate of the economy has 
been negative. The main cause of this is basically structural. Therefore, credit 
policies are able to play only an insignificant role, by solving some of the financing 
problems or affecting the total demand. 
Secondly, in the case of the export sector, those who benefit are the exporters, 
not the producers, of the exportable commodities. Exchange rates are low and 
discouraging for producers especially with the high costs of production. 
Thirdly, for medium-and-long-term participation in the capital of productive 
projects, the policy differentiates between the government and the private banks, so 
that the former would extend not more than 20% of their ceiling to the productive 
projects, while the latter would extend not less than 35% of theirs. Although this 
redirection of financing to the productive projects is a forward step, it is too much 
for private banks with their limited ceilings. It might be appropriate to order all 
banks to allocate, for instance, 10% of their credit ceilings, and to increase this 
amount gradually. In this way commercial banks would be in a better position to 
finance the productive sectors which are of a long-term nature and at the same 
time remain involved in profit-generating activities of a short-term nature. 
Fourthly, the policy no longer suits an increasing volume of private sector sav- 
ings in the form of deposits that require profitable outlets; that is to say, the policy 
is inappropriate as regards the increasing need of the Sudanese economy for invest- 
ment in different economic fields and the role of commercial banks in extending 
development financing. Although the policy has attempted to attract commercial 
banks to invest in productive sectors, which is dcesirable and important, it has 
neglected the need of commercial banks to generate adequate profits, at least to 
reward those who keep deposits and hold shares with commercial banks. No bank 
applies this policy without affecting its return negatively, (see Chapter VII, section 
7.7) 
Fifthly, the number of banks and their branches has increased tremendously. 
The credit ceilings policy does not allow branches in remote areas to meet the 
demands of customers there for loans. 
Prices are increasing continuously because of the deterioration in the value of 
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the Sudanese pound and the rising costs of production. Therefore the increase in 
banks' ceilings is almost absorbed by these prices' increases and in real terms there 
is no increase in the ceilings assigned to banks. 
Sixthly, an imposition of ceilings on private commercial banks is not expected 
to reduce money supply and inflation, one of the main causes of which is the deficit 
financing of the central government and public corporations. Commercial banks 
depend on private savings mobilisation to provide funds for investment; whatever 
the volume of their credit in the Sudan, they cannot affect the level of prices in 
the same way deficit financing of the government can. 
The credit ceilings policy has resulted in a large proportion of private savings 
standing idle. These idle financial resources are indicated by the high rates of cash 
reserves of commercial banks with the Central Bank. As `a proportion of assets, 
commercial banks' reserves with the Bank of Sudan increased from 13.6% in 1983 
to 21.53% in 1984 and 34.4% in 1986, (Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 
1986/87) 
In 1987, the Bank of Sudan adjusted the credit policy of 1986 which had already 
specified certain proportions of the credit ceilings to be allocated to productive 
sectors. The 1987 policy was considered more flexible in this regard. It required 
financing of sectors which are of great importance and priority to be not less than 
80% of each bank's ceiling. The sectors are: export; working capital for agriculture; 
small-scale crafts; and medium-and-long-term development financing. 
In justifying this policy, the Central Bank mentioned that it aimed at directing 
banking credits to fund productive sectors and the related activities to enable banks 
to respond flexibly according to the needs of the leading economic sectors. 
As for medium-and-long-term financing, the policy eliminated the priority that 
was first given to such types of financing. The defect of this policy is that banks 
are able to avoid financing medium-and-long-term financing without contravening 
the policy itself. 
As early as 1988, the 1987 credit policy was revised but there were no big 
changes except that the new policy added that: (1) what is meant by medium-and- 
long-term financing is the loans with a repayment period of more than one year and 
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which are granted for financing fixed capital in agriculture and industry, loans for 
crop tranportation, financing of small crafts firms; and participation in companies' 
capital; (2) in choosing productive investment projects and financing small crafts 
units, banks should give priority to less developed regions of the country. 
(III) Implications: 
The implications of this kind of policy are quite obvious: 
The stringent credit policies forced banks (and IBs in particular) to stop re- 
ceiving investment deposits since IBs are unable to place these funds in profit- 
generating outlets (see Chapter VII, section 7.7). They were unable to do so 
because IBs have multiplied their capital, reserves and deposits but were given 
limited credit ceilings. These credit ceilings were too narrow given the financial 
resources available. 
If IBs as profit-makers, do not have the chance to invest all the resources avail- 
able to them, they are more likely to give priority to the allocation of shareholders' 
funds rather than those of depositors. Thus IBs stopped receiving new investment 
deposits. But the unabsorbed portion of private savings will either find their way 
to the informal money market or will be used in residential investments. However, 
both types of activities are marginal and unproductive. 
The Central Bank needs to design a credit policy that combines the develop- 
mental efforts of all commercial banks with a sufficient overall profitability of the 
total funds. Nowadays reserves of IBs have been accumulated as idle reserves with 
the Central Bank. For instance, Tadämon Islamic Bank's reserves ratios with the 
Central Bank increased from 16.6% in 1983 (the year of a start) to 44.6% in 1984, 
50.8% in 1985 and 56.5% in 1986, (Al Mugtasid, Tadämon Islamic Bank Magazine, 
January, 1987, p. 57). These funds could be freed to be placed in different projects. 
If the Central Bank is to resort to a credit ceilings policy, it could link these ceilings 
for every bank with its resources from capital and deposits, so that the ceiling can 
be increased or decreased according to the movements of the financial resources of 
any bank. 
" Summary: 
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The conclusion is that so far as the effect of public policies on the role of banks 
in economic development is concerned, one could say that policies have affected 
this role negatively. The government's policies have been consistently protectionist, 
and therefore bankers in particular, and industrial entrepreneurs in general, have 
adopted conservative behaviour. 
Public policies hinder the banking system by increasing the taxation of profits. 
Moreover, the continuous deficits of the government's budget have affected both 
bank behaviour and capital formation. 
Of course, it is not only the attitude of authorities which has affected the con- 
tribution of all banks to the financing of productive projects; structural problems 
of the Sudanese economy have also hampered the role of banks in this regard. 
To all managers of IBs, structural bottlenecks in the economy are hindering in- 
vestments in productive projects to a great extent. For managers, uncertainties 
surrounding productive investments are high, especially given the nature of the 
Sudanese economy. 
The new regime (in power since June 1989) held an Economic Conference for 
National Salvation in October 1989. At this conference it was decided to change 
the laws for encouraging investments in the Sudan. The characteristic features of 
the new law are: 
(i) No differentiation between foreign and local investors, or differentiation 
between investment projects. 
(ii) Encouragement for investments in agriculture, industry, animal production, 
the service sector and other productive activities. 
(iii) Concentration will be on (i) investment projects which have more potential 
for increasing national income, expanding the economic base, diversifying economic 
activities, increasing the value added, using the local resources and enhancing the 
export potentiality of the economy; and (ii) those projects in the less developed 
regions of the country. 
The new law introduced more concessions, tax and customs duty exemptions, 
especially duties on the importation of inputs for investment projects. 
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Of vital importance is the recommendation of the conference with regard to 
financial institutions. The conference asked for : (a) a study to establish an 
investment-guarantee corporation, subsidising the three specialised banks and the 
Sudanese Developmemt Corporation in order that they might play an effective 
role in investment; (b) encouragement of investment and finance companies and 
investment banks; (c) a study of the possibility of setting up a market for financial 
securities; (d) and finally, and this is crucial, a study of the possibility of releasing 
the domination (monopoly) by the public sector of some investment sectors, to 
encourage competition from private sector. 
The government also held a conference for Sudanese nationals working abroad 
(SNWA) in August 1989, ratifying its proceedings in October 1989. Recommen- 
dations of the conferrence were intended to encourage and improve the investment 
environment. They include: 
" Introducing of appropriate amendments to laws regarding investments, taxes 
and other economic measures. 
" Continuation of these investment policies so that investors would not be hesi- 
tant and reluctant due to changes in policies. 
" Reducing profit margins of the banking system to reduce costs and inflation 
rates. 
" Encouraging the more attractive modes of finance of mudäraba, istizra' and 
istisna `. These are the Islamic modes of finance of equity capital, participation 
in agricultural credit and industrial credit respectively. 
" Most important of all is the amendment of the credit policy of the Central Bank 
so that the credit ceilings granted to banks would be increased to allow more 
investment opportunities for the SNWA to place their savings in the productive 
units. 
" One more recommendation emphasizes on planning and preparation of land in 
different regions to establish handi-crafts and small-scale industry units to be 
funded by the SNWA. 
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All of these recommendations reveal a big change in the government's attitude 
towards development fianciers in general and banks in particular. 
These measures notwithstanding, obstacles in the path of Sudanese economic 
develpment are numerous. These include: 
(1) Primitive techiques employed in industry and especially in agriculture 
(2) Widespread illiteracy and ignorance. These are handicaps that cannot be 
dealt with through conscious policy, at least in the short-run, even if the policy 
makers are inclined to do so. 
(3) The economy is facing huge public debt; on top of this, the government 
is quite unable to balance current receipts and expenditures, and as a result the 
nominal debt has quadrupled over the years. The civil war has been the most 
disastrous event in this unhappy series of setbacks. 
(4) Political instability has upset responsible measures intended to secure fi- 
nancial reform. 
(5) Given the financial instability of the government, private domestic capi- 
tal accumulation on any significant scale is virtually impossible. The government 
sometimes follows discriminatory policies, which account for the disappointing con- 
tribution of the banking system to economic development. There are facilities given 
by the Central Bank to government banks rather than other commercial banks in- 
cluding IBs. 
To conclude, the role of IBs in financing medium-and-long-term projects has 
still been limited. One of the main reasons for this is the public policy towards 
banking system in general and IBs in particular. Government policies should en- 
courage banks to be more concerned about long-term investments. There should 
be long-term policies to solve the problems of the Sudanese economy in the first 
place, and to reallocate banks' funds towards investment spending instead of con- 
sumption spending. 
8.5.5 The character of Islamic modes of finance: 
IBs operate primarily three forms - mushäraka, mudäraba and murabaha each 
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with different informational needs and operational problems. This may affect the 
demand (investors' attitude) and supply (management attitude) of medium-and- 
long-term investments as follows: 
(a) Mushäraka: 
Certain information reqirements are necessary to formulate and implement a 
mushäraka deal. In undertaking a mushäraka contract, IBs need information on (1) 
a commodity or a factory, (2) marketing information and (3) personal information 
about the client. 
This list is in the perceived order of priority for the success of mushäraka. The 
problem facing IBs managers is the external information. The managers argue that 
information about the market and commodities are not very reliable because the 
economic environment is changing rapidly. Under these conditions IBs are unable 
to apply mushäraka. 
Apart from information, there are other problems in following mushäraka: 
(i) Better entrepreneurs are unwilling to contemplate participation financing. 
Managers of IBs indicated that the demand by this group of entrepreneurs for 
participation financing is low. Investors prefer mushäraka only when the risk is 
high. 
(ii) The traditional form of Islämic partnership is not attractive to customers, 
since they do not like to disclose their business affairs, and this form of partnership 
gives the bank the right to interfer in the partner's affairs. 
(iii) In most cases the partner's share in the capital of the venture is in the 
form of machinery, buildings, etc. The problem facing IBs is the valuation of such 
assets. The partner always looks for a high value in order to claim a high share of 
profits. There are no professional valuators in the Sudan and FIBS deals with the 
matter through negotiation and arbitration. 
(iv) In managing any mushäraka wherein fixed assets are provided by the part- 
ner, problems arise with regard to the treatment of depreciation. Depreciation as 
an expense item has created some problems and the Shari `a Supervisory Boards 
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(SSBs) of all IBs disapprove of this concept as it is elaborated in the current eco- 
nomic literature because it is based on inaccurate estimations. This could be unfair 
for either of the partners, and therefore the SSBs of IBs reject it. Moreover, the 
cost of depreciation is disapproved by the shari'a because it is a proxy, not a vlaue. 
(v) Valuation of management remuneration; in running a mushäraka, the ar- 
rangement of the partnership is left mainly to the partner. For his pain he gets a 
percentage of the realised profits. The problem is how to put a value on this effort 
and how to relate the percentage to the effort objectively. 
(b) Mudäraba: 
The nature of this mode of finance may restrict the supply for medium-and- 
long-term financing since it depends predominantly on a customer. Therefore em- 
phasis lies on the collection of information on a client. Before being given finance, 
clients are investigated with respect to their experience and honesty. Managers 
have indicated that the personal qualities of a customer have in many cases re- 
stricted granting credits for productive investments. 
If mudäraba credit is to work efficiently, IBs need to obtain full information 
about their clients' experience and trustfulness. However, in the absence of a 
proper accounting system and statistics on clients, information is difficult to obtain. 
Because of this problem, there is a tendency among managers to concentrate on 
customers whom they know personally. 
In practice, IBs have devised strict rules and regulations for the initial selection 
of customers, although this does not guarantee that customers will declare their 
actual profits on the venture. In the Sudan the law does not require enterprises 
to have proper books and records except those registered as limited companies. 
Banks simply have to trust customers on what they reveal as profits. It is often 
difficult or impossible for the bank to determine the exact figure because records 
may be incomplete or non-existent. The the problem is a formidable one because by 
increasing costs it encroaches on the bank's revenues and affects the availability of 
staff to monitor the bank's operations. Therefore mudäraba needs more scrutinity 
as far as the client is concerned and, hence, this might explain why IBs are so 
conservative to use it in order to finnance medium-and-long-term investments. 
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Information on the marketability of the products is also important, especially 
in circumstances of rapidly changing prices and inflation rates. Given the thriving 
black market in the Sudan, it is difficult for IBs to collect proper information on 
the market and give finance through mudäraba; banks are likely to extend their 
fianance to those customers whom they know personally, a procedure prompts the 
management to be more conservative. 
(c) Muräbaha: 
Muräbaha is not able to absorb all types of lending activities. In funding 
working capital needs, it can be used for funding raw materials but not other 
components. This is because muräbaha is a way of financing tradeable commodities 
which must be held or delivered at the time of sale. 
Thus muräbaha lacks the flexibility of interest-lending in the case of long-term 
investments and is probably not used for this type of projects. 
Apart from the above problems concerning Islamic modes of finance, IBs face 
the difficulty of repayment on time; indeed, in many cases there are no balances 
to repay. 
When customers fail to repay, IBs encounter two problems; first, the money 
is blocked, obviating its use in other investment projects; and second, unlike tra- 
ditional banks, IBs cannot claim more profit for the delay, this being haräm in 
Islam, i. e. not permissible in Islaic ruling. 
" Summary: 
Islamic modes of finance require information on clients and the market so that 
these modes might be applied adequately. This requirement is particularly im- 
portant in the case of medium-and-long-term investments. Therefore some IBs 
managers are discouraged from financing some productive investments either be- 
cause of a lack of information or because the traditional form of Islamic mode of 
finance is not attractive to some investors and is unable to absorb all types of lend- 
ing activities. Hence the sponsoring of productive investments by IBs is affected 
by the nature and character of Islamic mode of finance. 
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Chapter IX 
Islämic Credit In The Sudan: The Case Of Faisal Islämic 
Bank (SUDAN) (FIBS) 
The preceding chapters are concerned with the development of IBs in Sudan, 
their market share, financial resources and contribution to medium-and-long-term 
investments, and to mbnetisation of the economy. In this chapter the performance 
of IBs is examined much more closely by taking the first and leading Islamic 
financial institution in the Sudan, FIBS, as a case study. 
The chapter is organised as follows, section one covers the establishment of 
the bank, its capital,, subsidiary companies and organizational structure. Section 
two gives details of the: geographical spread of the bank's network and the deposits 
liabilities compared with commercial banks in general and other IBs in particular. 
Section three shows the volume of lending activities of the bank, its role in financing 
different sectors of the economy and, as well, comparing this with other commercial 
banks including IBs. 
9.1 Establishment, Capital and Organization 
9.1.1 Establishment 
In February 1976, the Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Faisal discussed with the 
then president of the Republic of Sudan an idea of establishing an Islamic bank. 
Talks resulted in the issue of a special law concerning the proposed bank. 
FIBS was established on August 18th 1977, under the 'FIBS Act'. It started 
officially on May 10th 1978. The bank was excempted from the application of 
rules and laws regulating banking services, insurance and, payment of taxes on 
profits and other regulations. These concessions were intended to encourage the 
bank to compete with the existing banks, but were withdrawn immediately after 
Islamization of the banking system in 1984. 
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Many people were interested in this new type of financial institution and some 
of them were suspicious about its operations without giving or taking interest. 
Though the bank was established in a completely interest-based financial system, it 
performed better than the existing commercial banks. Its outstanding performance 
convinced the public at large of the applicability and feasibility of interest-free 
dealings. A number of IBs were opened up partly as a consequence of FIBS' 
success. 
9.1.2 Capital and subsidiary companies 
The authrised capital is L. S. 100 millions, of which L. S. 58.4 millions is paid-up. 
The bank's capital is divided among Sudanese (40%), Saudi (40%) and other 
shareholders from different Muslim countries (20%). In comparing FIBS with other 
IBs, it is obvious that FIBS accounts for one-third of these banks' paid-up capital. 
The growth rate of paid-up capital is nill over the last five years due to delayed 
payment of subscription by shareholders37, (Table 9.1). 
Table 9: 1: IBs: Paid-up Capital (LS. million) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Amoun Annual growth Amount Annual growth Amount Annual growth Amoun Annual growth 
FIBS (1) 58.4 0 58.4 0 58.4 0 58.4 
Tajamon Islamic 
Bank 21.4 . 005 
21.5 0.11 23.9 0.00 23.9 - 
Sudanese Islamic 
Bank 19.4 0.21 23.5 0.00 23.5 0.00 23.5 
Islamic Co-operativ 
Development Bank 6 0.13 6.8 0.02 6.9 0.00 6.9 
Islamic Bank of 
Western Sudan 8 0.19 9.5 0.00 9.5 0.00 9.5 
Al Baraka Bank 55.1 0.004 55.3 0.00 55.3 0.00 55.3 
Total (2) 168.3 0.40 175 0.20 177.9 0.00 177.9 - 
(1)/(2)% 34.7 - 33.3 - 32.8 - 32.8 
Source: IBs: Annual Reports. 
37 See Chapter VII, section 7.10 
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The bank owns five subsidiary companies undertaking different economic ac- 
tivities in insurance, trade and services, construction, clearance and investment. 
These are: (i) the Islamic Insurance Company, (ii) the Islamic Trade and Services 
Company, (iii) Real Estate Development Company, (iv) the Sudanese Clearance 
Company and (v) the Islamic Investment Company (Sudan) which is a joint ven- 
ture between FIBS and Dar al- Mal al- Islami and invest in agriculture and industry 
only. 
9.1.3 Organizational structure 
The organization of any institution aims at achieving its objectives and goals. 
FIBS, as an Islamic bank, tries to implement a new banking concept in that it 
adhers strictly to the rulings of Islamic shari'a in the fields of finance and other 
dealings. However, being an Islamic bank does not imply that its organization is 
fundamentally different from other banks. However, the administrative organisa- 
tion of the bank is as follows: 
9.1.3.1 Management 
The board of the directors is composed of Sudanese, Saudi and other Muslim 
countries' shareholders; it is a body in which ownership rights are vested. All the 
executives are Sudanese. 
9.1.3.2 Shari 'a Supervisory Board (SSB) 
As an Islämic financial institution, FIBS must have not only a board of direc- 
tors, it has to have also a Shari`a Supervisory Board SSB. The Main objective of 
the SSB is to 
`give creditibility to the operations of the bank by authenticating their legitimacy from the 
Shari'a point of view', (Mudawi, A. Yousif, 1984, p. 4). 
The SSB enjoys a high degree of independence from the bank management. 
It is appointed by shareholders in the General Assembly. The bank management 
refers to the SSB for advice on how to execute operations without contravening 
Shari `a rules. 
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Two departments are under supervision of the SSB. The first, the Zakät de- 
partment, is concerned with the collection and distribution of Zakät and donations. 
The Zakät is due annually on the bank's capital as well as its annual profits and 
distributed to the needy people as stipulated by the Shari 'a. 
The second department is the legal affairs department. It is responsible for 
completing legal procedures with customers and settlements in the case of dispute. 
Investment operations of the bank are concluded under contracts of mudäraba, 
mushäraka and muräbaha. The legal affairs department consults the SSB on con- 
clusion of these contracts. In most cases the bank agrees with customers on fair 
solutions to disputes without resorting to formal civil prosecutions. 
9.1.3.3 Investment department 
The investment department is an important one. FIBS extends its credits 
on the basis of., participation which means sharing the risk of losses as well as 
profits. As a result, the bank has more involvement in the projects it finances. 
The department is divided into three subsections: (a) a feasibility studies section 
which undertakes studies on the projects presented by customers for finance; (b) an 
executions section which completes procedures for projects that the bank agreed to 
finance and (c) a follow-up section to make sure that the finance provided is spent 
in the proper way and to ensure that the project is well-managed. In fact, FIBS 
has good experience in this regard. Before implementing follow-up, the banks's 
return on investment projects was quite low, 5 to 6%. When the follow-up was 
implemented, the results were quite rewarding, (Hamdi, A. A., 1981). 
9.1.3.4 Recruitment and training centre 
The bank initially relied largely on staff who were experienced in the tradi- 
tional commercial banks. On joining the bank, they attended intensive courses 
and sessions on the Shari `a, to learn the rules which govern economic activities in 
Islam. The staff is usually shown the different contracts which govern the bank's 
operations and were instructed in the legal status of current accounts in the bank, 
stressing on the difference between the investment deposits in an Islamic bank and 
the similar time deposits of traditional banks. 
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The bank has set up its own training centre which arranges training pro- 
grammes inside and outside the country as it has close links with training and 
academic institutions in different parts of the world. 
9.1.3.5 Research and statistics centre 
The centre is responsible for initiating and carrying out researches on different 
economic issues. A major part of the research is devoted to the areas of ana- 
lyzing different forms of Islamic financing, and investigating the implementation 
techniques involved in each form of financing. It undertakes also research on the 
Sudanese economy and the world economy. Moreover, the Centre collects data 
on all financial activities of the bank, tabulating these data and analysing them 
regularly. 
Other departments function as organisational units for financial and banking 
affairs, foreign exchange, information and public relations. 
9.2 Geographical Distribution, Deposit Liabilities & MarketShare 
9.2.1 Geographical distribution of the bank's network 
Although the growth of financial intermediaries in absolute terms is essential 
for achieving economic transformation, the geographical dispersal of their expan- 
sion among various regions is central to the realization of full monetization of the 
entire economy. Unfortunately, the available evidence reveals that banking facili- 
ties in the Sudan have almost exclusively been concentrated in Khartoum province. 
105 Out of 315 branches operating different banking facilities were placed in Khar- 
toum, i. e. 30% (Bank of Sudan, 1989). 
The same applies, however, to FIBS which concentrated its activities in Khar- 
toum, particularly in the first three years. Since 1980 FIBS started to concentrate 
on providing banking facilities in the rural regions of the country which include 
the bulk of the inhabitants in the subsistence sector. 
Of the 19 branches run by the bank, 9 are in Khartoum province, (Table 9.2). 
Nevertheless, although 50% of the bank branches are in Khartoum area, they do 
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not limit their services and facilities to inhabitants of the urban areas. The bank's 
branches provide services to low-income groups from outlying regions. 
Up to 1984,88% of total deposits with the bank originated in Khartoum 
province. Because of the bank's network spread, this proportion was reduced 
drastically to 62.5% in 1987, (Table 9.2). Moreover, the bank has recently been 
licensed to open another four branches in the Western Sudan the most backward 
region of the country. FIBS is adopting the strategy of spreading credit activity 
to a large number of customers in the rural areas. 
9.2.2 Deposit liabilities: their structure and growth 
The size of deposits with any financial institution is an indicator of its good 
reputation and performance. One may argue that apart from the good service 
provided by FIBS, depositors who deal with it may have religious motives as the 
bank is an Islamic one. This is only true to a limited extent because if the bank 
is not competitive in the quality of its services, it will account for only a small 
market share, (see Chapter VII, section 7.5.2.3). However, the proof for showing 
the real contribution of FIBS is supplied by disclosing its contribution in saving 
mobilization. There is, first, a brief account of the bank services offered by FIBS. 
. Accounts 
Current accounts are offered according to the normal banking practices. These 
accounts are, however, guaranteed by the bank. Current accounts in foreign cur- 
rencies are also undertaken espacially for the Sudanese nationals working abroad 
(SNWA). 
Saving accounts are offered by the bank free of charge. All or any part of the 
saving deposits may be withdrawn by the customer at request without notice, and 
there is neither interest rate nor profit paid to depositors. 
On holding saving account, a customer is liable for having greater access to 
bank credit. However, saving account is different from current account in that: 
(i) the former account could be opened for any amount of money while there is a 
minimum limit for current account; (ii) there is a cheque book provided for holders 
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of current accounts while those who open saving accounts are supplied with a book 
used at counters only. 
Investment deposits are also offered. When the bank started the minimum de- 
posit of investment account was L. S. 100. Funds are deposited subject to one year 
withdrawal notice. They are utilized in the various investment projects of the bank. 
The bank takes 25% of the profits of investment accounts for its entrepreneural 
efforts in administering the funds, that is its reward as mudärib (working on cap- 
ital). If the deposit is withdrawn before an elapse of three months, the customer 
is not entitled to any profit, (Hamdi, Abd el Rahim, 1981). 
In addition to accounts, FIBS undertakes: 
" Domestic as well as international bank transfers 
" Collection of bills. 
" All forms of letters of credits and letters of quarantees. 
" Safe custody services are also provided. 
FIBS has been successful in providing the normal banking services and, si- 
multaneously, satisfying customers who in the past used banking services on the 
basis of interest rates. This success is reflected in the growth of its deposits. To 
demonstrate this for the 1979-88 period, Table 9.3 shows the structure and growth 
of FIBS' deposits as compared with other IBs working in Sudan. 
9.2.3 Deposit structure 
FIBS and other IBs 
It is clear that, as mentioned in Chapter VII (section 7.7.1.2 and Table 7.16) 
the major component of IBs' deposits is the current account deposits. However, 
FIBS is not an exception. The component of its deposits is predominantly current 
accounts, which was 82.6% in 1979,64.5% in 1983,71% in 1985 and 77.6% in 
1988. Thus, current deposits are, throughout the 1979-88 period, not less than 
two-thirds of total deposits, (Table 9.3 (A)). 
FIBS' market share of deposits among IBs declined from 147% in 1984 to 102 
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Table 9.3(A): FIBS & Other IBs Deposit Structure (LS. million) 
1979 1980 1981 1892 1983 1984 1985 1086 1987 1988 
FIBS (1): 
Current 19 40 60 128 168 193 239 241 317 392 
Saving 1 1 2 8 12 30 38 30 42 52 
Investment 3 8 40 66 79 67 69 48 41 81 
Total 23 49 102 202 257 290 336 319 400 505 
Ta¢amon 
Islamic Bank: 
Current 26 56 103 155 228 
Saving 1 2 5 8 14 
Investment 17 19 13 16 16 
Total 44 77 121 178 258 
Sudanese 
Islamic Bank: 
Current 12 69 97 167 233 
Saving 1 2 4 7 8 
Investment 9 14 13 16 18 
Total 22 85 114 190 259 
Al Baraka amic Bank: 
Current 59 65 75 88 96 
Saving - - - - - 
Investment 13 17 10 13 13 
Total 72 82 85 101 109 
Co-operative 
Islamic Bank! 
Current 31 39 52 95 106 
Saving 2 4 10 14 10 
Investment 7 11 14 11 11 
Total 40 54 76 120 127 
Islamic Bank 
of Western Sudan 
Current 15 21 38 45 52 
Saving - - 1 2 2 
Investment 4 8 9 8 8 
Total 19 29 48 55 62 
IBs Deposits (2) 197 327 444 644 815 
(1)1(2) 147 102 0.72 0.62 0.82 
* Excluding FIBS 
Source: IBs Reports. 
% in 1986 and 62% in 1988. This finding implies two posibilities that: (i) either 
FIBS and other Ms are hunting the same group of depositors so that some of them 
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shifted from FIBS to other IBs when they found similar interest-free services or 
(ii) the other IBs are more efficient than FIBS and are competitive to it. But the 
fact still remains that FIBS is dominating the market share among IBs. 
9.2.4 Deposit growth 
(I) FIBS 
There was a remarkable increase in the volume of deposits during the first five 
years, 1979-83, then a aecline during the last five years - 1984-88. Total deposits 
grew by 34.6% over the years 1979-83,13% over 1984-88 and by 31% throughout 
the ten-year period - 1979-88. This decline was syncronised with an establishment 
of other IBs in Sudan starting in late 1983. 
Breaking down deposits into their components, one notices the decline of 
growth rates of current, saving and investment deposits. These growth rates were, 
subsequently, 55%, 71% and 87% during the first period and were 17%, 12% and 
-8% during the last five years, (Table 9.3(B)). Thus, investment depsoits experi- 
enced a negative growth rate, a decline which was attributed to the stringent credit 
policies affecting deposit raising by all banks. 38 It may also be attributed to the 
establishment of other IBs, extending similar type of services. 
(II) FIBS and other lBs 
IBs other than FIBS started operation in late 1983. Therefore, to compare 
FIBS with these banks, only the data for the year 1984 and onwards are relevant. 
Growth rates of other IBs' deposits, total deposits and their components, ex- 
ceeded those of FIBS. The growth rate has been slowed down for FIBS in late 
years (1984-88) to reflect a more normal rate. But it still remains the fact that 
growth rates indicate that other IBs have been growing rapidly since they were 
established, that FIBS lost share primarily to these banks. 
Of particular interest is the growth rate of investment deposits. It was -8 % 
for FIBS, -2% for Tadamon Islamic Bank, 15.3% for the Sudanese Islamic Bank 
and -3% for Al-Baraka Bank. Hence, the decline in investment deposits of FIBS 
was greater than that of other IBs. Moreover, even the average growth rates for 
38 See the preceding chapters and also see EI-Ashker, A. A. (1990). 
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all these banks collectively were higher than growth rates of FIBS' deposits and 
their components. 
Table 9.3(B): IBs: Growth of Component Deposits 
1 
Type of Account Total deposits 
Current Saving Investment 
1979.8 1984-8 M9-15a 2979-83 1984-8 1979-8 1979-8 1984-8 1979-8 1979-8 1984-8 1979.8 
FIBS 0.55 0.17 0.31 0.71 0.12 0.49 0.87 0.0-8 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.34.6 
Ta¢amon Islamic 
Bank - 0.53 - 0.67 - -0.02 0.44 
Sudanese Islamic 
Bank - 0.70 - 0.546 - 0.153 0.575 
Islamic Bank of 
Western Sudan 0.325 0.21 0.142 - 0.301 
Islamic Co-opezati 
Development Bank 0.335 0.446 0.09 - 0.307 - 
At Baraka Bank - 0.122 - - - -0.03 0.764 
Average IH 0.4024 - 0.468 0.067 0.477 
Source: as calculated from Table 9.3(A). 
FIBS has announced recently what is called the `First Saving Scheme. It has 
been designed to attract funds from SNWA, particularly those working in the Gulf 
Estates and Arab Republic of Yemen. The scheme covers financing of projects 
presented by SNWA either as individuals, small groups or as a company, and in 
the field of handicrafts, professions agricultural and animal production. It also 
covers the establishment of small servicing projects and light industries. 
Pre-requisite. for the financing are: (1) the opening of a savings account in a 
foreign currency of any amount; in the event that the account balance reaches U. S. 
$ 2000 or more, it may be converted into an investment account; (b) the bank will 
finance projects in local currency, with the deposit, valued by an official rate for 
the dollar, serving as a guarantee; (c) the bank will invest the deposit, if converted 
into an investment deposit. In this case the depositor will be given 70% of profits 
realized in dollars; he/she can claim back the deposit in dollars by the end of the 
project's period (FIBS, First Saving Scheme, February 1988). 
9.2.5 FIBS & banking system: deposit liabilities 
In comparing FIBS deposits with those held by other commercial banks, it 
appears that deposits of the former grew by 31% while those of the latter grew 
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by 28% only over the same period, (Table 9.4). However, it deserves mentioning 
that FIBS' deposits constituted, on average, 10.6% of commercial banks deposits, 
(Table 9.4). Adding FIBS. ' deposits to those of other banks, the growth rate 
was 28% while excluding FIBS', the growth rate was 26% as shown above. This 
implies that FIBS has contributed positively to the mobilization of savings by the 
banking system. This finding is not surprising as it is known that FIBS is backed 
by more than 11000 shareholders, (assuming that there is a correlation between 
shareholders and savers), (FIBS, Performance Report, 1985). 
Table 9.4: FIBS & Commercial Banks: Private Deposits, The Period 
1979-1988 (LS. million) 
979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Growth rate 
FIBS (1) 23 49 102 202 257 290 336 322 400 505 0.346 
Commercial Banks (2) 529 695 904 1305 1781 1964 3280 4243 4148 4855 0.28 
(1)/(2) (%) 4.3 .. 7.1 11.2 15.6 14.4 14.8 10.2 8 9.6' 10.4 - 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports; FIBS Reports, relevant years. 
Taking the annual growth of deposits of banking system in the Sudan, one 
notices the declining annual growth rate for all commercial banks, (Table 9.5). 
Moreover, in comparing FIBS with other IBs working in other (nearly similar 
environments) countries, annual growth rates indicate that FIBS and Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Egypt (FIBE) grew rapidly, with a particularly faster than normal rate 
of growth in the early' years. Their growth rates slowed down in late years to 
reflect not only a normal rate, but also the impact of policies (monetary and credit 
policies) in these countries. On the other hand, the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) 
showed a relatively rapid growth rate in early years since it was established (in 
1978) and then a declining trend of growth. 
9.3 Investment Activities 
An investment is central to any Islamic bank and it must be given a spe- 
cial attention as the Islamic bank does not lend money on an interest rate basis. 
Therefore, it is expected to scrutinize the projects that are selected for finance. 
The important point in this regard is that investments are undertaken according 
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to the Islamic modes of operating. In Chapter II it has been shown the various 
forms of interest rate which are prohibited by Islam. Chapter III discussed the al- 
ternative formula available for investment and financial transactions in the Islamic 
framework. In this chapter there is first a brief discussion of the forms of Islamic 
modes of finance in connection with the investment activities of the FIBS. 
Table 9.5: FIBS & Other Banks: Annual Growth of Deposits 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/8 1987/88 
Banking system 
Government banks 
Joint & Foreign bank 
(excluding IBs) 
0.31 
- 
0.30 
0.21 
0.47 
- 
0.44 
0.28 
0.61 
0.37 
0.28 
0.29 
0.10 
0.14 
(-0.005) 
0.67 
0.63 
168 
0: 29 
- 
All Islämic banks 113 113 0.98 0.57 0.41 0.33 0.23 0.37 0.21 
FIBS 113 113 0.98 0.27 0.13 0.16 (-0.04) (-0.02) 0.17 
FIBE 234.8 0.689 0.535 0.258 0.042 (-0.066) - 
KFH 0.979 0.609 0.475 0.019 0.019 0.047 0.09 
Source: Bank of Sudan Reports; FIBS Reports; Volker Neinhaus, 1988 
9.3.1 Islamic Investment formulae 
IBs do not give or take interest rate in their dealings. They follow either of 
the following formulas: 
(I) Mushäraka (Partnership) 
Whose main features are that wealth (capital) and labour are held on a partner- 
ship basis by both parties (the bank and the customer), the share of each partner 
in the profits is a general ratio and not a particular rate in relation to the capital. 
The two parties agree in advance on the ratio into which the net profits are to be 
divided between them. 
For instance, in financing commodity trade, FIBS began in the first years to 
supply up to 80% of the required funding and the partner supplies the remaining 
20% (the ratio varies according to the type of commodities). From the net profits, 
the partner is given allowances for managing the operation which varies between 
20 and 35%. The remainder of the profits is divided between the two parties 
according to the share of each party in the capital of the operation. From the 
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point of view of Islamic law, the ratio of profit sharing can be different from that 
of capital participation and so the bank usually gives the partner a share in the 
profits higher than the partner's actual contribution in capital. If, however, losses 
occur they are borne by the two parties in accordance with their respective shares 
of the capital. 
In financing industry (working capital), FIBS evaluates assets of the partner 
in cash terms, determines the working capital to supply and agree on the ratios of 
profits and loss sharing. 
In fact this formulae is found more convenient for financing of industry, agri- 
culture, services and trade. The bank studies the operation submitted by the 
customer for finance, the participation of the customers in the capital and the 
profits of the operations are determined. The customer must contribute a cash or 
kind as part of the capital in the case of partnership. A time limit is determined 
for the termination of the operation. The partner is authorized to manage the 
operation directly. No security can be taken from the partner as a partner, it is 
taken against negligence or wilful act by the partner. 
There is, however, a problem in connection with the implementation of the 
partnership, this is how to valuate the element of labour (management) contributed 
by the partner. Although this problem is of theoretical nature the bank solved it 
by determining the contribution of the element of labour according to the type 
of operation. For instance, exports operations are given a higher management al- 
lowance (or incentive) than import operations. Another problem is how to valuate 
the fixed assets contributed by the partner. 11 
A third problem which is considered to be the most important is the extension 
of the operations further than their stipulated time limits. In other banks an 
additional interest rate is imposed on delayed debts. For an Islamic bank, if the 
customer is not likely to liquidate the operation for a reason pertaining to the 
market, the bank has to accept this and such a situation results usually in a 
decrease of the real profits of the bank due to the extension of the operation time. 
To solve this problem, FIBS makes use of the terms stipulated in the contract of the 
operation and it uses persuasion to facilitate prompt liquidation. Overtime, and 
after long practice of mushäraka, the bank found that it is important to be careful 
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about the initial evaluation of the projects, the selection of the right partner and 
the follow-up of their performance and the adoption of effective control mechanisms 
to monitor operations. 
The bank adopts a mechanism of control embodied in the original contract to 
regulate drawings from the bank's participation in order to avoid the incidence of 
surplus liquidity in the hands of the customers and to guarantee a continuous flow 
of repayments. For instance, the partner must submit a contract of purchase or 
shipment documents before receiving any funds from the bank. 
(II) Partnership leading to ownership (leasing) 
This is a developed version of the original partnership formula which is suit- 
able for medium-and-long-term operations. A portion of the net proceeds of the 
operation is deducted and allotted to the repayment of the original trade finance. 
Another portion is given to the bank as a profit and the third portion to the cus- 
tomer as his profit. FIBS uses this formulae in financing basically craft activities. 
(III) Mudäraba (Quiräd) 
Mudäraba is a contract between two parties according to which one of them 
pays the other a specific amount of money (capital) to invest for an agreed general 
ratio of the net profit. This contract is characterised by the fact that all the capital 
comes from one party (rabb ul- mäl) and the labour (i. e. management) comes from 
the other party, the mudärib. The net profits are divided between them according 
to the ratios agreed upon in advance in the contract. The profit due to each party 
must not be a rate determined in relation to the capital but a ratio out of the 
realized profits. The difference between this mode and the partnership is that 
here all financial loss is borne by the capital owner only unless it comes from the 
negligence of the mudärib. This is why the bank regards this formulae as more 
risky and uses it in operations closely supervised by the bank such as exports 
operations. 
Mudäraba can be absolute (unconditional) or restricted (conditional). The 
bank uses the absolute form in its relationship with the holders of investment 
deposits, and the bank acts as mudärib. The depositor signs, a written undertaking 
authorizing the bank to invest deposits according to unconditional mudäraba, and 
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it does not guarantee repayment of all or part of these deposits in case of losses. In 
this way the bank has the right to determine the field and method of investment. 
In giving finance to the customer, on the other hand, the bank uses the con- 
ditional formulae, acting as an owner of capital rabb ul-mäl. It takes from the 
mudärib a collateral to guarantee good management (i. e. avoiding negligence or 
misbehaviour) or the customer keeps the goods concerned in the bank's stores. The 
bank regulates withdrawals from the mudiäraba operation account, and it applies 
also the repayment control mechanism. 
(IV) Sale by instalment 
Many Muslim jurists regard a selling price in cases of instalments to be haläl 
when it is set higher than in the case of cash sale on stipulation that if the customer 
does not pay the instalments in the specified time, the price cannot be raised, and 
payment should be delayed. 
The bank is now using this formula with extremely soft terms to finance small 
instruments of production for craftsmen, like lathes, saws and sewing machines as 
well as commercial vehicles including trucks, pick-ups and tractors. 
(V) Muräbäha (sale for profit) 
The muräbaha formulae implies an ordinary sale of a commodity for a profit 
over and above the original price at which the bank has purchased it. Certain 
conditions are to be fulfilled in the muräbaha sale: that both parties should know 
the original purchase price, the profit sum or rate and there should be no interest 
already included in the original purchase price. 
FIBS is using this formula in financing local and foreign trade operations. The 
sale can be ended by handing over the shipping documents in case of imported 
goods. A muräbaha contract does not commit the customer to buying of any 
commodity he demanded and is made available to him even if it satisfies the 
conditions he has asked for. 
The bank does not take a collateral if the customer. received the goods and 
paid for that instantly. If the commodity is imported, the customer is asked to 
sign an undertaking giving the bank the right to clear 'the commodity through 
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customs and sell it in case the customer rejected it. If payment for the commodity 
is by instalment, the bank asks for the real estate mortgage, or the security may 
be partly a real estate mortgage and partly the storage of the commodity at the 
bank's warehouses, or a personal security by a third party. Up to 1985 the bank did 
not take deposits in advance from a customer. But then the Central Bank, in order 
to control money supply, asked IBs to take 25% of the value of any commodity to 
be paid in advance by a customer to the bank. However, the muräbaha formulae is 
accepted by customers because it is simple and allows them the freedom in selling 
goods. 
(VI) Quard hasan (Benevolent loans) 
These were made available to the bank's partners as an interest free overdraft 
if they are faced with difficulties or unexpected needs. They were also used as an 
incentive for good customers. The bank used to give benevolent loans also to semi- 
government corporations and needy people. However, in early 1985 the Central 
Bank of Sudan prohibited an extension of benevolent loans by IBs. 
9.3.2 Profit margins 
The bank's policy is not to help raise prices and so it does not finance the 
purchase or storage of the local commodities unless the purchase is from original 
sources and not through intermediaries. It also conforms to the legal profit margins 
for different commodities and services as determined by the state, and the bank's 
ratio of profits is therefore determined as a percentage of the legally fixed prices. 
As is shown above, FIBS finances investment operations according to the 
Islamic contracts of mushäraka, mudäraba, murctbaha, eijära and other forms of 
Islamic finance. It takes different profit margins depending on the types of the 
commodities and the clients. 
For some essential commodoties financed on muräbaha (mark-up) the bank 
takes lower profit margins. For non-essential commodities it takes higher profit 
margins. Table 9.6 shows the various profit margins taken on muräbaha operations 
in different economic sectors, and according to the payment 'of instalments. It is 
clear that profit margins vary according to the type of aýcommodity and the time 
span of an operation. 
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? able 9.6: FIBS: Instalment & Profit Margins Structure 
Payment of Profit 
instalment (months) margin% 
(I. ) Finance of local trade: 
(a) instalment every month 1 2 
(RP* 1-3 months) 2 4 
3 4.5 
(b) instalment, at the 2 4 
end of the period 3 5.5 
(RP 2-3 months) 
II. Finance of foreign trade 6 13 
(local & foreign component) 
Finance of working capital 3 4.5 
and raw materials 6 10 
(RP 3-12 months) 9 13.5 
12 18 
Finance of agricultural 
machinery and equipment: 
(a) Annual instalments 1 year 15 
(RP 1-3 years) 2 years 25 
3 years 35 
(b) half-year instalment 1 year 15 
(RP 1-3 years) (two instalment) 
2 years 25 
(four instalment) 
3 years 34 
(six instalment) 
Finance of trucks and 1 year 18 
buses 2 years 25 
(RP 1-3 years) 3 years 36 
Source: FIBS: Investment Department. 
* RP = Repayment period. 
In mushäraka (partnership) the management allowance varies between 20 and 
30% of the net profits. The management allowance may rise up. to 50% in the. case 
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of mudäraba, (Hamdi, Abdel Rahim, 1981). 
9.3.3 The risk element in bank's investments 
Risks arise in finance operations either because of the nature of the finance 
formula themselves or because of the economic circumstances under which IBs 
work. 
The risks inherent in the formulae are that the partner enjoys a great deal of 
control over the operation (either as a partner or as a mudärib) according to the 
Islamic formulae which gives him the right to act, and according to the bank's 
policy of authorizing the partner to manage the partnership operation for himself 
and the bank, (Hamdi, Abdel Rahim, 1981, p. 17). There is also the moral com- 
mitment on the bank to facilitate the procurement of the means of production to 
the small-scale producers which causes the bank to lower securities offered by the 
small producers. 
The risks arising from the environment include the difficulty to determine 
appropriate profit-sharing ratios in advance for both the bank and the customer. 
The customers sometimes do not understand the Islamic investment formulae, 
but in practice the risk arising from this decreased over time when customers 
continued being financed by the bank on Islamic modes of finance and they have 
become acquainted with the conditions of these modes. Another source of risk is 
the customers tampering sometimes with figures and records they are entrusted 
with. 
In order to reduce the risk involved in investment operations, FIBS adopts the 
following procedures: 
(i) It undertakes technical and economic studies of each operation carefully 
and investigates the customer's financial position and dealings. In addition there 
is continuous supervision and follow-up of the operation. 
(ii) The control of funds coming into and out of the operation through the 
determination of the methods and conditions of withdrawals and repayments, with 
a view to enable the bank to make sure of the suitable allocation of its funds. The 
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bank has introduced also a fund reserves for losses equalization which is used to 
cover the losses. 
The bank asks for physical or personal securities by a third party in favour of 
the customer who, i. e. the third party, signs undertaking to pay the amounts due 
to the bank if the originäl customer defaults. 
FIBS insists on securing its operations in accordance with Shari `a stipulations. 
As mentioned above, actual security in the form of a mortgage is needed to secure 
competent performance by the partner. Moreover, the withdrawal mechanism used 
by the bank to regulate investment operations is designed to fit the special nature 
of each operation so that some flexibility is maintained for the partner to conduct 
the operation. 
As a matter of policy, FIBS tries to take collateral for all operations. The 
different forms of security, physical mortgage, storage of goods, personal security 
and others, are usually taken separately or collectively to provide full security 
to the bank's operations. Losses resulting from reasons other than negligence or 
breach of contract by the partner are shared by the bank and the customer in 
proportion to contributiön of the bank and the customer. 
9.4 The Allocation of Generated Deposits 
9.4.1 Investments and deposits utilisation 
(I) FIBS and other IBs 
As mentioned earlier, an investment is central to any Islamic bank and must 
be given special attention as the Islamic bank does not lend money on an interest- 
rate basis. Accordingly, FIBS concentrated on a selective investment policy to 
realize objectives of both the depositors and shareholders, and to enable the bank 
to contribute positively to the socio-economic development of the Sudan. 
The growth rate of, FIBS' investments was 27.4% during the period under 
review - 1979/1988. The data on Table 9.7 below show that FIBS' investments 
witnessed a steady increase annually up to 1984, declining in 1985 and began 
increasing again. The growth rate of FIBS' investments during the five-year period 
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1984-88 was lower than that of other IBs. As, however, FIBS started operations 
five years earlier than these banks, the lower growth rate of its investments might 
be regarded as a normal rate. Moreover, FIBS is among IBs which utilise their 
deposits at lower rate. 
Table 9.7: FIBS & Other IBs: Credit Growth & Deposit Utilisation 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Growth rate 
FIBS (1) 133* 120 158 192 241 0.166 
(0.46)* (0.38) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) - 
Tadamon 22.3 26.7 24 38.2 67.1 0.256 
Islamic Bank (0.51) (0.35) (0.20) (0.39) (0.26) - 
Al-Baraka Bank 25 32 50.4 70 84 0.32 
(0.35) (0.39) (0.32) (0.33) (0.37) - 
Islamic Bank of 7 17.8 17.19 33.7 40.5 0.414 
Western Sudan (0.37) (0.61) (0.56) (0.61) (0.65) - 
Sudanese Islamic 14 40.1 55.68 146 155 0.61 
Bank (0.64) (0.59) (0.48) (0.77) (0.60) - 
Islamic Co-operative 43.2 60.4 73.6 74 121 0.073 
Development Bank (108) (112) (0.97) (0.62) (0.96) - 
Total (2) 104.5 187.2 316.6 361.9 467.6 0.37 (33)* 
(1)/(2) 127 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.515 - 
* In LS. million; * values between brackets indicate degree of deposit utilisation 
* 0.33 is the average IBs growth rate 
Source: IBs Reports, relevant years. 
As a percentage of other IBs' investments, FIBS' investments decreased from 
127% in 1984 to 64% in 1985 and 51.5% in 1988. The decrease in its share was at- 
tributed to an establishment of other IBs. It was also attributed to the government 
policy of containing money suuply and credit and an adoption of the IMF stabili- 
sation programmes and financial reforms. FIBS and other IBs could no longer find 
profitable outlets to finance from their resources. 
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When calculating growth rate of investments for the first five years of the bank's 
operations, it was 58.6%, but investments experienced a slow growth during 1984- 
1988. This slow down was synchronised with an expansion in Islamic banking 
services provided by similar IBs which started operations in the second half of 
1983. That is the market share of FIBS among the section of customers who 
prefer IBs' services was reduced. Another cause of the decline was the restricted 
credit and monetary policies adopted by the government to restore internal and 
external imbalances facing the Sudanese economy. 
(II) FIBS and commercial banks 
In comparing FIBS' investments with commercial banks' advances, investments 
of the former constituted only 2% of advances of the latter in 1979. This percentage 
increased steadily overtime till it reached 10% in 1982 and 1983. Since then, FIBS' 
investments have been declining and constituted only 6% in 1986,5% in 1987 and 
5.5% in 1988, (Table 9.8). This decline was attributed to the causes mentioned 
earlier. 
Table 9.8: FIBS & Commercial Banks: Credit Growth & Deposit 
Utilisation 
Years 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Growth rate 
(%) 
r 
FIBS' invest ments l fib8 12 57 84 136 125 133 120 158 192 241 23.3 
FIBS' deposits(Df ib3) 23 49 102 202 257 290 336 319 400 505 34.6 
Ifib3/Dfib3 0.52 0.65 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.48 0.48 - 
Commercial banks; 
advances(ACOm 449 561 778 1143 1377 1609 1777 2637 3793 4345 25 
deposits Dcom 529 720 943 1340 1781 2064 3623 4243 5786 6206 28 
Acom Dcom 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.75 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.70 - 
I fib, 
ACo7n 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports; FIBS' Reports. 
Taking the growth rate, one notices that FIBS' investments grew by almost the 
same rate as advances of the banking system. Growth rate of FIBS' investments 
was 27.4% while that of commercial banks was 25%. On the other hand, although 
deposit growth rate for FIBS exceeded that of commercial banks, 34.6%. for the 
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former and 28% for the latter, deposit utilisation for FIBS was throughout the 
period lower than the country average of deposit utilisation. 
9.4.2 Financing of productive sectors 
It is natural that any new financial institution should be involved in short- 
term financing at the outset. This is necessary for two reasons: first, to enhance 
its financial position; and second, to encourage depositors and shareholders by 
giving them rewarding return. 
FIBS adopted this policy, but at the same time it did not ignore the importance 
of long-term financing, Therefore in its second year in operation the bank financed 
two oil mills, and designed plans for financing productive projects in the medium 
and long term. The details of this are broken down by sector as follows. 
9.4.2.1 The industrial sector 
FIBS gave more attention to industry through mushciraka (partnership) con- 
tracts which are more appropriate in providing capital to this sector. Following 
this form of financing, the bank achieved what can be called an alliance between 
capital and work, which resulted in the bank having a stake in industrial concerns 
it financed. Moreover, it played a positive role instead of acting as a creditor only. 
The amount of funds provided to this sector totalled L. S. 74 millions over the 
years 1979-1987. It was used in buying raw materials, machines and equipment 
and as working capital for different industries. A special interest was shown in 
the oil mills industry which witnessed a remarkable increase in the early 1980s. 
To bridge the gap between local consumption and production, the bank helped 
this type of industry, especially oil seeds production in the rural areas. The total 
amount of credit was L. S. 15 millions up to 1984. 
In 1983, FIBS diversified its industrial investments. It started as a provider 
of capital for different long-term projects. These included food factories, printing 
presses, drugs factories, spare parts for Port Sudan Petroleum Refinery, sugar 
factories, the railways corporation and other public and private industrial concerns. 
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However, the bank's contribution might have been more impressive than its ac- 
complishments had certain problems been solved. These are a number of obstacles 
to the promoting industry: (a) a lack of enthusiastic and competent entrepreneurs 
to set up and operate manufacturing firms and (b) constrains connected with the 
investment environment, including inappropriate economic policies and structural 
rigidities. 
9.4.2.2 The agricultural sector 
The Sudanese economy is basically agricultural with activities in this sector 
dominating over those of other sectors. The potentials for development lie in 
agriculture. The bank planned therefore to contribute significantly in promoting 
this vital component of the economy. 
Between 1980 and 1982 FIBS allocated L. S. 4 millions to the rainfed agricul- 
tural sub-sector. Over 300 tractors and ancillary equipment were sold to farmers 
on concessionary terms! It helped in marketing agricultural products, both locally 
and in the world markets. Participation in promoting agriculture also included the 
provision of fuel and petroleum products whose scarcity is a real problem facing 
farmers during the rainy seasons, espacially those in rainfed areas, (FIBS Quarterly 
Review, 1984). 
To expand and modernize the agricultural sector, FIBS imported production 
goods worthy an equivalent of L. S. 51 millions, over 80% of which were agricultural 
machinery, water pumps and tractors. Moreover, the bank imported spare parts 
with a value of U. S. $ 27 milions for public corporations undertaking agricultural 
investments on a large scale such as the Sudan - Egyptian Company for Agricultural 
Integration and the El Suki Agricultural Corporation; the bank also met their 
demands from imported insecticides and fertilizers. 
In 1983, FIBS started medium-term financing. It granted interest-free loans 
(quarcl hasan) to a number of agricultural corporations. More important is the 
bank's investment of LS 6.25 million in the Damazin project for agricultural and 
animal production. Another two projects that were supported are in Northern 
Sudan: the El Tibaylab project, which extends over an area of 10,000 feddans, 
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and the El Hasa agricultural project. The bank entered in the latter by buying 
the Agricultural Bank share which was LS 700,000; it also financed running costs. 
Total investments in agriculture reached L. S. 37.3 millions in 1986, while they 
were L. S. 6.3 millions in 1985. Part of the funds provided were directed to import 
insecticides, seeds and other agricultural inputs. 
9.4.2.3 Transport and services sectors 
One can state without hesitation that the contribution in this area was quite 
remarkable and outstripped that of other banks. FIBS imported 1300 freight 
transport trucks whose value was U. S. $ 12 million and coaches worth more than 
U. S$ 6 million. 
The bank shared in the establishment of one successful company working in 
passengers transport which links the capital with different regional and rural ar- 
eas. 39 It owns 60% of its capital (L. S. 25.5 million). Moreover, it owns shares in a 
number of companies transporting petroleum products, including Trans- national 
Transport Company, and air-cargo companies that work between the South and 
the North of the Sudan. 
9.4.2.4 Financing of small-scale industry 
The theory of economic development demonstrates several inter-related posi- 
tive characteristics of small industries. Many studies show that as compared with 
large industries, small-scale industries' activities are more labour-intensive. They 
generate income on a large scale; they are less capital-and-import intensive, they 
cater for local, especially low-income markets, and are more geographically dis- 
persed. 
These characteristics lead to the conclusion that small-scale industries might 
play an important role in the Sudan at its present stage of development. Therefore 
FIBS has a strong desire to promote them. 
The bank opened a specialized branch in one of the biggest industrial areas 
in Khartoum to provide handi-crafts and artisians with their equipments either 
30 Attaysir aandport Company. 
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from local markets, or by importation. The branch extended its credit activities 
to low-income groups of taxi drivers and micro-bus and coach drivers who in the 
past worked as salaried drivers, (see the next chapters). 
9.4.2.5 Trade finance 
Because of the unavailability of foreign currency, the government is unable to 
finance importation of necessary consumer goods. In this regard FIBS played a 
vital role using its foreign resources and facilities in importing basic commodities. 
Special considerations were given to commodities that are largely used by low- 
income groups. 
The bank imported fuel, foodstuffs, chemicals and drugs. For instance, it 
imported 140,000 tons of wheat from the United States, excluding the finance 
of production and transportation of dura (sorghum) to areas of consumption. Be- 
tween 1980-84 it imported petroleum products whose value totalled LS 197 million, 
flour, wheat, lentils, rice, powdered milk, and other foodstuffs with a value of LS 
59 million. Apart from this, the bank brought from abroad chemicals and drugs 
worth LS 55 million, excluding the amount paid to import raw materials for some 
industries. It paid, moreover, LS 61 million for building materials, timber, and 
carpentry inputs. 
9.4.2.6 Exports finance 
In comparing the value of exports financed by FIBS with the whole economy's 
exports, one will find that exports financed by the former constituted 14.2% of the 
latter's, on average. 
Investments in exports decreased drastically. They slowed down to L. S. 4.6 
million in 1985, and to L. S. 2.6 million only in 1986. The main reasons for this 
are: (i) an increase in costs of production of the Sudanese exports, (ii) a decline in 
production and deterioration in quality of exportable products, (iii) less demand 
abroad for Sudanese exports and changes in the conventional markets of the Su- 
danese exports, (iv) producers are discouraged by paying them with the official 
rate of the Sudanese pound (L. S. 2.5 per a dollar) which is too lower than the free 
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market exchange rate, and (v) finally the prohibition of exporting sorghum, dura 
in 1986. (Table 9.9 portrays investments distributed among sectors. ) 
9.4.2.7 Social welfare 
It has been pointed that FIBS set up a separate department concerned with 
the collection of Zakät and donations, and distribution of these funds to needy 
people. Within five years the bank distributed about L. S. 10.5 million as Zakat 
and LS 8 million as donations. In addition, the bank paid LS 9.74 million as 
taxes to the public treasury. The bank's labour force is now approaching 1000 
employees, including workers, secondary schools leavers and university graduates. 
However, the social role is considered as complementary to participation of the 
bank in economic development. 
9.4.2.8 Attraction and mobilization of foreign currency 
FIBS was successful in attracting hard currencies either through an increase in 
the foreign component of capital and deposits or by financing exports. Remittances 
of foreign currencies to FIBS increased from U. S. $ 31.4 million in 1979 to U. S. $ 
749 million in 1984. It deserves mentioning that the bank's capital is owned by 
11049 shareholders distributed as 10107 from the Sudan, 861 from Saudi Arabia 
and 441 shareholders from other Muslim countries. 60% of its paid-up capital is 
in dollars. 
As a result of its good performance, FIBS mobilized enormous foreign cur- 
rency deposits that totalled U. S. $ 768 million in 1983 and U. S. $ 639 million in 
1984. Moreover, it was given by some banks overdrawing facilities not less than 
U. S. $ 35 million over the indicated period, without being charged interest rates. 
Fortunately, it used these facilities to the utmost in marketing national exports in 
the world market. 
In addition, total foreign remittances to FIBS from paid-up capital, deposits 
and free-charge allowances by foreign banks formed 54% of the economy's foreign 
currency remittances from foreign trade over the period 1979-1984, (table 9.10). 
After 1984 the Central Bank imposed restrictions on commercial banks (excluding 
government banks) to deal in foreign currency, especially remittances. 
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Table 9.10: FIBS: Foreign Currency 'iemittances & Sudan Total Exports 
Proceeds, The Period 1979-84 (LS. million) 
YEARS 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
FIBS paid-up capital(1) 04 06 10 16 36 36 
FIBS private deposits(2) 06 44 159 221 768 639 
FIBS facilities from 
foreign banks(3) 07 21 44 67 42 42 
FIBS exports proceeds(4) 18 36 66 103 50 32 
FIBS total foreign 
currency remittances(5) 31.4 107 279 406 899 749 
Sudan exports proceeds(6) 458 694 488 295 372 n. a. 
(4/6)% 03.8 05.2 13.5 34.9 13.4 ii. a. 
(5/6)% 06.8 15.4 57.2 137.6 241.7 n. a. 
n. a. = not available. 
Source: Bank of Sudan Reports; FIBS Reports, relevant years. 
9.5 FIBS: Overall Performance 
9.5.1 Performance: an overview 
For an assessment of the quantitative importance of FIBS, its market share has 
been shown earlier in this chapter. Using the assets side for the same purpose, it is 
obvious that the bank built up its assets rapidly till it became the second largest 
bank of the country since, 1984. Though it was the fifth bank in 1980, within 
five years it occuppied this second rank with respect to assets, (Table 9.11). The 
capitalization of the bank in relation to its total assets ranged from 8% in 1980 to 
30% in 1983. 
9.5.2 Revenue, profits, and returns on deposits and shares 
During its first five years, 1979-83, the bank's revenue grew at a rate higher 
than the expenditure rate, (Table 9.12). This high rate slowed down after 1983. 
According to what is shown by the statistical figures, if revenue had grown by the 
same rate experienced in the first five years, the bank's financial 
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Table 9.11: Assets & Capital/Assets E'iatios, The Period 1980-85 (LS. million) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Assets: 
FIBS 67 138 275 440 447 480 
Bank of Khartoum 315 452 759 1049 1200 1647 
Unity Bank 186 243 313 367 409 348.5 
El-Nilien Bank 301 291 366 410 463 - 
Sudanese Commercial Bank 86 119 101 176 198 162 
(K/A)( f ibs) 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.27 
(K/A)(com) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.05 
(K/A)(gbs) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
(K/A)( f ibs) capital/assets ratio for FIBS 
(K/A)(com) capital/assets ratio for all commercial banks 
(K/A)(gbs) capital/assets ratio for government banks 
Source: Commerciak Banks Reports. 
Table 9.12: FIBS Revenue Components, Expenditures, Profits & 
Returns (LS. million) 
191 198 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Growth rate 
1 779-8 1979-8 
Direct investments 
Banking services 
Foreign exchange 
Others 
879 
231 
1221 
14 
260 
107 
116 
131 
8039 
2238 
3170 
612 
1504 
3792 
8472 
1126 
9901 
8257 
1067 
4749 
1222 
3893 
3054 
228 
2010 
5337 
4758 
641 
1380 
4005 
1506 
673 
2118 
6234 
0868 
3659 
2208 
9712 
8667 
5135 
66 
0.84 
0.63 
0.78 
0.22 
0.30 
-0.7 
0.36 
Total revenue 234 496 1409 2835 3627 1939 27841 2658 3194 3779 0.72 0.25 
Expenditures 120 230 3700 7400 1220 1030 1261 17380 1831 2320 58 30 
Total profits 114 266 1039 2005 24079 9099 1822 9184 1383 1459 58 20 
Shares return (9i) 15 20 25 23 18 12 16 6 1 3 
Investment deposits rteurn (91) 14.7 16 15 15 10 5 9 8 9 7 
Bank interest rate (%) 8 8 9 12 15 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
n. a. = not available 
Source: FIBS Reports, relevant years. 
position would have been much better. Actual figures were LS 19.4 million in 1984, 
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LS 27.8 million in 1985, and LS 26.6 million in 1986. Expected figures, estimated in 
the light of the revenue growth rate in the first five years, were LS 48 million, LS 63 
million, and Ls 83 million in the indicated years respectively. This fall in revenue 
could be interpreted by a number of factors such as competition from other IBs, 
credit policy, and structural inflexibilities characteristics of the Sudanese economy 
which have obstructed an efficient allocation of resources. Thus, one can notice 
the sharp decline in growth rate of income in the years 1983/1988 which led to a 
decline in growth rate from 72.2% during the first five years of the bank's operation 
to 14.8% over the 1979-88 period. 
FIBS, like other IBs elsewhere, when first launched in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, made huge initial profits, but that its performance deteriorated in the mid- 
1980s. However, because FIBS is more dependent for revenues on short-term trade 
financing, it suffered like other IBs more from the credit policies restricting trade 
finance. 4o 
Looking at the component sources of income, the substantial contribution of 
direct investments in raising income to the bank is evident. The average percentage 
of investment contribution was 53% over the period 1979-1988. This was followed 
by foreign exchange transaction revenue, which constituted on average 24% of the 
bank's income. Despite their remarkable growth during the first five years of bank 
operation, foreign exchange transactions witnessed sharp decline during the last 
five years. This decrease was prompted by restrictions on foreign exchange dealings 
imposed by the Central Bank. It was also attributed to the expansion of informal 
(black market) buying and selling of foreign currency. Banking service revenue 
amounted to 17%, and, finally other sources (like the bank's share in other IBs) 
produced 6% (Table 9.12). 
FIBS expenditure has risen considerably, especially in the first five years. This 
rapid increase in expenditure was attributed to the increased spending on branch- 
ing, depreciation, and maintenance of assets and administrative expenses, (Table 
9.12). 
40 Professor Moore interpretes this deterioration in Islämic banks performance as, first, Islaznic banks 
are more dependent on revenues from short-term finance, and this was affected by economic reces- 
sion in the Gulf which radically cut imports into the region, and, second, Isliimic banks tended to 
accumulate risky debts without taking adequate provisions for nonperforming loans. See Moore, 
Clement H., (1990). 
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As mentioned earlier, in this section, the bank achieved high rates of income 
in the first five years, and thus a high profit rate, 36% during this period. Profits 
recorded a remarkable decrease in 1984 and fluctuations in the last four years 
1985-1988. This decline in profits was a consequence of obstacles that have been 
constraining direct investments in the last years. 
When profits fell, returns on shares were reduced to 12%. Depositors were 
also affected to the extent that returns on their deposits were only 5% in 1984, 
1% in 1987 and 3% in 1988. On the other hand, returns on available resources for 
investment (deposits, capital, and reserves) were very low. The returns increased, 
though insignificantly, up to 1982; since then they began falling. In fact, in 1983 
the Bank of Sudan blocked banks' resources by asking them to keep at least 10% 
of their deposits as cash balances. 
9.5.3 Returns on equity and assets 
Market share of FIBS has been shown in the preceding sections. However, 
the increasing financial potential of FIBS would hardly be of great use if it is 
used in a less efficient way than conventional banks. To measure profitability, net 
income/equity ratios are calculated for FIBS and government banks over the period 
1980-85. Net income is calculated as the total income less operating expenses, 
depreciations and provisions. It is the net income which is liable to distribution 
between depositors and shareholders. Net income/assets ratios are also calculated 
to disclose returns in investments. 
From the first instance, the net income/equity ratio indicates that FIBS was 
less lucrative to its owners if compared with the government banks, (Table 9.13). 
This will not mean, however, that FIBS was less efficient than the government 
banks. The interpretation for this low ratio in the case of FIBS is that its equity 
(paid-up capital and reserves) is equal to multiples of that of government banks. 
It is clear that the decreasing trend of net income/equity ratio was due to, first, 
an increase in capital for FIBS and, second, a decrease in total income for all 
banks, including FIBS. It seems that until 1982 FIBS was indeed paying more to 
its depositors than the other banks, but then, as its revenues diminshed, it could 
no longer keep up, (Table 9.12). 
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Table 9.13: FIBS & Government Banks: Net Income/Equity & Net income/Asset 
Ratios (The Period 1980-85) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Y 'b' 
EJ ib. 
0.54 0.63 0.57 0.18 0.7 0.14 
Yiib. 
AJib. 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04 
Y, a. ý Ekb 200 366 191 330 81 115 
Yh. ý 
Akb 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Yt, 
E.. b 
175 280 200 140 86 119 
Y .. b 
Aub 0.04 0.6 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 
YSb 
E. cb 
100 150 100 133 86 222 
, Qh A. cb 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.12 
Y 100 233 250 400 416 n. a. 
Y .. b A 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 n. a. 
Y= income; A= assets; E= equity. 
Source: Commercial Banks Reports. 
If, on the other hand, the net income/assets ratio is calculated to ascertain 
returns on investments, FIBS exceeded the government banks throughout the pe- 
riod under review. This is more important because whenever the ratio is high this 
means that the resources available (including deposits) have been used effectively 
and that both depositors and shareholders will get high profit margins. 
9 Summary 
FIBS is among the first leading IBs established in different parts of the world, 
and also the first Islamic bank in the Sudan. It is also among the top 100 Arab 
banks, (Moore, C. H., 1990). 
It takes about one-third of paid-up capital of IBs working in Sudan. Although 
it is concentrating in urban area, FIBS' branches are also spreading in rural areas. 
FIBS accounts for about two-thirds of deposits of the Sudanese Islamic banks, 
and about one-tenth of deposits of commercial banks. Despite the considerable 
growth of the bank's deposits during the first five years of it operation, deposits 
growth rate slowed down after 1984. This decrease was synchronised with a start 
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of other IBs also providing banking services on interest-free basis. The negative 
impact of stringent credit policies on deposit growth was tangible. This negative 
impact is particularly considerable on investment deposits. Despite their success 
in collecting deposits, however, Islamic banks in general seem to have experienced 
difficulties in placing the funds in profitable projects. 
FIBS uses Islamic modes of finance to allocate its resources in investment activ- 
ities. The various profit margins taken on operations vary according to the type of 
commodity and sectors. If the commodity which needs finance is a necessary one, 
or the project to be financed is in productive sector, profit margins are preferrably 
low. 
FIBS accounts for 51.5% of total investments of other IBs in the Sudan. Its 
investments were declining as a result of both strict credit policies and due to 
the establishment of other IBs. It accounts for around 5.5% of total advances of 
commercial banks. 
During its first five years of operation, 1979-83, the bank's revenue grew at 
a rate higher than the expenditure rate. This rate slowed down after 1983. The 
component source of revenue were direct investments, foreign exchange transac- 
tions, banking services and revenue generated by participation in capital of other 
IBs. 
When profits fell, returns on shares were reduced. Depositors were also af- 
fected, returns on deposits being only 2.3% in 1988, less impressive than in early 
1980s. 
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Chapter X 
Small-scale Industries (SSIs) In The Sudan 
10.1 Introduction 
Rapid industrialisation has for several decades been regarded as an attractive 
and effective strategy for transforming developing economies and maximising their 
rates of economic growth.. Indeed many developing countries began in the early 
1950's to launch industrialisation drives based generally on an import-substitution 
strategy, which usually resulted in the establishment of large-scale capital-intensive 
industries in urban areas. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that 
this strategy has often produced disappointing results. In a number of developing 
countries not only has the overall rate of growth of the economy been low but 
employment in the industrialisation has failed to keep pace with population growth 
and in some cases even declined in absolute terms (Frank, C. R., 1968). 
The Sudan experience with industrialisation has been similar to that of other 
developing countries. Sudan's industrial sector is facing many difficulties: 
(i) The sector needs foreign currency to get input needs for sustaining a ca- 
pacity utilisation which is now less than 25%. Because of the unsolved issues 
between the Government of Sudan and the IMF, the foreign exchange situation of 
the country is poor and unsatisfactory. 
(ii) The sector is extremely import-depedent because of the technologies chosen 
in the 1960's and especially the 1970's; the structural change of industry since 
independence (in 1956) has favoured more and more those branches with higher 
import-content, especially the production of luxury consumer goods. 
(iii) The insignificant export industries producing edible oil and yarn are under 
pressure, especially with lack of adequate fixed capital input. 
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(iv) The industrial policies adopted since independence have favoured large- 
scale and capital-intensive industrial ventures at the expense of small- and medium- 
scale firms. 
(v) The industrial public sector has failed to realise even modest targets in pro- 
viding goods as projected and realising development objectives like equity, regional 
balance, employment and resource use. 
However, the results of all this proved to be disappointing. On the other hand, 
the SSIs sector is, presumably, characterised by some development advantages: (a) 
low import-dependency; (b) high employment generation; (c) use of appropriate 
technologies, (d) generation of local skills; (e) supply of needed goods and services 
for local and rural markets and stronger linkages to the agricultural sector. 
In this context the SSIs need investigation in order to understand their prob- 
lems, perspectives and the contribution that they can possibly make to industrial 
growth and economic development. However, given the assumed development ad- 
vantages of SSIs, this chapter and the next one address basically the question 
related to their financing. Therefore, section 10.2 gives a theoretical background 
concerning the financing of SSIs. Section 10.3 gives a historical and institutional 
policy review as related to SSIs development in the Sudan so as to understand the 
policy constraints affecting this sector. 
The most important empirical issues should be set forth. The first relates to 
the importance of SSIs in the Sudan; thus section 10.4 exposes the magnitude, 
composition and characteristics of SSIs and thier contribution to national income 
and employment. 
A second issue centres on, first, the labour-intensity of SSIs and, second, the 
output generated by unit of capital by SSIs. Do SSIs, for example, possess a higher 
labour/capital ratio than large-scale industries? Then, given the output objective 
and the apparent relative scarcity of capital, do smaller firms use less capital to 
produce a given value of output than larger firms? These two points are discussed 
in section 10.5 
A fifth, most important, issue is the source of financing to SSIs. Can SSIs have 
acccess to external finance or do they depend on internal finance? In other words, 
294 
is the finance available to SSIs adequate, and if not, what are the causes? Because 
of the importance of this SSIs financing issue, the next chapter is an empirical 
examination of the experience of FIBS in financing small crafts. For that purpose, 
primary data was obtained. In order to address the various issues raised here in this 
chapter, secondary data was collected from annual reports of banks and financial 
institutions, economic surveys of Ministry of Finance, the industrial surveys issued 
by Ministry of Industry, and other reports and leaflets issued by some academic 
as well as researches and professional centres concerned with industrial researches 
in general. 
10.2 SSIs Financing: A Theoretical Background 
Finance is required so that a firm may carry on its day-to-day operations 
and undertake investment projects. A review of the literature on small business 
financing in developed and developing economies identifies different opinions and 
views to the issue of small business financing. "' But there seems to be widespread 
agreement that the main problem for these firms is the inability to obtain sufficient 
funds to promote growth. This difficulty is not a recent phenomenon, it was 
higlighted as long as 1931 in the UK by the Macmillan Committee and has been 
subsequently discussed in the Radcliff Report (1959), the Bolton Report (1971) 
and the Wilson Report (1980). As Martin Binks summarised it, the problem is 
`the smaller the firm, the larger the proportionate increase in the capital base required to 
respond to an increase in demand, but the lower its ability to command loan and equity finance', 
(Binks, M., 1979). This shortage of finance, or a finance gap, as a formidable 
contraint to smaller firms, has been identified by the Committee on Finance and 
Industry in 1931. 
10.2.1 Finance gap 
As mentioned above, the debate concerning the finance gap has a history going 
back to the Macmillan Report of 1931 in the UK. The report pointed to the 
existence of what has come to be known as the `Macmillan Gap', 
41 Throughout this chapter and the next one, the terms 'firm', `business' and 'enterprise' are used 
interchangeably as collective terms. 
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`It has been presented to us that great difficulty is experienced by the smaller and inedium- 
sized businesses in raising the capital which they from time to time require even when the 
security offered is perfectly sound. To provide adequate machinery for raising long-dated capital 
in amounts not sufficiently large for a public issue always presents difficulties., ' 
Thus the Macmillan gap was the lack of provision for small and medium- 
sized businesses seeking external finance. The Macmillan Committee proposed 
the setting up of a specialised institution concerning itself particularly with the 
financing of smaller commercial and industrial companies. However, operations 
and performance of such types of institutions suggested by this and other reoprts 
and which have been, in consequence, set up, will be examined later. 
In 1959 the Radcliff Committee commented 
`there is a danger, which it is socially as well as economically desirable to avoid, that the 
growth of small firms may be impeded because they lack some of the facilities open to large 
companies for obtaining capital', (Radcliff Committee Reoprt HMSO, Cmnd. 827, 
August 1959). 0 
In 1961 Bates said 
`despite some progress in the period, partly as a result of the recommendations of the Macmil- 
lan Committee, the financial problems of small firms are little near solution than they were thirty 
years ago', (Bates, J., 1961, 
p. 470). 
Bates added that the finance gap is partly economic, in the sense that many 
firms are not credit-worthy by normal standards and partly institutional, in that 
the range of existing institutions is inadequate and the special institutions do not 
operate on a large enough scale. 
Again in the UK, in 1971, the Economists Advisory Group (Bolton Comnmit- 
tee) stated that 
`we do not, however, believe that there is any single major gap or deficit that calls for radical 
action. If we may so style it, there is no `Bolton gap' analogous to the 'Macmillan gap' to exist 
some years ago', (Economist Advisory Group, Part 1, Report No. 4, p. 68). 
But the Bolton Committee pointed to an existence of what may be called as 
`information gap' that small firms are less informed than larger ones about sources 
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of finance and they are less advised; lenders have less knowledge about the affairs 
of small firms than of large firms and are thus handicapped in their assessment 
of risk. The Committee added that the `transaction costs' (of investigating and 
administering) loans tend to vary inversely with the size of a loan, so that for equal 
risk with a large firm, the small firm would have to pay a higher rate. The Bolton 
Report concluded that firms may fail to obtain finance either because they have 
not applied to the most appropriate source, or because they have done so and, 
nevertheless, been refused. Thus, to the Bolton Committee the small businesses 
were still disadvantaged in seeking external finance compared with larger firms. 
There is another report in 1980, the Wilson Report, identifying an existence 
of finance gap for small firms, stating that the assistance provided to potential 
entrepreneurs by the capital market is limited. The Wilson Report finding is that 
`bankers believe that lending to small firms is more risky than lending to large and that 
loss ratios are therefore likely to be higher. Moreover, banks are notably reluctant in supporting 
innovative developments', (Interim Report of the Committee, HMSO, Cmnd. 7503, 
March 1979). 
The Wilson Report identified as well an `information gap', saying that a per- 
sistent theme in the evidence received by the Committee is the alleged existence 
of the communications gap between small firms and financial institutions. Small 
firms may not know enough about the range of different forms of financial help 
and advice available to them. Small firms even after they have identified an ap- 
propriate source of finance may lack the skills necessary to prepare a persuasive 
case. 
Small firms in other countries have similar difficulties. In the United States, 
a nationwide survey conducted by the Department of Commerce in 1934 disclosed 
that the long-term funds could not be obtained from any source by almost half of 
all small manufactures needing such credit. There was a shortage in the flow of 
long-term capital to small businesses. The issue was returned to in the late 1950's. 
The Federal Reserve Board of 1958 provided the basis for the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958. The Reserve Board's Report was, however, by no means 
unanimous. The general conclusion was that there was 
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`some evidence in the background studies that there is an unfilled margin, perhaps a rather 
thin one, between the volume of funds available to small concerns in general, and to new firms 
in particular, and the volume that could be put to use without prohibitive risk. ', 
(Federal 
Reserve Board Report, 1958). 
Kaplan and Banner (1958), Garvin (1971) all claimed to have significant ev- 
idence of small business capital gap with respect to intermediate and long-term 
loans. 
In Canada, the Industrial Development Bank was set up in 1944 to help fill a 
gap in the financial structure, closely resembling the `Macmillan gap' which, it was 
argued, was unlikely to be filled by private institutions. Its function is to make 
term loans to industrial enterprises which, because of their small size, or a lack 
of a sufficiently long earning records, or complications in respect of the security 
they could offer, could not obtain term financing from other sources on reasonable 
terms and conditions, (Bates, J., 1961). 
Gunter Kayser and Dieter Ibielski (1989) said that small and medium-size 
enterprises in West Germany suffer from a high debt to equity ratio (gearing ratio) 
which does limit their investments. For this reason, and because of their lack of easy 
access to capital markets, the German Government specifies financial aids to these 
firms. In Brazil, the government adopted a series of measures, the object of which is 
to strengthen the financial position of small firms. In 1965, the Brazilian National 
Development Bank created a special line for medium-and-long-term financing to 
small firms, (Barros, F. R., 1978). 
There is a consensus among academicians and professionals in the Sudan that 
there is a shortage of finance to small firms, (National Economic Summit, 1986). 
But still there is no empirical work done on the identification and measurement of 
the financial difficulties and problems of small enterprises. 
10.2.2 Why does finance gap exist for small firms? 
Banks and other financial institutions employ normal commercial criteria and 
the less obviously creditworthy firms are unlikely to be helped. Banks are in most 
cases held back by an insistence on normal standards of creditworthiness based 
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on an assessment of the financial prospect of the applicant. For normal purposes 
such assessments are reasonable enough since most lending institutions have to 
take a prudent view; but part of the Macmillan gap arises from the existence of 
firms that cannot fulfil normal standards. Thus, finance gap arises for smaller 
firms as : (i) these firms may not have a good profit record; (ii) they may appear 
risky, or their plans may take a long period to mature; (iii) they may not be able 
to offer lenders the security they normally require; (iv) the unit costs involved in 
processing applications for small firms is relatively greater; (v) the owners of small 
firms may not always have the necessary financial expertise; (vi) they may not know 
enough about the range of different forms of financial help and advice available to 
them; (vii) they may lack the skills necessary to prepare a persuasive case; (viii) 
proprietors of small firms appear to fear loss of independence if they accept funds 
from outside sources; (ix) suppliers of fund do not always sufficiently understand 
the special needs of small firms and the constraints within which they operate 
and, (x) small firms are at relative disadvantage in influencing policy making and 
in making applications for selective aids. 
However, views may differ on the reasons why a finance gap arises for small 
firms, but these are nearly the main causes of the gap. Mike Jarrett and Mike 
Wright (1982) argued that if the firm is newly established, it lacks a track record 
of success to encourage individuals and institutions to provide funds. The Wilson 
Report (1980) found that bankers believe that lending to small firms is more risky 
than lending to large and that loss ratios are therefore likely to be higher. The 
Report criticised banks as saying that 
`their attitude towards risk, and ability to assess it, are said to make them unnecessarily 
restrictive in their lending policy, particularly towards new or rapidly expanding small firms', 
(Interim Report, HMSO, Cmnd. 7503 March 1979). 
On the other hand, security is one of the main problems facing small firms in 
raising external finance. The shorter the track record of the firm, and the lower 
the value of its capital assets, the higher the ratio of concrete security to loan 
requirements. Thus, small firms feel the great burden of security requirement, 
(Binks, M., 1979). 
In fact, there are voluminous writings on these causes of finance gap facing 
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smaller firms and hindering their growth, J. Bates (1961; 1982), Peter Johnson 
(1978), P. J. Hutchinson (1978), Graham Bannock (1981), William A. Brock and 
David S. Evans (1986). All these writers approached these reasons of the finance 
gap and its implications. Committee reports contain exposition of these constraints 
as well as recommendations to get rid of them. 
However, in a country like the Sudan, small firms face not only the constraints 
mentioned above, but in addition they are faced with unfavourable economic condi- 
tions and rigidities characterising the Sudan economy, and an absence of clear-cut 
policies to support their case and enhance their position. There is neither a defi- 
nition for what consitiutes a small firm nor a policy for smaller businesses in the 
banking system. 
10.2.3 Solving an identified finance gap 
10.2.3.1 External source of finance 
(i) Long-term credit 
As mentioned earlier, opinions and evidence of a finance gap for small firms 
are conflicting. In both Britain and the United States financial facilities have been 
provided although at different times and in different ways. 
The UK was the first to consider the problem in the Macmillan Report and 
the first to act, with the implementation of that Report's recommendation. The 
Macmillan Committee proposed the setting-up of a specialised institution con- 
cerning itself particularly with the financing of smaller commercial and industrial 
companies. The formation of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation 
(ICFC) in 1945 was a fruit of the Macmillan Committee proposal. The ICFC was 
set up by the Bank of England and the clearing banks and was intended to sup- 
plement existing financial institutions. It is now part of the Finance for Industry 
(FFI), which is 15% owned by the Bank of England and 85% by the London and 
Scottish clearing banks. Thus the ICFC was created to provide medium-and-long- 
term finance for small and medium-sized firms. 
The ICFC invested a total of X400 millions in small businesses over the period 
1945-73. It was restructured in 1973. The total invested over the period 1973-79 
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was £248 million in both loan and share capital, (Interim Report, 1979). Loans 
are normally payable over periods of up to 20 years. Interest rates, which are 
determined by the cost of money to ICFC, are fixed for the period of the loan. On 
the other hand, equity stakes are normally sought as part of the financial package 
where the investment is thought to be particularly risky. ICFC also purchases 
equity through its associate Estate Duties Investment Trust (EDITH), and it sel- 
dom invests in totally new enterprises. It also provides financial advice and other 
services to its customers, and leasing and hire-purchase facilities and sale-and lease 
back of property. 
In 1961, Technical Development Capital (TDC) was formed to provide finance 
for technologically innovative businesses. TDC was taken over in 1966 by the 
ICFC and becomes subsidiary under the wing of ICFC which provides it with 
larger resources of funds and staff. 
There are other specialised institutions formed to do similar functions. For 
instance the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) was set up in 
1948 to provide finance for industry and trade specifically oriented to the exploita- 
tion of inventions and technological innovations where adequate finance is not avail- 
able from other sources. The National Enterprise Board (NEB) was established in 
1975 with the objective of promoting industrial efficiency. The Council for Small 
Businesses in Rural Areas (CoSIRA) was formed in 1968 to support employment 
in small firms in rural parts of England. There are also other government-funded 
institutions to support small firms, the Scotish Development Agency (SDA) and 
the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) are being assigned to do similar functions, 
both giving loan and equity in their respective countries. 
As stated earlier, the Bolton Committee mentioned that there is an 'informa- 
tion gap' and `advice gap' crippling small firms to obtain finance, 
`we found a widespread belief that small firms were ignorant of the sources of capital, the 
appropriateness of various types of loans to their particular needs and the conditions that would 
be expected of them if they were to secure the finance they desire. We also found considerable 
disquiet at the quality of advice in these matters that firms received from their professional 
advisers. There may be what we might call an `advice gap', (Economists Advisory Group: 
Part 1, Report No. 4,1971). 
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Thus, Bolton Committee felt that smaller firms should not be put at a disad- 
vantage compared with large firms. To remedy the disadvantage of the `information 
gap' the establishment of Small Firms' Advisory Bureaux was recommended. 
One of the most important British government moves in the direction of solv- 
ing the problem of small firms in this regard has been the setting up of Small Firms 
Information Centres (SFICs). This is a direct result of the Bolton Committee's 
recommendations. The SFICs provide a range of advice including a series of book- 
lets on most. aspects of small firm management, a telephone information service 
and a councelling service which enables owners and managers of small firms to 
discuss their problems with other experienced businessmen. 
However, shortcomings of the previous attempts at providing finance for small 
firms have been detected and suggestions are included in these reports to remedy 
them. Problems with the specialised equity and loan institutions that have been set 
up may be summarised as: (a) in relation to the needs of small firms, the amount of 
funds actually provided has been fairly small; (b) some of the institutions impose 
high minimum size cut-off points; (c) for those institutions not dealing exclusively 
with small firms, the disproportionately high cost of processing applications and 
the higher risk involved would lead them to prefer investment in larger projects; 
(d) many institutions appear to be slow at providing funds whilst there has also 
been some hesitancy among small firms to approach the institutions, (Jarrette M. 
and Wright M., 1982). 
The Wilson Report recommended the establishment of a Loan Guarantee 
Scheme (LGS), which would remove the constraints imposed by security require- 
ments which restrict bank lending to small firms. Under such a scheme, the gov- 
ernment would underwrite loans provided by the financial institutions. The main 
issue is the amount of risk the clearing banks should have to bear. 
The LGS was introduced in 1981. The government guaranteeing 80% of the 
loans to smaller firms. Loan periods may be from two to seven years, at the 
commercial rate of interest plus 3% per annum. The scheme as fomulated was 
criticised as it appears to have a number of shortcomings: (a) the amount of money 
available is small; (b) the loan period is only a mediume-term; (c) the interest rate 
is punitive instead of being subsidised, (Bates J. and Parkinson J. R., 1982; Jarrett 
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M. and Wright M., 1982). However, until the introduction of the LGS, Britain 
lagged markedly behind Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, Netherland and 
the United States, all of which made use of credit guarantee and subsidised loan 
and equity finance schemes for small firms. In France the length of the loan period 
can be up to twenty years, with a period of grace before interest payments. 
The introduction of the Unlisted Security Market (USM) towards the end 
of 1980 was made partially in response to the recommendation of the Wilson 
Committee and partially in response to the general lack of venture capital that is 
provided for existing firms to expand. It was intended to fill a gap in the provision 
of venture capital for small firms on London stock exchange. By reducing the 
percentage of equity required to be in public hands, from 25% for a full listing to 
10% on the USM, and by lowering the cost of entry, it was hoped that smaller 
firms would be able to raise external finance more easily than hitherto. 
Another method of finance was initiated. Whilst the USM seems most appro- 
priate for fast growing firms and LGS for riskier projects, finance for management 
buy-outs (MBO) is concerned with firms where the owners wish to sell. There are 
three main types of buy-outs schemes: (1) asset purchase, (2) holding company 
loan and (3) funding and share purchase. Typically, the financing takes the form 
of a combination of loan and equity funds, with usually the majority equity stake 
lying with the management. 
In the USA Congress codified the concern for small business with the passage 
of the Small Business Act in 1953, which established the Small Business Adminis- 
tration (SBA). It directed the SBA to help small firms obtain government loans, 
government contracts and technical and managerial know-how. Congress strength- 
ened this Act in 1958 by requiring government agencies to conduct a representative 
share of their business with small firms. It also passed the Small Business Act in 
1958, which encouraged the creation of investment companies that could provide 
small businesses with venture capital, (Brock, W. A. and Evans, D. E., 1986). 
The SBA was established as an independent federal agency to assist, counsel 
and champion the millions of American small businesses. The range of help pro- 
vided is very wide and includes the actual provision of funds, both in the form of 
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loans and loan guarantee and in the form of equity through SBA licensing of Small 
Business Investment Companies (SBICs). 
The SBA helps small businesses obtain loan finance in three forms: (i) by direct 
loan; (ii) by participation loans with private banks and (iii) by guaranteeing loans 
from private banks. The first type, direct loans, are only used as a last resort. SBA 
emphasizes maximum private lender participation in each loan. This policy has 
made it possible for SBA to provide funds to a much greater number of applicants 
than would be possible under a direct loan programme, (Hutchinson, P. J., 1982). 
When loans from private sources are not available on reasonable terms, SBA may 
guarantee up to 90% of a bank loan to a small firm. For the SBA guarantee the 
private bank pays SBA a percentage fee. The interest that the bank may then 
charge the small firm is limited by SBA regulations. 
If a small firm cannot obtain a loan from a private bank on a participation basis 
with SBA and if, even with the offer of 90% guarantee, a loan is not forthcoming, 
the SBA may grant a direct loan. The firm must of course produce a good case 
for the money but even then funds may not be available due to the Federal Fiscal 
restraints. The loans are granted for periods up to 20 years for the acquision of 
land and building, up to 6 years for acquiring working capital, and otherwise up 
to 10 years. The interest rate on SBA's portion of participation loans as well 
as its direct loans are regulated by a statutory formulae relating to the cost of 
money to the government. A special feature of SBA is its provision of financial 
opportunities for disadvantaged groups like loans for the handicapped. Congress 
strengthened the role of SBA as a representative for small businesses within the 
government. In 1976, Congress established the Office of Advocacy at SBA. This 
office was directed to measure the direct costs and other effects of government 
regulations on small businesses and make legislative and non-legislative proposals 
for eliminating excessive or necessary regulations of small businesses. 
On the other hand SBICs provide both equity capital and long-term loans to 
small firms, they also provide management assistance to the firms they finance. 
Without special SBA approval the total funds loaned to, or invested in equity 
securities of a particular small business, a single SBIC may not exceed 20% of the 
paid-in capital and surplus of the SBIC. The most important feature of the SBICs 
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is the gearing they are able to exploit through SBA guarantee. An SBIC may 
request SBA to lend, or to guarantee 100% of the loans from private institutions 
to the SBICs up to an amount of 300% of its private capital. A private investor in 
an SBIC is granted concession on personal tax. Moreover, as far as corporation tax 
is concerned, SBICs are allowed a deduction of 100% of dividends received from a 
taxable domestic corporation rather than the 85% allowed to most corporate tax 
payers. 
Thus far, these are almost the main sources of external long-term finance, both 
in equity and loan form, to 
small firms. The dominant suppliers of external loan 
finance for small firms are, of course, banks. On the other hand, special institutions 
provide equity capital. 
(ii) Short-term credit 
In order to fill the finance gap, small firms, like other companies, need short- 
term finance. If small businesses have problems in this respect they may not 
survive into the long term. The argument is that small firms need not only long- 
term capital for expansion, they need also financial resources for working capital. 
The four main sources of short-term finance are: trade capital, factoring and bank 
credit and hire-purchase and leasing. 
Trade credit works in two directions: the firm gives credit to its customers 
(debtors) and it itself receives credit from suppliers (creditors). Two motives exist 
for extending trade credit, the `transaction' motive and the `financing' motive. The 
transaction motive produces a certain level of trade credit which exists merely as 
a consequence of doing business. The financing motive relates to that proportion 
of trade credit that responds to economic stimuli, especially'monetary policy (i. e. 
the relative difculty in borrowing money and the level of rate of interest). 
Factoring and bank credits: one of the ways in which 'a small firm can 
reduce its trade debtors is by resorting to factoring. The principle is that the 
firm sells its trade debts to a factor; the factor then takes over the responsibility 
for collection of the debt. By instantly providing up to 80%' of invoice value, the 
firm has the advantage of liberating the cash tied up in debtors. Liquidity is thus 
increased, and the dependence on outside resources is reduced. The bank's role 
here reflects its traditional one as a provider of short-term funds. 
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Hire-purchase and leasing: hire-purchase is rarely used by large companies, 
but it is frequently a feature of small firms' purchases of plant and machinery. It 
is particularly used by small, rapidly growing firms who may find it difficult to 
arrange a bank loan. 
10.2.3.2 Internal source of finance 
As seen above, small firms face constraints in raising funds from external 
sources especially equity capital. The younger firms are not within reach of equity 
finance as provided by the over the counter (OTC) markets, ( Wilson Committee 
Report, Interim Report, 1979). They are therefore dependent upon injections of 
equity by individuals concerned with the firm (or their relatives), or retained prof- 
its. As for retained profits, small firms who plan to remain competitive are unable 
realize very high levels of profitability. 
However, the proprietor's equity is normally used as funding start-up capital. 
The Wilson Committee found that individuals setting up business for the first time 
fall into one of three categories. First, there are those starting completely from 
scratch, with the proprietors having no experience in, or connection with existing 
enterprises. Secondly, there are ex-employees of existing firms starting up in similar 
or related areas. Finally, there are those who take over existing businesses with 
the intention of developing them along different lines. 
But in almost every case the main initial source of capital will be equity sub- 
scribed by the proprietor himself, or by his family. The number of outside investors 
prepared to take equity stakes (especially for start-up capital) in small new busi- 
nesses is limited. 
Proprietor's own equity is also the most appropriate source of venture capital 
for an innovation. Banks are notably reluctant in supporting innovative devel- 
opments, developments which sometimes are in the context of major changes of 
process or product and does not always necessarily involve new technology. Small 
firms feel the difficulties particularly acutely more than large firms because of thier 
disadvantageous position in the capital market. So they depend on the proprietor's 
equity. 
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o Summary 
Writers though expressed conflicting views, identified an existence of `finance 
gap' and `information and advice gaps' for small firms. In the UK, USA as in other 
countries efforts were launched to bridge the gaps by establishing the specialised 
financial institutions and by encouraging the banks to provide more funds to small 
businesses. Deficiencies in financing small firms were pointed out by writers and 
notably by committees formed by governments, especially in the UK. The main 
issues are: the subversion of limited liability by requirements for `excessive' security 
and the tendency for banks to assess firms for their break-up value rather than as 
going concerns. In short, criticism is that banks lack flexibility and are reluctant 
to take risks. 
However, the potential for bank lending to small firms is a profitable opportu- 
nity to be seized, and banks must face the real obstacles to this endeavour which 
have more to do with banks' organisation and general attitudes than with small 
firms themselves. Generally, financial institutions operate as if their small busi- 
ness customers are the same as private individuals whereas their needs are, in fact, 
different. 
Graham Bannock argues that 
`sustained economic growth in the economy as a whole will not be resumed until there is a 
massive shift in resources towards small firms, (Bannock, G., 1981). 
The small businesses sector could be a net lender to the financial market. If the 
sector grows - and banks help bridging the finance gap - these advantages could 
become even more attractive to banks which have suffered in other areas from 
competition from each other. Certainly, competition among the banks for small 
business customers seems less acute than it is for other categories of customers. 
Exploiting fully the opportunities available in the small firms sector will require 
more flexibility in lending, and fundamental changes in attitudes and organisation. 
If, however, a finance gap, information gap and the advice gap have all been 
identified for small firms in developed countries like Britain, then by all means 
small firms in the Sudan face even a much more worse situation. The finance gap 
facing small firms in the Sudan will be examined in section 10.5 of this chapter and 
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in the next chapter. The gap will be examined in its economic dimension, i. e. as 
many small firms are not creditworthy by normal standard, and in its institutional 
dimension, i. e. the range of existing institutions is inadequate and the specialised 
institutions do not operate on a large enough scale. 
10.3 SSIs Development Within The Industrialisation Processes 
In the long run, an establishment of a significant number of small businesses in 
a country, especially in rural areas, will widen the base of ownership of industrial 
enterprises. It has been oberved that, irrespective of the level of development or 
degree of industrialisation of any country, the small firm is substantially important 
to its progress. Continued experience indicates that this type of a firm has its own, 
exclusive characteristics indispensable in both developed and developing countries. 
In the developed world, economists have shown concern for small firms and their 
problems (especially financial constraints) because the restriction of growth so 
produced can have serious implications for employment, innovation, the ability 
to compete with foreign firms, the ability to counteract the undesirable effect of 
increasing industrial concentration and so on. 
This section will give a historical and institutional policy review as related to 
the small industry development in the Sudan so as to grip policy constraints that 
might have been affecting this sector. 
At the outset it is important to mention here that a definition of what consti- 
tutes a small firm is still lacking. Small firms are a very heterogeneous sector, and 
it is even difficult to agree on what is a small firm and how big is the small firms 
sector. As Peter Johnson put it 
`inevitably, what constitutes a small firm is a matter of judgement', (Johnson, P., 1978) 
The method usually practised is that of characterising a firm's size by the number 
of employees and/or by its turnover. In the UK, in terms of reference given to 
Bolton Committee, it was suggested that 200 employees might be regarded as the 
upper size limit for such a firm. This definition was revised by Wilson Committee 
which depended very much on a definition in terms of turnover. In the USA, the 
definition of a small firm for SBA purposes varies and depends on the type of help 
sought, the nature of the business and the particular industry in which the small 
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firm operates. The definition of `small' in the USA context does in fact include 
many firms which would be regarded as medium or even large in other countries. 
In the Sudan there is no specific definition for a small firm, but some insti- 
tutions used to classify SSIs according to total investments and the number of 
employees. For instance, the Minisrty of Industry, following the Arab Industrial 
Development Organisation (AIDO), defines a small firm as that employing 24 
labourers or less, and whose fixed assets investments is not more than LS. 500,000. 
The Industrial Research Consultancy Institute defines a firm as small if it employs 
between 10 to 50 labourers and invests not less than LS. 40,000 and not more 
than LS. 200,000. The Sudanese Rural Developmet Company defines small firms 
on financial basis, and a firm is considered small if its investment is US$ 25,000. 
However, all investment acts have not decided on what constitutes SSIs in Sudan. 
Because of the difficulty in obtaining data concerning investments in smaller firms, 
and due to the high inflation rates in Sudan and the subsequent devaluations of 
the national currency, a small firm is defined here to include firms employing 50 
labourers or less. It seems an appropriate definition in the case of the Sudan as it 
was suggested by UNIDO (September 1985) and by the ILO. It seems also suitable 
as the economy is backward, especially in respect to industry. 
10.3.1 Industrial Sector Growth 
Due to an increase in the number of industrial enterprises, and an increase in 
industrial investments during the 1960s, the contribution of the indutrial sector 
rose from 1% in 1956 to 6.7% in 1960 and to 15% in 1973. This contribution then 
declined to 8.3% in 1974/75,6.8% in 1981 and to 6.5% in 1984/85 (Table 10.1). 
This decrease was attributed to the problems facing Sudanese economy in general 
and the industrial sector in particular. 
Six distinct periods of Sudanese industrial development may be distinguished: 
1) The pre-independence period until 1956, with cottage industries and colonial- 
type processing of exported primary products; 
2) 1956-1960, with indirect public intervention and the introduction of modern 
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Table 10.1: Structure of Production (GDP) (%) 1978-1988 
1977/78 1978/79 1979/8 1980/81 1981/82 1982/8 1983/8 1084/85 1085/80 1980/87 1987/88 
Agriculture 31.5 34.1 32.0 32.8 33.1 30.9 42.3 37.4 40.0 40.7 39.9 
Industry 7.5 8.7 6.8 6.9 6.8 7.0 5.8 6.5 6.9 7.0 7.6 
Mining 0.06 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 
Water and 
electriciry 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 
Construction 4.1 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.4 5.4 5.8 5.12 4.0 5.0 
Transport and 
communication 7.9 11.2 8.6 9.0 9.4 8.6 5.4 5.8 5.12 4.0 5.0 
Trade and 
real estate 19.3 19.7 19.2 20.1 19.7 19.9 13 13.8 13.7 14.3 14.2 
Other services 22.7 21.0 18.1 11.3 16.6 10.0 21.7 23.7 21.8 20.2 20.6 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Surveys, various issues 
3) 1960-1969, with direct public intervention in industrialisation parallel to 
private industrial investments; 
4) 1969-1973, with nationalisation and confiscation of private industries in 
1970, followed by denationalisation in 1971; 
5) 1973-1977/78, with huge agro-industrial investments mainly by the public 
sector; 
6) From 1977/78 onwards, with greater economic pressures affecting industry. 
Development of SSIs in the Sudan was affected adversely by these policies 
throughout these periods. However, objectives, strategies and instruments used 
have been changing considerably over time. 
Concerning the first period, during the early period of colonisation, cottage in- 
dustries prevailed and some products based on wood and cotton, could even be sold 
on foreign markets. The Sennar Dam built in 1925 made large-scale cotton culti- 
vation in the Gazera Scheme possible. This led to the first stage of manufacturing 
as represented by cotton-ginning factories. The expansion of this industry encour- 
aged the development of edible oil industries based on cotton seeds. However, the 
colonial import policy had negative consequences on the growth of the cottage in- 
dustries (Hansohm D. and Wohimuth K., 1987). Moreover, colonial interventions 
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affected negatively investments in the private industrial sector, especially in the 
small industry sector. Only oil-seed pressing industries were able to develop to 
some extent during that period, because of the widespread oil extraction activity 
taking place at the household level. Some import-substitution took place during 
the World War II. These industries were induced by supply bottleneck, but they 
were unable to survive after the war. Some SSIs by non-indigenous Sudanese pri- 
vate investors took place particularly in the spheres of confectionary, vegetable 
oils, soft drinks, soap, perfume and building materials. 
The second period (1956-60) may be regarded as a period of indirect public 
intervention. Private investment was considered the main vehicle of industrialisa- 
tion. The idea was to move quickly from import substitution of consumer goods to 
import substitution of intermediate and capital goods. The `Approved Enterprises 
(Concessions) Act(1956) was an important step to promote private investments in 
the Sudan, but it did by its implicit policy prescriptions discriminate against SSIs. 
In this period, the State invested in large-scale agricultural and infrastructural 
projects, whereas the private sector concentrated on industry and housing. How- 
ever, some structural change of industry towards textiles, shoes, paper products 
and chemical products took place. Thus, the second period may be considered 
the starting point of modern manufacturing in the Sudan. The neglect of rural 
development prevented any development of SSIs; in urban areas no support was 
given to SSIs and crafts. 
The third period (1960-69) was crucial to the Sudanese industrialisation. Di- 
rect public intervention emerged. Influential was the `Ten-year Plan of Economic 
and Social Development, 1961/62-1970/71'. It was during this period that the 
Industrial Bank of Sudan was established, in 1961, to give additional assistance 
to private industry. The nine public factories built up in the spheres of agro- 
industries did not upset the leading position of the private sector. However, the 
basic constraints to broader industrial development 
(the small market size, neglect 
of agricultural development and of rural industry) were not removed during this 
period by general and industrial policy measures. The low performance of in- 
dustrial policies led to `The Organisation and Promotion of Industrial Investment 
Act, 1967', stressing the role of private entrepreneur (Affan, B. 0., 1985), but not 
improving the position of small and rural industries. 
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In the fourth period (1969-73), nationalisation and confiscation of private in- 
dustries, including foreign capital, took place, but in 1971 the policy was reversed. 
The long-term consequences of these policies for Sudan's industrial development 
were important. In order to restore credibility and to attract foreign investors, 
even more favourable investment concessions were granted, `The Development and 
Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act, 1972' was a move in this direction. 
Inspite of these incentives, no improvement was achieved. Instead, these conces- 
sions distorted the structure of industry. 
The fifth period (1973-77/78) was marked by intensive direct public inter- 
vention in industry. The intention was to expand modern agriculture and agro- 
industries rapidly. Various forms of public sector capital participation in indusrty 
were used, as well as institutional instruments (establishing, for instance, the Su- 
danese Development Corporation). 
The government moved further towards the support of capital-intensive and 
import-intensive projects, mainly in the sugar and textile industries. The sharp in- 
crease of the capital/labour ratio in this period indicates not only the bias towards 
capital-intensive technologies, but also the increasing extent of excess capacities 
(Affan, B. 0., 1985). This public policy attitude was typified in the US$ 1 billion 
Kenana Sugar Project, (Wohlmuth, K., 1983). The large-scale bias of Sudan's 
industrialisation in this period drained all the scarce availabe resources from alter- 
native uses. 
The final period (since 1978) is also a period of industrial decline. The great 
number of public sector investment projects led to overspending, and pressure 
on both infrastructure and human skills. There was no industrial development 
planning to the effect of maximising linkages with other sectors, (Wohlmuth K. 
and Hansohm D., 1984). The absence of change to Sudan's productive system and 
to the income distribution system both resulted in a stagnating industrial sector. 
The fact that since 1977/78 all the major branches of manufacturing industries 
have been in decline may therefore be attributed not only to austerity policies, but 
is basically the result of the inappropriateness of industrial policies to remove basic 
constraints. Despite the heavy agro-industrial investments in the 1970's, there is 
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virtually no agricultural machinery. industry to support productivity increases in 
agriculture (Bedri, M. A., 1979). 
The six periods show, (i) the increasing role of the public sector, and (ii) that 
the whole of industrial policy in the Sudan is not favourable for the internal growth 
of small enterprises. The government launched new measures in October 1989 to 
encourage investment in SSIs, especially in rural areas, (see Chapter VIII, section 
8.5.4). 
10.3.2 Overall Performance of SSIs 
This section provides a profile of the magnitude, composition, regional distri- 
bution and contribution of the SSIs to national income and employment. Such 
an overview can usefully serve to provide a foundation for understanding the role 
played by SSIs in the Sudan. It is important to mention here that statistical 
records concerning SSIs are very deficient. There is obviously a limited coverage 
to SSIs outside urban areas. 
10.3.2.1 Magnitude, composition and regional distribution 
Table 10.2 reveals the total number of industrial enterprises to be 6759. Small 
enterprises (50 employees or fewer) comprises 95%, medium-size enterprises (50- 
100 employees) represents 3% and large-scale enterprises (above 100 employees) 
2% of all industrial firms. It is also clear that the food industry is the principal 
industry among the different categories of industries. 
Table 10.2: Employment in Manufacturing Enterprises 
by Size of Enterprise 
Number of Classification Number of Percent 
employees enterprises 
1-50 Small-size 6543 96.8 
51-100 Medium-size 79 1.2 
Above 100 Large-size 137 2.0 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Industrial Survey, 1984/85. 
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Almost all small enterprises are privately owned, whereas 60% of large-scale 
industrial firms are owned by the public sector and 40% by the private sector. This 
situation came about because large-scale industries need huge investments which 
are unavailable to small investors, and are therefore undertaken by the State. In 
the case of SSIs, the amount of investment needed is relatively small, and the type 
of technology used is simple, thus, individuals are encouraged to establish small 
firms. 
Regional distribution of SSIs shows that more than 50% are located in Khar- 
toum area and the Central Region. The less developed regions of Darfor and the 
South have the minimum of small firms located there, 6.3% and 0.2% respectively. 
The other regions have almost equal numbers of small firms (Table 10.3). The 
concentration of these industries in Khartoum and the Central Region is for a 
number of reasons: (i) the relatively adequate availability of infrastructure such 
as transport and electricity, (ii) easy access to raw materials, and (iii) proximity 
to a potential market for the industrial products in the urban areas and Central 
Sudan due to the relatively high standard of living. Moreover, Table 10.3 reveals 
that all categories of SSIs are also located in Khartoum and the Central Region 
whereas the less developed regions lack most of these industries, especially textiles, 
weaving, wood products and basic metal industries. 
10.3.2.2 Contribution to national income and employment 
Relative to the great number of SSIs (95%) compared with the large-scale 
industries (LSIs), their contribution to employment and national income remains 
small. In terms of employment SSIs constitute 30.4% of industrial labour. With 
regard to the national income, 38.7% of the industrial component of the GDP is 
from SSIs. On the other hand, although LSIs (empolying more than 100 labourers) 
represent only 2% of the number of industrial firms, they absorb 65.8% of industrial 
labour and 56% of the industrial component of the GDP. Medium-size industries 
(employing between 51 and 100 labourers) which represent 1.2% of the number of 
industrial firms, constitute 3.8% of the labour force in the industrial sector and 
5.4% of the industrial component of the GDP (Table 10.4). 
The significant share of LSIs compared to small industries could be attributed 
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Table 10.4: Contribution of SSIs to GDP and Employment 
Number o Gross output % Number of % 
firms (%) (LS 000's) employees 
Small firms 96.8 591.2 38. 44014 30.4 
Medium firm 1.2 82.8 5.4 5432 4.0 
Large firms 2.0 862.2 56.1 95056 65. 
Total 100 1536.2 100 144502 100 
Source: Ministry of industry, 1989. 
to the large size of investments. Of industrial investments, 77% go into LSIs and 
only 16% into SSIs. Thus, the considerable contribution of LSIs in employment 
and national income does not imply that these 
industries are more efficient than 
SSIs. Large firms records with regard to employment and output exceeded that of 
SSIs because the government invested in the industrial sector and it encouraged 
large-scale investments by granting concessions and tax excemptions. 
The effective and efficient use of resources is important for the Sudanese econ- 
omy as it faces economic and financial constraints. 
The economy lacks capital, 
savings and institutionalised credits 
for development, a developed infrastructure 
and a skilled labour. Allthese urge 
for an appropriate industrial strategy fitting 
the situation of the economy. In this respect, SSIs are important. An examination 
of resource utilisation by SSIs and LSIs would show the 
former to be more efficient 
than the latter. LSIs appear to be heavily capital-intensive and grossly unpro- 
ductive. To provide evidence for this, three criteria are used: (a) the amount of 
investment needed to create a new job in each industry, (b) the value added, and 
(c) the investment /output ratio in both large and small industries. These criteria 
use an important element, capital, which is scarce in developing countries to be 
used in industry. Therefore, if the cost needed to create a new job is lower in the 
case of smaller firms, and if the value added and the output per unit of investment 
are higher than that of larger firms, then the SSIs sector could be more potential 
for development. This assumed potentiality becomes significant if it is known that 
LDCs lack the capital and the infrastructure to develop industry. 
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10.3.2.3 Investment and labour 
The average investment in building and machinery was found to be LS. 26000 
in small enterprises and LS. 6 million in LSIs (Table 10.5). Therefore, LSIs are 
more `capital-intensive' than SSIs. Moreover, compared to LSIs, SSIs need half of 
the investment to create a job which costs LS. 9,000 in LSIs, (Sen A. R., 1985). 
This characteristic encourages investment in SSIs in general and in the case of 
Sudan in particular, for Sudan lacks capital for industrial development, has a work 
force which is redundant and has raw materials available. By absorbing this labour 
force, SSIs could help to solve the problem of unemployment and thereby improve 
the standard of living of the poor. 
10.3.2.4 The Value added 
The value added is an indicator to the performance of a firm. It gives the 
value of the product less costs of factor inputs (excluding wages and salaries). 
Theoretically, the value added of LSIs is assumed to be bigger than the value added 
of SSIs, as the investment, and hence output, is larger and is expected to contribute 
more. However, when the value added for SSIs is compared with the estimate of 
the value added of LSIs, the small enterprises are revealed to contribute more, 
approximately 51.7% of the entire industrial sector's value added (Table 10.5). In 
addition, the value added per unit of labour was found to be LS. 9300 in SSIs 
compared to LS. 2600 in LSIs. A shrinking `value added' of large enterprises in the 
Sudan is due to two factors: (i) these industrial concerns are State-owned and suffer 
from sluggish administrative procedures and a heavy bureaucracy, and (ii) these 
industries depend on imported raw materials which require foreign currency to be 
obtained. SSIs in the Sudan import a much smaller share of their material inputs 
than do their large-scale counterparts. Thus, these smaller industries require less 
foreign exchange for material inputs per unit of output than do their large-scale 
counterparts, a distinctive advantage for SSIs as foreign exchange is scarce in the 
Sudan. 
10.3.2.5 Investment/output ratio 
The Investment /output ratio is an approximate measure of return on invested 
capital. Table 10.5 reveals that an investment of one `unit' of capital investment 
317 
gives more than two and a half `units' of output in SSIs, whereas one `unit' of 
capital produces one `unit' of output in LSIs. Thus, it is possible to conclude that, 
in terms of cost of creating new jobs, on the criteria of the value added and the 
investment /output ratio, the performance of SSIs exceeds that of LSIs. 
Table 10.5: SSIs: Investment, Output and Value Added 
(LS. 000x) 
Small firm Medium firm Large firms 
Gross output 591.2 82.8 862.2 
Output/worker 13.4 15.1 9.1 
Investment 215.2 36.6 824.8 
Investment : worker 4.9 6.8 8.7 
Investment /output 1: 2.7 1: 2.3 1: 1 
Value added 288 20.7 248.7 
% 51.6 3.7 44.7 
Value added/worker 6.5 3.8 2.6 
Average investment' 26.6 464.4 6021 
* Fixed capital 
Source: Ministry of Industry, 1987. 
SSIs appear to need less capital compared with LSIs, and are characterised 
by low cost to create new jobs, high `value added' and output/capital ratio. The 
Sudanese economy is experiencing a low saving ratio on the part of investors, 
inadequate capital for investment and inadequate infrastructure and low technical 
levels. These and other factors give prominance to SSIs. The time is ripe for these 
industries to be developed and for government to turn its attention to them and 
solve their problems. Of particular importance are the financial constraints facing 
SSIs. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
10.4 SSIs and Sources of Finance 
A detailed examination of the matter of finance to SSIs will be in the next 
chapter, evaluating the empirical experience of FIBS with small handicrafts. The 
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main objective of this section is to determine the role of the Sudanese and for- 
eign, commercial and development financial institutions in servicing the financial 
requirements of smaller businesses, and to assess the volume and type of credit 
extended to SSIs. Investigating financial facilities available to SSIs will reveal 
whether a `finance gap' exists for smaller firms in the Sudan. This gap will be 
examined, as mentioned above in section 10.2, in its economic dimension, i. e. as 
many smaller firms are not creditworthy by normal standards, and in its insti- 
tutional dimension, i. e. ' the range of existing institutions is inadequate and the 
specialised institutions do not operate on a wide enough scale. Thus, the ultimate 
objective here is to see, if there is a finance gap, whether financial institutions are, 
at least partially, responsible for it. 
In considering the financial position of small businesses in the UK, the Bolton 
Committee (1971) and the Wilson Committee (1979) investigated the working of 
the banking system and in particular the effect of the monetary policies on the 
operations of banks who were regarded as the dominant suppliers of external loan 
finance for small businesses. The efficiency of the capital markets was measured in 
the UK and other developed and developing countries by the long-term debt and 
equity finance. In 1955, a study by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System of the USA measured the financing problem of smaller firms by the period 
of credit contraction, the availability of credit to smaller firms and the policies of 
financial institutions towards small businesses. However, the adequacy of financial 
institutions with regard to the financing of small fims will be measured here by 
the amount of credit available to small firms compared with the financial ability 
of these institutions, and by the conditions of financing, taking into consideration 
the credit policies of the central bank, and other factors affecting credit extension. 
The existing sources of finance to industry in general and small firms in partic- 
ular are, (i) public and private commercial banks, (ii) public development financial 
institutions which are supported largely by government such as the Sudanese In- 
dustrial Bank (SIB) and the Sudanese Development Corporation (SDC), and the 
private and joint-venture development agencies such as the Islamic Investment 
Company (SUDAN) (IICS). 
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10.4.1 Commercial Banks 
The financial system in the Sudan is entirely regulated and managed by the 
government. The Central Bank exercises a quantitative monetary control, primar- 
ily by specifying credit ceilings of the commercial banks, as well as qualitative 
control of the allocation of banks' financial resources.. In addition, the Central 
Bank has the financing power to approve any loan or advance exceeding certain 
level (LS 300,000 in 1988). In controlling the supply of money, the Central Bank 
prescribes the liquidity ratios of commercial banks and requires obligatory deposits 
with the commercial banks. 42 In short, institutional financing is highly influenced 
by government policies (especially monetary and credit policies) and those of for- 
eign lenders. 
In the Sudan, there is neither a definition for what constitutes small business, 
nor a policy for small businesses in the banking system. There is no clear-cut 
policy regarding small business. The issue is dealt with casually, while the bank 
is trying to conform to the directives of the Central Bank, (Ahmed, S. A., 1988). 
However, no classification as to the size of the business is' considered in the process. 
Therefore, commercial banks were criticised by small firms' owners for their lack 
of response to small business financing. Thus, there is an indication of a small 
business `policy gap' in the banking system in Sudan. Empirical investigation by 
the author uncovered that the share of SSIs in total industrial financing by banks 
was only 1%. Moreover, bank managers indicated that 44% of the credit given was 
in the form of working capital, only 6% in fixed capital and 50% in both working 
and fixed investments; and 94% of the loans were of medium and short-term nature. 
In investigating the causes of this deficiency of banks in financing small busi- 
nesses, three factors are under consideration: (i) the monetary and credit policies 
of the Central Bank, (ii) the financial ability of these banks and (iii) the behaviour 
of bankers towards smaller firms (this point will be elaborated more in the next 
chapter). 
Regarding the first factor, the credit squeeze policy imposed by the Central 
Bank and the austerity policies adopted by the government are, partly, responsible 
42 For detailed exposition of these policies and their implications see Chapter VI (section 6.4), Chapter 
VII (section 7.7) and Chpater VIII (sections 8.5). 
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for the difficulties smaller firms have faced in raising institutional finance (see 
Chapter VIII). Under the ceiling system, banks tended to extend credits to small 
enterprises only to the extent that funds were not required by large firms. Small 
business bears the brunt of the restrictive monetary policy. 
Considering the second factor, the commercial banks' financial ability enables 
them to finance small firms. Referring back to Table 7.17, it is'obvious that banks 
have a large portion of their resources unutilised. Excess lending capacity of banks 
(depending on deposits only and not including capital) increased from 28% in 1980 
to 52% in 1983 and 58% in 1988. The existence of a small business financing gap, in 
conjunction with the large amount of unutilised lending capacity provides evidence 
that banks contributed to this gap. 
Third, empirical work provides evidence that commercial banks in the Sudan 
were mainly concerned with trade financing. Table 8.3 shows that short-term 
loans dominated the advances made by the commercial banks (64% in 1988). This 
finding is a reflection of the lack of long-term financing offered by banking system 
in general (see section 8.4), despite the credit policies (1985; 1986) directing banks 
to increase the share of medium and long-term financing. On the other hand, there 
is no formal definition of smaller firms. Therefore, regarding industrial financing, 
it is difficult to determine quantitatively the contribution of commercial banks in 
financing smaller businesses. Bank managers enumerated a number of reasons for 
giving a high priority to large firms rather than to small and newly established 
enterprises that: (i) under the credit squeeze policy, a bank has to channel its use 
of resources into profitable and well secured investments; (ii) large enterprises are 
more able to provide guarantee and security to a bank and (iii) banks are more 
eager to secure their profits rather than to concern themselves future prospect of 
the small businesses. Thus, the attitude of bankers is not favouring financing small 
firms, and there is a'Sudanese' Macmillan gap in its economic dimension. 
10.4.2 The Sudanese Industrial Bank (SIB) 
Development banks were perceived by academics and professionals as instru- 
ments for achieving rapid industrialisation. The theoretical foundations of this 
type of development financial institutions are industrial development and the pro- 
vision of long-perspective finance at a reasonable terms and costs to firms which 
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are unable to maintain their lending relations with commercial banks. An impor- 
tant question in this regard concerns the extent to which SIB established a system 
of finance for industry and the way in which this differed from commercial banking 
practices. 
The SIB was established in 1961 as a development financial institution with 
an authorised capital of LS. 5 million, 
`Given the low level of savings, scarcity of foreign exchange, and investors' reluctance to 
indulge in industry, the need for a specialised industrial financing institution seemed imperative. 
Sudan's commercial banks' loans to industry have been characterised by their short-term nature. 
Private Sudanese investors were sceptical towards investment in relatively new field industry', 
(SIB Report, 1980). 
The 1961 legislation confined the bank to the financing of projects in the 
manufacturing sector only, regardless of the size of industry. 
10.4.2.1 SIB: total funding operations 
Table 10.6 analyses the bank's operations since its inception in 1962, and re- 
flects the effect of these operations on investment and financing of industry. During 
the period 1962-87, the bank approved 294 loans to establish new projects and 88 
supplementary loans for existing projects. The total bank contribution in these 
projects was LS. 36.3 million (88%), in the form of loans; LS. 3.5 million in equity 
form (8%) and LS. 1.6 million as guarantee (4%). Thus, the total bank contribu- 
tion during this period (25 years) ammounted to LS. 41.4 million, as part of the 
total investment of LS. 406.6 million, i. e. the bank contribution represented 10% 
of the total investments created by the financial and assisted firms. In fact up to 
1986, the cumulative percentage contribution of the bank to total investment was 
55%, but there was big increase in total industrial financing in 1987. Moreover, it 
is noticeable that loan finance was dominant whereas equity finance was meagre. 
The number of industrial firms receiving loans and financial facilities from SIB 
was 351, (SIB Report, 1987). This shows the low level of financial contribution 
of SIB to industry. According to the 1984/85 industrial survey, the number of 
manufacturing firms registered in the Sudan was 7036. This indicates that only 
5% of manufacturing firms succeeded in obtaining finance from SIB. 
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Table 10.6: SIB: Analysis of Operations (1962-87) 
(LS. 000s) 
Number of loans 
Origin Supplementary 
SIB contribution 
Loans Equit Guarantee 
Total Percentage contribution 
SIB Investors 
1962 5 67.7 - - 67.7 51.5 48.5 
1963 14 3 397.8 - - 397.8 67. 32.4 
1964 13 3 242.3 - 242.3 48.1 51.9 
1965 8 - 136.4 - 136.4 16.2 83.8 
1966 15 4 350.6 438.4 193 982 72. 27.3 
1967 14 3 159.6 - 159.6 59.5 40.5 
1968 11 4 234.1 52.8 286.9 54. 45.3 
1969 1 4 - 4 66. 33.4 
1970 3 3 72.4 270 342.4 65 35 
1971 16 3 272.5 445.1 717.6 67. 32.6 
1972 9 3 293.6 - 77 370.6 71.1 28.9 
1973 11 4 1507.5 - 423 1930.5 46. 53.5 
1974 7 5 316.1 - 88 404.1 60. 39.7 
1975 5 5 1271.4 - 1271.4 54. 45.2 
1976 9 3 1747 138 - 1885 60. 39.7 
1977 6 6 552.8 - - 552.8 60. 39.7 
1978 16 1 817.7 - 817.7 55.1 44.9 
1979 14 6 714.7 - - 714.7 63. 36.2 
1980 13 8 1733.8 - - 1733.8 47 53 
1981 15 8 1172.2 - - 1172.2 52. 47.5 
1982 23 6 1524.1 - 1524.1 42. 57.7 
1983 13 3 1795 - 1795 52. 47.4 
1984 18 3 4160.6 900 - 5060.6 55. 44.7 
1985 - - - - - - 
1986 6 1 2249.1 - - 2249.1 55. 44.4 
1987 29 3 14467. 2000 - 16467. 45.5 54.5 
Tot 294 88 36260. 3476.1 1549 
141285.5 
_M. 
63.2 
Source: Sudanese Industrial Bank, Annual Report, 1987. 
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Unlike commercial banks, the SIB does not raise revenue from private deposits. 
It relies mainly on aid from the government in equity form, representing 66% of the 
total resources in 1987, and aid and loans from foreign agencies with an average 
of 34%. Thus, the bank's resources are meagre and it depends on Ministry of 
Finance, an absolute owner of the bank. 
However, like commercial banks, SIB is experiencing unutilised loan capacity. 
This unutilised lending capacity was 29% in 1986 and 37% in 1987. An existence 
of such excess capacity with SIB is more disturbing than the situation at the 
commercial banks. Here again, the existence of a small business finance gap, in 
conjunction with the unutilised capacity of SIB is an indication of a small business 
`policy gap'. 
10.4.2.2 Financing SSIs 
More important is the role of SIB in financing SSIs. Table 10.7 reveals that 
applications to SIB for credit increased from 52 in 1975 to 82 in 1982 and 111 in 
1987. 
Regarding investment, the bank's contribution in financing SSIs was 56% of 
total investments in these industries in 1975, and increased to 64% in 1980, then 
declined in 1983, to 49%. The share of SSIs in finance granted by SIB to all 
industrial firms increased from 12% in 1975 to 80% in 1979,96% in 1980, shrank 
to 64% in 1982,19% in 1983 and rose again to 88% in 1987 (Table 10.7). 
However, the role of SIB in financing industry in general and SSIs in particular 
is still limited as: 
(i) The strict credit policy imposed by the Central Bank on commercial banks 
had an indirect impact on the operations and performance of SIB. The policy 
affected the productivity of existing units funded by the bank and in consequence 
affected the level of collection of outstanding loans. 
(ii) Monitoring and follow-up of executed operations is still lacking. The bank 
has little up-to-date information about the industrial units given credits. 
(iii) The financial position of SIB is weak, and it is not allowed to borrow 
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from the banking system. Up to 1987, the paid-up capital is only LS. 24.4 million. 
This situation prompted the bank to concentrate on short-term finnance which 
constituted 45% of the total finance by the bank in 1987 (SIB Annual Report, 
1987). 
Table 10.7: SIB: Credits to SSIs (LS. 000s) 
Noumber o 
application 
Approved 
application 
Approved 
(SSI8) 
Loans to 
SSIs (1) 
Loans to all 
industry (2) 
(1)/(2) 
% 
197 52 8 3 151 1271.4 12 
197 36 12 7 569.2 1884.7 30 
197 - 16 16 714.7 714.7 80 
198 - 20 17 1673 1733.8 96 
198 82 23 20 980 1524.1 64 
198 - 13 7 345 1795 19 
198 111 29 29 14467 16467 88 
Source: Sudanese Industrial Bank, Annual Reports, various issues. 
(iv) Activities of the bank are constrained by the problems facing industry in 
general such as inadequate infrastructure, a skilled labour shortage, poor manage- 
ment and other constraints. 
(v) The problem of supplying working capital to industries which depend on 
raw materials. Some industries need raw materials which are available only in 
certain seasons. The bank's law did not allow it to finance raw materials. In 1985 
the law was amended, and since then the bank has been granting working capital 
loans. 
(vi) According to its by-law, the bank may not invest, by loan or guarantee, 
in any one private industrial enterprise, more than the following percentage of its 
equity capital: 15%, if the private industrial enterprise is owned and operated by a 
co-operative society or limited company; 10%, if the private industrial enterprise is 
owned by a partnership, and 7% in all other cases. This financing strategy is based 
on the assumption that the applicant is able to attract in start-up capital, and is 
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thus contradictory to the main objective of establishing a specialised industrial 
bank. 
(vii) Regarding creditors of financing, the Bank requires security for any loan 
guarantee it issues. Thus, the firm's building, fixed plants and machinery, are 
subject to a first mortgage for the period of a loan. It was stated in the Bank's 
policy that the total value of the mortgage item should not be less than 120% of 
the approved loan, otherwise an extra mortgage was required, (see section 10.2 
above). Moreover, the plant should be insured in favor of the Bank throughout 
the period of the loan. This proves that SIB is security-oriented, and questions 
critically the fundamental difference between commercial banks and development 
banks like SIB in providing development finance to small firms. 
(viii) The other factor which might undermine an objective behind the estab- 
lishment of SIB is the cost of finance. Throughout the period 1962-70, the interest 
charged by the bank was 8.5% on medium-term loans (i. e. 2 to 6 years), 9.5% 
on long-term loans (i. e 6 to 15 years). Then the interest rates on both types of 
loans were increased to 14% and 15.5% till 1980 respectively. In early 1984, the 
Bank's Act and Bye-law were amended to comply with the Islamic shari `a code. 
The Bank started lending money on muräbaha and mushäraka basis, the terms of 
which included a penality in the case of delay or default (although this pracice 
is contradicting the Islamic viewpoint on muräbaha and mushäraka). The Bank's 
profit margin is between 17% and 21% under muräbaha finance, and the range 
of profit sharing is between 30% and 40% under mushäraka finance. Moreover, a 
commitment charge at the rate of 2.5% per annum is charged on signing a loan 
agreement. 
The point is that, although the finance charges of the Bank are slightly lower 
than those charged by the commercial banks, they are very high compared to 
other countries. The higher cost of finance accompanied by stringent security is 
fair enough indication of the difficulties facing SSIs in raising institutional finance 
in the Sudan. Compared with the ICFC in the UK, and, the SBA in the USA and 
their experience with small firms there, SIB played a very minor role in enhancing 
the financial position of the SSIs in the Sudan. Thus, there is a Macmillan gap in 
its institutional dimension. Moreover, more than 50% of, the small firms financed 
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by the SIB were found to be located in Khartoum. Finance for firms in rural areas 
was very limited. The Bank has no branches outside Khartoum. 
10.4.3 The Sudanese Rural Development Finance Company (SRDFC) 
The SRDFC was founded in 1981, as a subsidiary company of the Sudan 
Rural Development Company (SRDC) with an authorised capital of LS. 10 million. 
SRDFC started operations in 1982, with an issued capital of LS. 3.2 million (32% 
as ordinary share capital). 60% of the paid-up capital was subscribed by European 
institutions, and 40% by Sudanese parties. The objective of the company, as stated 
in the Article of Association, is 
`to meet the need of medium and long-term capital finance, as well as technical assistance 
to commercially viable small and medium-scale enterprises, principally in the private sector', 
(SRDFC, Article of Association, 1981). 
Such an attempt by Sudanese commercial banks and foreign banks is a confir- 
mation of the financial difficulties that smaller firms face in raising and securing 
institutional long-term finance. This sort of institution is similar to the ICFC 
(UK) and SBA (USA). The main difference between SRDFC, ICFC and SBA is 
that ICFC and SBA were founded on a comprehensive research work and conse- 
quent detailed policy under government sponsorship, whereas SRDFC was set-up 
by foreign and domestic owners with the object of financing commercially viable 
projects. This difference implies the existence of a small business conceptualisation 
gap in the Sudan. 
As mentioned above in section 10.3, SRDFC has not maintained a clear and 
precise definition of a small business. The definition used by the Company related 
to the volume of finance and to geographical area. However, with the exception 
of one or two firms, the company files demonstrated to us that all firms financed 
by SRDFC had labour force of fewer than 25 employees. Thus, the operations 
and financing of SRDFC are restricted to rural areas and to towns other than 
Khartoum. This policy, which characterises SRDFC, is initiated as a development 
factor to help reduce finance gap in rural areas; in this manner, SRDFC is similar 
to the Welsh Development Agency and Scottish Development Agency in the UK. 
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10.4.3.1 SRDFC: financing activities 
SRDFC extends finance in the form of equity participation, muräbaha or other 
forms and combinations thereof which comply with the Sudanese law. In financing 
under the shari'a code, the muräbaha loan agreement has been selected as the 
financing instrument. 
SRDFC finance would be in foreign or local currency or a combination of both. 
The question here is of whether to lend in foreign currencies, where the imported 
production inputs require the use of foreign funds, or in the Sudanese pound. The 
prevailing exchange rate (market rate) was used by the company in calculation of 
loans at the repayment time. This practice proved discriminatory to small firms, 
and favoured large ones which were able to raise institutional long-term finance 
from financial institutions at the official exchange rate. 
The following limits are observed as a guideline for the size of enterprise quali- 
fying for SRDFC finance: SRDFC finances up to 50% of total project cost; (ii) its 
maximum contribution in a single project is US$ 500,000, if the cost of a project is 
greater than US$ million; the company participates only with other investors, as 
joint-venture. However, investment by a third party(s) alongside SRDFC and the 
project sponsor himself/herself is encouraged by the management of the company. 
Within the maximum ceiling of financing, the financing power of the management 
of SRDFC could be defined as follows: (a) up to US$ 30,000 the general manager; 
(b) up to US$ 100,000 the finance committee and (c) more than this and up to 
US$ 500,000 is delegated to the board of directors. 
The SRDFC's financing strategy, being of a long-term nature, is a good vehicle 
to eliminate or close the identified small business finance gap. The main and clear 
limitation of this financing strategy, is that the company provides finance only to 
an entrepreneur who is able to raise 50% of the total cost. In addition, SRDFC is 
itself operating with meagre financial resources. 
Table 10.8 shows that SRDFC finance targetted small agricultural and in- 
dustrial establishments, with the industrial investment being the dominant. The 
financing strategy advantages newly established projects. The finance is given for 
fixed assets as well as initial working capital. An average loan per project is LS. 
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Table 10.8: SRDFC: Finance to SSIs, (LS. 000s) 
1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 
Amoun % Amount] % Amoun % Amount % 
ABrcultur 643 16 214 14 1200 20 1100 57 
Industry 2769 70 1292 86 3800 62 835 43 
Services 531 14 - - 1100 18 - - 
Total 3943 10 1506 10 6100 10 1935 10 
Source: Sudan Rural Development Finance Company, 1989. 
Table 10.9: SRDFC: Structure of Profit Margins 
Amount (000's) Repayment perio 
(month) 
Fixed charge 
(per annum) % 
Less than LS. 250 1-12 20-25 
Less than LS. 250 13-25 26-30 
Less than LS. 250 23-30 31-40 
More than LS. 250 short period 20-25 
More than US$ 100` short period 18 
More than US$ 100 long period 20-25 
" Repayment in US$ at exchange rate at due date. * Repayment at exchange rate prevailing 
at date of dispersion. 
Source: Sudan Rural Development Financ Company, 1989. 
225,000. The unutilised capacity (40% in 1986/87) can be justified on the ground 
that SRDFC is at an early stage of operation with a conservative attitude. 
In determining the cost of financing in SRDFC, the volume, type of finance, 
term of financing and the repayment period are used as yardsticks. The cost of fi- 
nance is calculated on a simple annual rate. Financing under muräbaha instrument 
is based on a predetermined cost, accompanied by a penalty charge over delay or 
default. This practice is an obvious violation of the shari'a code. The structure of 
profit margins adopted by the company could be summed up as shown on Table 
10.9 above. 
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Compared with SIB or even with commercial banks, the cost of lending is high 
for small firms dealing with SRDFC. This practice challenges the theoretical foun- 
dation of SRDFC as a financial development agency. Regarding delay in payment 
or loan default, the company charged the client a 25% penalty for the first two 
months, 40% for a delay period of two to six months, and 50% for a delay exceeding 
six months. 
The loans and financing provided by SRDFC are usually secured by mortgage 
deeds and guarantees from a third party(s). For small projects needing less than 
US$ 30,000, post-dated cheques followed by a letter of guarantee from a bank or by 
nal guarantee are acceptable as security. For all loans exceeding US$ 30,000, 
loans are provided against mortgage deeds exceeding 200% of the amounts of funds 
provided. Thus, the guarantee required is difficult especially for investors such as 
owners of small firms. 
From the explanation above, it can be inferred that the operation and financing 
practices of SRDFC have not been consistent with the main objective of its forma- 
tion. In other words, whereas the company as set-up with a positive bias towards 
small business financing, its financing practices, in terms of cost of finance and 
other conditions of financing, confirm the existence of a small business financing 
gap in the Sudan in an economic and institutional form. 
10.4.4 The IslAmic Investment Company (Sudan) (IICS) 
The IICS was set-up in 1982 as a private limited company, owned by FIBS 
and Dar Al Mal Al Islämi with an duthorised capital of US$ 10 million. The 
company started operations in late 1983 with an issued capital of US$ 3 million (an 
equivalent of LS. 7.5 million), subscribed by owners on equal ratio. The company 
was set-up to 
'(1) accumulate Muslims' savings and to invest them according to shari'a code; (2) to par- 
ticilmte in the economic development of Sudan and, (3) to improve and enhance saving and 
investment behaviour of the Muslim community, (IICS Article of Association). 
10.4.4.1 IICS: financing operations 
The company as a financier operates its business as `muddrib' by issuing `sukük 
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a! mudäraba' (mudäraba certificates) to the public at large. Thus, the financing 
source for the company is these mudäraba certificates as well as its capital. It 
was stated in the company policy that sukük a! mudäraba is for one year, which 
enables the company to make an investment within one year put of the mudäraba 
resources. 43 
The company provides finance under mushäraka against revaluation of assets 
a security for the company investment. The cost of finance is embodied in the 
profit-sharing agreement, which in most cases is distributed 45% for the company 
and 55% for the client for profit not exceeding LS. 400,000. If the profit exceeds 
this amount, it is distributed as 25% for the company and 75% for the client. As 
usually under mushäraka agreement, losses are distributed according to the share 
in the operational capital. 
Table 10.10 reveals that the IICS financing was devoted mainly to large en- 
terprises (49%) rather than small manufacturing firms. This was attributable to 
the security provided by large firms to the company in a position of muddrib. A 
striking feature of the company operations is that they were financed from and 
within the financial resources generated from the issuing of sukük al muddraba. 
This means that an equity capital of the company remained unutilised, a conser- 
vative attitude of the company management. It is noticeable from the table that 
even the fund raised through `sukük' was not used fully, with an average unutilised 
lending capacity of 13% during the four-year period 1984-87. 
Summary 
These are the main institutional sources of finance to SSIs in the Sudan. It is 
obvious that financial facilities provided by the commercial banks, and the pattern 
of allocating these facilities provide evidence that smaller firms in the Sudan are 
at disadvantage in terms of type, volume and conditions of financing. Thus, one 
would say that commercial banks contributed partly to the small business finance 
gap in Sudan. Moreover, there exists a large volume of commercial banks' financial 
43 The rnudäraba certificate is issued for one year so that the IICS Iquidates operations annually and 
either distributes profits to holders of certificates or debit losses toýthe value of these certificates. 
The one-year period of operation is called a round. 
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resources which remain unutilised, and this finding is indicative of the conserva- 
tive attitude of banks towards small business financing. Banks have been highly 
security-conscious and profit-oriented. 
Financing practices of even the development financial institutions violated the 
main objective of setting up these development bodies as they have been, as well, 
both security-oriented and profit-conscious. 
Table 10.10: IICS: Analysis of Financing Operations 
(LS. 000s) 
Mudäraba Circulations 
First round Second roue Third round Fourth roun Total 
Amour % Amoun ! Amour % Amours % Amour % 
Small firms 421 35 520 16 1747 50 2797 69 5435 46 
Large firms 750 63 2526 79 1617 46 950. 24 5843 49 
Other sectors 26 2 140 5 137 4 303 7 606 5 
Total 1197 10 3186 100 3501 10( 4000 100 11884 10 
Total value of 1209 3193 3501 4000 11903 
mu4droba certificates (1) 
Unutilised reserves of (1) 12 7 19 
% of unutilised funds 0.1 0.2 
0.16 
Capital of IICS (2) 7500 
Total financial 
resources (3) 22403 
Invested resources (4) 11884 
Lending capacity' (5) 20162 
Unutilised loanable 
capital (6) 8278 
(6)x(5) 41 
* X90% of financial resources 
Sauna: Ialämic Investment Company (Sudan), 1989. 
Regarding the financial institution policies, there is a small business `policy 
gap'. In addition to this, owners of small firms indicated that there was a lack of 
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information and advice about the financial facilities available in banking system. 
There is no specialised advice unit for providing information to customers. Hence, 
there is an `information gap' and `advice gap'. However, the next chapter is a 
comprehensive and detailed examination of the empirical experience of FIBS in 
financing one brand of SSIs, crafts. 
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Chapter XI 
Financial Assistance To Crafts: The FIBS Experience 
Introduction 
As mentioned above, the main theme of this work is to examine the Islamic 
credit system in the Sudan and its role in development financing (see Chapters, VII, 
VIII and IX). Graham Bannock argues that resources are needed to be deployed 
in smaller firms in order to sustain economic growth (see Chapter X). For this 
reason, and because the leading Islamic bank in the Sudan, FIBS, has initiated 
and is sustaining small crafts, this chapter is an empirical examination of FIBS' 
experience in this concern. FIBS set up a specialised branch for this purpose, 
referred to throughout this chapter as the crafts branch. 
It has been mentioned in Chapter X that the SSIs in the Sudan face a `finance 
gap' and `information and advice gaps'. Financial institutions, either commercial 
banks or the specialised development bodies, are partly responsible for the exis- 
tence of such gaps. This chapter is a critical evaluation of FIBS' attempt to solve 
these identified gaps with reference to one type of SSI: the craft activities. 
11.1.2 The Crafts units: sampling 
This empirical examination is the result of a fieldwork carried out in the Sudan 
during the period February-April 1989. As a part of evaluating, in general, the 
experience of the Sudanese Islämic banks in development financing, the aim of this 
fieldwork is to assess the role of FIBS in financing crafts. " A craft unit is defined 
here as a small firm which uses simple technical equipment in an industrial activity 
to produce a commodity or provide a service. 
(i) Total and sampled population 
44 Throughout this chapter, the term crafts refers to crafts units or firms in Greater Khartoum. 
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The crafts branch undertook a primary survey of the crafts units in an urban 
area, Greater Khartoum, in 1986. The total number of units was found to be 948, 
distributed as follows: 36% in the industrial area of Khartoum, 25% in Northern 
Khartoum and 39% in Omdurman, (FIBS, Crafts Branch, Crafts Survey, 1986). 
However, that survey concentrated only on units based in the industrial areas 
of Greater Khartoum which have permanent workshops. But there are also those 
who work in streets and open yards without being licenced, and those who use part 
of their residence as a workshop. Moreover, crafts units in urban areas make up 
only a fraction of total number of SSIs. Table 10.3 (the preceding chapter) shows 
that the number of the SSIs units in Khartoum is nearly 2000 (1782 in 1985), 
representing 27% of SSIs units in the Sudan. A senior official in the Ministry of 
Industry (Sudan) told us that almost half of the SSIs units in Khartoum area are 
crafts. The manager of the crafts branch, whom the author interviewed in March 
1989, estimated that the number of crafts units in Greater Khartoum was more 
than one thousand. 
For the purpose of this survey, the target population consists of crafts in 
Greater Khartoum. The total population was sampled so that the sampled popu- 
lation comprises crafts assisted by FIBS. Up to 1987 the number of loans extended 
by the crafts branch was 2322. Some loans were extended for the same customers, 
in other words, a customer received more than two or three loans. Customers who 
received more than two loans and fewer than five were counted in the sampling 
as receiving one loan. A significant number of loans were for buying mini-buses, 
taxes, tractors and their attachments. Such loans were also excluded. The total 
number of loans was cut to 1186. This number was taken as the sampled popu- 
lation. The sample size was taken to be 10% of this sampled population, i. e. 
120. 
The total number of questionnaire forms distributed was 125. The total num- 
ber collected was 111. Sixteen of the forms filled in by craftsmen were either 
incomplete or inconsistent. The net outcome of the sample size was 95. 
The method used in selecting the sample was simple random sampling, (see 
Chapter VII, section 7.5. ). The questionnaire forms were administered by three 
research assistants (university graduates). 
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other words, the conditions affect the preferrence of craftsmen so that they apply 
for credit on a muräbaha basis rather than mushäraka. Therefore, the lack of equity 
finance might be attributed to these conditions. 
However, to test this argument or finding, the chi-square test is used here so 
that: 
The null hypothesis should state that the variables (conditions of modes as 
specified by the branch, and the modes themselves, muräbaha and mushäraka) 
are independent of one another (i. e. the chi-square is not larger than would be 
expected by chance. ) 
The alternative or research hypothesis should state that the variables are re- 
lated or dependent (ie. the chi-square is larger than would be expected by chance). 
Following the techniques of calculating X2, the calculated value (X2) is found 
to be 0.42. The significance level chosen is 0.05, and the degree of freedom is 3. 
Comparing 0.42 to the critical value (the distribution value), since the cal- 
culated value is lower than the critical value (= 7.815 at 0.05 probability level), 
i. e. since 0.42 < 7.86, the decision to be made is to accept the null hypothesis 
and reject the research hypothesis at all levels. The conclusion is that there is no 
relation between the conditions of modes as specified by the branch and the pref- 
erence of mode by craftsmen. Thus, the lack of equity finance is not attributed to 
the conditions of modes. The craftsmen themselves apply for and prefer muräbaha 
rather than mushäraka. 
11.6 Assisted Crafts Units: Assessment of Financing Activities 
This section investigates in detail the conditions of granting credit by the 
branch as experienced by the craftsmen who received these credits; it further elab- 
orates the assessment of craftsmen to these conditions and whether or not the 
craftsmen regarded them as a hindrance to deal with the branch. 
11.6.1 Repayment period 
Craftsmen were asked to show the repayment period of the loans they received 
from the branch. Revealed responses are shown in Table 11.11. 
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(ii) To contact crafts would require statistics and information about these firms 
which is not available, thus it would be time-consuming to contact them, and the 
cost would be prohibitive. 
The fact that only crafts in urban areas were addressed may be seen as a short- 
coming. Even then, it is certain that some of the craftsmen who were addressed 
in urban areas were in fact from rural areas. 54.2% of craftsmen who filled in the 
questionnaire. forms indicated that they are from rural areas (outside Khartoum). 
(iv) An analysis of survey. results 
Though it was lengthy, the questionnaire was straightforward. The questions 
were basically concerned with the financial position of crafts, their business rela- 
tionship with the branch, the possibility of obtaining credit, and their ability to 
fulfil conditions for credits. The SPSSX programme was used in analysing the 
materials collected. 
11.2 Crafts: socio-economic characteristics 
11.2.1 Social characteristics 
(i) Providing a source of income 
It is important to point out the contribution of the crafts sector in providing 
a source of income to people. The level of contribution is determined by the 
proportion of population depending on that sector. Due to limitations of the 
survey, it is difficult to assess fairly the role of the sector in this concern. Despite 
that, the survey finding reveals that 89.5% of the craftsmen who were addressed 
with the questionnaire are married, and 11.5% are single. Married craftsmen were 
asked to indicate the number of their children, or dependents, for whom they 
are responsible for supporting. 36.8% of the craftsmen support a family of a 
size between one and five children, 43.2% support six to ten childern, 14.7% are 
responsible for eleven to fifteen children and 5.3% are supposed to maintain more 
than fifteen children. 
Sudanese society is still tribal and its social structure is based on the extended 
family; an individual is socially as well as religiously responsible for his father, 
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mother and grandparents. Therefore, when this particular social characteristic of 
the society is taken into account, it will be found that the number of people who 
depend on the crafts sector in maintaining their living is larger than that which has 
actually been indicated by the survey. This provides evidence for the importance 
and role of the sector in this concern. 
(ii) Relationship between real and professional age 
The survey results disclose that there is a positive relationship between the 
actual age of the craftsmen and the years they spent in profession. The sample 
younger craftsman (aged between 20 and 25 years) remains in the profession for 
few years (1-5 years) whilst the older craftsman (aged between 46 and 50 years) 
practices his profession for more than thirty years. Table 11.2 shows that the 
average actual age of the craftsman in Sudan is 45 years. The crafts activity needs 
expertise and capital to start up. Therefore, it is not easy for the younger to have 
their own workshops. Thus, the majority of craftsmen in Sudan started work in 
their thirties. 
Regarding how long they have been or tend to remain in their profession, the 
survey findings disclose that 28.4% of the craftsmen remain in their profession for 
more than thirty years, 13.7% remain for twenty six to thirty years, and 9.5% 
remain for twenty to twenty five years. That is to say, over 50% (51.6%) have 
practiced their profession for twenty years and more (Table 11.2). 
(iii) A relationship between education and profession 
Craftsmen were asked to indicate, first, their level of education and, second, if 
there is a relationship between education and profession. Table 11.3 reveals that 
8.5% of the sample craftsmen had either very little schooling45 or no-schooling, 
36.8% had preliminary schooling, and 16.8% were educated up to the intermediate 
level. Thus, the proportion of those craftsmen who had preliminary and inter- 
mediate education was 53.6% of the sample size. What attracts attention here is 
the finding that the number of those who had secondary education, and university 
and technical institution graduates, increased among the craftsmen (37.9%). This 
45 In Sudan there is a practice of sending children to what is called khalwa which is a kind of informal 
education system to learn the principles of Arabic language and Qur'an. It is a pre-preliminary 
schooling stage. 
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finding is indicative of the fact that the crafts sector has attracted more educated 
people in the past few years. 
Table 11.2: Crosstabulation: Actual Age by Professional Age 
Age Number of years in profession 
1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 Above 30 
21-25 3 
26-30 3 6 1 
31-35 1 2 1 2 2 
36-40 1 2 3 5 4 4 
41-45 1 2 2 4 2 4 6 
46-50 2 1 1 1 2 9 
Above 50 2. 1 3 12 
Total 13 14 6 13 9 13 27 
(%) 13.7 14.7 6.3 13.7 9.5 13.7 28.4 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
Table 11.3: Craftsmen: Level of Education 
Education level Frequency Valid percent Cumulative percent 
Khalwa 7 7.4 7.4 
No-schooling 1 1.1 8.5 
Primary school 35 36.8 45.3 
Intermediate school 16 16.8 62.1 
Secondary school 13 13.7 75.8 
University graduate 9 9.5 85.3 
Technical education 14 14.7 100 
Total 95 100 100 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
However, despite the increasing number of educated people among craftsmen, 
still the relationship between the type of education (and its level) and the profession 
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is not strong. The majority of craftsmen (66.7%) have indicated that there is no 
relationship between their education and profession. In fact; one third of craftsmen 
receiving education related to their professional career is an improvement. The 
majority of this group of craftsmen had either secondary education or graduated 
from university and technical institutions. 
(iv) A final important social characteristic of craftsmen is that most of them 
come from rural areas. 52% of the sample craftsmen were born outside Khartoum. 
This finding indicates that craftsmen found favourable conditions for work in ur- 
ban areas, especially with regard to the provision of services, market outlets for 
products and other facilities not available for crafts activities in rural areas. 
The fieldwork has disclosed that though the crafts activity is old, a great 
development in the number of crafts units occurred during the eighties. This 
expansion in the number of operating units is attributed to the Sudanese working 
in Gulf States who invested part of their savings in this sector. However, though 
the number increased, there has been no new invention, and more recent start-ups 
have copied those who have already established workshops. 
11.2.2 Economic characteristics 
(i) Creating employment opportunities 
As mentioned in Chapter X, large-scale and capital intensive industries have 
produced disappointing results in a number of developing countries, and employ- 
ment through industrialisation has failed to keep pace with population growth. 
The SSIs sector is presumably characterised by, in addition to other advantages, 
higher employment generation. The survey findings provide evidence for this in 
the case of crafts in the Sudan. 
Although the sample was chosen randomly, 100% of the owners/directors of 
the sample units have indicated that they employ workers. More important is 
the fact that when craftsmen were asked to indicate the blood-relationship with 
their employees, only 11.5% showed that their employees are from the family, 5.2% 
replied that employees are relatives (from the extended family), and 9.5% are from 
either the immediate family or relatives. The majority of employees (73.8%) are 
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neither members of the immediate family nor relatives of the craftsmen. This 
implies that the crafts sector is capable of providing employment opportunities. 
This is in fact important particularly in the case of Sudan where unemployment 
among school-leavers and even among the well educated people (graduates) is 
increasing, and the public sector is totally unable to create new jobs, especially with 
the austerity economic programmes and the huge cuts in government spending. 
The fieldwork has revealed that 67.4% of the surveyed units employ from one 
to ten labourers, 27.4% from eleven to twenty labourers and only 5.3% employ 
from twenty one to thirty workers. This finding is in consistent with a definition 
used in Chapter X to define what the term `small firm' implies. 
The total number of workers employed by the sample units is 713. It appears, 
therefore, that the average employment capacity for each unit is 7.51 labourers. 
The crafts branch found that total urban employment in the sector was 5181 in 
1986. If, as stated above, the total number of crafts units in Khartoum is more 
than 1000, and if the average employment capacity is 7.51 labourer, it could be 
suggested that the total labour force in the sector is more than 7,500 in Khartoum. 
In 1987,7457 labourers (5255 unskilled and 2202 skilled) applied for posts in 
government units. The number taken on represented 36.4% (18.7% skilled and 
17.5% unskilled) of the applicants, (Economic Survey, 1987/88). Thus, compared 
with the government, the private crafts sector has more potential and is more 
capable of creating jobs for workers. 
The fieldwork shows that there is a variation in an employment capacity even 
among crafts units. When crosstabulating crafts categories by the number of 
employees in each, the SPSSX produces the results shown on Table 11.4. 
It is obvious that blacksmiths, carpentry, welding and fitting (mechanical works 
on lorries) are the professiöns which absorb more labourers. On the other hand, 
tyre-repair, battery re-charging and plumbing are less labour-intensive among the 
crafts units. This may be attributable to the fact that the latter crafts use more 
modern techniques. In general, recruitment of labour by sector is fairly closed 
circuit, not directly absorbing many rural migrants or unskilled (school-leavers) 
job seekers. The requisite skill is the major prerequisite for entry, and this is 
generally acquired through apprenticeship. 
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Table 11.4: Crosstabulation: Profession by Number of Employees 
I 
Type of 
activity 
Number of employees 
1-10 11-20 21-30 
Total 
Cobbler 2 2 - 4 (4.2)* 
Blacksmith 25 9 - 34 (35.8) 
Carpenter 16 7 2 25 (26.3) 
Welder, fitter 9 - 3 12 (12.7) 
Welder, resprayer 3 4 - 7 (7.4) 
Electrician 2 - - 2 (2.1) 
Tailor 2 4 - 6 (6.3) 
Tyre-repair 2 - - 2 (2.1) 
Others 3 - - 3 (3.2) 
Total 64 (67.4) 26 (27.4) 5 (5.3) 95 (100) 
* Percentages. 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
(ii) Start-up capital (fixed investments) 
The fixed capital of the sector is in the form of buildings, machinery, equip- 
ments and raw materials. The survey findings disclose that there is a similarity 
in the size of fixed investments for crafts categories, so that 60% of units -except 
goldsmiths, battery repair and recharging, baking- started with fixed investments 
ranging between LS. 1,000 and LS. 5,000.16.8% of the units. started with a fixed 
capital of LS. 6,000 to LS. 10,000. However, all the craftsmen have indicated to us 
that they began work without help from banks or government. Thus, more than 
75% of the crafts units had only a low fixed investment. On the other side, 5.3% of 
the sample units had fixed investment ranging between LS. 11,000 and LS. 15,000, 
and only 4.2% started with more than LS. 100,000 (Table 11.5). 
The two units that started with more than LS. 100,000 are in the category 
of carpentry. But even within this category, fourteen out of twenty five units (; Zý 
60%) started with the same low capital (LS. 1,000-5,000), and the two firms which 
started with large capital represented only 8% among the firms of this category. 
Among the blacksmiths category, 68% (23 out of 34) of the units started with the 
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lowest level of capital, 18% (six firms) started with LS. 6,000-10,000, two firms 
started with LS. 11,000-15,000 and only one firm had a capital ranging between LS. 
50,000 and 100,000. However, both carpenters and blacksmiths are characterised, 
among other categories, by a relatively high fixed investment, this implies that 
they are more dependent on machinery and equipment than other categories. 
Table 11.5: Crafts Distribution: Start-up & Current Capital 
Type of Start-up & current capital (000s) 
activity 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-40 41-50 51-100 Above 10 
Cobbler 4 (0)* 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (2) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Blacksmith 23 (3) 6 (2) 2 (4) 0 (3) 1 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (7) 1 (5) 0 (9) 
Carpenter 14(0) 4(0) 1 (2) 0(1) 1 (0) 1 (1) 2(0) 0(0) 0 (11) 2 (10) 
Welder, fitter 8 (0) 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (3) 0 (5) 
Welder, respraye 3 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 1 (2) 1 (3) 
Electrician 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 
Joiner 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) 
Tailor 3 (0) 1(0) 1 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (2) 0 (1) 
Tyre-repair 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Others 1 (0) 1 (1) . 0 
(0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 
Total 57 (3) 16 (3), 5 (8) 4 (9) 2 (1) 2 (4) 3 (3) 0 (10) 2 (24) 4 (30) 
% 60 (3.2) 16.8 (3.2 5.3 (8.4 4.2 (9.5 2.1 (1.1 2.1 (4.2 3.2 (3.2 0 (10.5) 2.1 (25.3 4.2 (31.6) 
* Distribution of units with respect to current (expansion) capital. 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
In fact, although for both categories most of the firms started with low cap- 
ital, firms are spreading throughout the ranges specified for the start-up capital 
(LS. 1,000-100,000). This implies as well that there is a minimum level for these 
two categories, and that firms can further expand by obtaining more productive 
equipment. It would appear that other categories are not characterised by a high 
level of fixed capital and that they are more dependent on skill of labour. 
On the other hand, one notices an increase in the `current' fixed investment of 
crafts units, which means that the sector has potential for growth and expansion. 
Table 11.5 reveals that the number of crafts units which started up within a range 
of LS. 1,000-5,000 is 60% of the sample units, now (1989), the firms which have 
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`current' fixed capital within the same range of LS. 1,000-5,000 are only 3.2%. At 
the other extreme, the firms that started within the high range of 51,000-100,000, 
were only two firms, yet now twenty four firms work with a capital within this 
range. Only four units started with more than LS. 100,000, now the number is 
thirty. All this indicates that the crafts sector is growing and could possibly be 
developed to contribute more to economic development. However, although 61.1% 
of the firms indicated that the average annual increase of their sales is within 1- 
10%, and only 7.4% of the sample firms (seven firms) showed an average annual 
increase of sales above 25%, 
it 
still remains the fact that the sector has potential 
for growth and could contribute more if it received sufficient support. 
(iii) Enhancing import-substitution industries 
Products of the crafts sector in the Sudan are varied, and are characterised as 
being cheap and at different prices. Thus, the sector provides products for people 
at different prices and hccording to their incomes. 
More important is the- fact that the sector has contributed in substituting 
imported products with local products such as spare parts, metalic compounds, 
furniture and other necessary products that were hitherto imported. 
However, the contribution of crafts is even more considerable in the national 
income. The crafts branch primary survey (in 1986) showed that total sales of crafts 
units located in Khartoum were LS. 42 million. Our survey (1989) reveals that 
this contribution has increased and is large. Though the craftsmen were cautious 
about disclosing their sales, the survey finding shows that total annual sales for 
the sample units (95 units) was LS. 9,504,000. On average, the annual sales per 
unit were LS. 121,147.48 Therefore, with the number of crafts units exceeding 
one thousand, as estimated before, their annual sales (in December 1988) were 
estimated to be around LS. 125 million. 
46 This average should be taken with some caution because three firms had sales considerably different 
from the other firms. One of the three firms had an annual sale of LS. 2 million, another one LS. 
500,000 and the third one LS. 300,000. These values are regarded as extreme, as most of the firms 
(54.7%) revealed sales ranging between LS. 10,000 and LS. 100,000. However, it is the opinion 
of the author that these extreme values might have rebalanced the average as craftsmen were so 
cautious ` about disclosing the exact figures of their sales in order to avoid tax payment. They 
thought that the research assistants were tax inspectors. 
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It is noticeable that a large proportion of crafts units' sales are from blacksmiths 
and carpenters categories. Out of twenty nine firms indicating annual sales above 
LS. 100,000 (the maximum amount specified in the questionnaire), eleven firms are 
from the blacksmiths category and nine are carpentry units. Welding and fitting 
(mechanical works on lorries) comes second to these two categories with respect 
to annual sales. 
(iv) Using imported raw materials 
The crafts sector uses a fairly large proportion of imported raw materials. 
47.4% of craftsmen indicated that they use imported raw materials, 22.1% use local 
materials and 30.5% use both local and imported raw materials. A dependence on 
the imported raw material has an implication at macro level, that it needs foreign 
currency and at the micro level, that the crafts will be affected by fluctuations in 
foreign currency prices47; moreover, a relatively heavy dependence on the imported 
raw materials inteirupts the production process as these materials are not always 
available when needed. It is certainly not preferrable at all to depend on imported 
raw materials, but the sector has no option, at least at this stage of the Sudanese 
economy where the linkage between component sectors of the economy is weak and 
the economy is still at an early stage of industrial development. 
Crafts units depend to a great extent on buying raw materials either from their 
own savings (45.3%) or borrowing (41.1%). That is to say, 86.3% of crafts units 
pay for their raw materials by securing cash. 6.3% depend on sharing products 
with outside parties so that these parties provide raw materials for products; 7.3% 
of craftsmen take cash in advance from buyers of the products to pay for raw 
materials. These figures show that more than 50% (54.7%) "do not depend on their 
own sources in buying raw materials. Instead, they are dependent on borrowing, 
sharing or taking money in advance. Thus, the sector lacks financial support to 
obtain its raw materials. 
11.3 Finance Gap 
The question which must be asked is whether the crafts sector faces a finance 
47 The dependence on imported raw materials proves the weak forward and backward linkages with 
other sectors of the economy. 
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gap, and other -information and advice- gaps? In this concern, craftsmen were 
addressed with the relevant questions to answer. It is vital to see first what the 
craftsmen need finance for? 
Craftsmen appear to need more finance for raw materials (47.4%), then comes 
the spending on new machines, i. e. for expansion (12.6%); repayment of debt 
(2.1%) and the least aspect of spending is the wages and salaries of workers (1.1%). 
Moreover, 36.8% of crafts units need the finance for raw materials and new ma- 
chines. Thus, spending on raw materials, new machines and both raw materials 
and new machines account for 96.8% of the total spending of sample units. 
The finance gap f6r crafts units could be identified through the extent to which 
they depend on institutional financing, i. e., on the frequency of taking loans, the 
adequacy of credit from banks and so on. On answering the question `To what 
extent you depend on the crafts branch to finance you? ', craftsmen reveal the 
following responses, 
Table 11.6: Dependence on Branch Finance 
Degree of dependence Value Valid percent 
up to 25% 53 55.8 
up to 40% 22 23.2 
up to 70% 14 14.7 
100% 6 6.3 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
It is obvious that only few craftsmen (6.3%) depend wholly on the branch in 
financing their activities, i. e., the branch provides them with 100% of the finance 
they need or usualiy apply for. The majority (55.8%) are sponsored only partially 
by the branch, giving them only 25% of what they need. 23.1% of the firms secure 
40% of their financial needs and 14.7% secure 70%. On average, the majority of 
the sample firms (78.9%) secure less than 50% of their financial needs. This implies 
that small crafts are under-financed. 
Craftsmen were asked again to indicate if the branch gives them all the finance 
they usually apply for? 17.9% have replied `yes' that they get fully the amount 
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they apply for, whereas 82.1% have indicated that they usually do not get the 
amount of credit needed for production. 
Crosstabulation gives similar results, when responses to the question `To what 
extent do you depend on the branch to finance you? ' were crosstabulated by replies 
to the question `Does the branch give you all the finance you need? ', the following 
results are produced, 
Table 11.7: Crosstabulation: Degree of Dependence by Adequacy of Finance 
Adequacy of Degree of dependence Total 
finance Up to 25% Up to 40% Up to 70% 100% 
Yes 6 5 3 3 17 (17.9)* 
N o 47 17 11 3 78 (82.1) 
Total 
L 
53 
4(55.8) 
22 (23.2) 14 (14.7) 6 (6.3) 95 (100) 
* Percentages. 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
Again, the large proportion of craftsmen (55.8%) get only 25% of their finance 
needed from the branch. On the other side, only 6.3% replied that they depend 
wholly on the funds from the branch. 
However, this might be attributed to the lack of good estimates by craftsmen 
of what they need. The survey results show that 66.7% of the sample craftsmen go 
to the branch with an estimate of the amount of funds they need according to the 
trend of demand for their products. It is true that smaller firms still lack financial 
control and a budgetting' system; owners/directors of these firms do not disclose 
or trust the financial affairs of their business to any one else in the firm. But still, 
craftsmen can specify, and they usually do, their financial requirements, and they 
are aware of the market conditions. 66.7% of the craftsmen, as mentioned above, 
have shown that they usually specify the amount of credit before they bring their 
case to the branch. 
The frequency of, applications for credit from the crafts branch is low. Crafts 
were asked to disclose the frequency of approaching the branch for credit.. Only 
347 
25.3% of the sample,, craftsmen usually approach every three months; 34.7% in- 
dicated they approach every six months, and 40% come every twelve months or 
more. 
On the adequacy of credit from the branch, craftsmen revealed that, although 
the size of loans that they get is reasonable, it is not enough. In this concern, 
24.2% considered the , 
size of loans they receive is too small, 60.4% considered that 
it is reasonable and 14.7% obtained the total amount of credit they asked for. 
To be certain aböüt the adequacy of finance to branch customers, craftsmen 
were asked if the shortage of credit is a hindrance to their work. 92% replied `yes' 
that it is a hindrance 
and 8% answered `no'. Moreover, only 30.2% of customers 
have revealed that their credit from the branch increased whereas 69.5% replied 
`no' that the branch did not extend to them more credit despite an increase in the 
demand for their products. 
Therefore, one could draw the conclusion that there is a finance gap for crafts, 
(1) that the majority depend to a lesser extent on the branch in providing funds, 
(2) the frequency of applying for the credit is low, (3) the credit received did not 
increase for the majority of craftsmen and (4) a shortage of finance is a hindrance 
to growth for more than 90% of crafts units. 
11.4 The Information and Advice Gaps 
11.4.1 Information gap 
Like other smaller, firms in the Sudan, the crafts firms are unaware of all the 
services provided by the crafts branch. 66.7% of the sample craftsmen said they 
do not know the range of services which are provided by the branch. Not only 
that, the majority do not even know the branch credit policy, in the sense that 
they deal with a bank for only a certain mode of finance (muräbaha in most cases). 
69.8% of the craftsmen do not know the branch credit policy. Moreover, 93.7% of 
craftsmen are used to using muräbaha only, and ignore other methods of financing 
such as mushäraka and murdäraba. 
On the other harid, craftsmen have indicated also that, apart from dealing 
with the crafts branch, they ignore as well the conditions of other types of credits 
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given by FIBS. 75.8% of craftsmen ignore these conditions, and, apart from the 
Sudanese Industrial bank, have no idea about other sources of finance for smaller 
firms. This situation has serious implications, as craftsmen cannot seek other cheap 
sources of finance, even if these are actually available. However, this statement of 
being ignorant about ; other sources is quite obvious in the responses of craftsmen 
who were addressed by a question about other financial institutions or banks that 
they may deal with? Apart from the crafts branch, there are only three cases of 
craftsmen who dealt 
with the Sudanese Industrial Bank, and one case of craftsman 
who dealt with Tadamon Islamic Bank. 
Hence, it may be said that there is a `Sudanese' Bolton gap facing the crafts 
sector. The crafts branch does not help in this regard. The branch is based in 
an industrial area ofö; Omdurman, and it is far from the crafts units loacted in 
Khartoum and Khartoum North. 
11.4.2 Advice gap 
Concerning the advice on technical, managerial or financial matters, the sample 
crafts have shown that there is a lack of information and advice. 95.8% of the 
craftsmen have reported that they did not seek or receive advice from any body. 
The majority of craftsmen (81%) have indicated that they did not hear at all of 
any bank or a business firm giving advice services. 
In fact there is noibody or institution in Sudan to provide financial, managerial 
or technical advice on small firms' affairs. Banks are, in general, not willing to 
finance industry, they, therefore, do not provide financial advice and information 
to crafts units. There is no formal system for advice and information in any type 
of banks operating in the Sudan. Craftsmen have not yet been familiar enough 
with the formal banking system, or the consultancy firms, and the cost of advice 
provided by private consultants is too high for smaller businesses in general and 
crafts units in particular. 
Thus, the above, discussion suggests that there is an information and advice 
gap facing crafts units. This gap is identified as a lack of information on financial 
facilities available to craftsmen and the non-existence of any body for providing this 
advice. One would say that this empirical investigation, based on the experience of 
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FIBS with crafts units in urban areas, points to an existence of `Bolton gap' with 
respect to information and advice. Of course, craftsmen on their part contributed 
to an existence of such gaps by being less careful about seeking these sources of 
finance. 
11.5 Crafts Funding By FIBS 
FIBS set up a specialised branch to sponsor crafts units, to activate this sector 
which is not accounted for by other banks and is considered as non-banking group. 
The branch was founded partly to apply the `specialisation approach' in the process 
of branching expansion of FIBS. FIBS believes as well that this sector is productive 
and has potential for growth. The branch started in 1979 to, (1) provide the 
craftsmen with the necessary machinery and equipment, (2) reduce the costs of 
these production inputs compared with their costs elsewhere by obtaining and 
selling them directly to the craftsmen without intermediaries and at low profit 
margins, (3) arrange repayments and instalments so that craftsmen could obtain 
equipment easily. 
The branch raises its own sources mainly from crafts. Its deposits increased 
from only LS. 182,000 in 1979 to nearly LS. 10 million in 1983 and to LS. 23.3 
million in 1986 (see Chapter IX, Table 9.2). As a percentage to FIBS' total de- 
posits, its deposits increased from 1% in 1979 to 3% in 1982,.. 6% in 1985 and 7% 
in 1986. This provides evidence for what has been stated in the preceding chapter 
that smaller businesses sector could be a net lender to the financial market. If 
the sector grows and banks help to bridge the finance gap, these advantages could 
become even more attractive to banks which have suffered in other areas from 
competition with Bach other. 
11.5.1 Conditions under which finance is provided 
Applicants are normally recommended by other customers or bankers. A crafts- 
man is required to show an identifier proving his/her membership of the National 
Crafts Federation. This is important for the branch to be certain about the pro- 
fessional ability of .a craftsman and that he has a workshop to undertake work or 
a licence to start work. Applicants are also required to prove'Ithe feasibility of the 
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project for which they need finance, therefore the branch officials pay a preliminary 
visit to the workshop. 
The branch sells equipment either in lump sum or by instalment. When sale 
is by instalment, the following conditions are to be satisfied: 
(i) That the customer opens an account with the crafts branch or other branches 
of FIBS. 
(ii) He/she pays 25% as a first instalment according to the conditions of credit 
extension specified by the Bank of Sudan. 
(iii) The maximum repayment period is three years. 
(iv) The branch conditions a guarantee for the remaining balance after payment 
of the first instalment: If that balance is LS. 50,000 or less, the bank accepts a 
`personal guarantee' qualified for payment on behalf of the client on default. 
(v) The branch accepts an investment account in foreign curreny -a minimum 
US$ 3,000- as a guarantee. 
(vi) If the remaining balance is above LS. 50,000, the branch asks for a real 
estate guarantee. 
(vii) Sometimes the branch takes goods as a guarantee, such as raw materials, 
which are stored with the branch and it releases these goods on demand after 
payment of the values 
(viii) The goods Under 
Company. 
(ix) The branch opens 
consideration are secured with the Islämic Insurance 
an account under the name of the client in order to 
facilitate repayment 'and follow-up. 
11.5.2 Financing activities 
Table 11.8 displays the contribution of the crafts branch in funding crafts over 
the years 1981-1987. It is clear that investments in crafts increased over the years 
under review. The credit was deployed to import machinery and equipment for 
351 
the various crafts activities, including spare parts; equipments for chemists and 
veterenaries, tractors and their attachments and other production inputs. It was 
deployed as well to buy equipment from the local market, and provide raw materials 
from local and foreign markets. 
Investigation of loans extended by the branch reveals that the size of a single 
loan is generally small. It varies from LS. 1,500 (in 1989) to more than LS. 100,000. 
It depends on the cost and category of equipment and machinery. 
Table 11.8: Crafts Branch: Extended Loans 
Number of loans 
each year Cumulative total 
Total finance (LS. million) 
each year Cumulative total 
1981 203 203 1.2 1.2 
1982 152 355 1.5 2.7 
1983 208 563 2.4 5.1 
1984 238 801 2.3 7.4 
1985 325 1126 4.1 11.5 
1986 496 1622 6.7 18.2 
1987 700 2322 11.0 29.2 
Source: FIBS, Special Report, 1987. 
However, it has been shown above that the majority of crafts are still under- 
financed, that more than 55% of crafts units get only 25% of what they actually 
need or what they 'apply for. Only 17.9% replied that they are given the the 
amount of funds they apply for (Table 11.7). Despite that, the contribution of the 
branch is better than that of other financial institutions. 
Table 11.9 reveals the financial assistance extended by the crafts branch com- 
pared with other financial institutions for 1986. It is quite clear that the branch 
exceeded all other institutional sources of finance to crafts firms. Both the number 
of firms assisted and the volume of assistance exceeded that given by other banks 
and financial institutions. If one adds the finance extended to the crafts sector 
by other branches of FIBS, the contribution of FIBS in . this area is formidable 
as contrasted with other banks. Thus, the total fund given by the crafts branch 
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in 1986 was 32% of the total finance extended to these units in urban areas, and 
excluding the branch share from the total, the percentage rose to 46%. 
In terms of number of assisted firms, the branch extended credit to thirty six 
crafts units in urban areas out of sixty two units which received credit in that 
year. However, the amount of credit given by the branch shown on Table 11.9 
excludes the funds received by the crafts in rural areas and the fund allocated to 
other categories such as retailing trade (buying refrigerators and freezers), chemists 
and veterenaries' equipments, tractors and their attachments and micro-buses and 
taxes. 
Table 11.9: Institutional Assistance to Crafts, 1986 
Number of unit Total finance Minimum loan size Maximum loan size 
crafts branch (1) 36 586925 450 88000 
FIBS (other branches) (2) 6 775000 10000 500000 
Commercial banks 5 301000 18000 200000 
SIB 3 62000 9000 36000 
OtherlBs 2 40000 15000 25000 
SRDFC & IICS 2 26000 12000 14000 
Other sources* 5 63500 1500 30000 
Total (3) 62 1854425 - - 
Total* (4) 1267500 - - 
Total* * (5) 492500 - - 
(1)/(2) % 32 - - - 
(1)/(4) % 46 - - 
(1)/(5) % 119 - - 
* An informal sector; * excluding (1); ** excluding (1) and (2). 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
An important feature characterising loans extended by the branch is that they 
include small-size loans, even though the cost of controlling and administering 
these loans is relatively, high. As it is shown on Table 11.9, the minimum size of 
a loan is LS. 450, and the number of loans is large, (see Table 11.9). Hence, the 
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branch is very much concerned about the sector and its growth despite the cost of 
administering this type of small-size loans. 
Other sources of finance extended not only limited funds, the size of loans they 
grant is larger than that of the crafts branch. This practice excludes many smaller 
firms from getting financial assistance, as some financial institutions impose high 
minimum size cut-off points, and are discouraged by the disproportionately high 
cost of processing applications of small crafts. 
In terms of costs of finance, the crafts branch conducts its lending at lower 
costs for crafts. Craftsmen were asked to indicate the profit margins they paid 
on credits. 10.5% have said they pay 5% per annum, 27.4% pay from 6 to 10%, 
35.8% pay from 11 to 15% and 21.1% pay 16-20%. In other words, 97.9% pay a 
maximum profit margins of 20%, and only 2.1% pay above 20% on loans provided 
by the branch. 
Comparing the crafts branch with the SRDFC, the cost of lending with the 
former is lower than that of the latter. For the SRDFC, the minimum profit margin 
(per year) is 20% and it might reach 40% for a repayment period of thirty months 
(see Chapter X, Table 10.9). Moreover, an average loan from the SRDFC is LS. 
225,000, whereas the minimum loan from the crafts branch' is found to be LS. 
1,500. Hence, crafts units, in this way, have more access to get credit from the 
branch than to get a loan elsewhere. 
It is also uncovered by the survey that the crafts units supported by the branch 
has an average lower capital investment than the firms assisted by other financial 
institutions. The average capital for the units funded by the crafts branch is LS. 
21,162, whereas the average capital for firms supported by other banks is LS. 
62,200. In addition to this, 96.8% of the crafts units funded by the branch are, in 
nature, productive units, producing commodities whereas only 3.2% are extending 
services. 
However, one notices the insignificant share of `equity' finance in the total 
loanable funds of the branch. When craftsmen were asked about the mode of 
finance they use, 93.7% reported that they use rnuräbaha, whereas only 6.3% use 
mushäraka, i. e. there is a concentration on trade finance as contrasted to equity 
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finance. When craftsmen were asked again to show if the branch imposes certain 
mode, 35.8% have said `yes' and 63.5% `no' that they are free in choosing the 
mode. 
It would seem therefore that the branch accommodates the crafts units with 
working capital only rather than the start-up capital or innovative capital, i. e., 
equity finance. Responses of crafts on the question about the aspects of spending 
(classified earlier in this chapter) provides evidence for this. As said above, 47.4% 
of the firms (47 firms) need funds- or received it- for raw materials, whereas only 
12.6% spend more on new machines. Moreover, the insignificant share of equity 
finance is also reflected in the finding that still 60% of the craftsmen rent their 
workshops, 33.7% own workshops and 6.3% have workshops partly rented and 
partly owned. In other words, the branch has not yet enhanced the sector with 
respect to fixed investment in the form of either building or machinery. 
This lack of `equity' finance might, however, be attributed to the conditions of 
muräbaha, as a form of trade finance, and mushäraka, as a form of equity finance. 
To the craftsmen, according to their understanding, muräbaha is better with regard 
to its conditions compared to mushäraka. To test the validity of this statement, 
responses on the question about the `mode of finance used by craftsmen' were 
crosstabulated by revealed responses on the question about the `factors affecting 
your (the craftsman) choice of the mode'. The results obtained are displayed in 
Table 11.10. 
Table 11.10: Crosstabulation: Chosen Mode by Factors Affecting Preference of 
Mode 
Easy guarantee (1) Low profit (2) Long repayment (3) All (1 +2+ 3) Total 
Muräbaha 
Mushärak 
26 (26.23)* 
2 (1.77) 
13 (14.05) 
2 (0.95) 
28 (26.23) 
0 (1.77) 
22 (22.48) 
2 (1.52) 
89 
6 
Total 28 15 28 24 95 
* Expected frequencies; X2 = 0.42; df =3 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
It appears that craftsmen prefer murdbaha as it looks to them more favourable 
than mushäraka given the conditions specified by the branch for each mode. In 
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other words, the conditions affect the preferrence of craftsmen so that they apply 
for credit on a muräbaha basis rather than mushäraka. Therefore, the lack of equity 
finance might be attributed to these conditions. 
However, to test this argument or finding, the chi-square test is used here so 
that: 
The null hypothesis should state that the variables (conditions of modes as 
specified by the branch, and the modes themselves, muräbaha and mushäraka) 
are independent of one another (i. e. the chi-square is not larger than would be 
expected by chance. ) 
The alternative or research hypothesis should state that the variables are re- 
lated or dependent (ie the chi-square is larger than would be expected by chance). 
Following the techniques of calculating X2, the calculated value (X2) is found 
to be 0.42. The significance level chosen is 0.05, and the degree of freedom is 3. 
Comparing 0.42 to the critical value (the distribution value), since the cal- 
culated value is lower than the critical value (= 7.815 at 0.05 probability level), 
i. e. since 0.42 < 7.86, the decision to be made is to accept the null hypothesis 
and reject the research hypothesis at all levels. The conclusion is that there is no 
relation between the conditions of modes as specified by the branch and the pref- 
erence of mode by craftsmen. Thus, the lack of equity finance is not attributed to 
the conditions of modes. The craftsmen themselves apply for and prefer murdbaha 
rather than mushdraka. 
11.6 Assisted Crafts Units: Assessment of Financing Activities 
This section investigates in detail the conditions of granting credit by the 
branch as experienced by the craftsmen who received these credits; it further elab- 
orates the assessment of craftsmen to these conditions and whether or not the 
craftsmen regarded them as a hindrance to deal with the branch. 
11.6.1 Repayment period 
Craftsmen were asked to show the repayment period of the loans they received 
from the branch. Revealed responses are shown in Table 11.11. 
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The minimum repayment period is twelve months. 45.3% of the sample crafts 
units experienced a repayment period more than a year and up to eighteen months. 
5.3% had loans for more than eighteen months and up to two years. An interesting 
finding is that craftsmen who had loans for more than two years and up to three 
years represent nearly 50% (49.4%) of the sample. This implies that with the re- 
payment period, the branch allows customers to pay instalments over a reasonably 
long period, and any assumed inadequacy on the part of the branch regarding 
financial support of crafts might not be interpreted by the repayment period stip- 
ulated by the branch. 
Table 11.11: Length of Repayment Period 
Period (months) Frequency Valid Percent 
12-18 43 45.3 
19-24 5 5.3 
25-30 18 18.9 
31-36 29 30.5 
Total' 95 100 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
In fact, the repayment period is vital as it affects craftsmen to decide on 
receiving credits. Craftsmen reveal great importance for this condition when they 
were asked to indicate its relative importance. 89.5% have replied positively that 
it is important änd does affect their decision to receive credit from the branch, 
and only 10.5% said it is not important and they do not take it into consideration 
when deciding oni receiving loans. 
However, the repayment period is truly vital for craftsmen and they are con- 
sistent in estimating its relative importance for them. When responses to the 
question about `The length of repayment period experienced by each craftsman' 
were crosstabulated by revealed responses on the `Relative importance of repay- 
ment period on a craftsmans' decision to take a loan', the results obtained are 
shown in Table 11.12. 
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Thus, the repayment period is important for those who have loans for a short 
period (12-18 months), a medium period (19-24 months) and long period (25-36 
months). 
Table 11.12: Crosstabulation: Repayment Period By Its Relative Importance 
Period (months) Important Not important 
12-18 39 4 
19-24 4 1 
25-30 14 4 
31-36 28 1 
Total 85 10 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
It is mentioned above that nearly 50% of the craftsmen had loans to be paid 
within more than two years, that repayment period is important for craftsmen 
and that they are consistent in indicating its relative importance. If, then, this is 
the situation, and the repayment condition stipulated by the branch is favourable 
for craftsmen to have more loans, one would expect craftsmen to increase their 
credit. On questioning craftsmen about `Whether they did increase their credit', 
only 30.5% reveal an increase and the majority (69.5%) show no increase. The 
question is, if the `repayment period condition' seems flexible, why the majority of 
craftsmen have not increased their credit? So the validity of the argument or the 
finding `repayment period condition is flexible' needs to be tested! 
To do that, responses on the repayment period experienced by craftsmen were 
crosstabulated by replies on the question `Did the credit you get from the branch 
increase? ' and chi-square test was carried. 
To set up a test of hypothesis, using chi-square, and according to the argument 
under consideration, 
-The null hypothesis should state that `the repayment period condition' and 
`the increase in credit' are not related or are independent of one another, so that 
the increase in credit is not attributed to the condition of `repayment period'. In 
this case, the chi-square value is not larger than would be expected by chance. 
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-The alternative or research hypothesis should state that the variables are 
related or dependent (i. e., the chi-square value is larger than would be expected 
by chance). 
Table 11.13: Crosstabulation: Repayment Period By Increase in Credit 
Period (months) Yes No Total 
12-18 15 (13.13)* 28 (29.87) 43 
19-24 2 (1.53) 3 (3.47) 5 
25-30 4 (5.59) 14 (12.5) 18 
31-36 8 (8.85) 21 (20.15) 29 
Total 29 66 95 
* Expected frequencues; X2 = 1.29; df = 3. 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989 
Selecting a probability level of 0.05, the calculated value (X2 = 1.29) is com- 
pared to the critical value (the distribution table value) at degrees of freedom equal 
3. Since the calculated value (X2 = 1.29) is lower than the tabulated value (=3.81), 
1.29 < 3.81, the decision to be made is to accept the null hypothesis and reject 
the research hypothesis. 
The conclusion is that, there is no relationship between the `specified repay- 
ment period condition' and the `increase in credit'. In other words, the `repayment 
condition' has not been the cause for craftsmen not to increase their credit, and 
this might be attributed to other factors. The argument that `repayment period 
condition is flexible and favourable to craftsmen' is valid, and in this respect the 
crafts branch has contributed positively in easing one of the important factors 
affecting the decision of craftsmen to get credit. 
11.6.2 Grace period 
Craftsmen were asked to reveal the grace period of loans they have received 
from the branch. Responses that they have revealed according to their empirical 
experience in this regard is shown in Table 11.14. 
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Contrary to the repayment period, the grace period seems to be short. Most 
of the cases have experienced grace period of six months (89.5% of the cases), 
4.2% of craftsmen received loans with 7-9 months as a grace period, 1.1% of the 
sample crafts units had no grace period for loans they received, and only 5.2% 
have received credits with a grace period of 10-12 months. This finding indicates 
that the grace period is too short for craftsmen and it might affect their decision 
to increase their credits from the branch! 
Table 11.14: Length of Grace Period 
Period (mönths) Frequency Valid percent 
0 1 1.1 
3-6 85 89.5 
7-9 4 4.2 
above 12 5 5.2 
Total 95 100 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989 
Table 11.15 shows the crosstabulation of responses on the `grace period' - 
as experienced by craftsmen- by responses to the question about `An increase in 
credit'. As is revealed in the table, the `short' grace period influenced craftsmen 
not to increase credit so that 70% of craftsmen (86 craftsmen) who had a `short' 
grace period, did not increase their credit for that reason. On the other hand, 
4 out of 5 cases (80%) with a relatively longer grace period have increased their 
credit. 
The conclusion is that, although the branch stipulates a flexible repayment 
period, it adopts such a `grace period condition' that has had negative impact on 
the willingness of craftsmen to increase loans. Therefore, the finding `credit did not 
increase' has partially been prompted by the `stipulated short grace period'. How- 
ever, it is important to be cautious about this conclusion, because when craftsmen 
were asked about the relative importance of grace period, 68.4% have indicated its 
relative importance for their decision to ask for a loan, while 31.6% have rejected 
that importance. They, thus, do not give the same weight to this condition as the 
case with the repayment period condition. 
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Table 11.15: Crösstabulation: Grace Period By Increase in Credit 
Period (months) Yes No 
0 1 0 
3-6 24 61 
7-9 0 4 
10-12 4 1 
Total 29 66 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989 
11.6.3 Profit margins 
It was mentioned above that the branch is conducting its financial activities at 
a relatively lower cost than other financial institutions such as the SRDFC. This 
does not imply, however, that the branch does not discourage some craftsmen by 
imposing high costs on loans. The statement needs more investigation. 
The sample craftsmen revealed that they pay the following profit margins on 
loans they recieve from the branch, (Table 11.16). 
37.9% of the craftsmen pay up to 10% as profit margins on loans, 73.9% pay 
15% and 94.7% (cumulative percent) pay up to 20%. Only 3.2% pay between 21% 
and 25% and more. The cost of lending looks reasonable compared to the cost 
of lending by other financial institutions. One could also say that the branch's 
loans are cheap taking into consideration the cost of administering and processing 
small-size credits. It is, as well cheap under the conditions of inflationary pressures 
and low level of real rate of return on money in the Sudan. 
This statement does not, by all means, invalidate the argument that profit 
margins might possibly inhibit craftsmen from taking loans. Now it is appropriate 
to consider this question. 
The impact of the profit margin on a decision to take a loan will be elaborated 
here at two levels, first, at the level of craftsmen and, second, at the level of the 
branch. 
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Table 11.16: Crafts: Profit Margins on Loans 
Profit margins (%) Frequency Valid percent 
0-5 10 10.4 
6-10 26 27.4 
11-15 34 35.8 
16-20 20 20.8 
21-25 3 3.2 
25 1 1.1 
Above 25 1 1.1 
Total 95 100 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
First, at the level of craftsmen, and compared to other conditions, it seems that 
craftsmen give little importance to the profit margins. Craftsmen who assigned 
great importance to the profit margins (44.8%) are less than those assigning less 
importance (54.2%). These two figures are close. It would seem that craftsmen are 
evenly split. However, it is the view and perception of the author that this result is 
attributed to a considerable extent to the lack of information (information gap) on 
other sources of finance -if any. As stated above, the information gap is formidable 
so that 70.5% of craftsmen know of no other sources of finance, that 71.6% do not 
have financial controller or a regular file system. Therefore, had craftsmen more 
access to institutional financing, and had they adequate information on sources of 
finance, they would have increased their credit with the banks. 
The `low priority' given by craftsmen to the impact of profit margins is also 
obvious from the outcomes of crosstabulating profit margins by revealed responses 
on an estimation of relative importance of these profit margins, '(Table 11.17). 
Figures in the table show that even the groups of craftsmen who receive loans 
at relatively high costs (more than 10%) have indicated less importance for the 
profit margins. It is, of course, true that no businessman likes to pay high costs 
on borrowed money, but in the case of crafts firms, information on other sources 
of finance is very limited, the financial market is fragmented and there is no com- 
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petition among financial institutions. So, for a craftsman, the last resort will be 
the single supplier of loans-regardless of the cost of borrowing at this stage. 
Table 11.17: Crosstäbulation: Profit Margins By Their Relative Importance 
Profit margins (%) Relative importance 
Important Not important 
Total 
0-5 6 4 10 
6-10 10 16 26 
11-15 16 18 34 
16-20 8 12 20 
21-25 1 2 3 
25 1 0 1 
Above 25 1 0 1 
Total 43 52 95 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
Second, more important is the impact of the profit margins as specified by the 
branch on the demand for credit. A comparison with other sources favour the crafts 
branch as a cheap source of funds. To test this finding, again the profit margins 
as a cost of lending experienced by craftsmen were crosstabulated with revealed 
responses on an increase in credit received. The results obtained are shown in 
Table 11.18. 
Following up a test of hypothesis, using chi-square, 
-The null hypothesis should state that the variables are not related, in the 
sense that the apparent finding `credit did not increase', on Table 11.18, is not 
attributed to the condition of profit margins (i. e., the chi-square is not larger than 
would be expected by chance). In other words, the stipulated profit margins are 
low. 
-The research hypothesis should state that the variables are related or are 
dependent, or the profit margins as a condition to get credit are high so that they 
discourage craftsmen to obtain more credit, (in this case, the chi-square is larger 
than would be expected by chance). 
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Table 11.18: Crosstabulation: Profit Margins By Increase in Credit 
Profit margins (%) Increase in credit 
Yes No 
Total 
0-5 5 (3)` 5 (7) 10 
6-10 9 (8) 17 (18) 26 
11-15 10 (10) 24 (24) 34 
16-20 5 (6) 15 (14) 20 
21-25 0 (1) 3 (2) 3 
25 0 (0.3) 1 (0.6) 1 
Above 25 0 (0.3) 1 (0.6) 1 
Total 29 66 95 
* Expected frequencies; X2 = 5.02; df = 6. 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
Following the same prodecure of chi-square test, at 0.05 level of significance 
with df = 6, the tabulated value is 12.59. Comparing this value with the calculated 
value (X2 = 5.02, since our calculated value is lower than the critical value, 5.02 
< 12.59, the decision to be made is to accept the null hypothesis and reject the 
research hypothesis. The conculsion is that profit margins - as a loan condition- 
have not affected the decision by craftsmen not to increase credit from the branch. 
Thus, the third condition specified by the branch is not a hindrance for craftsmen 
to seek more credit. 
11.6.4 The guarantee 
The repayment period and profit margins as specified by the crafts branch for 
credit extension seem to favour craftsmen seeking more credit. The condition of 
`the grace period' is strict, so that craftsmen have been effectively discouraged by 
that stipulation. The most important of all is the condition of providing adequate 
guarantee to the bank. This is considered vital as an element among conditions 
of credit extension that, in most cases, denies smaller firms access to institutional 
financing. In this concern, does the crafts branch ease the condition of provid- 
ing adequate guarantees so that crafts units can obtain credit and increase their 
demand for it? 
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At the outset it is important to mention here that the sample craftsmen have 
appropriately given great importance to the guarantee and are consistent with 
smaller firms elsewhere which encountered difficulties in providing the suitable 
security to get finance. 58.9% of the craftsmen mentioned that need for a guarantee 
considerably hinders their access to more bank credit, whereas 41.1% said that it 
is difficult, but to a lesser extent, for them to prepare the guarantee required. It 
is not easy for crafts firms to provide such a guarantee. 
In extending its financing activities, the branch stipulates that a craftsman 
should supply the branch with the necessary guarantee so that a loan might be 
provided. The required guarantee is one of three kinds: (1) the easier one, personal 
guarantee so that a client is backed by a well-known person, capable of paying 
instalments on behalf of a client in case of default; (2) joint storage of goods (such 
as raw materials bought by the branch for the customer) under the auspices of 
the branch and the craftsman and the latter may regularly take from these goods 
as he/she pays the value of goods under consideration; (3) the difficult guarantee 
of providing real estate, including machinery, equipment, or even the workshop 
buildings, so that the real estate comes under the control of the bank. 
The empirical experience of crafts firms with the branch reveals that the branch 
relaxes conditions so that it is satisfied in most cases with the easier (minimum) 
guarantee required. On replying to the question about the kind of guarantee 
provided, 78.9% of craftsmen have indicated that the branch accepted a personal 
guarantee. 3.2% of craftsmen satisfied the branch by storing goods and 16.8% were 
given credits on provision of the difficult guarantee, the real estate. To provide 
evidence of the bank's relaxed attitude on this condition, craftsmen were asked 
again to show if it i§ difficult for them to provide the appropriate security as 
stipulated by the branch. Only 29.5% encountered difficulties, and the majority, 
69.5%, faced no such difficulties. This is a good record for the branch in easing 
the guarantee and, in consequence, allowing craftsmen more access to the financial 
facilities. 
Further evidence for this `assumed' good record is supplied by the figures on 
Table 11.19. 
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As the figures show, the majority (56 craftsmen) have indicated the relative 
importance of the 
guarantee as a difficulty to get credit, but 60% of those assigning 
greatly relative importance have not found difficulty in satisfying the branch with 
the kind of guarantee available to them. In other words, craftsmen have properly 
assessed the importance of guarantee as a hindrance to get credit in principle, but 
they have not encountered that difficulty according to their empirical experience 
with the crafts branch. 
Table 11.19: Crosstabulation: Guarantee Difficulty By Relative Importance 
Guarantee provision Relative importance Total 
Important Not important 
Difficult 19 9 28 
Easy, 36 30 66 
Total 56 39 95 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
However, the apparent finding that `credit did not increase' for crafts has 
been tested against other conditions, and apart from `grace period', the other 
conditions as stipuläted by the branch have not been the cause for this situation. 
It is important to test it with regard to the final condition of guarantee. As 
with other loan conditions, the question `Did the credit you get from the branch 
increase? ' was crosstabulated against the various types of gaurantee by craftsmen. 
The revealed responses, as crosstabulated, are shown below, (Table 11.20). 
Looking at the figures on the table, it is clear that even with the `easier' 
kind of guarantee, craftsmen have indicated that they have not increased their 
credit. However, the chi-square test has been carried for the more `difficult' types 
of guarantee. Assuming that there is a relationship between the type of guarantee 
required and the finding that `credit did not increase', the chi-square test proves 
that there is totally no relationship (X2 = 1.82 < 3.841, i. e., the calculated value 
is lower than the tabulated value at 0.05 probability level with df = 1). The 
conclusion is that the stipulated kinds of guarantee have not influenced craftsmen 
to increase credits even though the branch is flexible enough in accepting the 
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Table 11.20: Crosatabulation: Type of Guarantee By Increase in Credit 
Type of 
Guarantee 
Credit increase 
Yes No 
Total 
Personal 23 52 75 
Estate 5 11 16 
Goods 0 3 3 
Nd guarantee 1 0 1 
Total 29 66 95 
xa=1.83; df=1 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
11.6.5 The mode of finance 
As a branch of, an Islamic bank, the crafts branch gives credits on the basis 
of Islamic mode of finance. Sometimes the distinctive nature of Islamic mode 
of finance, e. g. mhshäraka , discourages some potential investors from taking 
credit from an Islamic bank (see Chapter XIII). -The, crafts branch gives credit 
on, predominantly, inuräbaha basis as the survey reveals. Some craftsmen do not 
prefer muräbaha as the bank does not allow them to use the fund of murabaha and 
it insists on giving goods. So, in this way, craftsmen loose the freedom to use the 
fund allocated to them. 
The key question is whether this affects the craftsmen's decision to seek credit? 
Responses reveal that 55.8% are not concerned with the freedom to use the fund 
of muräbaha, and 44.2% hope and want the branch to give them freedom in using 
the funds. This indicates that craftsmen have not been affected negatively by 
muräbaha mode of finance as a distinctive mode, not enabling the customer to use 
the fund as he likes. This argument is supported more by the finding that, as 
mentioned above, 64.2% of craftsmen have reported that they are free in choosing 
the mode of finance they want and the branch does not impose specific modes. 
" Summary 
Crafts firms face a finance gap, and information and advice gaps. Of particular 
importance is the finance gap. The crafts branch has helped in bridging part of this 
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gap, but still the crafts sector is under-financed. The cause for this has been tackled 
with regard to the conditions stipulated for credit extension by the branch. An 
empirical investigation proves that with the exception of `grace period condition', 
other stipulationg are flexible and have not influenced craftsmen in deciding to 
increase credit. 
However, two possible explanations might exist as a cause for this `under- 
finance' situation of crafts sector. It might be explained on the demand side that 
the firms face a declining demand or other problems or are unable to present their 
case properly and satisfactorily. Or, alternatively, the cause might be on the supply 
side, that the branch is itself restricting the total credit to be deployed in the crafts 
sector. Now, it is appropriate to examine these explanations. 
11.7 Under-financed Crafts Sector: Possible Explanations 
11.7.1 Demand perspedtive 
The fact that the crafts sector remains under-financed might come from the 
craftsmen themselves. First, the demand for their products may be inadequate 
and ineffective so that they approach the branch less frequently and take out fewer 
loans. However, revealed responses of the craftsmen on'this matter show that the 
demand for their products is high enough and they look forward to expansion. 
On the level of demand, 66.3% of the craftsmen answered that demand for their 
products is high, and only 33.7% reported a low level of demand. Not only that, 
67.4% have shown that they assess finance they need according to the level of 
demand for their products. Thus, there is little problem with respect to demand. 
The argument that the demand is low and that craftsmen cannot assess their 
financial need will not stand as an explanation for under-financed situation. 
Second, on addressing craftsmen with the questionnaire, they reported that 
some other problems affect their work and, in consequence, affect their demand 
for finance. Revealed responses are displayed in Table 11.21. ' 
The point is that, because of these problems the production process is inter- 
rupted and work stoppage is frequent. The majority of craftsmen agree that the 
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impact of these problems on their work, and consequently, on their readiness and 
decision to take loans is great. 
Table 11.21: Problems Affecting Demand for Loans 
Problems Frequency Valid percent 
Electricity shortage (1) 8 8.4 
Transport (2) 2 2.01 
spare parts (3) 9 9.5 
Skilled labour (4) 1 1.1 
Raw materials (5) 9 9.5 
High tax (6) 8 8.4 
All problems above 50 50.5 
(1) +(2) + (3) only 10 10.5 
Total 95 100 
Source: Crafts Survey, 1989. 
Craftsmen were asked again about the degree of impact of each problem on 
their work and their demand for loans from the branch. The results obtained are 
shown on Table 11.22. 
As the figures on the table disclose, inadequate supplies of raw materials and 
spare parts are the most difficult problems affecting crafts work and in consequence 
their demand for finance. Craftsmen have classified these two problems as a cause 
of not applying for more loans. Thus, they regard them as a hindrance and these 
problems have discouraged them to take loans. But, on the other hand, these 
problems themselves are a result of a shortage of finance by the branch. Therefore 
one could say that had the branch financed adequately raw materials and spare 
parts, these constraints would have disappeared. 
Other problems are either structural in nature, such as the electricity cuts, 
or are related to the economic policies of the government, such as tax ratios. It 
seems that both problems affect the work of crafts to a considerable extent. Their 
solution lies in the hands of policy makers rather than the craftsmen themselves 
or the branch management. 
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Table 11.22: Problems: Degree of Impact 
Problem Great impact 
Frequency Valid percent 
Rank 
Raw materials 75 23 I 
Spare parts 72 22 II 
Electricity cuts 71 21 III 
High tax rates 70 20 IV 
Transport 26 8 V 
Skilled Labour 14 6 VI 
Total 328* 100 - 
* Total is not 95 as some craftsmen face, and were asked to indicate, more than one problem. 
Source: crafts Survey, 1989. 
Third, it has been stated earlier that 93.7% of the branch operations with the 
sample craftsmen have been executed on a muräbaha basis. One of the conditions 
of muräbaha is an instant payment of 25% of its costs as a first instalment. This 
is a condition stipulated by the Central Bank. However, 58.9% of the craftsmen 
have indicated that an instant payment of the `compulsory' first instalment has 
discouraged them to take finance. It is not easy for many craftsmen to fulfil this 
condition, and if they pay the first instalment, they cannot find money to pay for 
working capital. 
Therefore, on the demand side, a state of under-financing exists as there are 
some problems crippling crafts work, and discouraging them to take loans from the 
branch. Moreover, the condition of paying 25% of the loan as a first instalment is, 
in most cases, beyond the capacity of craftsmen. Hence, their demand for credit 
is dampened. 
11.7.2 Supply perspective 
It has been mentioned above that only 17.9% of the sample craftsmen who 
applied for loans from the branch received the full amount they applied for, and 
81.3% did not receive the amount they wanted. Moreover, as said before, 30.5% 
of the -branch customers have increased their credit whereas 69.5% did not. 
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The author had lengthy conversation with the director of the investment di- 
vision at the crafts branch. The director agrees that it is true that not every 
applicant is given a loan and/or the amount he applies for. Being asked about the 
reason, he replied that the following factors, and according to their importance, 
affect his final decision on granting a loan: (i) past record of the crafts unit; (ii) 
the number of loans the unit received from the branch and its performance and 
the size of deposits it keeps with the branch; (iii) availability of information about 
the firm and availability of the commodity the craftsman needs; (iv) the type of 
activity of the crafts unit and (v) the availability of guarantees. 
However, all members of the sample had received loans from the branch. Their 
names and files containing documents of their financial dealings with the branch 
were found in the archive room of the branch. The number of those indicating in 
the questionnaire forms that they have not had full amount of the finance they 
wanted is 78 craftsmen. Names of these 78 customers were picked out and brought 
to the director of investment division to sort out why these craftsmen have not 
received the full amount of the finance they applied for. Rejection is found to be 
based on the following reasons: 
Thirty seven cases were rejected due to the restrictions of credit ceiling policy, 
at least at the time when they applied for loans. Because the Central Bank specifies 
ceiling limits to banks, FIBS, as similar to other banks, distributes its ceiling 
among its branches. Therefore, in the case of these firms, the cause has not been 
the unavailability of finance at disposal of the branch as much as it is a cause 
related to policy, that the branch is not allowed to exceed its -ceiling limits. 
Sixteen crafts units were not given the funds they wanted on account of defaults 
in repaying loans received from the branch and bad performance. 
Twelve cases were found asking for more than their actual needs and capac- 
ity. In such cases, the branch asks an official to visit the workshop, assessing its 
assets, and collect more information about the production capacity and aspects of 
spending. 
Four cases were rejected as they were not presented satisfactorily and the 
documentation was incomplete. 
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Four applications received less than the amount they needed because the type 
of activity of the craftsmen was not favoured by the branch. In other words, an 
internal policy of the branch at that time was to reduce finance for such activity. 
It would appear that the most important factor affecting the inadequacy of 
finance to small crafts units is the credit ceiling policy. Thus, though the branch 
is sometimes prepared to finance, it is constrained by the limited ceiling. This is, 
in fact, a common problem that face all banks in the Sudan. 
The sixteen crafts units which were failing to repay were found facing internal 
difficulties such as bad management, marketing problems and competition from 
other crafts units producing similar products, in addition to the problems of elec- 
tricity cuts, shortage of raw marterials and unskilled labour. 
Some customers used to ask for more than their actual needs with the view that 
in the end they will get the amount they need. This practice is common among 
craftsmen because they have a pre-perception that branch officials always reduce 
the amount of loan needed. However, in this regard, the director of investment 
division at the branch replied that the branch does not reduce the amount primarily 
but according to the actual need of the applicants and after investigation. But the 
branch management tries to distribute the available resources, already specified by 
the ceiling, among a large number of craftsmen. This is why as has been noted 
earlier in this chapter, the loan-size of the branch is relatively small. 
A satisfactory presentation of the case affects the branch response towards 
applicants. Some craftsmen have been discounted as being unable to bring the 
necessary documents for completing the procedure. This is also a common prob- 
lem facing banks in the Sudan and affects the bank-customer relationship. The 
majority of craftsmen do not keep regular records and an adequate filing system. 
70.8% of the sample craftsmen have said that they do not keep regular files. These 
are the things that affect the branch response and its readiness to give funds. 
Therefore, four cases of this kind were not given their required funds as presented 
to the branch. 
Finally, some craftsmen need funds for goods or commodities for which the 
branch will not loan money. The branch has priority for granting funds according 
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to categories of crafts activities. 
Hence, these are the possible explanations on the supply side that would appear 
to explain why some crafts units are under-financed. The director of investment 
division was also asked why the majority of loans are on a muräbaha basis (trade 
finance) rather than mushäraka (equity finance)? He has replied that muräbaha 
is less risky; the return is quick and the bank is not responsible for follow-up or 
supervision in the case of muräbaha as contrasted with mushäraka. 
11.8 Some economic implications 
The economic implications of financing activities of the crafts branch might 
not be considerable and therefore could not be felt in the short run. The finance 
gap, and the information and advice gaps that face the crafts units, as one sector 
of smaller firms, cannot be tackled and therefore solved by a growing - though 
pioneering - branch such as the crafts branch of FIBS. It might be said that it is a 
little early to assess this experience. Despite that, some favourable outcomes can 
be pointed to as a result of the financing activities of the branch. 
On employment, it has already been pointed out that all the assisted firms 
(100%) hire labour and that 73.7% of the labour force of these units come from 
outside the circle of family or relatives of the owners/directors of the crafts units. 
craftsmen were asked again about the impact of receiving finance from the branch. 
71% said that they have increased employment as a result of availability of more 
(external) finance from the branch. Thus, the majority have gained from their 
business relationship with the branch. 
On production, 66.7% of the sample units indicated that their production levels 
have increased. Although it is difficult to know exactly an increase in the volume 
of production, 35% of the (64) assisted firms, whose production increased, have 
shown that their production has increased by 10%, 19.8% have experienced an 
increase of 15%, 18.9% have increased production by 20%, 15.8% of the assisted 
firms realised an increase of 25% and 9.5% have increased their production by more 
than 25%. 
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11.9 Conclusion 
As mentioned in Chapter X, the SSIs sector is, in contrast to LSIs, presumably 
characterised by some development advantages: (a) low import-dependency; (b) 
high employment generation; (c) use of appropriate technology; (d) generation of 
local skill; (e) supply of needed goods and services for local and rural markets and 
stronger linkages to other economic sectors. On the other hand, Sudan's experience 
with large-scale intensive industries has produced disappointing results. However, 
despite this, the SSIs in general, and the crafts sector in particular, are constrained 
by problems affecting negatively their rapid growth and therefore their potential 
contribution. 
It has been explained in Chapter X (section 10.3) that the entire industrial 
policy in the Sudan is unfavourable for the internal growth of smaller enterprises, 
and in this respect there is an obvious policy gap. Governments in industrial, as 
well as some developing countries, have attempted to support the SSIs sector in 
different ways (see Chapter X, section 10.2.3). However, in contrast to governments 
elsewhere, the government in the Sudan could be described as deficient in providing 
the necessary support to the crafts sector. The areas of deficiency are as follows: 
There are no incentives or concessions for investment in the crafts sector. 
Public corporations and private firms are not directed to support the sector, 
the government's effort to attract the foreign financial and technical assistance to 
the sector is very limited. 
The policy of protecting local industries from competition of foreign manufac- 
tured products is not clear, continuous or strong enough to function. The products 
of crafts are completely unprotected, therefore craftsmen suffer more than other 
local industries. 
As mentioned above, the survey reveals that the majority of craftsmen do not 
own their workshops. They depend on rented workshops. In this concern, the 
government does not provide land or improved services at reasonably low prices. 
There is no public policy for subsidising production inputs needed by the sector 
or even catering for the continuous supply of these inputs., 
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It is a common problem for all crafts units, that production inputs are not 
available, especially the scarcity and higher prices of raw materials. Most of the 
crafts units use relatively small quantities of raw materials, as such, but they cannot 
import their requirements or buy them at wholesale (lower) prices. Therefore, the 
crafts units cannot benefit from concessions and import duties and tax exemptions 
on these raw materials. Craftsmen are in most cases under the pressure of accepting 
the blackmarket prices of raw materials. Thus, craftsmen have no alternative other 
than to raise the prices of their products. 
Most of the crafts units face the problem of electricity cuts and an inadequate 
supply of fuel or wood energy. In addition, industrial areas in the three towns 
(Greater Khartoum) lack even water supply, efficient transport network and other 
basic services. 
The most difficult problem facing the crafts sector is the finance problem. De- 
spite a good record for FIBS in supporting the sector, it remains characterised as 
under-financed. Internal sources of finance are inadequate, especially with higher 
prices of production inputs and that a significant number of craftsmen are indebted 
to other people. The sector is therefore in desperate need for finance to meet op- 
erating expenses (raw materials) and start-up and expansion capital requirements. 
One of the problems of the crafts sector is marketing of the products. The 
sample craftsmen reveal that they do not receive services such as marketing facili- 
ties from the branch or from any other body. The problem is in general attributed 
to the following: (1) that there is no protection for the sector's products; (2) an 
absence of proper distribution channels or marketing centres or show-rooms; (3) 
the quality of the products and finishing are not yet good enough to compete 
with other products especially imported products, in addition to the prevalence 
of copied products and an absence of innovative products; (iv) many crafts units 
compete with each others and produce the same kind of goods or services; (v) few 
craftsmen have knowledge of marketing methods. 
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Chapter XII 
Conclusion And Recommendations 
12.1 Summary Conclusion 
In classical times the outright opposition to usury came from the philosophers 
and moralists. They considered usury to be morally wrong because it involved 
paying for time; that usury is the result of the unnatural use of money and contrary 
to natural law. 
The Pre-Reformation Christian and Islamic standing on usury is that both 
prohibit usury outright and what is clearly permissible is a return from a partner- 
ship. Both call for a share of risk between the lender and the borrower, and no 
one party is allowed to acquire more advantage at the expense of other partner. 
Both reject time as a justification for the payment of interest and say that when 
gain is sought from an activity not in itself productive without labour, expense or 
risk on the part of lender, this is illegitimate and reprehensive. 
An exposition of theories of interest shows that these theories discuss the issue 
of interest from a different angle, having considered different factors that might 
affect interest rates. However, all the theories are concerned with the expected 
rate of interest only. The question of real rate of interest remains untouched. In 
other words, if both the borrower and the lender of capital, any form of capital, 
are to get a `fair' gain from any joint work, negotiation on predetermined interest 
rate would be unfair for either of the two parties. The economic activity based on 
actual return, i. e. on a PLS basis, is fair and advocated by the Islamic financial 
theory. 
Modern theories of profit based their views on the subject following the classical 
economists who addressed the problem as one of dividing social income among the 
socio-economic classes, landlords, labourers and businessmen calling the share of 
businessmen as profit. 
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The classical economists differentiated between interest and profit, but this 
differentiation was not so clear because at that time capital was almost always 
employed by its owner. They recognised three elements in the income of the capi- 
talist entrepreneurs, first, a payment for the base use of capital, second, payment 
representing reward for the entrepreneur's activities as a manager, third, payment 
to compensate the entrepreneurs for risk. Profit as a unique form of income not 
reducible to remuneration for either capital or labour was developed by German 
writers. The socialists, Marx and others, as developing the classical economics, 
dropped the distinction made by the classical writers. They merged land with 
capital and regarded profit as including all non-labour income. 
In actual society economists commonly use the expression `pure profit' to refer 
to the income of the business after deduction of wages and rent or interest for all 
the human and propery services employed in the enterprise. Attempts to present 
a theory of profit restricted in meaning have taken two main directions: the first 
centers in the effort to identify a peculiar form of service of which profit is the 
remuneration. Since the ordinary managerial activities are frequently hired on a 
salary basis, there left the service of `risk bearing' as a basis for such theory. The 
second direction revolves around an examination of the function of management 
as it is tied up with the nature of a risk which could be insured. 
However, modified versions of the risk theory differentiated between risk, a 
`measurable uncertainty', and uncertainty, an `unmeasurable risk'. For this theory, 
unmeasurable risk is associated with economic change. In other words, profit is an 
uncertain outcome of economic activity in a continuously changing environment. 
Thus, this viewpoint is identical with the Islamic view-point of profit as being an 
uncertain outcome. According to this theory profit and loss arises in many cases 
from circumstances entirely apart from human foresight. 
The shari `a advocates the share in profit and in loss for any transaction to be 
undertaken by partners. That is, instead of working on the basis of Hba, or in 
terms of the current economic literature on the basis of ex ante interest rates, the 
Islamic shari`a calls for participation in the ex post or the actual result of the work. 
However, both the Middle Ages and modern history show some attempts to apply 
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the PLS notion. The forms applied were quite similar to the Islämic methods of 
finance. 
There are many reasons advanced in the literature for the possible instability 
of the traditional banking systems. Proposals for reforms of this system along the 
lines of equity participation have been made at various times in the United States 
especially during the periods of banking crisis. Arguments for the PLS system 
have also been made in the wake of the debt crisis of the LDCs during the 1980's. 
There has been a revival of proposals for an equity-based system. 
The Islamic banking system may prove to be better suited to adjusting to 
shocks that result in banking crises and disruption of the payments mechanism. 
The interest-based system in fact intensifies the business recession. As soon as 
the banks discover that business concerns are beginning to incur losses, they reduce 
assistance, and call back their loans, as a result of which some firms have to close 
down. This increases unemployment, resulting in further reduction in demand and 
the infection spreads. IBs, working on the basis of the PLS, are prepared to share 
in losses which reduces the severity of business recession and enables the productive 
enterprise to tide over difficult periods without closing down. 
There are changes in the real world; as soon as interest rates rise in one part 
of the world, capital starts moving to that part. When the rate changes, massive 
movements of capital start from one country to another. Under the PLS system 
movements of capital will be guided by the expectations about profits. Fluctuations 
in the rates of profit will be less than fluctuations in the rate of interest. Therefore, 
a system based on PLS will be more stable than the interest-based system. 
IBs have come to existence so as to prove in practice the working of PLS 
system. The Islamic methods of finance of muciäraba, mushäraka and other forms, 
provide the alternative to the interest-based dealings. 
Though, however, they have come to existence recently, IBs have expanded 
rapidly and at the present time they are actively participating in the international 
financing. There are, however, some factors that act to the detriment of IBs. 
These include their difficult relationship with the monetary, authorities, the lack 
of adequately skilled staff and the absence of Islamic financial instruments which 
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could help to widen their dealings with the international financial markets. None 
of issues has been solved and this will continue to affect the growth of IBs. 
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As it is central for this study, the Sudanese economy has been examined. This 
economy shares with LDCs most of their economic and related characteristics; 
the low per capita income, low growth rates, retarded economic development and 
a dual economic structure. The study shows that the Sudan has a history of 
interrupted development plans. In contrast to other low-income countries, the 
Sudan is characterised by high inflation rates. Agriculture is and will remain the 
key sector of the Sudanese economy for the foreseable future. 
In the Sudan, the marginal propensity to consume and the average propensity 
to consume are high. With regard to capital formation in the Sudan, the main 
economic problem has been and still its excessive dependence on the cultivation 
and export of a few agricultural products. Lack of adequate savings has prompted 
a recourse to external sources of investment funds. In the Sudan, although the gov- 
ernment financed a major share, the private sector played a vital role in economic 
development. 
The main features of the external financial performance of the Sudanese econ- 
omy are in the balance of payments statements. The balance of payments exhibited 
a number of structural rigidities. The Sudanese economy is heavily indebted, with 
rising debt servicing. Due to debt problems, successive governments were and are 
trying to follow economic policies geared to repayment of debts. Therefore, the 
Sudanese economy is highly linked with the IMF and its policies since 1978. 
Again, for the sake of this study, the financial and banking aspects of the 
economy have been investigated. It is found that the Sudanese economy is less 
monetised. The informal money market in the Sudan is quite dominant due to the 
existence of financial repression. Therefore, the lending and borrowing mechanism 
in the informal credit sector, which is less monetised, involves payment of high 
interest rates. 
In the Sudan, banks during the colonial periods served mainly expatriates who 
were engaged in developing exports of raw materials. Indigeneous people partici- 
pated in the the process of intermediation as depositors only rather than borrowers. 
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After independence, a very similar banking system has evolved where favoured pri- 
vate and official borrowers still absorb the limited finance available at low rates 
of interest. The mass of small farmers and small industrialists remain financially 
repressed. Together with the government, urban borrowers absorb virtually all of 
the banks' lending resources. Huge interest differentials between organised banking 
and informal rural credits is usual in the Sudan as in other LDCs. 
The money supply and liquid asset holdings by the public have expanded 
noticeably over the years. This reflects the growth of the banking system, and 
further development of a money-oriented economy. The government follows a 
low interest rates policy. But this policy was not effective. The bank of Sudan 
has relied primarily on the control of rediscounting, and on quantitative credit 
controls to manage the money supply. Because the public sector was a major 
borrower during most of the 1970s, and till now, monetary policies have in general 
been accommodating and have only become more restrictive under pressures from 
external imbalances and inflationary tendencies which have required stabilisation 
programmes. 
Faced with a deteriorating balance of payments situation and an increasing 
inflation rate, the monetary policy in the Sudan has become stricter. Each bank 
is given a monthly ceiling on credit expansion and is required to keep high liquid- 
ity ratios with the Central Bank. Despite this liquidity requirement, the banking 
system continues to have excess liquidity. In the Sudan, the financial market distor- 
tions have been accentuated by intervention policies directed towards keeping the 
nominal interest rates unduly low and by the enlargement of government deficits 
financed by recourse to the banking system. 
The nationalisation of commercial banks in 1970 was a turning point in the 
development of the Sudanese banking system and the monetary and credit policies 
which emanated from it. The measure was taken to develop and improve banking 
services to various economic sectors, particularly in the traditional areas; putting 
an end to foreign domonation and providing the Central Bank and the government 
with full power to control credit policies. 
However, measured in terms of a number of branches, deposits mobilised 
and credit disbursed, banking facilities were and are concentrated in urban ar- 
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eas, whereas the rural areas remain backward so far as the growth of banking is 
concerned. The banking system has been latter affected by the programmes of eco- 
nomic concentration and financial reforms agreed upon with the IMF and foreign 
creditors to the Sudan Government. 
Private deposits dominate the total deposit liabilities of the commercial banks. 
Moreover, demand deposits have a big share in total banking deposits. Saving 
depsoits have shown an impressive growth up to 1977, but are latter characterised 
by slow growth rate, a cause attributed to the negative real interest rate. 
Most parts of the banks' advances were and have been of a short-term nature. 
The whole pattern of lending has been dominated by the financing of foreign trade. 
However, although commercial banks are blamed for shying away from long-term 
investments in productive sectors, some obstacles, apart from the credit policies, 
forced commercial banks to concentrate on short-term financing. One of these is the 
absence of capital and money markets for exchanging local shares and securities. 
In the Sudan, only 25% of the total population are able to benefit from the credit 
facilities provided by commercial banks. The rest of the community who live in 
the un-organised money markets are either unaware or largely unable to make use 
of financial credit which most of them desperately need. As a result, they find 
themselves exposed to money-lenders who charge exhorbitant interest rates. The 
bulk of the farmers in the Sudan have limited access to the credit facilities provided 
by commercial banks and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan; and in view of their low 
level of income, these farmers accept the shail credit. 
In the Sudan, the empirical evidence shows a positive association between 
savings and monetisation, a result which implies that the efforts to monetise the 
subsistence sector will have a favourable effect on savings. Therefore, banks should 
intensify their efforts to extend more services to rural areas. 
IBs have been introduced to the Sudan by establishing FIBS in 1978 with a 
special law. The initial success of FIBS encouraged policy makers in the country to 
support IBs development so that there are now six IBs. In 1984 the whole banking 
system was Islamised by a presidential decree, and concessions were withrawn from 
FIBS. Despite the fact that IBs were greatly affected by the regulatory measures 
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imposed, they are actively participating in the financial and business activities of 
commercial banks. 
Economists have stated different opinions on the effectiveness of banking sys- 
tem in promoting or facilitating economic development. In short, the banking 
system is one of many institutions that influence the economy and affect its per- 
formance for better or worse. A banking system may make a positive contribution 
to economic growth and development, but its effect may be offset by other fac- 
tors such as unfavourable resource endowments, or unhelpful government policies. 
What can be asserted is that any given banking system might, with different poli- 
cies, be made more or less effective in its contribution to economic development. 
FIBS is the first and leading Islamic bank in the Sudan. 62% of the deposits 
with IBs are with FIBS. 51% of the Islamic credit was extended by FIBS. The 
bank has significantly contributed to the financing of different economic sectors. 
Most important of all is its initiation and financial sponsoring of the small crafts 
firms. 
Many developing countries began in the early 1950's adopting an import- 
substitution strategy, which resulted in the establishment of large-scale capital- 
intensive industries in urban areas. This strategy has produced disappointing 
results. The experience of Sudan with industrialisation has been similar to that of 
other developing countries. 
On the other hand, the SSIs sector is characterised by some development ad- 
vantages such as low-import-dependency, high employment generation and use of 
appropriate technology. However, of many problems facing smaller firms, the ques- 
tion of financing is a critical one. 
A review of the literature on small business financing in developed and develop- 
ing economies identifies different opinions and views to the issue of small business 
financing. But there seems to be widespread agreement that the main problem 
for these firms is the inability to obtain sufficient funds to promote growth. This 
shortage of fund is identified as a finance gap. There are other information and 
advice gaps facing smaller firms. 
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Smaller firms in the Sudan contribute in the overall GDP and employment. 
Compared to larger firms, smaller firms are found to be characterised by low in- 
vestment/labour ratios, high value added and high investment /output ratios. 
Sources of finance to smaller firms in the Sudan are the commercial banks, the 
SIB, the SRDFC and the IICS. The small firms are at disadvantage in terms of 
type, volume and conditions of financing. 
However, resources are needed to be deployed in smaller firms in order to 
sustain economic growth. FIBS, as said before, has initiated the financing of 
smaller crafts units. It set up a specialised branch for this purpose. The branch 
grows over time and has its own financial resources. Deposits mobilised from the 
craftsmen have increased. Although the branch has contributed in bridging the 
finance gap of smaller firms, its role is constrained by some obstacles such as the 
public economic policies. 
12.2 Major Research Findings 
12.2.1 IBs: a role in monetisation and market share 
The findings of this research depend on the fieldwork analysis presented in 
Chapters, VII, VIII, X and XI. Thus the major findings from an examination of 
the experience of the Sudanese IBs could be summarised as follows: 
IBs branches constitute 25.8% of the banking system branches, which indicate 
the relative importance of IBs. Both IBs and commercial banks have the same 
degree of concentration in the urban area of Greater Khartoum, but IBs existence 
in the backward and rural regions is bigger than that of other commercial banks. 
This might be interpreted as a contribution to monetising the traditional sector 
and would therefore have a favourable impact on economic growth. 
IBs dominate 62% of the paid-up capital of the banking system. An intro- 
duction of IBs as a joint-venture between the Sudanese nationals and foreign 
subscribers has benefited the economy, since the experience of introducing IBs 
attracted foreign resources and mobilised the stagnant local resources. They are 
characterised by high degree of capitalisation in contrast to other. operating banks 
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IBs have nearly 20% of total deposits of the banking system. A contribution 
which could be attributed to IBs is that they attracted new depositors to banking 
business, those who in the past have eschewed dealings with conventional banks on 
religious grounds. Moreover, IBs attracted new small depositors as well (Chapter 
VII). 
IBs maintain their market share thanks to, religious considerations, the com- 
petitive services they provide and to the wide spread of services relative to conven- 
tion al banks. One finding which is not favourable to IBs is that customers were 
not attracted by higher return or by greater access to credit facilities. However, the 
religious element is found to be dominant even in distribution of deposits among 
different accounts. 
The investment account is an important component of total deposits of IBs. 
Depositors of course put their savings in this account for the purpose of invest- 
ment. The larger the share of investment deposits in total deposits, the longer 
the maturity of deposits, and the bank is more able to deploy them in long-term 
investments. 
The research findings, support the opinion that IBs' customers are willing to 
take risk with a bank, and can accept loss of part or all of the value of investment 
deposits. More important is the finding that the religious element has no greater 
impact on the willingness of customers to take risk than the eonomic factor has. 
Thus, customers are willing to take risks even on an economic basis. 
Customers who prefer investment (PLS) accounts are willing to accept variable 
(uncertain) rates of return. Moreover, customers accept uncertain rates of return 
not only for religious reasons but also on economic grounds. 
One of the factors affecting the banks' market share is the level at which they 
carry out their services. If IBs are capable of serving clients efficiently, they will 
attract more customers and hence positively influence their market share. IBs are 
found carrying out their services fairly adequately, but no better or worse than is 
the case with conventional banks. 
IBs still do not extend credit facilities to a large number of customers; and even 
the few who use these facilities are not from the low-income depositors,,, the group 
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which is in desperate need of help. The majority of IBs' depositors are ignorant of 
conditions and policies on credit facilities. 
IBs did affect customers' knowledge through the relatively widespread of ser- 
vices; a finding which is in favour of IBs playing a role in monetising the economy. 
It would appear that the effort of managers to raise and maintain deposits is 
still not very effective. This limits the market share of IBs. 
The attitude of authorities through the public policies (in particular the credit 
policies) has affected all banks in general and IBs in particular. Thus, credit 
policies have firstly affected the deposit structure of IBs and secondly the degree 
of utilisation of these deposits. Both types of impact have direct implications for 
the market share of IBs. 
Like other IBs elsewhere, those in the Sudan do not undertake interest-based 
transactions. This is, however, an obstacle to the growth and expansion of IBs 
since they neither keep deposits with interest-based banks, nor do they hope for 
interest-based banks to hold funds with them. Thus, they loose a great part of the 
market share that were they to pay an interest rate. 
One of the elements liable to affect the market share of IBs is the way they 
manage their portfolio. The issue of portfolio management is important and has 
not yet been solved by IBs in the Sudan. 
There is no specific criterion followed by IBs in determining the rate of return 
on deposits, therefore the rate of profitability of investment deposits varies from 
one bank to another. 
IBs have been fair with depositors versus shareholders because they follow the 
parctice of deducting the legal and general reserves from net profits (of sharehold- 
ers) and not from gross profits (of depositors and shareholders). This practice is 
fair since depositors have no stakes in these banks. 
12.2.2 IBs: a contribution to development financing 
When IBs were founded, it was declared that their objectives was to participate 
in development. These objectives imply a direct and specific responsibility on the 
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part of IBs to play an effective role in social and economic development by adopting 
methods of finance that are different from those of traditional banks. 
What IBs have accomplished on the side of development financing, is still 
far less than what was first declared and expected. It is apparent that IBs have 
concentrated on short-term activities to maintain their existence in the market. 
IBs wished to convince their depositors and shareholders that they were capable of 
generating high profits and returns. However, this policy should be a transitional 
and not a permanent one. 
Although IBs have mobilised fairly adequate financial resources, the fact re- 
mains that they still concentrate their investments on short-term commercial activ- 
ities as do other commercial banks. On the other hand, the medium-and-long-term 
financing was for the most part participation in capital of banks and financial in- 
stitutions and subscriptions in subsidiary companies. 
What also attracts attention is the direction of financial resources to investment 
outside the country. 
It is found that in the Sudan inadequate finance is crippling industrial and 
commercial development. Most, or all, productive units lack finance. Almost, all 
the financial institutions concentrate on financing credit-worthy firms, especially 
those in urban areas, and extend little credit to the financially-starved productive 
units, particularly those in the rural areas. Financial institutions neither promote 
new investment opportunities nor encourage applicants for finance to come forward 
and provide them with advice and extra services. The situation is more or less the 
same for IBs. 
Why the contribution to medium-and long-term financing is insignificant? 
Regarding closely the liability side of IBs, they are capable of financing in- 
vestment projects of a long-term nature. This implies that IBs are financially 
able to invest in productive projects, and that these are not problems in this re- 
spect if other obstacles are removed. Managers of IBs have indicated that when 
they wished to invest in productive projects, they were not faced with illiquidity 
problems. 
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The demand for medium-and-long-term credits is in general found to be low 
since customers were constrained by the conditions specified by IBs for granting 
credits, such as the short repayment and grace periods, high profit margins as well 
as the type of guarantee required by IBs. Hence, the strength of demand for such 
type of credits is likely to be weak. 
On the other hand, the character of demand for medium-and-long-term invest- 
ments is such that customers refrained from applying for productive investments 
and tended instead to go for trade finance. There are two reasons for customers 
preference for trade finance rather than productive loans: (a) customers are not 
prepared to take risk and (b) they lack adequate capital. 
Thus, part of the insignificant contribution to medium-and-long-term finance 
by IBs might be accounted for by the inability of customers to fulfil some conditions 
specified by IBs for credits and the customers' tendency to avoid risks and prefer 
trade finance. 
The attitude of IBs' managers is not conductive to medium-and-long-term 
investments. The lack of expert staff; the concentration on investors in urban 
areas; the great emphasis on collateral without differentiating between the nature 
of the proposed projects; the shifting of resources from rural to urban areas and 
the emphasis on the profitability of a project, all these are factors which influence 
IBs' managers to sponsor productive investments. 
So far as the effect of public policies on the role of banks in general and IBs 
in particular, in development financing, these policies have negatively affected this 
role. The government's policies have been consistently protectionist, and there- 
fore bankers in particular, and industrial entrepreneurs in general, have adopted 
conservative behaviour. 
It is, of course, not only the attitude of authorities which has affected the con- 
tribution of all banks to the financing of productive projects; structural problems of 
the Sudanese economy have also hampered the role of banks in this regard. To all 
managers of IBs, structural bottlenecks in the economy are hindering investments 
in productive projects to a great extent. 
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Islamic methods of finance require information on clients and the market so 
that these methods might adequately be applied. This requirement is particlarly 
important in the case of medium-and-long-term investments. Therefore, some 
IBs' managers are discouraged from financing some productive investments either 
because of a lack of information or because the traditional form of Islamic method 
of finance is not attractive to some borrowers. 
12.2.3 FIBS and financial assistance to crafts firms 
In general, a definition of what constitutes a small firm is still lacking. In the 
Sudan there is no specific definition for a small firm, but some institutions used to 
classify smaller firms according to total investments and the number of employees. 
A contribution of the Sudanese industrial sector to the GDP has been fluctuat- 
ing and declining overtime. This is attributed to the problems facing the Sudanese 
economy in general and the industrial sector in particular. 
Development of SSIs in the Sudan was adversely affected by the industrial 
policies since the early 1960s. 
Smaller enterprises comprise 95% of all industrial firms in the Sudan. Almost 
all small enterprises are privately owned since the firms need smaller amount of 
investment, and the technology used is simple. 
Regional distribution of SSIs show that more than 50% of smaller firms are 
located in Khartoum and the Central Region due to some reasons such as, for 
instance, the relatively sufficient availability of infrastructure and easy access to 
raw materials. 
Large firms records with regard to employment and output exceeded that of 
SSIs because the government invested in the industrial sector and it encouraged 
large-scale investments by granting concessions and tax exemptions. 
SSIs appear to need less capital compared with LSIs, and are characterised by 
low cost to create jobs, high value added and output/capital ratio. 
Financial facilities provided by the commercial banks, and the pattern of allo- 
cating these facilities provide evidence that smaller firms in the Sudan are at dis- 
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advantage in terms of type, volume and conditions of financing. Thus commercial 
banks partly contributed to the small business finance gap in the Sudan. Moreover, 
there exists a large volume of commercial banks' financial resources which remain 
unutilised, and this finding is indicative of the conservative attitude of banks to- 
wards small business financing. Banks have been highly security-conscious and 
profit-oriented. 
Financial practices of even the development financial institutions violated the 
main objectives of setting up these development bodies as they have been, as well, 
both security-oriented and profit-conscious. 
Regarding the financial institutions policies, there is a small business `policy 
gap'. In addition to this; owners of small firms have indicated that there is a lack 
of information and advice about the financial facilities available in banking system. 
The categorical distribution of crafts units in the Greater Khartoum reveals 
that the two important categories are the blacksmiths and carpenters. A large num- 
ber of people depends on the crafts sector to maintain their living. The majority of 
craftsmen in the Sudan started work in their thirties, and the majority have been 
practicing their profession for twenty years and more. Despite the increasing num- 
ber of educated people among craftsmen, still the relationship between the type of 
education (and its level) and the profession is not strong. Most of craftsmen came 
from rural areas because they find better and favourable conditions for work in 
urban areas. Though the crafts activity is old, a great development in the number 
of crafts units occured during the eighties; despite the increase in number, there 
has been no new invention, and more recent start-ups have copied those who have 
already established workshops. 
The crafts sector has great potential for employment. This is in fact important 
particularly in the case of the Sudan where unemployment among school-leavers 
and even among the well educated people is increasing, and the public sector is 
totally unable to create new jobs. 
The fieldwork analysis shows that there is a variation in an employment ca- 
pacity even among crafts units. Blacksmiths, carpentry and welding and fitting 
are the professions which absorb more labourers. 
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The fixed capital of the sector is in the form of buildings, machinery, equip- 
ments and raw materials. The survey findings disclose that there is a similarity 
in the size of fixed investments for crafts categories. However, both blacksmiths 
and carpenters are characterised, among other categories, by a relatively high fixed 
investment. There is a noticeable increase in the current fixed investment of crafts 
units, which means that the sector has a potential for growth and expansion. 
Products of the crafts sector are varied, and are characterised as being cheap 
and at different prices. More important is the fact that the sector has contributed 
in substituting imported products with local products such as spare parts, metalic 
compounds, furniture and other products that were hitherto imported. 
The crafts sector uses a fairly large proportion of imported raw materials. 
Crafts units depend to a greater extent on buying raw materials either from their 
own savings or borrowing. The sector lacks financial support to obtain its raw 
materials. 
There is a finance gap for crafts firms. The majority depend to a lesser extent 
on the branch for providing funds, the frequency of applying for the credit is low, 
the credit received did not increase for the majority of craftsmen and the shortage 
of finance is a hindrance to growth for more than 90% of crafts units. 
There is a `Sudanese' Bolton gap facing the crafts sector. The crafts branch 
does not help in this regard. Craftsmen have no idea about other sources of finance 
for smaller firms, and they ignore the banking credit conditions. 
Concerning the advice on technical, managerial or financial matters, the field- 
work results have shown that there is a lack of information and advice; the majority 
of craftsmen did not hear at all of any bank or a business firm giving advice services. 
Investments by the crafts branch have been increased over time. The credit is 
deployed to import machinery, equipment and raw materials from abroad as well 
as providing them from the local market. Investigation of loans extended by the 
branch reveals that the size of a single loan is generally small even though the 
cost of controlling and administering these loans is relatively high. The majority 
of crafts firms are under-financed. Despite that, the branch exceeded all other 
institutional sources of finance to crafts firms. Both the number of firms assisted 
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and the volume of assistance exceeded that given by other banks and financial 
institutions. 
In terms of costs of finance, the crafts branch conducts its lending at lower 
costs for crafts, when compared with other financial institutions. In this way, 
crafts units have more access to get credit from the branch than to get a loan 
elsewhere. It is also uncovered by the survey that the crafts units supported by 
the branch have an average lower capital investment than the firms assisted by 
other financial institutions. 
There is an insignificant share of `equity' finance in the total loanable funds 
of the branch. It would seem that the branch accommodates the crafts units with 
working capital only rather than the start-up capital or innovative capital, i. e., 
equity finance. In this regard, it is found that craftsmen prefer muräbaha, as a 
form of trade finance, rather than mushäraka, as equity finance. 
The crafts branch have helped in bridging part of the finance gap facing crafts 
firms, but still the crafts sector is under-financed. The cause for this has been 
tackled with regard to the conditions stipulated for credit extension by the branch. 
An empirical investigation proves that with the exception of grace period condition, 
other stipulations are flexible and have not influenced craftsmen in deciding to seek 
increased credit. 
The state of under-finance exists for craftsmen as there are some problems 
crippling firms and discouraging them from taking loans from the branch. More- 
over, the condition of paying 25% of the loan as a first instalment is, in most cases, 
beyond the capacity of craftsmen. Hence, their demand for credit is low. 
On the other hand, it is found that the following factors affect the decision 
of the branch to give part of the loan needed by the craftsmen or to cancel the 
application altogether: (a) the past record of a craft units; (b) the number of loans 
the unit received from the branch, its performance and the size of deposits it keeps 
with the branch; (c) the availability of information about the firm and availability 
of commodity the craftsman needs; (d) the type of activity of the crafts unit and 
the availability of guarantee. 
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It is found that the majority of assisted firms have gained from their business 
relationship with the branch, benefits in terms of an increase in employment and 
production levels as a result of availability of more (external) finance from the 
branch. 
There are no incentives or concessions for investments in the crafts sector. 
Public corporartions and private firms are not directed to support the sector; and 
the government's effort to attract the foreign financial and technical assistance to 
the sector is limited. 
Most of the crafts units face other problems such as the electricity supply cuts 
and an inadequate supply of fuel or wood energy, the lack of efficient transport 
network and other basic services. 
12.3 Some Recommendations 
IBs are required to participate more in improving the productivity of the ex- 
isting capital by extending their services, especially to the rural areas, and by 
improving access to equipment and markets by extending funds to those in tra- 
ditional sectors to finance more productive inputs. In this respect, the purpose 
of IBs, as financial institutions in an underdeveloped economy, would be to pro- 
vide collecting points for savings of a relatively small average amount from a large 
number of individual sources. 
Since the Sudan is a poor country, there is a great need for IBs and for other 
financial agencies to collect and invest the savings of the people and institutions 
within its borders. It should be emphasized here that, it is not enough just to 
extend services to rural areas, mobilising savings there and placing them in in- 
vestment activities outside these rural areas. Not only should the spread of IBs 
improve the interregional flows of funds, it should also reduce the disparities in the 
cost of borrowing, and invest the mobilised resources in the rural areas. 
It is found that IBs use deposits of branches in rural areas in one way or 
another to fund investments in urban areas. This `export' of rural area savings 
will have an adverse effect on the growth rate of these backward areas. In this 
respect one might recommend that IBs should adopt a growth from below policy, 
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with more emphasis on the financing of small-scale economic activity in industry 
and agriculture. They should open branches in rural areas so that every branch 
could carry out specific functions, and this would activate stagnant potentialities 
for growth. 
The growth-from-below policy should be through the branch banking expan- 
sion rather than unit banking expansion. Branch banking has the advantage of 
widening the resource base which enables sudden emergencies to be dealt with 
more easily, diversifying their risks to a greater extent. Hence IBs could be less 
susceptible to difficulties. 
IBs are found depending to a great extent on religious commitments of de- 
positors to maintain their market share, and to a lesser extent on the competitive 
and widespread of services. However, in order to avoid endangering their market 
share, IBs should attract more customers through extending a wide range of credit 
facilities and realising high returns on investment deposits. This is quite important 
since the majority of depositors are from low-income groups. 
If IBs' deposits are to be of a predominantly long-term nature, and if they are 
to be in a better position to undertake more long-term investments, IBs should 
encourage their customers to have investment accounts. Customers (depositors) 
with IBs are found prepared to accept loss on the value of investment deposits and 
the uncertainty on return. So, IBs should encourage this attitude by customers 
but they should work to give reasonably high return on their deposits. In other 
words, IBs should build their bank-customer relationship on economic rather than 
religious considerations. 
IBs should offer different investment accounts characterised by different risks 
and depositors should have a say on how these savings are allocated. Moreover, IBs 
should provide for the motives of depositors who seek an investment in lesser risky 
and short-term projects, and the motives of shareholders who seek more riskier 
and long-term projects. Thus, money from depositors should not be pooled with 
that of shareholders. 
The monetary and credit policies followed by the Bank of Sudan have become 
very stringent. They have crippled the size, form and utilisation of deposits with 
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banks in general and IBs in particular. In this regard, the recommendation is 
that the credit policy should be flexible with banks so long as they direct more 
finance to certain economic sectors or activities in line with the objectives of the 
development plan of the country. 
IBs should find financial instruments and innovations which enable them to 
deal with other banks, so that the former can keep with the latter or hold for 
them deposits, on interest-free basis. This remains a question for the managers 
and Shari `a Supervisory Boards of IBs. 
The conditions of opening up accounts with a bank, especially the investment 
account, should be made easy particularly for rural savers who are poor compared 
to those in urban areas. IBs should give rural savers some incentives and privileges, 
even in kind. In this way, IBs would mobilise more of stagnant resources in rural 
areas instead of competing with other banks for the same group of depositors in 
urban areas. 
The Sudanese IBs came to existence with some objectives. These objectives 
imply a direct and specific responsibility on the part of IBs to play an effective role 
in social and economic development. It is apparent that IBs have concentrated on 
short-term commercial activities to maintain their existence in the market. There 
can be no doubt that the policy of achieving high profit is important for the success 
of IBs or any profit-making institution, but this should not be a permanent policy. 
The policy of convincing depositors and shareholders should be transitional, and 
IBs should redirect their objectives towards other real productive activities. 
There can be no doubt that the development goals adopted by lBs coincide 
with the needs of the national economy. IBs are required to extend finance to small 
investors, producers, craftsmen and small industrialists, particularly those in rural 
areas. However, as mentioned above, regarding the liability side of IBs, they are 
capable of financing investment projects of a long-term nature. 
The research findings show that demand for medium-and-long-term invest- 
ments was constrained by the short repayment and grace periods and by high 
profit margins; they were also hindered by the type of guarantee required by IBs. 
If IBs wished to encourage customers and increase the demand for their facilities, 
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these conditions should be relaxed so that customers would be able to fulfil them. 
Moreover, IBs should increase their shares in these projects because customers 
showed that they lack capital to undertake this kind of productive investments. 
If demand for medium-and-long-term investments is low, IBs should be `supply 
leading' rather than `demand following'. They do not have to concentrate on 
short-term self-liquidating commercial loans; rather, they should establish close 
ties with productive investors, especially those in rural areas, and provide funds 
for fixed investments as well as for working capital. The `supply-leading' policy 
is so important, not only because demand for corporate financing is low, but also 
because IBs are able to finance this type of investment. 
IBs, in this concern, have to maintain sound banking assets which are `self- 
liquidating' in the sense that customers are thought sure to be able to repay. 
However, to prevent difficult liquidation, IBs have to maintain the total volume of 
their lending. 
IBs lack skilful staff to undertake feasibility studies for medium-and-long-term 
projects. A provider of long-term capital is concerned not so much with the balance 
sheet position as with the long-term earning capacity of the borrower. Assessment 
of the earning capacity is very different task from assessment of the current balance 
sheet position. It calls for a long view of markets. 
Assessment of these factors can be undertaken reasonably by a larger group of 
specialists. Therefore, IBs need feasibility studies units, with experts specialising 
in one or more industries. IBs should provide finance not only for working capital 
but for fixed investment, and not only for trade (muräbaha) finance, but for finance 
on a participation basis. 
The government's policies towards banks have been consistently protectionist, 
especially since 1978 when the IMF policies were applied to curb the total credit 
in the economy. These policies should be relaxed so that IBs, among other banks, 
should have some freedom to deploy their resources. 
Islamic methods of finance require information on clients and the market so 
that these modes might adequately be applied. IBs should have their informa- 
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tion units within the investment departments to help in providing the necessary 
information. 
The effective and efficient use of resources is important for the Sudanese econ- 
omy as it faces economic and financial constraints. The economy lacks capital, 
savings and institutionalised credits for development, a developed infrastructure 
and skilled labour. All these suggest the need for an appropriate industrial strategy 
fitting the critical situation of the economy. In this respect, SSIs are important, es- 
pecially with the disappointing result of the Sudanese experience with large-scale 
industrial strategy. The Sudanese economy has been experiencing a low saving 
ratio on the part of investors, inadequate capital for investment and inadequate 
infrastructure and low technical levels. These and other factors give prominence 
to SSIs. The government should turn attention to them and solve their problems. 
Of particular significance are the financial constraints facing SSIs. 
The government is deficient in designing a policy to develop the sector. How- 
ever, a general framework of the public policy towards the sector could be based 
on the following: 
(1) The government's industrial strategy should concentrate on the SSIs similar 
to crafts firms where investment needed is small and it is labour-intensive. 
(2) As the SBA (see Chapter X) does in helping smaller firms to obtain gov- 
ernment contracts, public and government corporations should meet their require- 
ments from the products of the sector. 
(3) The policy should enhance forward and backward linkages among industrial 
categories on the one hand and between the industrial sector and other sectors on 
the other hand. 
(4) The policy towards the sector should be complementary to the comprehen- 
sive industrial strategy, so that it continues in the medium and long-term. 
(5) The government has not yet set-up a separate body to sponsor the crafts 
sector. It is only in early 1989 that the Ministry of Industry has established a 
small unit to supervise the sector. The director of the unit whom the author met 
in March 1989, has revealed to us that the unit has not yet started proper working, 
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and not equipped enough to sponsor the crafts sector. However, this unit is a move 
towards helping the government to design a policy for the sector. The unit could 
be supported to design a policy and to be responsible for the execution and follow- 
up of government policy towards the sector. As the SBICS do (see Chapter X), 
this unit could be enhanced to provide technical and managerial consultancy to 
craftsmen, training programmes and advice on financial affairs and information on 
financing sources. 
(6) The government could, perhaps, help in bridging the finance gap by taking 
into consideration financial needs of the sector when the Central Bank designs 
monetary and credit policies. The Bank of Sudan could ask banks to deploy a 
fairly significant percentage of their financial resources into the crafts sector. The 
body responsible for the sector could also help in this respect by obtaining external 
aids, both technical and financial. 
(7) Whilst FIBS relaxes the condition of guarantee for craftsmen, the majority 
of crafts units lack the adequate guarantee to obtain institutional finance. The gov- 
ernment should work out a programme to arrange for the provision of guarantees 
as the government in the U. K. does through the LGS, and as the SBA (U. S. A. ) 
does to enable smaller firms to have greater access to institutional credits, (see 
Chapter X). 
(8) The provision of raw materials to the sector is of paramount importance, 
because the crafts units use raw materials in smaller quantities and they cannot 
afford import costs or the costs of buying larger quantities and storing them. The 
government should cater for this problem. Also the need of craftsmen for training, 
technical and managerial advice and marketing is by no means less important. 
The role of FIBS in financing crafts units may be insignificant, and it may 
need revision and enhancing. The initiative is constructive and it is a brave move 
towards a sector that has remained for a long time unknown to the banking system. 
The government should appreciate this experience and enhance it practically by, 
for instance, allowing banks to deploy their deposits which are standing idle with 
the Central Bank, so that funds allocated to crafts sector should not be included 
in the ceiling limits specified by the Central Bank for these banks. 
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As for FIBS, it should revise the past experience of financing crafts units and 
expand it so that the bank should concentrate on equity finance rather than trade 
finance, and on fixed investments rather than working capital. The bank could, 
and is recommended to, have branches for crafts in local towns, especially in the 
bakward regions of the country. 
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Appendix A 
Depositors Questionnaire 
Name: ..................... 
Q1. Do you have an account with a conventional bank? 
[ ]Yes [] No 
Q2. If yes, do you have an account first with a conventional bank or an 
Islamic bank? 
Q3. Why do you have an account with an Islamic bank? 
Religious reasons [] Competitive services [] High returns 
For more access to loans [] Spatial reasons (convenience) 
Q4. Which type(s) of account(s) do you have with an Islamic bank? 
Current account: [] Local [] Foreign 
Savings account: [] Local [] Foreign 
Investment account: [] Local [] Foreign 
Q5. You have no contractual right to withdraw your fund before an end of a 
well-defined period. Does this affect your decision to deposit with the bank? 
[] Yes [] No 
Q6. You are exposed to risk of nominal losses when you have investment 
account with an Islamic bank. Does this affect your decision? 
[] Yes [] No 
Q7. Which one do you prefer, an investment account with an Islamic bank or 
a time deposit with a traditional bank? 
[] Investment account [] Time deposit account 
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Q8. If you prefer a time deposits account, which of the following is important 
to you? 
Not important Important Greatly important 
Guarantee of deposit 
value 
Guarantee of fixed 
rate of return 
Q9. Indicate how effectively does the Islamic bank provide services? 
[] Poor [] Fair [] Good [] Excellent 
Q10. (a. ) Which of the following banking services you make use of? 
Provision of different accounts services [] Letters of credit and guarantee 
facilities 
[] Transfer of money and currency exchange [] Borrowings from the bank 
Q10. (b) If you restrict yourself to only one of these services, what are the 
reasons? 
Not aware of other services []I do not need them 
I'm unable to meet the conditions of these servivces 
Q11. Are you aware of the bank's policy and services in relation to credit 
facilities? 
[ ]Yes [] No 
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Appendix B 
Borrowers (Investors) Questionnaire 
Name: ..................... 
Q1. Do you deal with conventional banks? 
[J Yes ] No I 
Q2. Indicate the relative importance of each of the following credit conditions? 
Conditions. Important Not important 
Repayment period 
Grace Period 
Profit Margins 
Type of Guarantee 
Freedom to 
use credit, 
Q3. Show the length of repayment and grace periods of your loans? 
Periods Length of period (months) 
1-2 3-6 7-9 10-12 Above 12 
Repayment period 
Grace period 
Q4. What are profit margins on loans? 
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Profit margins (%) 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 25 Above 25 
Q5. To what extent is it easy for you to provide a guarantee? 
II Easy [] Difficult 
Q6. Would you indicate how efficient is the bank in providing its services? 
[] Bad [] Reasonable [] Excellent 
Q7. For what purpose do you borrow money from the bank? 
Trade [] Agriculture [] Industry [] Transport 
Q8. Apart from trade, do you undertake feasibility study to the bank for 
finance? 
[ ]Yes [ No 
Q9. If yes, what type of investment project was not funded? 
[] Agriculture [] Industry [] Tranport 
Q10. Which of the following is a reason for you to prefer trade finance? 
High profit maigins [] The high turn-over of capital in trade 
The low risk [] Inadequate capital for other non-trading investments 
Q11. What a PLS method of finance do you use? 
[] Muräbaha [] Mushäraka [] Mudäraba [] Others (specify) 
Q12. Does the bank impose the PLS method you deal with? 
[ ]Yes [] No 
Q13. If no, what are the reasons for choosing a certain PLS method? 
Q14. Is your business (financial) relationship with the bank growing? 
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[ ]Yes[ ]No 
Q15. Do you know the bank's policies regarding loans? 
[] Yes [] No 
Q16. What size of loans do you usually apply for? 
Loan size (000s LS) 
50-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-1000 
403 
Appendix C 
IBs Managers Questionnaire 
" First: The role of the management in savings mobilisation 
Q1. What are the methods adopted to raise savings knowledge? 
2. To what extent is the bank capable of encouraging small savers to save 
and invest? 
Q3. Are there incentives to small depositors in a form of gratis loans or 
concessionary facilities to buy, say machinery, with nominal profits? 
Q4. Is there a system adopted for offering a premium for long-term deposits? 
[] Yes [] No 
ý Q5 Depositors of investment accounts are exposed to risk, and depositors have 
no institutionalised influence on the management decision. Does the bank 
offer different investment accounts charactewrised by different risks? 
[] Yes I ] No 
Q6. How is the portfolio managed, are depositors' funds allocated in different, 
less risky, projects while shareholders's funds in another, high risky ones? 
Q7. Indicate the relative importance of deposits of branches in rural areas in 
financing the banks's urban funding activities? 
Not important [] Important [] highly important 
. What are the 
difficulties encountered in establishing branches in rural 
areas? 
" Second: Investment and allocation of savings 
Q9. Is there weak demand by successful entrepreneurs for participation fi- 
nancing because they do not wish to share the expected profits with someone 
else? 
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[ ]Yes [] No 
Q10. Could one say that it is not very attractive that the traditional form 
of Islamic partnership financing gives the bank the right to interfer into the 
partner's? [] Yes [] No 
Q11. What do you say about the shortage in financing seed capital for small 
and medium-sized enterprises? 
Q12. IBs are said to be concentrating on financing domestic and interna- 
tional trade, and of some manufacturing projects in major cities while no 
much financing is available for small farmers and craftsmen outside big cit- 
ies. How do you react? 
Q13. The share of medium-and-long-term financing in total financing of IBs 
is regarded as low. If one goes beyond the short-term financing of working 
capital, the financing is provided not on the basis of participation but of leasing 
contracts. Would you agree? 
Q14. Indicate the relative importance of investment through customers, sub- 
sidiary companies and direct invesyment: 
Not important Important Highly important 
Loans to Customers 
Subsidiary Companies 
Direct investments 
Q15. Indicate the relative importance of the following factors in affecting an 
allocation of funds in the above way? 
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Not important Important Highly important 
Limited credit 
ceilings 
Profitability 
Others specify) 
(a) 
(b) 
Q16. Indicate the relative importance of the following in granting credits to 
customers? 
Not important Important Highly important 
Collaterals 
Personal qualities 
of the client 
Q17. Indicate the relative importance of the rate of return from a productive 
project in hindering investment in that project? 
Not important Important Highly important 
Rate of return 
from projects 
Q18. Is there any problem from the side of funds to finance medium-and-long- 
term investments on a corporate basis? 
" Third: The bank's relation with monetary and financial authorities 
Q19. Are there special laws regulating IBs' operations? 
L-ýQ20. Are there facilities given by the Central Bank to conventional banks 
rather than to IBs? 
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Q21. Are there interest-free financing facilities extended by the Central Bank 
to IBs? 
Q22. Is the bank liable to pay more taxes than a conventional bank due to 
differences in methods of finance? 
" Fourth: The bank's relation with other financial institutions 
,, 
Q23. Is the bank involved in investing part of its capital abroad? 
[ ]Yes [ No 
Q24. If yes, what are the causes? 
Q25. Is the management considering a more international approach for its 
business? [] Yes [] No 
" Fifth: The bank's profits 
Q26. 
How do you calculate gross profits (of depositors and shareholders) and 
net profit (of shareholders)? 
Q27. In calculating gross profits, do you deduct any income generated without 
a direct recourse to depositors' funds from the pool to be distributed between 
depositors and shareholders? 
Q28. Are there any conditions for depositors to be entitled to profits such as 
a minimum contracted period and a minimum balance in the deposit account? 
Q29. How do you take the legal and general reserves? Are they deducted from 
the gross profits or from the net profits? 
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Appendix D 
Craftsmen Questionnaire 
Name: .................... : 
Q1. What is your place of birth? [] Khartoum [] Rural areas 
Q2. What is your age (years)? 
15-20 [] 21-25 [] 26-30 [] 31-35 
36-40 [] 41-45 [] 46-50 [] Above 50 
Q3. Are you married? [] Yes [] No 
Q4. How many children do you have? 
1-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 [] Above 15 
Q5. How many years have you been as a craftsman? 
[] 1-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 
16-20 [] 21-25 [] 26-30 [] Above 30 
Q6. What is the level of your education? 
Khalwa [] No-school [] Primary school [] Intermediate level 
Secondary level [] University graduate [] Not stated [] Technical in- 
stitute 
Q7. Is there any realtion between your education and your profession? 
[ ]Yes [ No 
Q8. (A) Do you own the workshop? [] 
(B) Do you rent the workshop? [] 
(C) Do you part-own and part-rent the workshop? [ I 
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Q9. Do you employ any labour apart from yourself? 
[ ]Yes [ ]No 
Q10. If yes, how many are they your relatives and how many are non-relatives? 
Members of your own family 
Other relatives 
Non-relatives 
Q11. What was your start-up capital? (000s LS. ) 
1-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 [] 16-20 [] 21-25 
26-30 [] 31-40 [] 41-50 [] 50-100 [] Above 100. 
Q12. What is the current capital (000s LS. )? 
1-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 [] 16-20 [] 21-25 
26-30 [] 31-40 [] 41-50 [] 50-100 [] Above 100. 
Q13. What is the size of your annual sales (000s LS. )? 
1-10 [] 11-20 [] 21-30 [] 31-40 
41-50 [] 51-100 [] Above 100. 
Q14. What is the average percentage of the increase of sales? 
1-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 [] 16-20 [] 21-25 Above 25 (%) 
Q15. What kind of crafts activity do you parctice in? 
Q16. What are your non-banking sources of finance? 
Own-savings [] Borrowing from others 
Sharing others [] Taking money in advance from buyers 
Q17. By how much do you depend on the crafts branch to finance you? 
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[] 25% [] 40% [] 70% I ]100% 
Q18. Is the demand for your products high? [] Yes [] No 
Q19. Have you accordingly identified your financial needs? 
Yes [] No 
Q20. Does the bränch meet all the finance you need? 
[ ]Yes [] No 
Q21. For what of the following you need finance? 
[(1)] Buy raw materils [(2)] Buy new machines [(3)] Pay wages and salaries 
[(4)] Pay other creditors [(5)] Meet marketing costs [(6) ] (1) & (2) 
Q22. What is the origin of the raw materials you use? 
Local [] Imported [] Both local & imported 
Q23. How frequently do you come to the branch to get credits? Every: 
Three months [] Six months [] Twelve months 
Q24. Is the demand for your products growing, declining, fluctuating or static? 
Growing [] Declining [] Fluctuating [] Static 
Q25. Which of the following problems you face? 
[(1)] Electricity cuts [(2)] Transport bottlenecks [(3)] Lack of equipment 
[(4)] Shortage of skilled labourers [(5)] Insufficient raw materials 
[(6)] High excise duties [(7)] All the above-mentioned problems 
[(8)] (1) & (2) [(9)] (1) & (2) & (3) 
Q26. How do you rate the serious bad effect of each? 
410 
Promlems Extremely bad Slightly 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Q27. Apart from financing, does the branch provide other services? 
(Specify, if at all) 
Q28. How long is the maturity of credits you received from the branch? 
[] 3-6 [] 7-9 [] 10-12 [] Above 12 (in months) 
Q29. How long is the grace period? 
3-6 [] 7-9 [] 10-12 [] Above 12 (in months) 
Q30. How much are the profit margins you paid on the credits you received? 
0-5 [] 6-10 [] 11-15 [] 16-20 [] 21-25 [] 25 [] Above 25 (%) 
Q31. Which kind of guarantee do you usually provide? 
Personal gaurantee [] Real estate guarantee 
The relevant object you get from the branch [] No guarantee 
Q32. Indicate the relative hardness to you of the guarantee required? 
Hard guarantee [] Easy guarantee 
Q33. Indicate the relative importance to you of the following credit conditions? 
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Conditions Essential Not important 
5 4 3 2 1 0 
Maturity of repayment 
Grace period 
Profit margins 
Required guarantee 
Freedom to use credit 
Q34. How efficient is the branch in providing services? 
Bad [] Fair [] Excellent 
Q35 Which of the following PLS modes you use in dealing with the branch? 
Muräbaha [] Mtishäraka [] Mudäraba [] Hire-purchase 
Q36 Is the branch imposing on you to choose a certain type of any of the above 
modes? II Yes II No 
Q37. Which of the following factors affect your choice of the mode? 
Soft guarantee required [] Low profit margins I pay 
long repayment period [] All these factors. 
Q38. Has the credit you got from the branch increased? 
[] Yes I ] No 
Q39 Are you aware of the banking services available at the branch? 
[] Yes [] No 
Q40 Are you aware of the branch's policy and services in relation to credit 
facilities? [] Yes [] No 
Q41. Have you considered. various kinds of financial assistance extended by 
banks or other entities including governments? 
[] Yes [] No 
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Q42 Do you keep any systematic records on your costs of production, sales, 
revenues ........ etc.? 
[] Yes [] No 
Q43 What is an approximate annual profit margins on your sales? 
[] 5-10 [] 11-15 [] 16-20 [] 21-25 [] Above 25 (%) 
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